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THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE 


CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  CIVIL  IVAR.—W. 


.  Cf  -7 


THE  AEMY  UNDER  POPE 


BY 

JOHN  CODMAN  ROPES, 

MSMBEK  OF  THE  MASSACHUSETTS  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY,  AND  THE  MILITARY 
HISTORICAL  SOCIETY  OF  MASSACHUSETTS. 


Forsan  et  h(BC  olim  meminisse  juvabit. 


NEW  yor: 

CHAKLES  SCKIBNlE'S  *0N 
743  AND  745  BroAway 


Copyright  by 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 
1881 


Trow's 

Printing  and  Bookbinding  Company 
201-213  East  iztk  Street 

NEW  YORK. 


THE   MEMOEY  OF 


MY    YOUNGEST  BROTHER 

HENRY, 

FIRST  LIEUTENANT  IN  THE  TWENTIETH  REGIMENT  OP 
MA6SACHUSETTS  VOLUNTEERS,  WHO  FELL  AT  THE 
BATTLE  OP  GETTYSBURG,  JULY  3,  1863, 
THIS  ESSAY  IS  AFFECTIONATELY 


PEEFAOE, 


It  may  be  considered  presumptuous  in  a  civilian  to  at- 
tempt a  history  of  a  campaign.  I  do  not  pro^DOse  to  discuss 
the  question  here,  further  than  to  say,  that  a  civilian  un- 
doubtedly does  labor  under  many  disadvantages  as  com- 
pared with  a  soldier  who  has  seen  active  service.  The 
study  of  military  matters  may,  however,  I  suppose,  be  taken 
up  at  any  time  of  life,  as  advantageously  as  in  youth. 

It  is  not,  to  my  thinking,  a  creditable  thing  to  the  counviy 
that  the  official  reports  of  the  war  liave  not  long  since  been 
published.  The  want  of  them  is  sensibly  felt  by  every  one 
who  endeavors  to  investigate  any  campaign.  These  rej)orts, 
both  Federal  and  Confederate,  are,  however,  now  being- 
published  under  the  authority  of  Government. 

The  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  which  I 
have  had  constant  need  to  consult,  constitute  a  most  in- 
teresting history  of  the  war  in  Virginia  ending  with  the  Bat- 
tle of  Fredericksburg.  Of  course,  some  allowance  must  be 
made  for  partisanship  and  strong  feeling,  but  I  will  say^ 
that  I  have  found  most  of  the  writers  perfectly  fair  and  can- 


viii  PREFACE. 

did.  The  reports  of  Lee,  Longstreet,  Jackson,  and,  in  fact, 
of  most  of  the  other  officers,  are  clear,  moderate  in  tone,  in 
excellent  taste,  and  show  a  thorough  appreciation  of  the 
soldierly  qualities  of  their  antagonists.  There  are  a  few 
braggarts,  like  D.  H.  Hill,  who,  no  doubt,  enjoyed  at  the 
time  the  rude  sport  of  belaboring  the  "  Yankees  "  in  their 
official  reports,  but  they  may  safely  be  left  to  the  mortifica- 
tion of  seeing  their  performances  exposed  by  the  side  of 
the  calm,  temperate,  and  self-contained  narratives  of  their 
brother  officers. 

I  desire  to  acknowledge  my  indebtedness  to  the  exhaus- 
tive work  of  General  George  H.  Gordon  on  the  Army  of 
Virginia,  as  also  to  his  smaller  volume  entitled  The  Sec- 
ond Massachusetts  and  Stonewall  Jackson." 

I  have  endeavored  throughout  to  be  perfectly  impartial. 
While  the  book  is,  of  course,  written  from  the  Federal 
standpoint,  it  has  been  my  endeavor  to  keep  in  mind  that 
it  is  now  sixteen  years  after  the  war,  and  that  the  country  is, 
at  last,  in  every  sense,  at  peace. 

J.  G.  R. 

53  Temple  Street,  Boston, 
October  10,  1881. 


COI^TElsrTS. 


PAGE 

Table  of  Authokities  and  Abbreviations,        .      .  xi 

List  of  Maps,  xiii 

CHAPTER  I. 

The  Situation  in  July,  1862,  ......  1 

CHAPTER  II. 

The  Battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  33 

CHAPTER  III. 

On  the  Rappahannock,    .      .       .      .      .      .      .  49 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Jackson's  Raid,  ....  „      ...  74 

CHAPTER  V. 

The  Pursuit  of  Jackson,  92 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Battle  of  Gainesville,  114 

CHAPTER  VII. 
McDowell  and  Porter,  .      .      .      .      .      »      .  125 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
The  Battle  of  Groveton,      ......  154 

CHAPTER  IX. 

LONGSTREET  AND  PORTER,  .         .         .         •         .         .  170 


X 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  X 

PAGE 

The  Battle  of  Manassas,        ...       ...  195 

CHAPTER  XL 

The  Battle  of  Chantilly,  217 

CHAPTER  XII. 
Halle(  K  and  McClellan,  227 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
Final  Reflections,  253 


APPENDIX  A. 

The  Address  to  the  Army,  and  General  Orders,    .  173 
APPENDIX  B. 

.    Porter's  Night  March,  178 

APPENDIX  C. 

Porter's  Orders  and  Despatches  on  the  29th,  .      .  181 
APPENDIX  D. 

The  Losses  in  Battle,  190 

APPENDIX  E. 

The  Numbers  of  the  Two  Armies,      ....  193 
APPENDIX  F. 

Time  of  the  Arrival  of  Kemper's  Division,      .      .  200 

APPENDIX  G. 
Roster  of  the  Federal  and  Confederate  Armies  at 
the  Battle  •of  Manassas,  otherwise  called  the 
Second  Battle  of  Bull  Run,  fought  on  Satur- 
day, August  30,  1862,  204 

Index,  S17 


TABLE 


OF 

AUTHORITIES  AND  ABBREYIATIOi^S. 


1.  General  Pope's  First  Report,  dated  September  3,  1862,  is  to  be 
found  in  the  Proceedings  and  Report  of  the  Board  of  Army  Officers  in 
the  case  of  Fitz  John  Porter,  vol.  ii.,  p.  1115. 

It  is  cited  as  Pope's  First  Report,  B.  O.,  pp.  1115,  1116. 

3.  General  Pope's  corrected  Report,  dated  January  27,  1863,  is  to  be 
found  in  the  Report  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War ; 
Supplement ;  Part  II.,  pp.  104-190. 

It  is  cited  as  Pope's  Report,  or  simply  as  P.  R.,  pp.  104-190. 

3.  Executive  Document,  No.  81,  House  of  Representatives,  Thirty- 
seventh  Congress,  Third  Session,  contains  Pope's  corrected  Report, 
with  the  Reports  of  Generals  McDowell,  Heintzelman,  Sigel,  and  many 
others. 

It  is  cited  as  Pope's  Virginia  Campaign,  or  simply  as  P.  V.  C. 

4.  The  Proceedings  in  the  Court  Martial  of  Central  Fitz  John  Por- 
ter are  to  be  found  in  Executive  Document  No.  71,  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, 37th  Congress,  3d  Session. 

They  are  cited  as  Court-Martial,  or  simply  as  C.  M. 

5.  The  Proceedings  and  Report  of  the  Board  of  Officers  in  the  case 


xii 


AUTHORITIES  AND  ABBREVIATIOXS. 


of  Fitz  John  Porter,  above  referred  to,  are  cited  as  Board  of  Officers, 
or  simply  as  B.  O. 

6.  The  Reports  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  are 
cited  simply  as  C.  W.,  with  the  volume  and  page. 

7  The  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  Richmond,  1864, 
are  cited  as  A.  N.  V. 

8.  General  George  H.  Gordon's  History  of  the  Campaign  of  the  Army 
of  Virginia  under  Pope,  Boston,  1880,  is  cited  as  Gordon's  Army  of 
Virginia,  or  simply  as  Gordon. 

9.  The  Second  Massachusetts  and  '^Stonewall"  Jackson.  History 
of  the  Second  Massachusetts  Regiment  of  Infantry.  By  George  H. 
Gordon.    Boston,  privately  printed,  1875. 

Cited  as  Second  Mass. 

10.  Statement  of  General  McDowell  before  the  Court  of  Inquiry, 
February  9,  1863.    Privately  printed. 

Cited  as  McDowell's  Statement. 


LIST  OF  MAPS. 


PAGE 

The  Field  of  Cedar  Mountain,    .        .       .      to  face  23 

General  Map  of  the  Campaign,  33 

Jackson's  March,  .43 

Positions  on  August  28th,  at  8  a.m.,    .        .       .  .69 

8p.m  77 

"                *'       29th,  "  12  m.,  .         .       .       .  116 
30th,      6  P.M.,    .       .       .  .132 
The  Field  op  Chantilly,  148 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  SITUATION  IN  JULY,  1862. 

In  order  to  understand  the  military  situation  at  tlie  time 
when  General  Pope  was  appointed  to  the  command  of  the 
Army  of  Virginia — June  26,  1862 — it  will  be  necessary  to  go 
back  a  little. 

The  Cabinet  of  Mr.  Lincoln  found  itself,  in  the  spring  of 
1862,  in  the  very  difficult  position  of  having  called  to  the 
chief  command  of  the  army  an  officer  in  whom  it  did  not 
place  entire  confidence.  The  attitude  of  General  McClellan 
on  many  points  was  disliked  ;  his  political  affiliations  were 
distrusted ;  his  extreme  caution,  so  far  as  his  own  move- 
ments were  concerned — his  easy  confidence  when  the  matter 
at  stake  was  the  safety  of  Washington — his  startling  plan 
of  removing  the  army  to  the  Peninsula — all  combined  to 
awaken  alarm,  and  to  deprive  him  of  that  cordial  support 
which  his  great  undertaking  required  in  order  to  be  success- 
ful. He  had  even  attempted  to  evade  the  orders  of  the 
President,  by  taking  with  him  to  Yorktown  troops  supposed 
to  be  needed  for  the  defence  of  Washington ;  the  Govern- 
ment had  promptly  interfered  by  detaining  the  entire  corjDS 
of  McDowell ;  and,  though  two  divisions  of  this  corps  were 
1 


2 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


afterward  sent  to  McClellan,  the  fact  remained  that  he  did 
not  have  at  the  outset  of  the  campaign  the  overwhelming 
force  on  which  he  had  calculated.  The  irritation  caused  by 
this  found  abundant  expression  in  his  correspondence  with 
the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War. 

This,  however,  was  not  the  worst  consequence  of  this  un- 
fortunate state  of  things.  Not  only  had  Fremont — when, 
late  in  the  winter,  he  had  been  relieved  from  command  in 
Missouri — been  given  a  considerable  force  in  West  Virginia, 
where  a  department  had  been  unnecessarily  created  for  his 
benefit,  but,  the  moment  McClellan  arrived  on  the  Penin- 
sula, McDowell  and  Banks  were  detached  from  his  control 
— the  former  being  assigned  to  a  new  department,  that  of 
the  Rappahannock,  and  the  latter  to  another  new  depart- 
ment, that  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  Here,  then,  were  four 
separate  and  independent  commands  in  Virginia,  on  the 
same  theatre  of  war — a  condition  of  things,  it  is  safe  to  say, 
most  unfavorable  to  military  success. 

Nevertheless,  after  McClellan  arrived  on  the  Chickahom- 
iny,  on  May  24th,  the  plan  was  that  McDowell,  who  still 
regained  three  divisions  of  his  corps — Franklin's  having 
been  sent  to  McClellan — together  with  Shields'  division  of 
Banks'  corps,  which  had  been  transferred  to  McDowell's 
command,  should  join  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  Fred- 
ericksburg. In  pursuance  of  this  plan.  Porter  had  occupied 
Hanover  Court  House  after  a  successful  action,  and  the  dis- 
tance between  the  two  forces  was  reduced  to  a  matter  of  only 
twenty  or  thirty  miles.  Before  the  union  was  effected,  how- 
ever, Jackson  made  his  brilliant  raid  in  the  Valley  of  the 
Shenandoah,  driving  the  diminished  force  of  Banks  before 
him,  and  creating  such  alarm  in  Washington,  that,  despite 
the  earnest  remonstrance  of  McDowell,  the  plan  for  rein- 
forcing McClellan  from  Fredericksburg  was  abandoned,  and 


THE  SITUATION  IN  JULY,  1863. 


3 


McDowell  was  ordered  to  strike  across  the  country  to  in- 
tercex)t,  if  possible,  the  retreat  of  Jackson.  In  this  move- 
ment Fremont  participated;  but,  despite  their  best  efforts, 
Jackson,  though  obliged  to  contest  in  some  actions  the  pos- 
session of  his  line  of  retreat,  made  good  his  escape.  He  lin- 
gered, however,  in  the  upper  part  of  the  valley,  and  detained 
so  many  of  our  troops  there  that  the  concentration  of  such  a 
strong  force  at  Fredericksburg  as  had  been  collected  in  May, 
though  attemjDted  by  McDowell,  could  not  be  effected.  Mc- 
Call's  division  of  McDowell's  corps  was,  indeed,  sent  to 
McClellan ;  but  Jackson's  raid  had  postponed  indefinitely 
all  ho^De  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  being  reinforced  by 
any  large  force  coming  from  the  North.  "When  satisfied  that 
this,  his  chief  object,  had  been  effected,  Jackson  joined  the 
main  army  under  Lee,  and  almost  immediately,  in  charge  of 
the  left  wing  of  the  enemy,  conducted  the  turning  move- 
ment against  our  right,  which  resulted  in  the  abandonment 
of  our  base  on  the  Pamunkey,  and  the  establishment  of  a 
new  base  on  the  James. 

On  the  very  day.  June  26,  1862,  when  this  movement  was 
commenced  by  the  action  at  Mechanicsville,  near  Eich- 
mond,  the  forces  under  Generals  Fremont,  Banks,  and 
McDowell,  were  consolidated  into  one  army,  called  the  Army 
of  Virginia,  and  Major-General  John  Pope,  United  States 
Volunteers,  was  assigned  by  the  President  to  the  chief 
command. 

The  numbers  and  composition  of  these  corps  were  ap- 
proximately as  follows  : 

FIRST  CORPS,— SIGEL. 

First  Division — Schenck. 
Third  Division — Schurz. 

Indepencient  Brigade — Milroy.  11 ,500 


4 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


SECOND  CORPS.— BANKS.* 


First  Division — Williams. 
Second  Division — Augur, . 


14,500 


THIRD  CORPS.— Mcdowell. 

First  Division — King. 

Second  Division — Ricketts  


18,500 


Cavalry. 


Bayard. 
Buford. 


5,000 


Total 


49,500 


Of  the  officers  commanding  we  may  here  say  a  few  words. 
General  Pope  was  a  graduate  of  the  Military  Academy  at 
West  Point,  of  the  Class  of  1842,  and  a  veteran  of  the  Mexi- 
can war,  in  which  he  had  been  brevetted  for  his  services  at 
Monterey  and  Bnena  Yista  ;  he  had  distinguished  himself 
in  the  operations  resulting  in  the  capture  of  Island  No.  10, 
in  the  Mississippi  River,  in  the  spring  of  1862.  General 
Sigel — who  had  succeeded  to  the  command  of  Fremont's 
corps,  Fremont  having  resigned  because  Pope,  his  junior, 
was  ]put  over  him — was  a  German  officer,  who  had  had  some 
military  training  and  experience ;  he  had  recently  served 
with  some  distinction  in  Missouri.  General  Banks  was  a 
civilian,  who  had  been  Governor  of  Massachusetts  and 
Speaker  of  the  National  House  of  Representatives.  His  ap- 
pointment to  the  command  of  a  corps  was  certainly  a 
hazardous  experiment.  He  was  a  brave  and  zealous  officer, 
but  destitute  of  military  judgment.    McDowell,  like  Pope, 

*  General  Pope's  estimate  of  Banks'  corps  is  only  eight  thousand  men  ;  but  it  is 
based,  probably,  on  the  number  which  Banks  commanded  in  the  battle  of  Cedar 
Mountain,  at  which  time  some  six  thousand  men  were  on  duty  elsewhere,  ex- 
clusive of  the  sick,  etc. 

General  Banks'  force  is  stated  by  Generals  Schofield,  Terry,  and  Getty,  to  have 
numbered  10,000  on  August  29th.— B.  O.  Report,  vol.  11.,  p.  1807. 


THE  SITUATION  IN  JULY,  1863. 


5 


was  a  graduate  of  West  Point,  of  the  Class  of  1838,  was  also 
a  veteran  of  the  Mexican  war,  and,  like  Pope,  had  been 
brevetted  for  services  at  Buena  Vista.  In  the  year  1861  he 
had  commanded  the  army  in  front  of  Washington,  and  had 
lost  the  battle  of  Bull  Eun.  He  was  well  known  to  be  an 
excellent  officer. 

These  forces  were  widely  scattered.  The  coi-ps  of  Fre- 
mont and  Banks  were  in  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah.  Of 
the  two  divisions  of  McDowell,  one.  King's,  was  at  Fred- 
ericksburg ;  the  other,  Eicketts' ,  was  at  Manassas  Junction. 

General  Po]3e  at  once  took  measures  for  a  concentration 
of  his  army.  Sigel  was  ordered  to  cross  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  at  Front  Eoyal,  pass  through  the  Luray  Gap  and  take 
post  at  Si^erryville.  Banks  was  ordered  to  pass  the  river 
and  mountains  at  the  same  place,  and  to  take  U})  his  position 
near  Little  Washington,  a  few  miles  east  of  Sperryville.  By 
an  oversight  of  a  staff  officer,  he  marched  to  Warrenton, 
but  S23eedily  returned  to  his  post.  Eicketts'  division,  of 
McDowell's  corps,  was  ordered  from  Manassas  Junction  to 
Waterloo  Bridge,  where  the  turnpike  from  Warrenton  to 
Sperryville  crosses  the  Eai)pahannock. 

These  movements  seem  to  have  been  judicious;  the 
presence  of  such  a  large  force  near  Front  Eoyal  Gap,  sup- 
ported as  they  were  by  other  troops,  and  with  communi- 
cations with  Alexandria  by  the  Warrenton  pike,  would  doubt- 
less hinder  the  enemy  from  undertaking  a  raid  in  the  valley. 

As  for  King's  division  of  McDowell's  corps,  Pox3e  was 
obliged  for  the  present,  against  his  own  judgment,  to  leave 
it  at  Fredericksburg.  The  Government  deemed  it  of  great 
importance  to  retain  the  line  of  communication  on  the 
north  side  of  the  Eappaliannock,  above  Fredericksburg,  and 
to  preserve  the  railroad  between  Aquia  Creek  and  Falmouth, 
oioposite  Fredericksburg.    It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that 


6  THE  ARMY  UKDER  POPE. 

considerations  of  this  sort  were,  as  General  Pope  justly 
thought,  not  worth  taking  into  account  in  the  presence  of 
such  a  problem  as  that  which  confronted  the  commander  of 
the  new  Army  of  Virginia.  It  was  of  the  first  imxDortance 
that  he  should  be  unfettered  in  his  movements  so  far  as 
was  possible.  The  preservation  of  the  Grovemment  property 
at  Aquia  Creek  and  Fredericksburg  was  a  matter  of  small 
consequence,  and  the  troops  arriving  from  the  Peninsula 
might  as  well  have  been  landed  at  Alexandria  as  at  Aquia 
Creek. 

These  dispositions  having  been  made,  some  time  had  to  be 
spent  in  reorganizing  the  army,  portions  of  which,  especial- 
ly the  corps  of  Sigel  and  the  cavalry,  needed  considerable 
attention. 

Meantime  the  military  situation  had  entirely  changed. 
General  McClellan  had  been  forced,  by  the  loss  of  the  battle 
of  Gaines'  Mill,  to  give  up  his  base  on  the  Pamunkey ;  and, 
though  his  army  had  well  held  its  own  in  the  obstinate  bat- 
tles which  followed,  yet  the  movement  to  the  James  was 
universally  felt  to  be  a  confession  of  the  failure  of  the  cam- 
paign. It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  distrust  felt  by  the 
Government  toward  General  McClellan  had  become  intensi- 
fied, and  that  his  hostility  to  and  suspicion  of  certain  members 
of  the  administration  had  increased  in  proportion.  Besides, 
not  only  did  the  position  taken  by  him  on  the  James  put 
the  entire  force  of  the  enemy  between  his  army  and  that  of 
General  Pope,  but  this  military  sexDaration  was  accompanied 
by  an  entire  lack  of  confidence  between  the  two  officers. 
Pope  had  very  sensibly  suggested,  while  the  seven  days'  bat- 
tles were  in  progress,  that  McClellan  should  preserve  his 
communications  on  the  Pamunkey,  and  fall  back  on  White 
House  ;  but  this  suggestion  met  with  no  approval  from  Mc- 
Clellan.   After  the  line  of  the  James  had  been  adopted. 


THE  SITUATION  IN  JULY,  1862. 


7 


Pope  took  some  pains  to  bring  about  a  cordial  understand- 
ing with  McClellan,  but  it  soon  became  evident  that  the  lat- 
ter aimed  solely  at  getting  such  reinforcements  for  his  own 
army  as  would  make  him  entirely  independent  of  any  ex- 
trinsic aid. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  armies  of  the  United 
States  in  Virginia  being  hopelessly  separated,  and  the  army 
of  General  Lee  being  large,  well  commanded,  and  elated 
with  victory,  the  Government  determined  to  call  to  the  gen- 
eral direction  of  military  affairs  an  officer  whose  reputation 
at  that  time  stood  very  high,  and  who  was  in  no  way  con- 
nected with  j)olitics — General  •Henry  W.  Halleck.  Under 
his  general  management  the  States  of  Kentucky  and  Ten- 
nessee had  been  recovered,  and  combined  movements  of  the 
land  and  naval  forces  had  secured  to  us  the  control  of  the 
Mississippi  Eiver  as  far  south  as  Yicksburg.  He  was  a  West 
Point  graduate,  of  the  Class  of  1839,  was  not  actively  en- 
gaged in  the  Mexican  War,  and  soon  after  left  the  army.  He 
was  a  student  of  military  matters  and  of  international  law, 
and  had  produced  some  quite  valuable  books  ;  but  he  was 
not  a  practical  soldier  at  any  time,  and  his  lack  of  vigor  and 
decision,  as  well  as  of  sound  military  sense,  gravely  imperilled, 
as  we  shall  have  occasion  to  see,  the  fate  of  this  campaign. 
He  was  appointed,  on  July  11th,  General-in-Chief  of  all  the 
armies  of  the  United  States,  but  did  not  arrive  in  Washing- 
ton and  assume  control  until  the  latter  part  of  the  month. 

General  Pope  in  the  meantime  was  in  Washington,  con- 
ferring with  the  authorities  there,  and  from  thence  issuing 
orders  to  his  army  in  the  field.  It  is  probable  that,  until  the 
arrival  of  General  Halleck,  his  advice  was  largely  relied 
on  by  the  President  and  Cabinet.  At  any  rate,  in  Wash- 
ington he  remained  till  July  29th. 

During  this  time  he  pushed  his  forces  nearer  to  the  one- 


8 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


my,  and  attempted  to  interfere  with  their  railroad  commnni- 
cations.  King  was  ordered  to  break  up  the  Virginia  Central 
Bailroad,  and  the  expeditions  which  he  sent  out  accomplished 
their  mission.  On  Jnly  14th,  Banks  was  instructed  to  send 
a  brigade  to  Culpeper,  and  Hatch,  who  commanded  the  cav- 
alry of  his  corps,  was  ordered  to  seize  Gordonsville,  where 
the  Virginia  Central  meets  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Rail- 
road, and  to  destroy  the  railroad  for  ten  or  fifteen  miles  east 
of  that  place,  and  also  to  break  Tip  the  road  in  the  direction 
of  Charlottesville.  Had  Hatch  carried  ont  his  instructions, 
the  result  would  have  been  a  very  serious,  though  perhaps 
temporary  interruption  of  the  enemy's  communications,  and 
there  was  no  good  reason  why  the  movement,  as  ordered, 
should  not  have  been  successful ;  but  Hatch,  instead  of  at- 
tempting it  with  cavalry  only,  took  with  him  infantry  and 
artillery  also,  and,  before  he  reached  the  immediate  neigh- 
borhood of  Gordonsville,  it  was  occupied  by  the  enemy  in 
force.  A  second  expedition  to  the  vicinity  of  Charlottesville 
met  with  no  better  success. 

The  fact  is,  that  the  possession  of  Gordonsville  was  of  the 
first  importance  to  the  enemy.  Through  that  town  ran  the 
railroad  which  connects  Eichmond  with  the  Shenandoah 
Valley.  As  soon  as  the  expeditions  sent  out  by  King,"*  of 
which  we  have  just  spoken,  threatened  this  important  line, 
Lee,  though  the  whole  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  within 
twenty-five  miles  of  Eichmond,  did  not  hesitate,  on  July  13th, 
to  despatch  to  Gordonsville  his  most  trusted  lieutenant,  the 
justly  celebrated  Stonewall  Jackson,  with  two  divisions — his 
own  (so-called),  commanded  by  Winder,  and  E well's,  com- 
prising together  about  14,000  or  15,000  men.  It  was  this 
force  that  forestalled  Hatch.    Then,  on  July  27th,  A.  P.  Hill 


*  Reports  of  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  i.,  p.  15. 


THE  SITUATION  IN  JULY,  1862. 


9 


was  ordered  u]y  with  his  division,  raising  Jackson's  force  to 
something  between  20,000  and  25,000  men. 

While  these  events  were  taking  place,  General  Poj)e  issued 
to  his  troops  a  proclamation,  the  full  text  of  which  will  be 
found  in  the  Appendix.*  Probably  no  address  that  was  ever 
issued  to  an  army  created,  such  a  storm  of  hostile  criticism 
as  this  did.  It  was  supposed  to  draw  injurious  comparisons 
between  the  troops  of  the  West  and  those  of  the  East.  It  was 
taken  to  exhibit  a  contempt  for  all  military  rules  in  the  man- 
agement of  a  campaign.  Finally,  it  was  considered  bombas- 
tic and  egotistic  to  an  unheard  of  degree.  Probably  General 
Pope  was  more  astonished  than  any  one  else  at  this  result. 
He  issued  the  order  to  the  army,  as  he  tells  us,f  "  with  the 
purpose  to  create  in  it  a  feeling  of  confidence  and  a  cheerful 
spirit  which  were  sadly  wanting  ; "  and  he  never  had,  as  he 
goes  on  to  say,  the  slightest  thought  of  reflecting  upon  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  effect  on  the  troops,  however, 
was  as  has  been  stated,  and  General  Pope  unquestionably 
entered  upon  his  campaign  heavily  handicaioped. 

He  had  also  issued  certain  orders,  the  full  text  of  which  is 
given  in  the  ApiDcndix,'^"  directing  the  troops  of  his  command 
to  subsist  on  the  country  so  far  as  i^racticable.  These  orders 
were,  perhaps  purposel}^,  misconstrued  to  Pope's  discredit. 
It  is  expressly  ]irovided  in  them  that  supplies  shall  be  taken 
by  the  officers  of  the  department  to  which  they  properly  be- 
longed (the  commissariat),  and  only  under  the  orders  of  the 
officer  commanding  the  troops.  Nevertheless,  many  persons 
asserted  that  they  countenanced  indiscriminate  pillage, 
which  was  entirely  untrue.  To  these  orders  (Nos.  5  and  6), 
no  valid  exception  can  be  taken. 

Another  order,  of  which  the  text  will  also  be  found  in  the 


*  Appendix  A. 


t  Rep.  C.  W.,  Supp.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  105. 


10 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


Appendix  (No.  7),^  provides  that  non-combatants  in  tlie  rear  of 
the  army  shall  be  responsible  in  damages  for  injuries  done 
to  the  track  of  railroads,  attacks  on  trains,  assaults  on  sol- 
diers, etc.,  committed  by  guerillas — that  is,  by  individuals 
not  enlisted  among  the  organized  military  forces  of  the  ene- 
my. Any  injuries  to  tracks,  etc.,  are  to  be  repaired  by  the 
neighbors,  or  an  indemnity  paid  ;  so,  where  soldiers  are  fired 
on  from  a  house,  the  house  shall  be  razed  to  the  ground, 
and  the  occupants  of  it  treated  as  prisoners.  Harsh  as  these 
measures  may  seem  to  those  who  believe  themselves  to  be 
defending  their  homes  from  an  invader,  it  is  certain  that 
they  are  clearly  warranted  by  the  laws  of  civilized  warfare. 
The  only  safety  for  the  non-combatant  population  of  an  in- 
vaded country  consists  in  the  rule  by  which  they  are  forbid- 
den acts  of  private  hostility. 

There  was  still  another  order  (No.  2),  of  which  the  text 
is  also  given  in  the  Appendix."^  This  provided  that  the  oath 
of  allegiance  should  be  tendered  to  all  male  citizens  in 
the  lines  of  the  army;  that  those  who,  after  having  taken 
it,  violated  it,  should  be  shot,  and  that  those  who  re- 
fused to  take  it  should  be  sent  beyond  the  lines  of  the 
army,  with  the  threat  of  being  treated  as  spies  if  they  re- 
turned to  their  homes.  For  this  order,  it  must  be  conceded, 
there  is  absolutely  no  justification.  A  commander  in  the 
field  has  nothing  to  do  with  allegiance,  or  oaths  of  allegiance, 
in  his  treatment  of  the  enemy.  He  can  only  apply  to  them 
the  well-recognized  laws  of  war  as  explained  above,  namely, 
that  all  combatants  belonging  to  the  organized  forces  of  the 
enemy  shall  be  treated  as  prisoners  of  war,  and  shall  be  en- 
titled to  the  immunities  and  respect  shown  to  prisoners  of 
war,  and  that  all  private  warfare  shall  be  repressed  by  the 


*  Appendix  A. 


THE  SITUATION  IN  JULY,  1862. 


11 


use  of  as  mnch  severity  as  may  be  found  necessary  to  sup- 
press it — but  that  is  all.  No  one  ever  heard  of  the  Germans 
tendering  to  the  French  villagers  the  oath  of  allegiance  to 
the  king  of  Prussia  ;  and  the  only  controversy  on  this  sub- 
ject of  any  consequence,  in  the  late  Franco-German  war,  was 
caused  by  the  doubt  whether  the  francs-tireurs  were,  or  were 
not,  such  a  part  of  the  organized  military  forces  of  France, 
as  to  be  entitled  to  the  treatment,  when  captured,  of  prison- 
ers of  war.  General  Pope's  authority  on  this  subject  was  not 
enlarged  in  the  slightest  degree  by  the  opinion  which  he 
entertained,  or  which  his  government  entertained,  that  the 
enemy  with  whom  he  was  fighting  was  in  rebellion  against 
the  United  States.  He  was  not  there  as  a  United  States 
marshal,  acting  under  the  orders  of  a  court,  and  arresting 
persons  against  whom  a  grand  juiy  had  found  indictments 
for  treason ;  but  he  was  there  as  an  officer  of  the  army  in  the 
field,  against  an  enemy  in  arms  and  entitled  to  be  treated  in 
all  respects  as  a  foreign  foe. 

While  General  Pope  was  in  Washington,  General  Halleck 
was  called  upon  to  decide  the  difficult  question  of  the  ad- 
visability of  removing  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the 
Peninsula.  The  question  w^as  not  a  purely  military  one. 
Had  it  been,  it  could  have  been  more  easily  decided ;  it  was, 
in  great  measure,  a  personal  question — that  is,  it  turned 
on  the  capacity  of  certain  officers  to  carry  out  their  allotted 
tasks.  Hence  arose  the  chief  difficulty  of  arriving  at  a  de- 
cision. 

Let  us  explain  this.  Had  the  Government  had  the  same 
confidence  in  General  McClelJan  which  they  had  two  years 
later  in  General  Grant,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would, 
without  much  doubt,  have  been  allowed  to  remain  at  Harri- 
son's Landing,  and  would  have  been  reinforced  in  the  late 
summer  and  autumn  sufficiently  to  enable  it  to  take  the  of- 


12 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


fensive  and  operate,  from  the  very  advantageous  position 
which  it  occupied,  on  either  side  of  the  James  Eiver.  But 
such  was  not  the  case.  The  distrust  of  General  McClellan 
was  greater  than  ever — and  there  were  several  reasons  for 
this. 

First. — His  campaign  had  been  characterized  by  an  as- 
sumption on  his  part  that  he  was  entitled  to  deal  on  an  equal 
footing  with  the  Government,  as  a  sort  of  contracting  party. 
Instead  of  doing  his  work  as  well  as  he  could  with  the 
means  he  had  or  could  procure,  he  was  constantly  attempt- 
ing to  drive  the  Administration  into  a  corner;  to  fasten 
upon  it'  the  responsibility  for  the  ill-success  of  his  mili- 
tary movements ;  to  threaten  it,  even,  with  the  consequences 
of  this  or  that  failure  to  do  what  he  desired.  Such  a  method 
of  procedure  on  the  part  of  a  general  is  wholly  without  pre- 
cedent, and  a  government  which  understood  its  position 
would  not  have  put  up  with  it  for  a  moment.  Let  a  gen- 
eral, by  all  means,  advise  his  superiors  of  all  material  facts, 
and  warn  them  in  the  strongest  terms  of  the  consequences 
of  such  or  such  acts,  but  let  him  never  forget  that  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  responsibility  for  military  failures  is  not  for 
him  to  undertake  ;  it  is  the  task  of  posterity  ;  it  is  his  to  do 
his  best,  let  the  consequences  be  what  they  may.  xls  an 
illustration  of  what  we  mean,  look  at  McClellan's  letter  to 
Mr.  Stanton,  of  June  14th,  where  he  says,  in  reference  to 
McDowell's  troops  :  "  If  I  cannot  fully  control  all  his  troops, 
I  want  none  of  them,  but  would  prefer  to  fight  the  battle 
with  what  I  have,  and  let  others  be  responsible  for  the  re- 
sults." Such  a  remark  as  this  shows  his  egotism  to  be  ex- 
cessive indeed.  He  actually  says  that  he  wants  to  have  his 
preferences  gratified,  whatever  may  be  the  consequences  to 
the  country. 

Second, — It  was  impossible  not  to  discern  in  General  Mc- 


THE  SITUATION  IN  JULY,  1862. 


13 


Clellan's  attitude  toward  the  Administration  a  distinct  polit- 
ical bias.  He  belonged  to  the  Democratic  party — the  party 
which  desired  to  prevent  the  slavery  question  from  compli- 
cating the  question  now  at  issue  in  the  field — that  of  the 
authority  of  the  nation.  He  may,  or  may  not,  have  been 
right  as  to  this  ;  but  it  is  very  plain  that,  as  a  commander 
of  an  army,  it  was  none  of  his  business.  Nothing  is  better 
settled  than  the  desirability  of  the  entire  subordination  of 
the  military  to  the  civil  power  in  a  free  country ;  yet  we  find 
McClellan,  on  July  7th,  writing  from  Harrison's  Landing  a 
long  letter  to  the  President,  in  which  he  gives  him  his  views 
on  the  way  in  which  the  war  should  be  conducted  in  refer- 
ence to  the  institution  of  slavery;  that  military  power 
should  not  be  allowed  to  interfere  with  the  relations  of  ser- 
vitude, either  by  supporting  or  impairing  the  authority  of 
the  master,  except  for  repressing  disorder,  as  in  other  cases," 
etc.  These  views  may,  or  may  not,  have  been  sound — it  is 
not  our  j)rovince  to  pronounce  on  them  at  all ;  but  it  is  clear 
that  a  general  officer,  thus  going  out  of  his  way  to  write  a 
long  letter  on  the  policy  of  the  Government  in  regard  to 
slavery,  has  taken  sides  in  politics,  which  a  military  man  in 
the  field  should  never  do.  In  fact,  his  friends  were  at  this 
time  presenting  him  to  the  country  as  the  great  Democratic 
general,  and  in  two  years  he  was  the  party  candidate  for 
the  Presidency.  Had  Mr.  Lincoln  removed  him  from  the 
command  immediately  on  the  receij^t  of  this  letter,  it  would 
have  been  not  only  justifiable,  but  wise  in  the  end. 

Third. — It  was  impossible,  for  any  one  who  had  carefully 
watched  the  campaign,  to  feel  any  great  confidence  that  Mc- 
Clellan ever  would  accomplish  anything.  He  never  was 
satisfied  with  the  advantages  he  possessed,  or  with  the  num- 
bers he  commanded  at  any  particular  time.  There  was 
always  something  remaining  to  be  done  before  he  was  ready 


14 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


to  move.  Add  to  this  an  entire  absence  of  that  clear  and 
cool  judgment  which  is  essential  to  the  accomplishment  of 
all  difificult  matters  in  this  world.  What  we  refer  to  may 
be  well  illustrated  by  the  fact  that,  in  the  course  of  a  single 
fortnight,  McClellan  had  in  one  telegram  told  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  that  his  numbers  were  greatly  inferior  to  those 
of  the  enemy  ;  that  he  would,  however,  do  all  that  a  general 
could  do  with  his  army,  and  if  it  was  destroyed  by  over- 
whelming numbers  he  could  at  least  die  with  it  and  share 
its  fate  ;  in  another  telegram,  that  he  (the  Secretary)  must 
hope  for  the  best,  and  he  (McClellan)  would  not  deceive  the 
hopes  he  formerly  placed  in  him  ;  in  another  telegram,  that 
if  he  had  ten  thousand  fresh  troops  he  could  take  Eichmond, 
yet,  that  he  lost  this  battle  because  his  force  was  too  small ; 
that  the  Secretary  had  done  his  best  to  sacrifice  the  army ; 
and  three  days  after  he  had  taken  up  his  position  at  Har- 
rison's Landing,  in  this  same  fortnight,  he  found  time  to 
lay  before  the  President,  in  an  elaborate  letter,  his  views 
•  on  the  slavery  question,  in  the  course  of  which  he  actually 
said  that  a  declaration  of  radical  views,  especially  upon 
slavery,  would  rapidly  disintegrate  our  present  armies." 
This  letter  winds  up  with  this  curious  declaration  :  "I  may 
be  on  the  brink  of  eternity,  and,  as  I  hope  for  forgiveness 
from  my  Maker,  I  have  written  this  letter  with  sincerity  to- 
ward you  and  from  love  for  my  country." 

Enough  has  been  said  to  show  that  the  Administration 
could  not  feel  that  in  McClellan  the  country  had  a  really 
able,  or  a  really  single-minded  servant.  There  might  be, 
and  there  was,  evidence  of  ability  and  character  in  him ;  but 
we  have  shown  that  there  were  sufficient  reasons  to  prevent 
entire  confidence  being  reposed  in  him  by  the  President 
and  Cabinet. 

At  the  same  time,  such  was  the  political  situation  that  the 


THE  SITUATION  IN  JULY,  1862. 


15 


Government  did  not  dare  to  remove  him.  There  was  enough 
to  justify  his  removal,  as  we  have  seen ;  but  political  feeling 
in  his  favor  ran  high.  Still,  the  breach  between  him  and 
the  administration  had  become  too  wide  ever  to  be  healed ; 
the  Government  could  not,  it  was  plain,  continue  him  in  his 
command,  reinforce  him,  and  rely  on  him  as  their  chief  gen- 
eral ;  and  there  was  no  one  of  conspicuous  fitness  whom  they 
could  put  in  his  j)lace.  What  then  could  be  done  ?  The 
army  might  be  removed  to  Northern  Virginia,  portions  of  it 
might  from  time  to  time  be  incorporated  in  the  army  under 
General  Pope,  and  if  that  officer  made  a  successful  campaign, 
the  difficulty  as  to  McClellan  would  settle  itself.  In  a  cor- 
respondence between  Halleck  and  McClellan  on  this  sub- 
ject, Halleck,  it  is  true,  proceeds  upon  the  supposition  that 
McClellan's  estimate  of  the  numbers  of  the  enemy,  two  hun- 
dred thousand  men,  is  correct ;  and  argues  that  the  army  could 
not  be  kept  on  the  Peninsula  in  that  climate  till  it  could 
be  reinforced  to  anything  like  that  number.  But  the  great 
difficulty  about  the  question  of  removal  was  one  which 
could  not  be  stated ;  the  Government  had  lost  confidence 
in  General  McClellan,  and  the  removal  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  from  the  Peninsula  provided  them  with  a  conveni- 
ent mode  of  disposing  of  their  superfluous  general. 

The  removal  of  the  army  was  determined  on.  General 
Pope  tells  us,  before  he  left  Washington  for  the  front,  on 
July  29th.  It  was  probably  the  visit  of  General  Halleck  to 
Harrison's  Landing,  on  the  25th,  which  settled  it.  On  the 
30th,  McClellan  was  ordered  to  send  away  his  sick.  On 
August  3d,  he  was  told  that  the  whole  army  was  to  be  sent 
to  Aquia  Creek.  The  next  day  he  wi'ot6  an  able  letter  to 
Halleck,  remonstrating  against  the  removal ;  urging  his  prox- 
imity to  Richmond ;  that  the  reinforcement  of  the  army  was 
a  far  cheaper  and  wiser  course  than  removing  it  to  the  neigh- 


16 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


borliood  of  Fredericksburg ;  that  tlie  army  would  be  more  or 
less  demoralized  by  tlie  movement ;  and  finally,  that  it  was 
the  true  policy  of  the  Government  to  place  all  the  other  de- 
partments on  the  defensive,  and  strike  their  most  powerful 
blow  against  Eichmond.  To  this  Halleck  replied  at  length, 
dwelling,  as  we  have  said  before,  on  the  impossibility  of  re- 
inforcing the  army  in  any  reasonable  space  of  time,  to  any 
large  extent,  and  ^Dressing  strongly  upon  General  McClellan's 
attention  the  advantage  possessed  by  General  Lee  of  opera- 
ting against  either  McClellan  or  Pope,  as  he  chose,  and  with 
an  army  superior  to  that  of  either.  Here  the  correspondence 
closed,  and  the  task  of  removing  the  army  began. 

When  General  Pojdo  left  Washington,  on  July  29th,  the 
destination  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  been  decided. 
The  task  imposed  on  Pope  was  to  j)revent  a  concentration 
of  Lee's  army  upon  our  forces  on  the  Peninsula,  while  in  the 
confusion  incident  to  the  removal,  and  while  -the  corps  com- 
posing them  were  separated.  He  ]3roceeded  at  once  to  the 
execution  of  this  task,  threatening  Gordonsville  again,  and 
this  time  not  as  before,  with  a  small  body  of  cavalry,  but 
with  a  powerful  force  of  more  than  30,000  men.  After  re- 
viewing and  inspecting  his  various  corps,  he,  on  August  7th, 
ordered  the  division  of  Eicketts  to  join  Crawford's  brigade 
of  Williams'  division  of  Banks'  corps  at  Culpeper  Court 
House.  The  remainder  of  Banks'  corps  he  pushed  south 
from  their  position  at  Little  Washington  to  where  the  Sper- 
ryville  and  Culpe^Der  turnpike  crosses  Hazel  Eiver,  a  point 
about  half-way  between  these  two  towns.  The  cavalry  of 
Buford,  supported  by  one  brigade  from  Sigel's  corps,  ob- 
served the  right,  with  headquarters  at  Madison  Court  House. 
Bayard,  with  four  regiments,  watched  the  left,  his  head- 
quarters being  at  Eapidan  Station.  Both  were  excellent 
officers.    Cavalry  pickets  were  stationed  at  intervals  along 


THE  SITUATION  IN  JULY,  1863. 


17 


the  Kapidan  to  its  11111011  with  the  Eappahaiinock,  just  above 
Fredericksburg.  A  signal-station  was  established  on  Thor- 
oughfare Mountain — a  precaution  which,  as  we  shall  after- 
ward see,  was  of  great  service.  These  dispositions  were 
intended  chiefly  to  provide  against  an  attack  by  the  enemy 
on  his  right,  Buford  having  reported  the  enemy  as  crossing 
the  Eapidan  westward  of  the  railroad,  and  advancing  in 
lieaw  force  upon  Madison  Court  House.  But,  consider- 
ing also  the  probability  of  an  attem^Dt  being  made  to  turn 
his  left  by  way  of  Eaccoon  Ford  and  Stevensburg,  and  also 
to  interrupt  his  communications  with  General  King  at  Fred- 
ericksburg, Pope,  on  the  8tli,  ordered  Banks  and  Sigel  to 
move  to  Culpeper  Court  House.  Banks  obeyed  promptly, 
reaching  that  place  at  eleven  at  night.  Sigel,  however,  in- 
stead of  marching  at  once,  sent  word  to  inquire  by  what  road 
he  should  march,  when  there  was  but  one  road,  and  that  a 
turnpike,  between  Sperryville  and  Culpeper ;  and,  in  conse- 
quence of  his  blunder,  his  corps  did  not  arrive  till  the  after- 
noon of  the  next  day. 

Besides  these  corps.  Pope,  on  the  8tli,  ordered  Crawford's 
brigade  of  Williams'  division  of  Banks'  corps,  which,  it 
will  be  remembered,  had  been  at  Culpeper  some  days,  for- 
ward some  eight  miles  to  the  neighborhood  of  Cedar  (or 
Slaughter)  Mountain,  on  the  road  to  Orange  Court  House, 
to  act  as  a  support  to  Buford's  cavalry.  Eicketts'  division 
of  McDowell's  corps  was  also  ordered  to  move  some  three 
miles  south  of  Culpeper  Court  House.  Early  the  next  morn- 
ing, the  9tli,  Banks  received  orders  to  move  the  remainder 
of  his  corps  to  the  front,  where  Crawford's  brigade  already 
was — that  is,  near  Cedar  Mountain.  We-^hall  recur  later  to 
the  orders  given  to  Banks ;  it  is  time  now  to  turn  to  see 
what  Jackson  was  doing. 

"  Having  received  information,"  says  that  oflicer  in  his 
2 


18 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


report,  that  only  a  part  of  General  Pope's  army  was  at 
Culpeper  Court  House,  and  hoping,  through  the  blessing  of 
Providence,  to  be  able  to  defeat  it  before  reinforcements 
should  arrive  there,  Ewell's,  Hill's,  and  Jackson's  divisions 
were  moved  on  the  7th,  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy,  from 

their  respective  encampments  near  Gordonsville  " 

On  the  9th,  as  we  arrived  within  about  eight  miles  of  Cul- 
peper Court  House  we  found  the  enemy  in  our  front,  near 
Cedar  Eun,  a  short  distance  west  and  north  of  Slaughter's 
(Cedar)  Mountain."  The  first  battle  of  the  campaign  was  at 
hand. 


CHAPTEE  n. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 

Generaij  Banks'  corps,  less  that  portion  of  it  which  was 
absent  on  detached  service,  did  not  reach  a  total  of  8,000 
men  of  all  arms  ;  of  Jackson's  three  divisions,  only  two 
brigades,  Lawton's  and  Gregg's,  were  absent.  Jackson  ex- 
pected doubtless  to  overwhelm  the  brigade  of  Crawford, 
which  he  knew  on  the  7th  was  supporting  the  cavalry.  But 
in  presence  of  a  larger  force  he  was  not  a  man  to  hesitate, 
unless  in  face  of  Overwhelming  odds.  It  may  safely  be  as- 
sumed that  his  intention  was  to  press  our  army  vigorously, 
and  that  he  hoped  to  defeat  it  in  detail.  General  Pope, 
on  the  other  hand,  was  well  aware  of  his  movements.  It 
was  his  intention  to  offer  battle,  but  not  until  he  had  con- 
centrated his  army.  Sigel's  folly  had  caused  a  delay  of 
twenty-four  hours.  Pope  could  not  retire  behind  Culpe- 
per,  for  that  would  be  to  sacrifice  his  communications  with 
Sigel ;  nor  would  it  be  wise  to  give  Jackson  an  unobstructed 
march,  or  a  march  obstructed  by  cavalry  only,  to  Culpeper, 
for  Jackson's  activity  and  energy  were  well  known.  It  was 
dangerous  to  forego  the  attempt  to  delay  him  on  his  march ; 
it  was  perfectly  safe  to  make  the  attempt,  because  the  troops 
in  the  immediate  front  could  take  up  a  strong  position  and 
be  reinforced,  first  by  Kicketts,  and  afterward  by  Sigel  when 
he  should  arrive.  Finally,  while  it  was  wise  to  send  a  por- 
tion of  the  troops  to  the  front,  it  was  necessary,  on  account 


20 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


of  keeping  up  the  communication  with  Sigel,  to  retain  a 
considerable  force  near  Culpeper  Court  House. 

"With  these  views,  General  Pope  sent  to  General  Banks  a 
verbal  order  through  Colonel  Marshall,  of  his  staff,  which, 
when  at  Banks'  request  it  was  reduced  to  writing  by  Major 
Pelouze,  of  Banks'  staff,  read  as  follows  : 

"  Culpeper,  9.45  a.m.,  August  9,  '63. 
*'From  Colonel  Lewis  Marshall  : 

General  Banks  to  move  to  the  front  immediately,  assume  command 
of  all  .forces  in  the  front,  deploy  his  skirmishers  if  the  enemy  advances, 
and  attack  him  immediately  as  he  approaches,  and  be  reinforced  from 
here." 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  order  as  given  by  General 
Pope  to  Colonel  Marshall,  and  whatever  may  have  been  the 
order  which  Colonel  Marshall  intended  to  give  to  General 
Banks,  the  above  is,  without  question,  the  order  which  Gen- 
eral Banks  received.  If  there  was  any  mistake  about  it,  the 
blame  must  rest,  without  any  dispute,  ujDon  the  superior 
officer,  who  might  have  put  it  in  writing  and  did  not. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  interpretation  of  this  order, 
however,  it  was  not  the  only  one  which  Banks  received. 
He  tells  us  himself,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  in  1864,f  that  after  he  had,  in 
compliance  with  this  order,  put  his  troops  in  motion,  he  left 
the  head  of  his  column  to  see  General  Pope,  and  asked  him 
if  he  had  any  other  orders.  General  Pope  told  him  that  he  / 
had  sent  an  officer,  acquainted  with  the  country,  who  would 
designate  the  ground  he  was  to  holcl.X    That  officer — General 

*  From  a  letter  from  Major  Pelouze  to  General  Gr.  H.  Gordon,  in  Gordon's 
"  Second  Massachusetts  and  Stonewall  Jackson,"  printed  but  not  published,  p. 
216.  See  also  Eep.  C.  W.,  1S65,  vol.  iii.,  p.  45,  at  the  end  of  the  volume,  where 
the  same  text  is  given  by  Banks,  with  a  few  unimportant  variations. 

tRep.  C.  W.,  1865,  vol.  iii.,  p.  45,  at  the  end  of  the  volume. 

X  The  italics  are  ours. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAm.  21 

Eoberts,  as  is  claimed  by  Banks,  urged  liim  to  take  the  of- 
fensive. This  Eoberts  denies,  but  it  seems  probable  that  he 
did  indulge  in  remarks  of  a  kind  likely  to  provoke  a  high- 
spirited  man  to  hazard  an  engagement.  But,  even  if  this 
were  so,  the  language  of  the  written  despatch — "Deploy  your 
shirmisJiers  if  the  enemy  advances,  and  attack  him  imme- 
diately as  he  approaches,"^  and  be  reinforced  from  here" — 
though  certainly  far  from  explicit,  does  not,  on  examination, 
sustain  the  interpretation  which  General  Banks  put  upon 
it.  The  taking  up  of  a  x)osition  by  our  forces  is  implied  in 
the  reference  to  the  advance  of  the  enemy.  The  enemy  are 
contemplated  as  advancing  upon  our  troops  in  position ;  when 
they  advance,  skirmishers  are  to  be  thrown  out ;  when  the 
enemy  approaches,  he  is  to  be  attacked  with  the  skirmishers, 
and  delayed  as  much  as  possible,  and  reinforcements  are  to 
be  at  once  sent  for  to  Culpeper.  The  reason  of  the  thing, 
also,  is  all  one  way.  To  suppose  that  Poj)e  would  send 
Banks'  corps  out  alone  to  attack  Jackson  is  absurd  of  itself, 
and,  taken  in  connection  wdth  the  careful  and  judicious  hand- 
ling of  his  troops  thus  far  in  the  campaign,  and  with  the 
strategic  needs  of  the  moment,  of  which  we  have  spoken  at 
length  above,  there  should  have  been  no  doubt  whatever  in 
General  Banks'  mind  as  to  his  duty  that  day.  He  should 
have  taken  up  a  strong  position,  pushed  his  j)ickets  well  out, 
and  ascertained  the  strength,  positions,  and  intentions  of  the 
enemy,  maintained  a  firm  countenance,  and  replied  at  once 
to  their  guns.  If  they  advanced,  he  should  have  deployed  a 
strong  skirmish-line,  and  given  it  to  the  charge  of  some 
alert  and  courageous  officer,  and  have  immediately  notified 
General  Pope.  Had  he  done  this,  there  might  have  been  no 
serious  engagement  on  that  day  ;  but  if  Jackson  had  brushed 


*  The  italics  are  ours. 


V 


22 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


away  tlie  skirmishers  and  pushed  his  way  to  the  main  line, 
he  ought  to  have  been,  and  would  probably  have  been  re- 
pulsed. Still,  General  Pope,  who  might  have  put  his  in- 
structions in  writing,  and  did  not,  must  share  the  blame. 
And  it  is  a  fair  criticism  on  the  instructions  that  they  say 
not  one  word  of  taking  up,  or  of  holding  a  j)osition.  The 
instructions,  besides,  do,  unquestionably,  order  Banks  in  a 
certain  emergency  to  attack.  It  is  true,  he  is  to  attack  with 
skirmishers ;  still,  he  is  to  attack.  The  order  breathes  the 
spirit  of  an  active,  aggressive  course.  If  General  Banks 
was  to  take  up  a  strong  position,  and  defend  himself,  why 
not  say  so,  in  so  many  words,  and  why  not  put  it  in  black 
and  white  ? 

The  road  down  which  General  Banks'  corps  marched  from 
Culj)eper  Court  House,  runs  to  Eobertson's  Ford  on  the 
Bapidan,  passing  to  the  westward  of  Cedar  Mountain. 
About  eight  miles  south  of  Cul]3eper,  the  road  crosses  a  little 
stream  called  Cedar  Bun.  At  this  j^oint  it  diverges  to  the 
right,  around  the  northerly  and  westerly  slopes  of  the  moun- 
tain. General  Boberts  directed  that  all  the  trooxDS,  with  the 
exception  of  Gordon's  brigade,  should  cross  the  run,  which 
was  an  insignificant  stream,  and  take  ujy  a  strong  position  on 
a  plateau  just  beyond  it.  This  was  done  and  the  little  army 
was  ranged  in  order  of  battle.  It  consisted  of  two  divisions 
of  infantry,  those  of  Williams  and  Augur,  one  brigade  of 
cavalry  under  Bayard,  and  a  full  complement  of  artillery,  and 
numbered  in  all  about  7,500  men.  The  brigade  of  Gordon, 
belonging  to  Williams'  division,  was  placed  in  a  very  strong 
position  behind  the  creek,  on  the  extreme  right ;  the  other 
brigade  of  this  division,  Crawford's,  was  placed  on  the  right  of 
the  road,  and  was  the  right  brigade  of  the  line  of  battle. 
On  the  left  of  the  road  Augur  arranged  his  brigades  from 
right  to  left,  Geary  being  on  the  road  and  connecting  with 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


23 


Crawford,  then  Prince  on  Geary's  left,  and  then,  somewhat 
refused,  the  small  brigade  of  Greene.  He  had  no  troops  in 
reserve. 

The  ai'tillery  were  ranged  on  the  plateau  in  front  of  the 
infantry.  The  cavalry  were  on  the  flanks  and  skirmished 
with  the  enemy. 

Jackson's  army  consisted  of  three  divisions,  his  own,  so- 
called,  now  commanded  by  General  Charles  S.  Winder, 


Battle  of  Cedar  Mountain. 


Ewell's,  and  A.  P.  Hill's,  and  numbered,  as  has  been  stated, 
between  20,000  and  25,000  men ;  the  latter  number  is  proba- 
bly nearer  the  truth.  He  pushed  Ewell  forward  on  his 
right  (our  left)  along  the  northerly  slope  of  Cedar  Mountain, 


24 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


with  two  of  his  brigades,  those  of  Trimble  and  Hayes,  the 
latter  commanded  by  Colonel  Forno.  The  remaining  bri- 
gade, that  of  Early,  was  kept  much  nearer  the  road,  so  that 
a  considerable  interval  existed  between  it  and  the  two  bri- 
gades first  mentioned.  Jackson's  division  was  directed  to 
advance  along  the  road,  with  one  brigade,  Campbell's,  com- 
manded by  Lientenant-Colonel  Garnett  on  the  left  (our 
right)  of  the  road,  the  brigade  of  General  W.  B.  Taliaferro 
on  their  right  (onr  left)  of  the  road,  and  the  famous  "Stone- 
wall Brigade,"  then  commanded  by  Colonel  Ronald,  in  re- 
serve. Behind  all  these  troops  was  the  powerful  division  of 
A.  P.  Hill,  comprising  the  brigades  of  Thomas,  Branch, 
Archer,  Pender,  Stafford,  and  Field. 

From  noon  to  about  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  there 
had  been  constant  artillery  firing.  The  Confederate  General 
"Winder  was  killed  by  a  shell  about  half-2jast  three,  while 
directing  the  fire  of  some  batteries,  and  his  division  was 
taken  by  General  W.  B.  Taliaferro — the  brigade  of  the  latter 
being  taken  l)y  Colonel  A.  G.  Taliaferro.  The  enemy  were 
pushing  on  in  the  general  direction  indicated  above,  but 
they  moved  cautiously.  In  time  our  cavalry  were  forced 
back.  Our  infantry  were  then  discerned  supporting  the  bat- 
teries. Then  was  the  time  for  Banks  to  have  pushed  out  his 
skirmishers,  and  notified  Pope  that  an  attack  by  the  enemy 
could  not  be  far  off.  Had  he  done  this,  he  could  probably 
have  been  reinforced  before  the  attack  became  general  by 
Ricketts'  division  of  some  8,000  men,  a  force  quite  sufficient 
to  have  enabled  him  to  hold  his  own.  Unfortunately  he  de- 
cided on  a  very  different  course.  He  entirely  under-esti- 
mated the  strength  of  the  enemy.  He  determined  to  attack 
himself,  with  his  whole  corps.  At  four  o'clock  he  advanced 
his  whole  line  forward  to  the  further  edge  of  the  plateau. 
At  half-past  five  he  gave  the  signal  of  attack. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  lAlOUNTAIN. 


25 


The  general  plan  was  for  Crawford  to  turn  the  enemy's 
left  by  assaulting  the  left  flank  of  Campbell's  brigade,  while 
Geary's  and  Prince's  brigades  of  Augnr's  division  should  at- 
tack Taliaferro's  and  Early's  brigades  on  our  left  of  the 
road. 

The  enemy  suspected  nothing  of  the  sort.  They  had  not 
yet  fairly  formed  their  line  of  battle.  They  were  in  fact  cau- 
tiously feeling  their  way,  preparatory  to  making  an  attack 
themselves.  On  their  right,  there  was  a  great  gap  between 
Early's  right  and  the  troops  of  Trimble  and  Hayes  ;  on  their 
left,  Campbell's  brigade  was  drawn  up  on  the  edge  of  the 
woods  and  facing  a  wheat-field,  but  its  left  flank  was  covered 
by  thick  woods,  and  Jackson  himself  told  its  commanding 
officer,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Garnett,  to  look  well  to  his  lefb 
flank,  and  to  send  at  once  to  General  Taliaferro,  who  com- 
manded his  division,  for  reinforcements.  The  brigade  of 
Bonald,  which  was  to  support  the  brigades  of  Campbell  and 
Taliaferro,  had  not  been  moved  up  near  enough  to  be  of  im- 
mediate service  in  case  of  need.  The  officers  sent  by  Gar- 
nett for  assistance  had  not  returned,  when  all  at  once  the 
storm  broke. 

Geary  and  Prince,  advancing  rapidly  in  front,  assaulted 
with  vigor  the  brigades  of  Early  and  Taliaferro,  and  the 
right  regiment  of  Campbell's  brigade.  Suddenly  Crawford's 
men  burst  upon  the  left  regiments  of  this  brigade.  Garnett, 
who  had  been  on  the  right  of  the  line,  hurried  to  the  spot. 
He  found  the  Federal  infantry  rapidly  advancing,  not  more 
than  fifty  yards  from  the  front  of  his  line,  and  bearing  down 
also  from  the  left,  and  delivering  a  most  galling  fire.  The 
First  Virginia  Battalion,  thus  struck  unexpectedly  at  a  great 
disadvantage,  gave  way  in  confusion.  The  Forty-second 
Virginia  was  ordered  to  change  front  to  meet  the  flank  at- 
tack, but  its  commanding  officer.  Major  Layne,  was  mortally 
Vol.  IV.— 2 


26 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


wounded,  and  the  regiment  broke.  Our  troops  now  working 
round  to  their  rear,  the  same  fate  met  the  other  regiments 
of  the  brigade,  in  spite  of  the  heroic  efforts  of  their  officers. 
Garnett  himself  was  wounded ;  Lieutenant-Colonel  Cunning- 
ham, of  the  Twenty-first  Virginia,  was  killed ;  the  flank-fire 
was  most  destructive ;  the  brigade  was  driven  back  in  dis- 
order ;  and  soon  the  victorious  troops  of  Crawford,  pressing 
on  without  stopping  an  instant,  struck  the  left  of  Taliaferro's 
brigade.  Here  the  blow  was,  if  anything,  even  more  deci- 
sive, for  Taliaferro  was  attacked  in  front  hj  Geary,  as  well 
as  in  flank  and  rear  by  Crawford,  and  in  spite  of  a  gallant 
resistance,  his  troops  were  driven  back  in  confusion  and 
with  gTeat  slaughter,  exposing  the  left  regiments  of  Early's 
brigade. 

Meantime  that  officer,  seeing,  in  the  beginning  of  the  ac- 
tion, that  he  was  likely  to  be  outflanked  on  his  right  by  the 
line  comx30sed  of  our  brigades  of  Prince  and  Greene,  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  Thomas'  brigade,  of  Hill's  division,  to 
take  position  on  his  right.  Hardly  had  he  done  this,  how- 
ever, when  Taliaferro's  brigade  on  his  left  gave  way  entirely 
and  carried  with  it  the  left  regiments  of  his  command. 

"I  found,"  says  General  Early,  "that  the  pieces  of  ai-til- 
lery  that  had  been  advanced  had  been  retired,  and  that  the 
left  regiments  of  my  brigade,  and  all  the  troops  to  their  left, 
as  far  as  I  could  see,  had  fallen  back,  and  the  enemy  were 
advancing  up  the  slope  of  the  hill."  Colonel  Walker  of  the 
Thii'teenth  Virginia,  who  was  on  the  left  of  the  brigade, 
speaks  of  the  brigade  on  his  left  (TaliafeiTo's),  giving  way 
and  running  off  the  field  in  disorder,  and  says  that  the  panic 
thus  begun  was  communicated  to  two  or  three  regiments  on 
his  right,  in  consequence  of  which  his  regiment  and  the 
Thirty-first  Virginia  had  to  retire,  being  unsupported  on 
either  flank.    Early,  however,  resolutely  maintained  his 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN.  27 


stand  with  the  Twelfth  Georgia,  and  parts  of  the  Fifty- 
second  and  Fifty-eighth  Virginia  regiments,  though  attacked 
in  front  and  flank.  Had  they  given  way,  he  admits  that  the 
day  in  all  probability  would  have  been  lost.  But  they  stood 
fast,  holding  their  position,  as  Jackson  says  in  his  report  of 
the  battle,  "with  great  firmness." 

Meanwhile,  Eonald  had  at  last  got  his  brigade  through 
the  woods  and  fences,  and  came  down  upon  the  exhausted 
troops  of  Crawford's  brigade.  They  received  him  with  a 
firm  countenance,  and  some  of  his  regiments,  especially  the 
Twenty-seventh  Virginia,"^  were  roughly  handled  and  forced 
back  with  loss.  His  line  was  badly  shaken,  if  not  giving 
way.  t  In  fact,  at  this  moment,  the  field  was  ours.  Had  it 
not  been  for  the  reserve  brigades  of  Hill,  Early  and  Thomas 
would  have  been  compelled  to  fall  back,  leaving  us  masters 
of  the  field. 

Fortunately,  however,  for  the  enemy.  Hill  was  within  call. 
Three  of  his  brigades,  those  of  Branch,  Archer,  and  Pender, 
now  arrived  on  the  ground.  While  Eonald  was  maintaining 
the  fight  with  his  comparatively  fresh  brigade  in  the  centre, 
and  Garnett  and  Taliaferro  were  bravely  rallying  their 
broken  troops  in  the  rear.  Branch  arrived  on  their  left  of 
the  road,  and  under  the  immediate  direction  of  Jackson 
himself  advanced  in  line  of  battle  and  encountered  our 
troops  in  the  woods  which  lie  beyond  the  wheat-field,  over 
which  they  had  charged.  The  exhausted  Federal  battalions 
fell  back  over  the  wheat-field  and  there  halted  and  received 
the  advance  of  the  enemy.  Branch's  brigade  took  up  the 
position  from  which  Campbell's  had  been  driven.  For  some 
time  our  men  stood  their  ground ;  but  they  were  in  no  con- 
dition to  meet  fresh  troops.    Taliaferro's  brigade  having 

*  A.  N.  v.,  Haynes'  Report,  vol.  ii.,  p.  68. 
t  A.  N.  v.,  Lane^s  Report,  vol.  ii.,  p.  270. 


28 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


been  rallied  and  brought  back  to  substantially  its  old  posi- 
tion, our  cavalry  made  a  gallant  charge  upon  them  down  the 
road,  but  were  broken  by  their  fire  in  front  and  the  oblique 
fire  from  the  regiments  of  Branch.  Then  the  infantry  on 
our  left  began  to  fall  back.  Augur  had  been  wounded; 
Geary  had  been  wounded ;  Prince  had  been  captured.  But 
the  remnants  of  Crawford's  brigade,  still  clinging  to  the 
edge  of  the  wheat-field,  and  firing  across  it,  were  now  rein- 
forced by  a  fine  regiment,  the  Tenth  Maine,  belonging  to 
this  brigade,  which  had  not  participated  in  the  battle  thus 
far.  But  one  regiment  could  do  but  little,  of  course,  though 
it  obstinately  held  its  own  for  nearly  half  an  hour,  losing 
out  of  its  461  officers  and  men  173  killed  and  wounded. 
Then,  when  it  was  too  late.  Banks  sent  for  Gordon's  brigade, 
hitherto  held  in  reserve  on  the  extreme  right.  It  was  a  use- 
less, perfectly  useless  order,  for  it  was  evident  that  the  enemy 
had  been  largely  reinforced  by  fresh  troops,  and  that  the  only 
thing  possible  to  our  exhausted  men  w^as  to  make  an  orderly 
retreat.  But  Banks,  who  was  on  the  spot,  was  still  uncon- 
vinced. He  had  just  endeavored  to  get  the  Maine  regiment 
to  sally  forth  alone  across  the  wheat-field,  and  now  he  sends 
for  Gordon,  not  to  cover  the  retreat,  but  to  resume  again  the 
offensive.  Gordon,  a  graduate  himself  of  West  Point,  and  a 
veteran  of  the  Mexican  war,  at  the  head  of  a  fine  body  of 
troops,  the  Second  Massachusetts,  into  which  Harvard  Col- 
lege had  sent  many  of  her  sons,  the  Third  Wisconsin,  and 
the  Twenty-seventh  Indiana,  took  his  troops  at  the  double- 
quick  across  the  creek  and  to  the  edge  of  the  wheat-field. 
But  by  this  time  the  groimd  was  occupied  only  by  the  dead 
and  wounded  of  Crawford's  brigade.  The  Tenth  Maine  even 
had  retired.  The  enemy  had  massed  their  forces  here.  In 
front  were  the  troops  of  Archer  and  Branch  ;  on  Gordon's 
right  were  Eonald  and  Pender.    The  action  was  brief  but 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN.  29 

terrible.  Till  they  were  flanked,  Gordon's  troops  stood  and 
inflicted  severe  loss  on  their  opponents,  but  before  long 
Pender  had  gained  their  right  and  rear  and  the  whole  thing 
was  over.  The  Second  Massachusetts  lost  heavily;  12  of- 
ficers and  147  enlisted  men  killed  and  wounded,  and  15 
prisoners,  35  per  cent,  of  the  number  engaged.  Never  was 
there  a  more  useless  sacrifice  of  brave  men's  lives. 

The  enemy  j^ushed  the  retreating  forces  until  they  took 
up  a  position  behind  the  creek  and  were  reinforced  by 
Kicketts'  division  and  Sigel's  corps,  the  latter  having  arrived 
in  the  evening.  Unaware  of  this,  Jackson  undertook,  in  his 
anxiety  to  reach  Culpeper  before  morning,  to  shell  the 
Federal  troops  out  of  their  position,  but  succeeded  in  rous- 
ing so  many  sleeping  batteries  that  he  shortly  discontinued 
his  cannonade,  having  suffered  some  loss. 

The  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain  was  over.  It  is  impossible 
not  to  regard  it  as  a  wholly  needless  engagement.  It  was  not 
any  part  of  General  Pope's  plan  that  it  should  be  fought.  It 
was  followed  on  the  day  but  one  after  by  the  retreat  of 
Jackson  to  the  Eapidan.  It  was  a  mere  tactical  victory  for 
Jackson,  and  was  won  only  because  he  had  the  larger  army 
and  the  stronger  reserves.  For,  as  a  battle  between  Jack- 
son's  and  Ewell's  divisions  and  Thomas'  brigade  of  Hill's 
division  on  the  one  side,  and  the  two  divisions  of  Banks' 
corps  on  the  other,  it  was  without  controversy  a  victory  for 
Banks'  corps.  But,  as  we  have  before  said.  Banks  knew  or 
should  have  known  that  the  whole  of  Hill's  division  was  up, 
and  that  it  was  no  part  of  General  Pope's  plan  that  a  battle 
should  be  fought  with  Jackson's  command  before  his  army 
was  concentrated. 

We  lost  one  gun,  it  was  mired  in  the  creek  on  the  retreat. 
Jackson  claims  to  have  captured  400  prisoners,  3  colors,  and 
5,302  {sic)  small  arms.    There  is  some  mistake  about  this  last 


30 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


item  doubtless — probably  a  misprint — as  there  were  not  many 
more  muskets  in  all  Banks'  corps. 

Crawford's  brigade,  out  of  1,767  officers  and  men,  lost  96 
killed,  397  wounded,  and  374  missing ;  very  many  of  the 
latter  being  doubtless  killed  or  wounded — in  all  867 — nearly 
one-half.* 

Gordon's  brigade,  numbering  less  than  fifteen  hundred 
men,  lost  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  466. 

Our  whole  loss  f  was  1,661  killed  and  wounded,  and  723 
missing;  total,  2,393.  Jackson  reports  1,283  killed  and 
wounded,  and  31  missing ;  total,  1,314.  The  loss  in  officers 
was  very  heavy  on  both  sides. 

It  was  a  hard-fought  battle ;  fierce,  obstinate,  sanguinary. 


*  History  Tenth  Maine,  p.  197. 

t  Gordon's  Second  Massachusetts  and  StonewallJackson,  p.  225,  note,  A.  N.  V., 
vol.  ii.,  p.  7. 


CHAPTEK  ni. 

ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK. 

Although  General  Pope  had  witli  liim  the  strong  division 
of  Eicketts,  and  the  two  divisions  of  Sigel,  besides  the  five 
thousand  and  odd  men  of  Banks'  corps,  in  all,  say  twenty-three 
thousand  to  twenty-five  thousand  men,  besides  cavalry,  he 
very  sensibly  sent  to  Fredericksburg  for  King's  division  -of 
McDowell's  corps,  which  joined  him  on  the  evening  of  the 
11th.  Meanwhile,  he  sent  a  flag  of  truce  to  Jackson  to  bury 
the  dead,  and  the  whole  day  of  the  11th  was  passed  in  this 
sad  duty. 

On  the  night  of  the  11th,  Jackson,  fearing  to  be  outnum- 
bered, retreated  to  the  Bapidan,  followed  at  once  by  General 
Pope,  and  on  the  12th  our  pickets  watched  the  Eajjidan 
from  Eaccoon  Ford  to  the  base  of  the  Blue  Eidge. 

On  the  14th,  two  excellent  divisions  of  General  Burnside's 
corps,  those  of  Eeno  and  Stevens,  arrived  under  command 
of  the  former  officer,  from  North  Carolina.  They  numbered 
together  some  eight  thousand  men.  They  had  come  by  way 
of  Aquia  Creek,  Falmouth,  and  the  north  bank  of  the  Eap- 
pahannock.  These  officers  were  both  men  of  noted  bravery, 
energy,  and  capacity. 

Thus  far,  it  will  be  observed,  General  Pope  had  performed 
the  mission  with  which  he  had  been  entrusted.  He  had 
substituted  his  single  will  for  the  different  wishes  of  three 
department  commanders.     He  had  concentrated  a  force 


32 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


which  had  been  widely  and  uselessly  scattered.  He  had 
menaced  the  enemy's  communications  so  seriously  that,  be- 
fore a  single  regiment  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  left 
Hanison's  Landing,  Lee  had  been  obliged  to  weaken  his 
army  by  sending  to  oppose  Pope  two  of  his  most  trusted 
officers,  Jackson  and  A.  P.  Hill,  and  at  least  twenty-five 
thousand  of  his  best  soldiers. 

Now,  however,  on  the  Peninsula,  the  signs  of  General 
McClellan's  departure  became  unmistakable.  General  Lee 
had,  in  this  state  of  things,  his  choice  of  three  courses  :  he 
could  either  concentrate  his  whole  disposable  force  upon 
the  retreating  army,  whose  corps  were  necessarily  more  or 
less  separated,  hoping  to  defeat  them  in  detail ;  or,  he  could 
observe  us  with  a  part  of  his  army  and  endeavor  to  cut  oft 
such  trains  or  stragglers  or  such  isolated  bodies  as  he  might 
find  exposed  ;  or  he  could  leave  our  army  to  get  away  as 
well  and  as  fast  as  it  could,  and  concentrate  his  whole  force 
upon  Pope,  who,  in  the  exposed  position  which  he  occupied 
on  the  Eapidan,  offered  a  tempting  prize.  He  chose  the 
last ;  and  on  August  13th,  three  days  before  McClellan 
moved,  General  Longstreet,  with  his  powerful  corps,  con- 
sisting of  twenty-one  brigades  of  infantry,  besides  artillery, 
was  ordered  to  the  Eapidan.  Stuart,  also,  with  his  cavalry, 
was  directed  upon  Gordonsville.  The  entire  force  assem- 
bled under  General  Lee  was  not  far  from  fifty-five  thousand 
men  of  all  arms.  He  outnumbered  his  adversary  by  more 
than  twenty  thousand  men. 

General  Pope's  army,  we  have  said,  was  in  an  exposed 
position.  Erom  Eapidan  Station  to  Culpeper  the  railroad 
runs  nearly  north,  from  Culpeper  it  runs  nearly  east  to 
Rappahannock  Station,  and  thence  noi^iheastward  to  Alex- 
andria. It  was,  therefore,  possible  for  General  Lee,  on  the 
Eapidan,  to  reach  Brandy  Station  or  Eappahannock  Station 


GENERAL  MAP  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN. 


ON  THE  RAPPAHAN^^OCK. 


33 


almost  as  easily  as  Pope  could,  by  moving  from  Eaccoon  and 
Morton's  Fords  through  Stevensburg.  This  turn  in  the  di- 
rection of  the  railroad  at  Culpeper  has,  in  fact,  in  all  our 
campaigns,  rendered  it  impossible  for  our  army  to  rely  on 
the  railroad  as  a  means  of  supx^ly  much  below  Culpeper, 
for  the  reason  that,  on  proceeding  beyond  Culpeper,  the 
line  of  supply  is  at  once  uncovered. 

General  Lee  proposed  to  avail  himself  without  delay  of 
this  weakness  in  his  adversary's  situation.  The  cavalry  un- 
der Stuart  were  to  seize  Rappahannock  Station,  while  the 
infantry,  under  Longstreet  and  Jackson,  were  to  turn  Pope's 
left.  But  Pope  had  his  signal  officers  on  the  alert,  and  had, 
besides,  captured  Stuart's  adjutant-general  in  one  of  those 
cavalry  raids  which,  with  his  accustomed  activity,  he  had 
sent  out  immediately  on  his  arrival  on  the  Rapidan,  and  the 
enemy's  plan,  which  was  fixed  for  the  18th,  was  discovered. 
Fortunately  for  us,  also,  there  was  some  delay  on  their  part. 
Pope  acted  with  promptitude  and  decision,  and  the  entire 
army  retreated  behind  the  Rappahannock  on  the  18th  and 
19th  without  any  loss  in  men  or  material.  Reno  fell  back 
by  way  of  Stevensburg ;  Banks,  who  was  at  Culi^eper,  by 
the  railroad ;  McDowell,  who  had  been  in  position  near 
Cedar  Mountain,  followed  Banks ;  while  Sigel,  who  had 
been  on  the  extreme  right,  crossed  higher  up  at  Sulphur 
Si3rings.  The  retreat  was  skilfully  masked  by  the  cavalry. 
These  movements  were  all  safely  accomplished,  and  the 
morning  of  the  20th  saw  the  Federal  army  in  position  be- 
hind the  river  Rappahannock. 

'  A  few  words  here  concerning  their  antagonists  will  not  be 
out  of  place. 

General  Robert  E.  Lee  was  at  this  time  fifty-five  years  of 
age.    He  had  graduated  at  West  Point  in  the  Class  of  1829. 
He  had  served  with  great  distinction  in  the  Mexican  War, 
3 


\ 

34  THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 

in  which  he  had  been  wounded  at  the  storming  of  Chapnl- 
tepec,  and  he  had,  as  Chief  of  Staff  to  Lieutenant  General 
Scott,  contributed  very  largely  to  the  success  of  the  cam- 
paign. He  was,  besides,  a  man  of  the  highest  standing  in 
point  of  family,  which  was  one  of  the  oldest  and  most  dis- 
tinguished in  Virginia,  and  he  was  a  man  of  strong  character 
and  unblemished  life. 

Lieutenant-General  James  Longstreet  was  a  South  Caro- 
linian. He  graduated  from  West  Point  in  the  Class  of  1842, 
served  through  the  Mexican  War,  being  severely  wounded 
at  Chapultepec.  He  commanded  the  right  wing,  w^hat  was 
afterward  the  First  Corps  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 
His  abilities  as  a  corps  commander  are  well  known. 

The  left  wing,  or  Second  Corps,  w^as  led  by  Major-Gen- 
eral  Thomas  J.  Jackson.  He  was  a  Virginian,  a  graduate 
of  West  Point  of  the  Class  of  1846,  had  served  through  the 
Mexican  War,  being  brevetted  for  his  gallantry  in  several 
actions.  His  devotion  to  the  cause  which  he  espoused,  his 
untiring  energy,  indefatigable  activity,  and  masterly  military 
judgment,  need  no  description. 

Among  the  junior  officers,  Ewell,  A.  P.  Hill,  and  Stuart 
were  the  most  distinguished.  All  w^ere  Virginians,  and  grad- 
uates of  West  Point— Ewell  in  1840,  Hill  in  1847,  and  Stuart 
in  1854.  All  were  officers  of  excellent  ability,  whose  capa- 
city for  their  tasks  was  never  questioned. 

With  the  exception  of  Jackson,  these  officers  had  not  left 
the  United  States  Army  from  their  graduation  until  the 
breaking  out  of  the  war. 

There  were  no  experiments  tried  in  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia.  The  most  distinguished  officers  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Southern  Confederacy  could  find  were  put  in 
the  highest  posts.  There  was  hardly  an  officer  of  rank  that 
was  not  a  graduate  of  West  Point.    The  war  was  conducted, 


ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK. 


35 


on  their  side,  on  strictly  military  principles ;  and,  without 
any  possibility  of  doubt,  their  adherence  to  these  principles 
enabled  them  to  gain  successes  that  would  otherwise  have 
been  unattainable  with  their  limited  resources.  Moreover, 
the  feeling  in  this  army  toward  the  commanding  general 
was  one  of  entire  confidence  and  enthusiastic  devotion.  This 
was  not  because  it  was  a  Southern  army,  or  anything  of  that 
sort,  but  because  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  so  for- 
tunate as  to  have  in  Lee  a  man  who  was  in  every  w^ay  head 
and  shoulders  above  his  colleagues. 

It  was  a  veteran  army.  The  discipline,  to  be  sure,  was 
not  very  strict,  but  the  trooi3s  were  well  led.  The  men  were 
sturdy  and  active  yeomen,  accustomed  to  an  outdoor  life 
and  the  use  of  arms  ;  they  had  had  a  year's  campaigning, 
and  they  were  full  of  confidence  in  their  leaders. 

General  Pope's  retrograde  movement  was  fully  approved 
by  General  Halleck,  who  directed  *  him  on  the  18th  to  stand 
firm  on  the  line  of  the  Eappahannock  till  he  could  heli3  him. 
and  to  fight  hard,  for  aid  would  soon  come.  For  the  pres- 
ent, too,  he  was  ordered  to  maintain  his  communications 
with  Falmouth,  as  the  Government  still  desired  to  avoid, 
if  possible,  the  destruction  of  their  railroad  between  that 
place  and  Aquia  Creek,  and  their  wharves  and  store-houses 
at  the  latter  place.  This  requirement  obliged  Pope  to 
retain  his  hold  on  the  lower  fords,  and  hampered  him 
more  or  less  in  his  manoeuvres.  On  the  21st  Halleck  re- 
peated t  his  direction  and  exhorted  Pope  to  stay  forty-eight 
hours  longer  and  he  should  be  reinforced. 

Halleck  had  good  reason  to  expect  the  immediate  arrival 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the  Peninsula.  That  army 
consisted  of  Eeynolds'  division  of  Pennsylvania  Eeserves, 


*P.  R.,  p.  m  t  Ibid.,  p.  125. 


36 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


whicli  had  once  belonged  to  McDowell's  corps  (which  was 
originally  the  First  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac),  but 
had  been  incorporated  with  the  Fifth  Corps  on  the  Penin- 
sula; of  the  Second  Corps  under  Sumner;  of  the  Third 
Corps  under  Heintzelman ;  of  the  Fourth  Corps  under 
Keyes  ;  of  the  Fifth  Corps  under  Porter ;  of  the  Sixth  Corps 
under  Franklin,  besides  the  cavalry.  All  these  troops  were 
to  be  sent  to  Aquia  Creek,  save  Keyes'  corps,  which  was  to 
be  left  to  garrison  Fort  Monroe  and  vic^inity.  General 
McClellan  seemed  to  be  urging  the  movement  with  zeal, 
and  there  was  every  reason  to  expect  the  arrival  of  the  troops 
to  begin  as  early  as  the  21st  or  22d.  Consequently  General 
Halleck  told  Pope  to  hold  on  to  the  line  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock. 

Lee,  on  his  part,  was  equally  aware  of  the  probability 
of  his  adversary  being  reinforced  and  that  in  a  few  days. 
Hence  he  was  most  anxious  to  get  at  Pope's  army  at  once, 
before  any  help  could  reach  him. 

On  the  20th  and  21st  his  main  body  came  up,  Jackson  on 
the  left  and  Longstreet  on  the  right.  The  latter  struck 
the  river  on  the  afternoon  of  the  20th  at  Kelly's  Ford,  a  few 
miles  below  Rappahannock  Station,  which  is  the  point 
where  the  railroad  crosses  the  river.  The  former,  on  the 
morning  of  the  21st,  arrived  at  Beverly  Ford,  a  few  miles 
above  the  station;  and  Stuart,  who  accompanied  him, 
threw  a  few  regiments  of  cavalry,  under  Robertson,  across 
above  Beverly  Ford,  and  pushed  a  small  force,  under  Rosser, 
across  at  Beverly  Ford.  But  these  detachments  were  sj)eed- 
ily  driven  back  again.  On  the  other  hand  our  forces  still 
held  some  points  on  the  westerly  side  of  the  river ;  General 
Hartsuff,  with  a  brigade  of  Ricketts'  division,  occupied  a  tete- 
cle-pont  at  Rappahannock  Station,  and  some  small  hills  near 
by.    The  gTeater  height  of  the  banks  on  our  side  gave  our 


ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK 


37 


artillery  an  advantage  over  that  of  the  enemy.  The  river 
itself,  though  fordable  every  few  miles,  was  nevertheless  an 
obstacle,  and  a  considerable  one,  as  it  turned  out,  to  General 
Lee's  advance.  There  was  a  great  deal  of  heavy  artillery 
firing  across  the  river,  and  there  were  several  unimportant 
skirmishes  on  both  sides  of  the  river,  chiefly  on  the  further, 
or  right  bank. 

General  Lee,  after  several  tentative  movements,  soon  be- 
came convinced  that  he  could  not  make  a  successful  crossing 
anywhere  between  Kelly's  Ford  and  Beverly  Ford,  and  he 
consequently  determined  to  seek  a  passage  higher  up.  Ac- 
cordingly, on  the  22d,  Jackson  marched  up  the  river  toward 
Sulphur  Springs,  a  point  about  ten  miles  north  of  Eappa- 
hannock  Station,  closely  observed  by  Sigel,  who  kept  pace 
with  him,  for  a  time,  on  our  side  of  the  river.  A  spirited 
attack  was  made  on  the  rear  of  Jackson's  column  by  a  bri- 
gade of  infantry  from  Sigel's  corps,  who  inflicted  consider- 
able damage,  and  came  near  making  a  valuable  capture  of 
trains ;  but  they  v/ere  at  length  driven  off,  with  the  loss  of 
many  men,  and  of,  at  least,  one  valuable  officer — Brigadier- 
General  Bohlen — who  commanded  them. 

Arrived  at  the  Springs,  whither  Sigel  was  unable  to  fol- 
low him,  as  his  line  could  not  safely  be  prolonged  so  far, 
Jackson  pushed  over,  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  22d,  Early's 
brigade  of  Ewell's  division,  with  one  additional  regiment 
and  two  batteries.  Immediately  after  this,  a  heavy  rain- 
storm set  in,  and  the  river  rose  during  the  night  so  much  as 
to  cut  off  all  communication  between  Early's  command  and 
the  rest  of  the  army. 

Longstreet,  meanwhile,  had  moved  up  from  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Kelly's  Ford,  and  now  occupied  the  right  bank  of 
the  river,  from  Eappahannock  Station  to  Beverly  Ford,  or 
even  somewhat  beyond  that  point. 


38 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


General  Pope,  of  course,  recognized  the  intention  of  the 
enemy.  It  was  too  plain  to  be  mistaken.  Lee  proposed  to 
cross  at  Sulphur  Springs,  or  at  Waterloo  Bridge,  or  at  both 
places,  to  turn  our  right,  and,  marching  through  Warrenton, 
threaten  our  railroad  communications  between  "Warrenton 
Junction  and  Manassas  Junction,  thus  forcing  us  to  fight  in 
a  disadvantageous  position,  and  before  our  reinforcements 
had  come  up.  Pope,  with  his  inferior  force,  could  not  op- 
pose him  at  all  points  of  the  line,  nor  would  it  have  been 
wise  had  he  attempted  it.  A  river  can  always  be  crossed  by 
a  superior  force  ;  and  the  best  thing  for  the  resisting  army 
to  do  is,  generally  speaking,  to  take  up  a  position  from  which 
it  can  attack  and  overwhelm  the  advance  of  their  opponents 
before  it  can  be  supported.  Pope  at  first^  determined  to  act 
on  this  plan.  He  tells  us  in  his  report  f  that  he  instructed 
General  Sigel,  who  occupied  the  right  of  his  line,  and  who 
expressed  great  apprehension  that  his  flank  would  be  turned, 
and  who  proposed  io  withdraw  from  his  position  and  retire 
toward  the  railroad,  to  stand  firm  and  hold  his  ground,  and 
to  allow  the  enemy  to  cross  at  Sulphur  Springs,  and  de- 
velop himself  on  the  road  toward  Warrenton ;  that,  as  soon 
as  any  considerable  body  had  crossed,  he  would  mass  his 
army  and  throw  it  upon  any  force  of  the  enemy  that  at- 
tempted to  march  upon  Warrenton.  The  despatch  to  Sigel, 
to  which  General  Pope  refers,  is  to  be  found  inserted  in  his 
report, t  but  while  the  instructions  to  Sigel  are  as  given 
above,  nothing  whatever  is  said  in  it  of  General  Pope's  in- 
tention of  massing  his  army,  and  attacking  the  enemy  found 
marching  upon  Warrenton.  It  is  possible  that  General 
Pope's  memory  may  have  been  at  fault  here,  as  ifc  is  probable, 

*  Pope  to  Halleck,  August  20  ;  P.  E-.,  p.  123.  Same  to  same,  August  22,  5  P.M.  ; 
P.  R.,  126. 

tP.  R.  p.  124.  t  Ibid.,  p.  129. 


ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK. 


39 


from  another  portion  of  his  report,  that  this  despatch  to 
Sigel,  which  was  undoubtedly  written  very  early  in  the 
morning  of  the  23d,  was  penned  when  Pope  had  a  very  dif- 
ferent operation  in  his  mind. 

General  Pope  had,  in  fact,  conceived  a  most  daring  plan, 
the  direct  opposite  of  this  of  which  we  have  spoken,  namely, 
to  recross  the  river  and  assail  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear. 
At  Eappahannock  Station  he  had,  as  has  been  stated,  a  tete- 
de-po7it  on  the  other  side  of  the  river.  His  artillery  also 
commanded  the  fords.  Writing  to  General  Halleck  at  9.15 
p.  M.  of  the  22d,*  he  says  "  I  must  do  one  of  two  things — 
either  fall  back  and  meet  Heintzelman  behind  Cedar  Eun 
[which  is  near  Catlett's  Station]  or  cross  the  Eappahannock 
with  my  whole  force,  and  assail  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear. 
I  must  do  one  or  the  other  at  daylight.  Which  shall  it  be  ? 
I  incline  to  the  latter."  And  General  Halleck,  replying  at 
eleven  o'clock  that  night,  says  f  that  he  thinks  the  latter  of 
the  two  propositions  the  best.  Pope  thereupon,  at  2.20  a.m. 
of  the  23d,  requests  %  Halleck  to  order  all  the  troops  coming 
up  the  river  from  Fredericksburg  to  cross  the  Eappahannock 
at  the  various  fords,  and  march  rapidly  on  Stevensburg  and 
Brandy  Station ;  and  that  his  movement  will  be  made  the 
next  day,  as  soon  as  he  finds  that  the  enemy  has  passed  a 
sufficient  number  of  his  troops  over  the  river. 

It  was  during  this  night  of  the  22 d  and  23d — an  anxious 
night,  doubtless,  for  General  Pope,  and  a  wakeful  one,  for  he 
seems  to  have  been  up  at  all  hours  of  it — that  he  received 
from  Sigel  the  despatch  of  which  he.  speaks  in  his  report, 
notifying  him  that  the  enemy  had  crossed  near  Sulphur 
Springs,  and  suggesting  that  his  corps  should  be  withdrawn 
to  Bealeton.    In  his  reply,  which  was  doubtless  an  immedi- 


*P.  R.,  p.  127. 


t  lb.,  p.  127. 


X  lb.,  p.  128. 


40 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


ate  one,  "he  orders  ^  him,  as  lie  says  in  his  report,  to  stand 
firm,  and  let  the  enemy  develop  toward  Warrenton,  and 
that  he  desired  the  enemy  to  cross  as  large  a  force  as  he 
pleased  in  the  direction  of  Warrenton.  This  seems  to  settle 
the  question,  what  was  the  plan  in  General  Pope's  mind 
when  he  was  writing  to  Sigel.  The  more  troops  of  the 
enemy  on  our  side  of  the  river,  the  fewer  there  would  be  for 
Pope  to  fight  on  the  other  side.  Had  he  intended  at  that 
time  to  overwhelm  those  who  had  crossed,  he  would  hardly 
have  thus  given  them  permission  to  cross  as  many  as  they 
liked.  The  matter  is  not  of  any  particular  importance,  ex- 
cept as  showing  that  the  intention  of  attacking  on  our  side 
of  the  river,  if  it  was  entertained  at  first,  was  soon  aban- 
doned for  the  plan  of  recrossing  the  river. 

But  the  next  morning,  the  23d,  it  was  found  that  the  rise 
in  the  river  had  rendered  this  project  of  a  counter-attack  im- 
practicable. It  was  perhaps  quite  as  well  that  it  was  not  at- 
tempted ;  no  army  that  had  not  been  thoroi^ghly  trained, 
and  that  was  not  under  officers  accustomed  for  years  to  act 
with  each  other,  would  have  had  much  chance  of  success  in 
such  a  dangerous  operation.  Pope's  army  had  just  been  or- 
ganized. As  for  those  troops  on  which  he  must  have  relied 
to  guard  the  railroad  during  this  incursion  on  the  other  side 
of  the  river,  they  had  not  yet  even  reported  for  duty. 

Still,  the  freshet  which  put  a  stop  to  this  plan,  rendered 
it  possible  to  capture  that  part  of  Jackson's  command  which 
had  crossed  near  the  Springs.  Accordingly,  on  the  morning 
of  the  23d,  Sigel,  whose  corps  had  been  posted  between 
Beverly  and  Freeman's  Fords,  was  ordered  to  move  up  the 
river  to  Sulphur  Springs,  and  thence  toward  Waterloo 
Bridge,  and  to  attack  whatever  force  of  the  enemy  he  might 


*  Pope  to  Sigel,  August  23 ;  P.  R.,  p.  129. 


ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK. 


41 


find  on  otir  side  of  the  river.  Nothing,  however,  came  of 
this  expedition.  Early  had  retired  behind  Great  Eun,  one 
of  the  affluents  of  the  Eappahannock,  which  was  so  much 
swollen  by  the  rain  that  Sigel  was  delayed  till  too  late  in 
getting  across  it.    But  this  was  no  fault  of  General  Pope's. 

In  this  attempt  to  capture  those  of  the  enemy's  troops  that 
had  crossed  the  river.  Pope  did  not  hesitate  to  uncover  for 
the  time  being  the  lower  fords  of  the  KaiDpahannock.  Owing 
to  the  freshet,  the  danger  of  a  crossing  by  the  enemy  at 
these  fords  had  very  greatly  diminished,  if  it  had  not  entirely 
disappeared,  for  the  bridges  had  been  swept  away  and  the 
fords  were  gone,  and  then  there  were  the  troops  of  Heintzel- 
man  and  Porter,  now  arriving  from  Alexandria  and  Aquia 
Creek,  who  would  furnish  for  the  moment  a  sufficient  de- 
fence. He,  therefore,  on  the  morning  of  the  23d,  ordered  ^ 
General  Sigel  upon  Sulphur  Springs,  as  has  just  been  stated, 
and  thence,  if  he  did  not  find  the  enemy,  upon  Waterloo 
Bridge,  some  few  miles  higher  up  the  river.  He  ordered  f 
Banks  and  Eeno  to  support  Sigel,  and  he  pushed  McDowell's 
corps  to  Warrenton,  where  he  fixed  his  own  headquarters. 
To  Warrenton  he  also  directed  J  Eeynolds,  who  had  come 
up  on  the  23d  from  Aquia  Creek,  with  his  fine  division  of 
Pennsylvania  reserves — 2,500  strong — the  first  arrival  from 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac — and  which  he  attached  to 
McDowell's  command,  to  which  it  had,  as  we  have  seen, 
originally  belonged.  He  also,  on  the  23d,  abandoned  his 
works  beyond  the  river  at  Eappahannock  Station  and  with- 
drew the  troops ;  he  destroyed  the  bridge  there  ;  and  for  the 
time  being,  at  any  rate,  he  renounced  §  his  plan  of  recrossing 
the  river.  These  movements  were  certainly  wise,  and  they 
were  ordered  with  commendable  promptitude. 


*  p.  R.,  p.  129. 
tP.R.,  p.  132. 


t  Pope  to  Banks  :  P.  E.,  p.  131. 
§  Though  not  definitely.    Pope  to  Hallecii ;  P.  B..,  135. 


42 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


While  this  was  going  on  in  our  army,  General  J.  E.  B. 
Stnart,  the  celebrated  cavalry  officer,  whose  enterprise 
and  audacity  were  justly  famous,  on  the  night  of  the  22d, 
conducted  an  expedition  of  1,500  horse  or  thereabouts,  to 
our  rear,  striking  the  railroad  at  Catlett's  Station.  The 
weather  was  horrible,  and  the  march  exceedingly  severe,  but 
the  object  of  the  expedition  was  in  part  attained,  for  baggage, 
despatches,  and  prisoners  were  taken.  The  trestle  bridge 
across  Cedar  Eun,  however,  could  not  be  destroyed.  Still, 
the  moral  efifect  of  this  raid,  so  far  as  it  went,  was  of  course 
favorable  to  the  enemy. 

On  the  24th  Early  succeeded  in  rejoining  his  corps. 
Sigel,  who  arrived  near  Sulphur  Springs  on  the  night  of 
the  23d,  having  marched  from  Freeman's  Ford,  was  delayed, 
as  we  have  said,  at  Great  Eun,  till  the  morning  of  the  24th. 
Whether  he  could  not  have  accomplished  more  than  he  did 
is  still  an  unsettled  question.  Between  his  corps  and  that 
of  Jackson  there  was  an  artillery  duel  all  that  day.  Buford, 
with  his  cavalry,  had  pushed  out  to  Waterloo  in  the  forenoon 
of  the  24th.  Pope  directed  him  to  destroy  the  bridge 
there,  but  for  some  reason  this  was  not  done.  Sigel  was  or- 
dered to  support  him,  and  Milroy's  brigade,  constituting  the 
advance  of  his  corps,  reached  Waterloo  late  in  the  afternoon 
of  the  same  day. 

In  the  evening  of  the  24th  Jackson  retired  to  Jefferson,  a 
place  about  four  miles  west  of  Sulphur  Springs,  and  his  po- 
sitions on  the  river  were  occupied  by  the  corps  of  Longstreet. 
That  evening.  Pope's  headquarters  were  at  Warrenton  ;  Sigel 
was  on  the  river  from  Waterloo  to  the  Springs ;  below  him, 
on  the  river,  was  the  corps  of  Banks ;  the  two  divisions 
of  Eeno  were  a  short  distance  east  of  the  Springs ;  Eicketts' 
division  of  McDowell's  corps  was  partly  between  Warrenton 
and  Waterloo,  and  King's  division  was  between  Warrenton 


ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK. 


43 


and  the  Springs.  Eeynolds  was  near  Warrenton.  Buford's 
cavalry  observed  the  extreme  right  beyond  Waterloo.  Every- 
thing was  ready  to  repel  another  attempt  at  crossing  either 
at  the  Springs  or  at  "Waterloo  Bridge. 


Jackson's  March. 


General  Lee  had  been  delayed  longer  than  he  expected  on 
the  banks  of  the  Rappahannock.  He  had  not  succeeded  in 
surprising  General  Pope.  Wherever  he  had  attempted  a 
passage  of  the  river,  he  had  been  met  with  adequate  resist- 
ance.   He  now  determined  on  the  bold  step  of  sending 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPR 


Jackson  round  oiir  right  by  way  of  Orleans,  Salem,  "White 
Plains,  and  Thoroughfare  Gap,  to  cut  our  railroad  communi- 
cations at  Manassas  ;  a  move  which,  if  successful,  would 
necessarily  bring  about  a  withdrawal  of  our  army  from  the 
line  of  the  Eappahannock.  It  was  a  dangerous  move,  and 
one  which  could  have  been  entrusted  to  no  one  but  Stone- 
wall Jackson ;  and  it  was  so  dangerous  that  even  he  came 
within  an  ace  of  being  totally  defeated.  Moreover,  the  ob- 
ject proposed  was  not  worth  the  risk.  It  was  not  supposed 
by  anybody  that  Pope's  army  could  be  materially  injured  by 
this  expedition.  There  was  nothing  in  the  world  to  prevent 
Pope  and  his  whole  army  from  retiring  safely  behind  Bull 
Eun  and  there  meeting  fresh  supplies  and  reinforcements, 
and  there  was  great  probability,  that,  on  the  way  there,  he 
would  have  an  opportunity  to  crush  Jackson  before  Lee 
could  possibly  rejoin  him,  not  to  speak  of  the  possibility  of 
Jackson's  encountering  large  bodies  of  troops  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  On  this  march  Jackson  started  on  the 
morning  of  the  25th  from  Jefferson,^  passing  through 
Amissville,  and  crossing  Hedgman's  Eiver,  as  the  Eappa- 
hannock above  Waterloo  Bridge  is  called,  at  Hinson's  Mills, 
and  thence  marching  by  way  of  Orleans  and  reaching  Salem 
at  night. 

The  march  of  this  column  could  not  of  course  be  kept  a 
secret.  Everyone  saw  it — the  clouds  of  dust  were  plainly 
visible — the  signal  officers  reported  its  strength,  but  where 


*  General  Pope  is  in  error  when  he  states,  as  he  does  in  his  report,  p.  131,  that 
''during  the  day  of  the  24th  a  large  detachment  of  the  en^my,  numbering  thirty- 
six  regiments  of  infantry,  with  the  usual  number  of  batteries  of  artillery  and  a 
considerable  cavalry  force,  marched  rapidly  to  the  north,  in  the  direction  of  Rec- 
tortown."  There  was  no  force  that  marched  in  that  direction  but  Jackson's,  and 
that  did  not  leave  Jefferson  till  the  morning  of  the  25th  ;  see  Reports  of  Lee, 
Jackson,  Early,  Taliaferro,  Hill,  Stuart,  and  Boswell.  Rep.  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  i.,  p. 
21 ;  vol.  ii.,  pp.  92,  124,  140,  142,  171),  199,  and  393. 


ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK. 


45 


Jackson  was  going  was  the  doubtful  question.  He  might  be 
going  into  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah  on  another  raid. 
From  Orleans  his  troops  could  pass  through  Chester  Gap. 
At  Salem  he  attained  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  which  led 
through  Front  Eoyal  to  Strasburg.  On  the  other  hand, 
from  Salem  he  could  follow  the  track  in  the  other  direction, 
marching  through  White  Plains  and  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and 
strike  our  rear  at  Gainesville  and  Manassas  Junction.  Which 
was  he  intending  to  do  ?  A  third  course  was  also  possible, 
namely,  a  sudden  dash  south  from  White  Plains  upon  War- 
renton. 

W^hichever  of  these  courses  he  might  choose  to  take,  how- 
ever, it  was  clearly  the  policy  of  General  Pope  to  retire 
promptly  to  the  line  of  Thoroughfare  Gap,  Gainesville,  and 
Manassas  Junction.  He  should,  the  moment  he  suspected 
the  movement  to  have  begun,  say,  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
25th,  have  retired  as  quickly  as  he  did  from  the  Rapidan  to 
the  Rappahannock  a  few  days  before.  Even  if  the  enemy 
were  going  into  the  valley,  he  could  not  detain  him  by  re- 
maining at  Warrenton,  and  confronting  the  heavy  bodies  of 
troops  that  still  remained  opposite  Sulphur  Springs  and 
Waterloo ;  while  if  Jackson  had  either  of  the  two  other 
plans  in  his  mind.  Pope  would  certainly  be  taken  at  a  great 
disadvantage.  It  needs  no  argument  to  show  that  the  pos- 
session of  unembarrassed  lines  of  communication  is  an  es- 
sential requisite  for  the  successful  conduct  of  a  campaign. 

In  this  emergency  General  Pope,  as  we  shall  see,  made 
the  mistake  of  trusting  to  the  Washington  authorities  to 
preserve  his  line  of  supplies.  He  remained  where  he  was, 
manoeuvering  in  the  neighborhood  of  Warrenton,  Sulphur 
Springs,  and  Waterloo  Bridge,  directing  General  Haupt,  who 
had  charge  of  the  transportation,  to  post  a  strong  division  at 
Manassas  Junction,  and  requesting  General  Halleck  to  push 


46 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


Franklin's  corps  with  all  speed  to  Gainesville.  It  may  well 
be  that  he  did  not  like  the  notion  of  retreating  further ;  yet 
anything  was  preferable  to  a  reliance  upon  officers  w^ho  had 
not  even  reported  for  duty.  There  is  no  doubt,  as  his  dis- 
patches *  clearly  show,  that  he  inclined  to  the  theory  that 
the  enemy  were  making  for  the  Shenandoah  Valley  by  way 
of  Front  Royal,  but  what  sound  objection  could  there  be  to 
his  taking  the  safer  course,  and,  by  occupying  Thoroughfare 
Gap  and  Gainesville  with  his  own  troops,  forestall  a  possible 
surprise  and  loss  ?    But  we  are  anticipating  a  little. 

On  the  morning  of  August  25th,  before  Jackson's  move- 
ment had  been  observed.  General  Pope  issued  a  General 
Order  f  for  the  formation  of  a  new  line  running  substantially 
north  and  south.  McDowell's  corps  was  to  be  on  the  right, 
at  Warrenton  ;  Sigel  on  his  left,  at  Fayetteville  ;  then  Banks, 
from  Bealeton  to  a  creek  near  the  river;  and,  finally,  Reno 
at  Kelly's  Ford.  These  officers  were  ordered  to  throw  out 
troops  in  the  direction  of  the  river  to  observe  the  enemy. 

McDowell  was  already  in  position.  Reno,  by  some  mis- 
take, retired  to  Warrenton  Junction.  Banks  fell  back  to 
the  neighborhood  of  Bealeton  Station,  or  was  between  that 
place  and  Fayetteville.  Sigel,  who  was  about  to  retire  from 
Waterloo  and  Sulphur  Springs  to  Fayetteville,  received  J  a 
verbal  order  from  General  Roberts,  of  Pope's  staff,  direct- 
ing him  to  hold  his  position  at  Waterloo  Bridge  at  all 
hazards,  and  advising  him  that  McDowell  would  support 
him  on  the  right  and  Banks  on  the  left.  This  seems  to 
have  been  a  repetition  by  Roberts  of  his  culpable  conduct 
on  the  day  of  Cedar  Mountain,  when  he  took  upon  himself 
to  vary  the  orders  of  the  commanding  officer  by  intimating 
to  Banks  that  Pope  expected  him  to  fight  a  battle.  Sigel 


*  Pope  to  McDowelJ,  P.  R.,  p.  187 ;  Pope  to  Sigel,  lb.,  p.  13T. 

t  Pope's  Virginia  Campaign,  McDoweU's  Report,  p.  37,        ^  P.  V.  C,  p.  SI. 


ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK. 


47 


found  the  enemy  assuming  a  very  threatening  aspect ;  he 
sent  to  find  McDowell  and  Banks,  but  they  were  neither  of 
them  in  the  position  in  which  Eoberts  had  said  they  were ; 
in  this  emergency  he  is  about  to  fall  back  on  the  aforesaid 
General  Order  to  retire  to  Fayetteville,  when  he  receives  an 
order  from  Pope  directing  him  to  march  to  Warrenton,  in- 
stead of  to  Fayetteville,  at  once.  This  he  does,  first  setting 
fire  to  Waterloo  Bridge,  and  arriving  at  Warrenton  at  two 
o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  26th. 

Before  the  25th  General  Heintzelman,  with  two  divisions 
of  the  Third  Corps,  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  under  Gen- 
erals Hooker  and  Kearney,  had  reported  for  duty.  His 
command  numbered  about  ten  thousand  five  hundred  men. 
He  ha^  come  direct  by  rail  from  Alexandria.  On  the  night 
of  the  25th  he  was  at  Warrenton  Junction. 

General  Fitz  John  Porter  also,  with  the  two  excellent  di- 
visions of  the  Fifth  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  under 
Generals  Morell  and  Sykes,  who  had  come  via  Aquia  Creek 
and  Falmouth,  and  had  been  under  the  orders  of  General 
Burnside,  who  commanded  at  Falmouth,  watching  the  low^er 
fords  of  the  Rappahannock  for  two  or  three  days,  reported 
for  duty  on  the  26th.  His  corps  numbered  rather  less  than 
nine  thousand  men.'^  On  the  night  of  the  25th  Morell  was 
at  Kelly's  Ford,  and  Sykes  at  Bealeton  Station. 

The  officers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  w-ho  had  joined 
General  Pope,  were  among  the  best  in  that  army.  General 
Eeynolds,  who  brought  up  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  was 
in  all  respects  an  admirable  soldier.  He  fell  at  the  head  of 
his  corps — the  First — on  the  bloody  field  of  Gettysburg. 
General  Meade,  who  commanded  the  army  there,  was  one  of 
his  brigadiers.    General  Heintzelman,  of  the  Third  Corps, 


*  Piatt's  brigade,  of  Stursfis'  division,  was  added  to  it  on  the  2Tth,  raising  the 
total  to  nearly  or  quite  ten  thousand  men. 


48 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


was  a  gallant  old  veteran,  and  his  lieutenants,  Kearney  and 
Hooker,  were  men  of  known  activity,  skill,  and  daring. 
Kearney  fell  in  the  conrse  of  the  campaign.  Hooker  rose  to 
the  command  of  the  army.  General  Porter,  who  commanded 
the  Fifth  Corps,  was  an  officer  of  the  highest  character,  and 
had  recently  distinguished  himself  at  the  battle  of  Malvern 
Hill.  His  division  commanders,  Morell  and  Sykes,  were  ex- 
cellent men.  Sykes  afterward  for  a  long  time  commanded 
this  corps,  and  led  it  at  Gettysburg  in  the  successful  strug- 
gle for  the  possession  of  Little  Eound  Top. 

These  were  all  the  reinforcements  which  General  Pope 
got  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  until  after  the  battle  of 
Manassas.  They  numbered  in  all,  including  Piatt's  brigade, 
only  23,000  men. 


CHAPTEE  IV. 

JACKSON'S  RAID. 

The  reports  of  the  signal-officers  of  the  march  of  Jackson*s 
cohimn  to  our  right  during  the  day  of  the  25th,  made  such 
an  impression  on  General  Pope's  mind,  that  he,  on  that 
evening,  changed  his  plan  as  indicated  in  the  General  Order 
of  that  morning.  He  ordered  McDowell  to  make  a  recon- 
noissance  as  early  as  possible  on  the  next  morning,  the  26th, 
with  his  wdiole  cor^DS  (except  Eeynolds'  division,  which  was 
to  be  left  at  Warrenton),  and  ascertain  w^liatwas  beyond  the 
river  at  Sulphur  Springs  ;  and  he  ordered  Sigel  to  force  the 
passage  of  the  river  at  Waterloo  Bridge  at  daylight,  and  see 
what  was  in  front  of  him.  This  order  reached  Sigel  just  as 
he  was  entering  Warrenton  at  two  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
after  the  fatiguing  night  march  from  Waterloo,  w^hich  had 
succeeded  to  the  perplexities  and  contradictory  orders  of  the 
afternoon.  He  sent  word  that  his  men  could  not  execute 
the  order  till  they  had  rested,  and  Pope  allowed  him  to  put 
them  in  camp  for  a  day.  McDowell  moved  with  prompti- 
tude early  in  the  morning  of  the  26th,  bringing  Eicketts 
from  his  position  on  the  Warrenton  and  Waterloo  road 
toward  Sulphur  Springs,  so  as  to  support  King,  who,  hav- 
ing been  posted  on  the  road  from  Warrenton  to  the  Springs, 
had  a  shorter  distance  to  march,  and  was  in  the  advance. 
Pope,  when  he  found  that  his  orders  could  not  be  carried 
out  by  Sigel,  notified  McDowell  to  use  his  discretion  about 
Vol.  IV.— 4 


50 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


crossing  at  Sulphur  Springs,  and  requested  him  also  to  as- 
certain, if  he  could,  what  was  passing  at  Waterloo  Bridge. 
McDowell  very  wisely,  thereupon,  contented  himself  with 
observing  the  enemy  at  the  Springs  with  King's  division,  and 
returned  Ricketts'  division  to  the  position  it  had  occupied  in 
the  morning.  King's  division  had  a  cannonade  with  the 
enemy  all  the  afternoon.  King  ascertained  from  a  flag  of 
truce  that  he  had  Anderson's  division  in  front  of  'him. 

McDowell  also  ordered  Buford,  w^ith  all  the  available  force 
of  Sigel's  cavalry,  and  some  guns,  and  with  three  days  cooked 
rations,  to  march  at  dawn  of  the  27th  toward  Chester  Gap, 
and  ascertain  the  direction  which  Jackson's  force  was  taking. 
Pope  also  ordered  a  cavalry  regiment  to  be  sent  from  Ma- 
nassas to  scout  the  railroad  as  far  as  the  Gap.  Reports 
came  in  from  scouts  that  the  enemy  was  marching  for 
Thoroughfare  Gap.  With  the  exception  of  these  orders,  no 
steps  were  taken  in  consequence  of  this  information.  It  was 
expected,  perhaps,  that  General  Halleck  would  be  able  to 
provide  for  the  safety  of  the  communications. 

At  the  close  of  this  day — August  26th — the  positions  of 
the  troops  were  substantially  as  follows :  Buford  with  his 
cavalry,  was  on  the  right,  near  Waterloo,  preparing  for  his 
expedition.  Eicketts  was  on  the  road  between  Waterloo 
and  Warrenton,  about  four  miles  from  Warrenton.  King  was 
on  the  road  between  Warrenton  and  Sulphur  Springs,  with 
one  brigade  near  the  Springs.  Reynolds  was  in  Warrenton. 
Sigel  was  in  camp  near  Warrenton.  Banks  was  at  Fayette- 
ville.  Reno  and  Heintzelman  were  near  Warrenton  Junc- 
tion, where  were  General  Pope's  headquarters.  Of  Porter's 
corps,  one  division,  Morell's,  was  at  Kelly's  Ford,  and  the 
other  division,  Sykes',  five  or  six  miles  east  of  Bealeton  Sta- 
tion. 

That  same  evening  Stonewall  Jackson  was  at  Bristoe  Sta- 


JACKSON'S  RAID, 


51 


tion  with  his  whole  force,  consisting  of  the  divisions  of 
Taliaferro,  A.  P.  Hill,  and  Ewell,  numbering  some  twenty- 
five  thousand  men.  He  had  marched  all  day  from  Salem, 
through  White  Plains,  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  Gainesville, 
and  had  nowhere  met  with  the  smallest  opposition.  He  had 
marched  all  that  afternoon  some  fifteen  miles  in  rear  of  oiu* 
army  with  his  twenty-five  thousand  men,  and  our  army  knew 
nothing  about  it.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that  this  was 
the  result  of  great  negligence.  Enough  was  known  to  de- 
mand the  sending  of  parties  of  observation  to  the  road  which 
Jackson  took ;  nay,  enough  was  suspected  of  the  intentions 
of  the  enemy  to  make  a  reasonably  prudent  officer  detach 
ten  thousand  men  to  Thoroughfare  GajD.  And  what  was  the 
object  in  maintaining  such  a  forward  position  with  the  army  ? 
Why  was  it  not  the  wisest  course,  in  view  of  the  possible 
movement  of  Jackson  through  Thoroughfare  Gap,  to  fall 
back  to  that  line  with  the  whole  army  ? 

General  Pope,  indeed,  tells  us  in  his  report  (p.  140)  that  he 
confidently  expected  that  by  the  afternoon  of  the  26th 
Franklin  would  have  been  at  or  near  Gainesville ;  and  that 
the  forces  under  Sturgis  and  Cox  would  have  been  at  War- 
renton  Junction.  There  may,  undoubtedly  have  been  a  time 
when  he  did  expect  this."^  But  he  certainly  did  not  07i  the 
evening  of  the  26th  sup^Dose  that  Franklin  was  at  Gainesville, 
for  we  find  him  writing  to  Porter  at  seven  o'clock  that  even- 
ing this :  "  Franklin,  I  hope,  with  his  corps,  will,  bi/  day 
after  to-morrow  night,  occupy  the  point  where  the  Manassas 
Gap  Eailroad  intersects  the  turnpike  from  Warrenton  to 
Washington  City, "  L e. ,  Gainesville.    And  in  this  letter  he  tells 


*  On  the  24th  General  Haupt  telegraphed  him  from  Alexandria  that  thirty 
thousand  troops,  or  more,  demanded  transportation ;  and  on  the  25th,  that  he 
expected  to  send  on  all  the  troops  now  there,  and  all  that  were  expected  to  ar- 
rive that  day.    P.  11 ,  p.  183. 


52 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


him  what  he  expects  abont  Cox  and  Sturgis,  who  have  not 
yet  joined  him,  namely,  that  Cox  will  join  him  in  the  after- 
noon of  to-morrow,  and  that  Sturgis  will  move  forward  the  day 
after  to-morrow.  Pope,  it  is  perfectly  evident,  knew,  on  the 
night  of  the  26th,  that  neither  Gainesville  nor  the  Gap  were 
guarded.  It  must  be  remarked  that  the  above  statement 
in  his  report  is  misleading,  as  are  also  others  on  page  142. 
The  truth  is  just  this  :  he  knew  perfectly  well,  on  the  even- 
ing of  the  26th,  that  there  was  no  force  of  our  army  at  the 
GajD,  or  near  it,  but  he  did  not  suppose  that  Jackson  was 
coming  through  the  Gap. 

On  the  evening  of  the  26th  "^^  Pope  determined  to  form  a  new 
line  running  substantially  East  and  West  between  Warren- 
ton  and  Gainesville.  He  wrote  McDowell  at  eight  p.m.,  that 
he  thinks  the  fight  should  be  made  at  Warrenton.  Sigel 
was  already  there.  It  was  not  necessary,  of  course,  to  issue 
any  special  orders  to  McDowell  for  the  concentration  of  his 
own  divisions.  Banks,  too,  at  Fayetteville,  was  in  a  good  po- 
sition to  support  the  new  line.  Eeno  was  ordered  to  move 
from  Warrenton  Junction  at  daylight  to  the  neighborhood  of 
Warrenton,  and  McDowell  was  directed,  as  soon  as  he  got 
near  Warrenton,  to  send  him  to  Greenwich,  a  village  nearly 
east  of  Warrenton,  and  about  as  far  from  Warrenton  as  War- 
renton is  from  Warrenton  Junction.  Why  Eeno  was  to  make 
this  fatiguing  march  it  is  not  easy  to  see.  Greenwich  is 
nearer  the  Junction  than  Warrenton  is.  Arrived  at  Green- 
wich, Reno  was  to  throw  forward  four  regiments  and  a  bat- 
tery to  Gainesville.  Heintzelman,  who  was  at  the  Junction, 
was  ordered  to  send  Kearney's  division  to  Greenwich. 
Hooker  was  to  remain  near  the  Junction.  Porter  was  ordered 


*  The  statement  in  his  Report,  p.  139,  that  he  came  to  this  determination  on 
the  evening  of  the  25th,  is  an  error.  The  orders  to  Reno  and  Porter  dated 
on  the  evening  of  the  26th. 


JACKSON'S  RAID.  53 

to  march  through  Fayetteville  to  the  vicinity  of  Warrenton. 
Of  his  two  divisions,  Morell's  was  at  Kelly's  Ford  and  below, 
and  Sykes'  was  five  miles  east  of  Bealeton  Station,  as  has 
been  stated. 

While  writing  these  orders  General  Pope  was  informed 
that  the  enemy's  cavalry  had  interrupted  the  railroad  near 
Manassas.  He  at  once  ordered  Heintzelman  "  to  put  a  regi- 
ment on  a  train  of  cars  and  send  it  down  immediately  to 
Manassas  to  ascertain  what  had  occurred,  repair  the  tele- 
graph wires,  and  protect  the  railroad  there  until  further 
orders."  To-pe  evidently  did  not  at  this  moment  suppose 
this  interruption  to  be  a  matter  of  very  great  consequence. 
But  at  midnight  he  writes  to  McDowell  that  the  question 
whether  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy  or  the  larger  portion 
of  it  has  gone  round  (i.e.,  through  Thoroughfare  Gap)  is  a 
question  which  we  must  settle  instantly,  so  that  we  may  deter- 
mine our  plans."  During  the  night  he  made  up  his  mind 
to  take  the  most  prudent  course  and  throw  the  main  body 
of  the  army  u^Don  Gainesville,  a  thing  which  the  direction 
he  had  the  evening  before  given  to  his  columns  enabled 
him  to  do  without  difficulty.  This  decision  was  a  wise 
one,  and  it  was  taken  with  General  Pope's  customary  promp- 
titude. 

At  half  past  eight  in  the  morning  of  the  27tli,  accordingly. 
General  Pope  ordered  McDowell,  with  his  own  and  Sigel's 
corps  and  the  division  of  Reynolds,  to  pursue  the  turnpike 
from  Warrenton  to  Gainesville  so  as  to  reach  Gainesville 
that  evening.  McDowell  at  once  ordered  Sigel  to  send  for- 
ward instantly  a  strong  advance  from  his  corps,  to  seize 
the  iDOsition  of  Buckland  Mills,  on  Broad  Run,  and  to  fol- 
low immediately  with  his  corps.  Bayard's  cavalry  preceded 
the  march.  Reynolds,  King,  and  Ricketts  followed.  Sigel 
reached  Buckland  Mills  in  time  to  save  the  bridge,  which 


54 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


tlie  enemy's  cavalry  wlio  covered  Jackson's  movement  had 
attempted  to  set  on  fire.  Milroy's  brigade  and  Schnrz's  di- 
vision reached  Gainesville  that  evening ;  Schenck's  division 
remained  with  McDowell's  corps  at  Bnckland  Mills. 

By  the  same  order,  Eeno,  with  his  two  divisions,  was  or- 
dered upon  Greenwich  from  Catlett's  Station,  the  nearest 
way,  instead  of  first  going  to  Warrenton,  as  directed  the 
evening  before.  He  was  followed  by  Kearny's  division  of 
Heintzelman's  corps.  Eeno  and  Kearny  reached  their  al- 
lotted positions  that  evening. 

By  the  same  order,  General  Porter  w^as  to  remain  at  "War- 
renton Junction  till  relieved  by  Banks,  who  was  ordered 
thifcher  from  Fayetteville,  to  assume  charge  of  all  the  army 
trains,  which  were  to  retire  by  a  road  jparallel  with  the  rail- 
road, and  of  all  the  railroad  trains,  which  were  to  be  run 
back  to  Manassas  as  fast  as  practicable. 

"While  Pope  was  issuing  this  order  for  the  concentration 
of  the  army  upon  Gainesville  he  was  undoubtedly  of  the 
opinion  that  the  railroad  had  been  cut  only  by  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  or  at  least  by  a  small  force  of  the  enemy,  whether 
cavalry  or  infantry.  The  regiment  w^hich  Heintzelman 
had  been,  the  evening  before,  directed  to  send  out  to  ascer- 
tain the  facts,  reported  the  next  morning  very  early  that 
they  had  found  the  enemy  in  full  force.  At  7  A.  m.  of  the 
27th  Hooker's  division  was  sent  out  from  Warrenton  Junc- 
tion to  drive  them  away.  Nine  miles  from  the  Junction, 
near  Bristoe  Station,  Hooker  encountered  Ewell's  division 
in  position.  It  was  between  two  and  three  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon.  Hooker  immediately  attacked  the  enemy,  and  in 
a  sharp  action,  lasting  till  dusk,  in  which  he  manoeuvred 
his  troops  admirably,  causing  Ewell  to  think  that  he  w^as 
largely  outnumbered,  he  drove  him  back  across  Broad  Eun. 
Ewell  was  directed  by  Jackson  to  retire  toward  Manassas  if 


JACKSON'S  RAID. 


55 


tlireatened  by  a  superior  force,  and  doubtless  lie  did  not 
contest  the  possession  of  the  ground  so  sharply  as  he  would 
have  done  had  he  been  expected  to  contest  it  stubbornly. 
Still,  it  appears  from  Early's  report  that  Ewell  was  out- 
manoeuvred by  Hooker. 

At  the  close  of  the  action  General  Pope  in  person  arrived 
on  the  field  at  Bristoe  Station.  He  now  for  the  first  time 
learned  the  truth,  namely,  that  Jackson  was  in  front  of  him 
with  his  whole  corps,  consisting  of  his  old  division  under 
Taliaferro,  the  division  of  Ew^ell,  and  the  light  division  (so- 
called)  under  A.  P.  Hill.  He  very  j^roperly  sent  at  once  for 
Porter  to  come  right  iii>  from  Warrenton  Junction,  about 
nine  miles  off,  and  for  Kearny  to  come  from  Greenwich, 
w^iich  was  not  more  than  half  that  distance.  He  would 
thus,  in  the  morning,  have  four  divisions  at  Bristoe,  includ- 
ing Hooker's.  Banks  was  ordered  to  take  Porter's  i^lace  at 
Warrenton  Junction.  If  necessary,  there  were  his  two  di\d- 
sions,  now  entirely  recovered  from  the  losses  of  Cedar  Moun- 
tain, available  for  some  more  active  service  than  guarding 
trains.  In  fact,  General  Pope,  had  he  contented  himself 
with  these  orders,  would  have  had  his  army  admirably  dis- 
posed the  next  day  for  any  emergency.  At  Gainesville  and 
in  its  neighborhood  he  would  have  had  the  three  divisions 
of  McDowell  and  the  two  divisions  of  Sigel.  At  Greenwich, 
he  would  have  had  the  tw^o  divisions  of  Eeno  ready  to  march 
upon  Gainesville  or  Manassas,  as  might  be  required.  At 
and  near  Bristoe  he  would  have  had  Hooker's  and  Kearny's 
divisions  and  the  tw^o  divisions  of  Porter ;  and,  within  sup- 
porting distance,  the  two  divisions  of  Banks — a  perfectly 
adequate  force  with  which  to  encounter  Jackson.  It  was 
absolutely  certain  that  Jackson's  command  was  somewhere 
to  the  eastward,  and  this  army  of  Pope's,  in  the  position  it 
w^ould  then  have  been  in,  would  separate  Jackson's  force 


56 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


from  the  rest  of  Lee's  army.  The  situation  would  have  been 
as  favorable  as  could  be  desired. 

But  General  Pope  did  not  content  himself  with  these  or- 
ders. He  ordered  Eeno's  divisions  from  Greenwich  to  Man- 
assas Junction ;  and  he  ordered  McDowell  and  Sigel,  even, 
to  march  on  the  same  place  at  daylight  the  next  morning. 
But  as  these  orders  need  a  fuller  discussion,  in  view  of  the 
movements  of  the  enemy,  we  will  postpone  further  mention 
of  them  until  we  shall  have  briefly  narrated  the  exploits  of 
Stonewall  Jackson  on  his  daring  raid. 

On  arriving,  after  a  fatiguing  march  from  Salem,  through 
"White  Plains,  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  Gainesville,  at  a  point 
near  Bristoe  Station,  without  any  opposition,  after  sunset  of 
the  26th,  Jackson  captured  without  difficulty  the  small  force 
guarding  the  road  there.  As  the  Confederates  were  coming 
in  sight,  one  train  ran  past  the  station  toward  Manassas 
Junction.  Another,  passing  in  the  same  direction,  they  tried 
to  stop  by  firing  at  it,  but  the  engineer  resolutely  drove 
ahead  and  escaped,  carrying  with  him  the  news.  A  third 
train  was  thrown  from  the  track  by  tearing  up  the  rails, 
and  the  communication  was  now  interrupted.  General 
Jackson  felt  the  importance  o*f  attacking  the  post  of  Manas- 
sas Junction  without  delay,  as  the  news  received  at  Alexan- 
dria of  the  appearance  of  his  troops  at  Bristoe  might  natur- 
ally cause  reinforcements  to  be  sent  to  the  garrison.  He, 
therefore,  eagerly  accepted  the  offer  of  General  Trimble, 
who  imdertook  with  the  Twenty-first  North  Carolina  and  the 
Twenty-first  Georgia  to  carry  the  post  that  night.  To  secure 
success  he  ordered  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  with  his  cavalry, 
to  move  forward,  and,  as  the  ranking  officer,  to  take  com- 
mand of  the  expedition.  The  escaped  trains  do  not  seem  to 
have  informed  the  garrison  of  the  danger.  A  little  after 
midnight  the  place  was  taken  ;  the  resistance  of  the  Federals 


JACKSON'S  RAID. 


57 


was  not  desperate ;  the  Confederate  loss  was  insignificant ; 
the  booty  was  enormous.  Considerable  controversy  ensued 
between  Trimble  and  Stuart,  as  to  the  honor  belonging  to 
them  respectively  in  the  affair,  into  which  we  do  not  propose 
to  enter  here. 

The  captures,  according  to  Jackson's  official  report, 
amounted  to  eight  guns,  with  horses,  equipments,  and  ammu- 
nition ;  immense  supplies  of  commissary  and  quartermaster 
stores,  upward  of  200  new  tents,  175  horses,  300  prisoners, 
and  200  negroes.  The  stores  consisted,  by  the  same  author- 
ity, of  50,000  pounds  of  bacon,  1,000  barrels  of  corn  beef, 
2,000  barrels  of  salt  pork,  2,000  barrels  of  flour,  and  other 
things  in  proportion. 

The  next  day,  the  27th,  at  seven  in  the  morning,  a  gallant 
attempt  to  recaj^ture  the  place  was  made  by  a  New  Jersey 
brigade  under  General  Taylor.  Jackson  says  of  their  ad- 
vance, that  it  was  made  with  great  spirit  and  determination, 
and  under  a  leader  worthy  of  a  better  cause.  It  was  of 
course  unsuccessful,  as  it  met  the  divisions  of  Hill  and  Tali- 
aferro, and  in  the  affair  Taylor  w^as  mortally  wounded. 

After  furnishing  to  the  hungry  men  as  many  of  the  stores 
as  they  could  use  or  carry  away,  the  remainder  were  burned. 

Ewell,  as  we  have  seen,  after  his  fight  with  Hooker,  retired 
from  Bristoe  Station  late  in  the  afternoon,  destroying  the 
bridge  on  Broad  Kun  as  he  retired. 

General  Jackson  could  not,  of  course,  stay  at  Manassas 
Junction.  His  position  was,  in  fact,  a  very  difficult  one. 
He  had  separated  his  command  loyigo  intervallo  from  the  rest 
of  Lee's  army.  McDowell,  Sigel,  and  Reno  were  at  Gaines- 
ville, or  very  near  it ;  so  that  he  could  not  go  back  the  way 
he  had  come.  Pope  himself,  with  the  three  corps  of  Heintz- 
elman.  Porter,  and  Banks,  was  on  the  railroad,  certain  to  at- 
tack him  if  he  stayed  a  day  longer.  If  he  should  go  to  Cen- 
3* 


58 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


treville,  he  would  certainly  put  Bull  Run  between  himself 
and  his  foes,  but  that  would  be  only  a  temporary  obstacle, 
and  then  there  would  be  nothing  for  him  to  resort  to,  but  a 
retreat  through  Aldie  Gap.  This  would  be  a  result  by  no 
means  in  keeping  with  his  intentions,  for  he  had  not  risked 
all  this  simply  for  the  glory  of  the  thing,  or  even  for  the  de- 
struction of  the  stores,  which,  though  of  great  value  to  him, 
w^ere  as  nothing  in  the  estimation  of  the  more  wealthy  Fed- 
eral government.  Should  he  then  turn  square  to  the  right, 
and,  keeping  to  the  south  of  the  railroad,  fall  upon  our 
trains  at  Catlett's  and  Warrenton  Junction  ?  General  Pope 
says  in  his  Report  ^  that  he  thought  this  was  altogether 
likely."  General  McDow^ell  f  also  says  that  he  was  under 
the  belief  that  Jackson  ^^was  moving  to  the  south  of  us,  to 
go  entirely  around  and  fall  on  our  enormous  wagon  trains 
under  Banks."  Doubtless  this  course  might  have  been 
taken  and  a  considerable  amount  of  damage  inflicted.  But 
this  would  have  been  to  have  made  of  the  whole  opei'ation  a 
mere  raid  on  our  supplies  ;  whereas  in  the  plan  of  Jackson 
and  Lee  it  was  a  great  deal  more  than  this ;  it  was  an  opera- 
tion intended  by  the  capture  of  our  supplies  in  the  rear  of 
our  army,  to  w^ork  a  demoralization  of  the  troops,  and  to 
bring  about  a  state  of  confusion  of  w^hich  they  could  take 
advantage.  And  for  this  to  be  accomplished,  it  was  neces- 
sary for  Jackson  to  be  again  reunited  to  the  main  army. 

General  Jackson  took  the  most  sagacious  steps  to  effect 
this.  He  made  up  his  mind,  apparently,  that  the  old  battle- 
field of  Bull  Run,  where  he  had  won  his  first  laurels,  was  ex- 
actly the  place  for  him  to  retire  to  now.  It  contained  good 
defensive  positions,  and  was  so  near  Haymarket  and  Thor- 
oughfare Gap  that  the  army  of  Lee  could  join  him  the  mo- 


*  p.  R.,  p.  144. 


t  McDowell's  statement,  p.  57. 


JACKSON'S  RAID. 


59 


ment  it  emerged  from  tlie  Gap.  For  it  was  part  of  the  gen- 
eral plan  that  Lee,  having  with  him  Longstreet's  command, 
should  follow  the  track  of  Jackson's  corps,  so  that  Jackson 
was  certain  in  a  day  or  two  of  reinforcements,  if  he  could 
only  take  care  of  himself  in  the  meantime. 

Therefore,  on  the  night  of  the  27th  and  28tli,  the  whole 
corps  ^  retired  from  Manassas  Junction  almost  simultane- 
ously, by  three  roads.  Taliaferro  f  moved  by  the  Sudley 
Springs  road,  which  leads  from  the  Junction  due  north  to 
Sudley  Springs,  crossed  the  Warrenton  Pike,  and  at  day- 
light of  the  28th  halted  on  the  battle-field  of  Bull  Eun.  A. 
P.  Hill  J  at  1  A.M.  of  the  28th,  moved  his  division  to  Centre- 
ville,  and  at  10  a.m.  marched  by  the  way  of  the  pike  to  the 
same  ]3lace.  Ewell,|  as  soon  as  his  troops  were  supplied 
with  provisions,  moved  in  the  direction  of  Centreville,  and 
bivouacked  between  Manassas  and  Bull  Eun,  and  at  dawn 
the  next  morning  moved  up  to  the  bridge  at  Blackburn's 
Ford  where  he  crossed  Bull  Eun,  and  then  proceeded  up 
through  the  fields  on  the  easterly  side  of  the  stream,  to  the 
stone  bridge  on  the  Warrenton  Pike,  then  crossed  Bull  Eun 
again,  and  marched  westerly  to  the  old  battle-field.  At  day- 
light of  the  28th,  therefore,  Taliaferro  was  on  the  old  battle- 
field of  Bull  Eun,  Hill  was  at  Centreville,  and  Ewell  across 
Bull  Eun  near  Blackburn's  Ford,  and  at  noon  the  whole 
corps  was  united,  having  suffered  no  loss,  greatly  refreshed 
and  elated  by  their  successful  expedition,  and  full  of  confi- 
dence in  their  leader. 

*  A.  N.  v.,  Jackson's  Rep.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  94. 
t  A.  N.  v.,  Taliaferro's  Rep.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  200. 
t  A.  N.  v.,  Hill's  Rep.,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  124,  125. 

§  A.  N.  v.,  Early's  Rep.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  181.    See  also  Forno's  Report,  p.  252. 


CHAPTEE  V. 

THE  PURSUIT  OF  JACKSON. 

We  return  now  to  General  Pope.  The  orders  for  the  con- 
centration of  the  entire  army  upon  Manassas  Junction  were 
written  on  the  evening  of  the  27th.  Porter  was  directed  *  to 
start  at  one  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  28th  from  Warren- 
ton  Junction,  and  be  at  Bristoe  at  daylight.  He  was  informed 
that  Hooker  had  had  a  severe  action  with  the  enemy,  who 
had  been  driven  back,  but  were  retiring  along  the  railroad. 
The  order  was  received  about  ten  o'clock.  At  the  urgent  re- 
quest of  his  division  commanders.  Generals  Sykes  and  Mo- 
rell,  and  of  General  Butterfield,  who  was  the  senior  briga- 
dier in  the  corps,  who  represented  that  their  troops,  having 
marched  from  twelve  to  nineteen  miles  that  day,  had  need 
of  rest,  that  it  was  a  very  dark  night,  and  that  the  road  was 
blocked  by  the  wagons  of  the  whole  army.  General  Porter 
postponed  the  hour  of  departure  till  three  o'clock.  This 
action  of  his  constituted  the  foundation  of  one  of  the  speci- 
fications under  the  charge  of  disobedience  of  orders,  when 
he  was  tried  by  court-martial.  We  shall  recur  to  this  sub- 
ject later  on,f  and  will  only  remark  here  that,  had  it  not  been 
for  what  subsequently  occurred,  no  one  probably  would  ever 
have  thought  of  making  such  an  ordinary  exercise  of  dis- 
cretion on  the  part  of  a  corps  commander  the  foundation 


*  P.  R„  p.  144. 


t  See  Appendix  B. 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  JACKSON. 


61 


of  the  extremely  serious  charge  of  disobedience  of  orders, 
which  is  one  of  the  gravest  of  military  offences. 

Similar  instructions  were,  at  nine  in  the  evening,  sent  to 
Kearny,  who  was  directed  upon  Bristoe,  and  to  Reno,  who 
was  ordered  to  move  on  Manassas.  Banks  was  only  told  to 
provide  for  the  trains. 

Porter's  column  experienced  considerable  difficulty  from 
the  blocking  of  the  road  by  the  wagons,  and  it  was  not  until 
ten  or  half-past  ten  in  the  morning  that  his  troops  were  in 
position  at  Bristoe  Station.  Porter  himself  rode  to  the  front 
and  reported  to  Pope  two  hours  earlier.  About  eight  o'clock 
the  division  of  Kearny  arrived  from  Greenwich.  General 
Pope  had  now,  either  with  him  or  on  the  road  to  Manassas, 
the  two  divisions  of  the  Third  Corps, ''^  the  two  divisions  of 
the  Fifth  CorxDsf  and  the  two  divisions  of  the  Ninth  Corps, J 
and,  some  miles  in  reserve,  the  two  divisions  of  Banks. 

PoiDe,  however,  as  we  have  before  remarked,  had  deter- 
mined to  concentrate  the  whole  army  at  Manassas.  At  9  p.m. 
of  the  27th  he  issued  the  following  order  to  McDowell :  ^ 

"  At  day Hght  to-morrow  morning,  march  rapidly  on  Manassas  Junc- 
tion with  your  whole  force,  resting  your  right  on  the  Manassas  Gap 
Railroad,  throwing  your  left  well  to  the  east.  Jackson,  Ewell,  and  A. 
P.  Hill  are  between  Gainesville  and  Manassas  Junction.  We  had  a 
severe  fight  with  them  to-day,  driving  them  back  several  miles  along 
the  railroad.  If  you  will  march  promptly  and  rapidly,  at  the  earliest 
dawn  of  day,  upon  Manassas  Junction,  we  shall  bag  the  whole  crowd. 
I  have  directed  E,eno  to  march  from  Greenwich  at  the  same  hour  upon 
Manassas  Junction,  and  Kearny,  who  is  in  his  rear,  to  march  on  Bris- 
toe at  daybreak.    Be  expeditious,  and  the  day  is  our  own." 


*  Those  of  Kearny  and  Hooker,  under  Heintzelman. 
t  Those  of  Morell  and  Sykes,  under  Porter. 
X  Those  of  Reno  and  Stevens,  under  Eeno. 
§  P.  li„  p.  145. 


62 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


General  Pope's  intention  was  that  McDowelFs  command 
should  march  from  Gainesville  in  echelon,  ^  their  right  rest- 
ing on  the  railroad  and  their  left  sweeping  through  the 
country  intervening  between  the  track  and  the  turnpike. 
He  expected  f  doubtless,  when  he  wrote  the  order,  to  engage 
Jackson  himself  in  the  morning  in  the  neighborhood  of  the 
Junction,  and  he  relied  upon  the  advance  of  this  line  from 
Gainesville  to  head  off  any  movement  of  retreat.  Had 
Jackson  stayed  and  accepted  battle,  the  scheme  would  have 
worked  admirably.  Had  Jackson  retired  during  the  night, 
as  very  possibly  Pope  thought  he  might  do,  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Gainesville,  he  would  have  certainly  encountered 
McDowell  or  Sigel  coming  to  meet  him. 

Plausible  as  this  plan  looked,  however,  there  were  grave 
objections  to  it. 

First  and  foremost,  it  failed  to  recognize  the  immense  im- 
portance of  preserving  our  central  position  between  the  two 
separated  wings  of  Lee's  army.  So  long  as  the  troops  of 
McDowell  and  Sigel  were  at  Gainesville,  we  had  decidedly 
the  advantage  of  position.  But  General  Pope,  though  he 
seems  J  on  the  evening  before  to  have  felicitated  himself 
justly  on  the  fact  that  McDowell  was  interposing  completely 
between  Jackson  and  the  main  body  of  the  enemy,  which 
was,  he  says,  on  that  evening,  still  west  of  the  Bull  Eun  Range 
and  in  the  neighborhood  of  "White  Plains,  seems,  neverthe- 
less, to  have  given,  without  hesitation,  the  order  to  abandon 
Gainesville  in  the  morning. 

Secondly,  Pope  had  a  sufficient  force  wherewith  to  fight 
Jackson  without  disturbing  McDowell  and  Sigel.    He  had 


*  p.  V.  C,  Reynolds'  Rep.,  p.  67  ;  McDoweirs  statement,  p.  50. 
+  In  his  order  to  Reno,  he  states  that  Jackson,  Ewell,  and  A.  P.  Hill  are  be- 
tween Gainesville  and  Manassas  Junction.    B.  0.,  P-  341, 
t  P.  R.,  p.  144. 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  JACKSON. 


63 


six  divisions — not  so  strong  divisions  as  those  of  Jackson, 
to  be  sure,  but  still  numbering  in  all  nearly  30,000  men, 
exclusive  of  Banks'  corps.  Had  it  been  necessary,  he  could 
at  any  time  have  called  upon  McDowell's  command  for 
further  aid.  At  any  rate.  Pope  did  not  hesitate  to  follow  the 
enemy  across  Bull  Eun  that  morning  with  only  Kearny's 
division. 

Lastly,  Pope's  dis^Dositions  did  not  take  into  account  that 
Jackson  might  be  doing  something  very  different  from  what 
he  anticipated.  This  was  actually  the  case.  Long  before  a 
regiment  had  started  from  Bristoe  or  Gainesville,  Jackson 
was  on  the  north  side  of  the  Warrenton  pike,  and  the 
greater  portion  of  his  command  were  actually  resting  from 
their  night-march  on  the  battle-field  of  Bull  Eun.  So  long 
as  we  held  Gainesville,  Jackson  could  not  get  away,  unless 
by  way  of  Aldie  Gap,  which  is  north  of  Thoroughfare  Gaj), 
and  nothing  that  General  Pope  could  do  could  possibly  pre- 
vent that.  It  would,  therefore,  have  been  wiser  for  Pope  to 
have  retained  McDowell's  command  where  they  were — irre- 
spective entirely  of  the  strategic  importance  of  Gainesville 
— until  he  knew  something  about  the  movements  of  Jack- 
son's column.  By  marching  that  force  between  Gainesville 
tod  Manassas,  he  actually  lost  a  day,  as  we  shall  see. 

Taking  it  altogether,  the  concentration  of  the  entire  army 
on  Manassas,  ordered  as  it  was,  on  the  evening  of  the  27th, 
when  General  Pope  supposed  that  the  main  body  of  the 
enemy  had  reached  White  Plains,  on  their  road  to  support 
and  .unite  with  Jackson,  and  when  he  did  not  know  and 
could  not  guess  with  any  certainty  where  Jackson  would  be 
the  next  day  at  noon,  was  an  inconsiderate  and  ill-judged 
movement,  and  was,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  the  parent  of  much 
disaster. 

Although  Ewell's  division,  which  was  the  last  to  evacuate 


64 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


Manassas,"^"  had  by  dawn  of  the  28th  not  only  left  the  Station 
and  bivouacked  in  the  fields  between  Manassas  and  Bnll  Enn, 
but  had  moved  up  to  the  bridge  over  Bull  Eun,  at  Black- 
burn's Ford,  nothing  whatever  seems  to  have  been  known  of 
its  operations  or  of  the  condition  of  things  at  Manassas,  by 
General  Pope.  However  impossible  it  may  have  been  to  dis- 
cover, in  the  obscurity  of  the  night,  what  the  enemy  were  do- 
ing, there  was  no  reason  whatever  v/hy  at  dawn  their  move- 
ments should  not  have  been  watched.  Had  an  enterprising 
officer  been  charged  with  this  duty,  he  would  have  been  sure 
to  pick  up  some  stragglers,  overcharged  with  the  good 
things  with  which  the  hungry  men  of  Jackson's  command 
had  doubtless  been  surfeiting  themselves,  and  would  have 
found  out  the  direction  taken  by  A.  P.  Hill  and  Taliaferro, 
as  well  as  have  observed  the  retreat  of  Ewell.  But  nothing 
of  the  sort  seems  to  have  been  attempted.  Had  this  infor- 
mation been  acquired  by  five  or  six  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
General  Pope  would  probably  have  seen  what  Jackson's  in- 
tention was,  namely,  to  get  to  a  position  from  which  he 
could  unite  his  forces  to  Lee's  as  soon  as  the  latter 
should  come  through  the  Gap.  He  would,  doubtless,  have 
instantly  countermanded  the  order  to  McDowell  to  come  to 
Manassas,  and  would  instead,  if  he  had  been  wise,  have 
urged  him  to  occupy  the  Gap  in  force,  as  well  as  to  throw 
out  reconnoitering  parties  on  the  turnpike,  to  ascertain  Jack- 
son's whereabouts.  But  whether  he  would  have  done  this 
may  be  questioned,  for  although,  as  we  shall  see,  the  mo- 
ment he  found  that  Jackson  had  left  Manassas,  he  ordered 
McDowell  to  return  to  the  turnpike,  he  made  no  provision 
whatever  for  retaining  a  force  at  Gainesville  or  sending  one 
to  the  Gap. 


*  Unless,  perhaps,  McGrOwau's  brigade  of  Hill's  division,  A.  N.  V.,  McGowan's 
Bep.,  pp.  277,  278. 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  JACKSON. 


65 


General  Pope's  report  is  in  error  in  regard  to  several  of 
these  points.  He  says  ^  that  Jackson  was  moving  from  Ma- 
nassas toward  Gentreville  as  late  as  ten  or  eleven  o'clock  in  the 
forenoon,  and  that,  had  McDowell  moved  forward  as  directed, 
and  at  the  time  specified,  Jackson's  retreat  would  have  been 
intercepted  at  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  he  could  not 
have  crossed  Bull  Eun  without  heavy  loss,  as  he  would  have 
been  closely  engaged  with  our  forces.  At  the  time  he  wrote 
this,  the  official  reports  of  the  Confederate  officers  were,  of 
course,  not  accessible.  It  is  now  clear  from  these  that  Gen- 
eral Pope  is  mistaken  in  the  above  statement,  and  of  course 
in  the  inferences  which  he  draws  from  it.  We  have  referred 
already  to  the  reports  of  Taliaferro,  Early,  and  Hill.  But 
there  is  still  other  evidence.  General  Johnson,f  of  Talia- 
ferro's division,  says  he  marched  away  from  Manassas  at 
dark,  and  arrived  by  way  of  the  Sudley  Springs  road  on  the 
field  of  Bull  Eun  at  midnight.  Colonel  Forno,J  of  E well's 
division,  says  he  crossed  Bull  Eun  at  daylight.  General 
McGowan,^  of  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  says  his  brigade  formed 
the  rear  guard,  and  that  it  retired  at  two  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  and  followed  the  division  across  Bull  Eun  at 
Blackburn's  Ford. 

General  Pope  did  not,  it  must  be  confessed,  begin  this  day 
of  the  28th  with  that  energy  which  the  situation,  it  would 
seem,  demanded.  Hooker's  division  had  rested  all  night ; 
Kearny's  division  arrived  at  Bristoe  at  eight  o'clock  after  a 
short  march  ;  Porter's  divisions  had  made  a  longer  march,  it 
is  true,  and  a  more  fatiguing  one,  owing  to  the  obstructions 
in  the  road,  but  Pope  says  his  corps  was  "by  far  the  freshest 


*p.  R.,  p.  147. 

t  A.  N.  v.,  Johnson's  Rep.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  243. 
t  lb.,  p.  252. 

§  A.  N.  v.,  McGowan's  Report,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  277,  278. 


66 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


in  the  whole  army  ; "  the  distance  from  Bristoe  to  Manassas 
is  only  five  miles ;  yet  General  Pope  reached  the  Junc- 
tion with  Kearny's  (and  doubtless  Hooker's)  division  and 
Eeno's  corps  not  before  twelve  o'clock.  After  some  hesita- 
tion, he,  in  the  afternoon,  pushed  forward  Hooker,  Kearny, 
and  Eeno  upon  Centreville,  which  was  natural,  as  A.  P.  Hill 
had  actually  gone  there,  and  Ewell  had  retired  in  that  direc- 
tion, though  not  going  so  far.  He  states  that  he  ordered 
Porter  forward  to  Manassas,  but  as  this  has  always  been  de- 
nied by  Porter,  and  as  no  evidence  of  it  has  ever  been  forth- 
coming, this  statement  is  probably  an  oversight  of  General 
Pope's. 

Kearny  reached  Centreville  late  in  the  afternoon,"^"  and 
found  a  regiment  of  cavalry  there,  covering  the  march  of 
Hill  to  Bull  Kun.  Hooker  f  not  only  did  not  get  so  far  as 
Centreville,  but  encamped  on  the  south  ^ide  of  Bull  Run  for 
the  night. 

Eeno  crossed  Bull  Eun  and  encamped  within  supporting 
dirstance  of  Kearny.  General  Pope's  headquarters  for  the 
night  were  not  far  from  Blackburn's  Ford.  It  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  not  much  had  been  accomplished  by  this  wing 
of  the  army. 

To  return  to  McDowell.  That  officer  and  Sigel  were  at 
Buckland  Mills  on  the  evening  of  the  27tli.  McDowell 
had, J  it  will  be  recollected,  sent  out  Buford  with  a  few  regi- 
ments of  cavalry  on  the  morning  of  that  day  to  find  out 
what  he  could  of  the  enemy.  Buford,  "  indefatigable  on 
this,  as  on  every  other  occasion  during  the  campaign,"  as 
General  McDowell  justly  says,  captured  fifty  prisoners  at 


*  p.  R.,  p.  147. 

t  P.  V.  C,  Heintzelman's  Rep.,  p.  55  ;  Carres  Rep,,  p.  117  ;  Burling's  Rep.,  p. 
ISl. 
t  Ante,  p.  50. 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  JACKSON. 


67 


Salem,  and  actnally  forced  Longstreet  to  halt  and  deploy  at 
White  Plains,  detaining  him  an  hour  or  more.  He  discov- 
ered that  Jackson  with  a  large  force  had  jDassed  through 
these  villages  and  through  Thoroughfare  Gap  toward  Ma- 
nassas Junction,  the  day  before  his  arrival,  and  that  Long- 
street  was  following  him  w^ith  a  larger  force. This  con- 
vinced! McDowell  that  Longstreet  would  be  coming 
through  the  Gap  the  next  morning,  and  he  so  told  Sigel. 

During  the  evening,  and  before  11.30  p.m.,  which  was  before 
General  Pope's  order  of  9  p.m.  arrived,  McDow^ell  took  de- 
cided steps  to  hold  the  positions  in  front  of  the  Gap.  He  or- 
dered the  whole  of  Sigel's  corps  to  Gainesville  and  Haymarket, 
the  latter  a  village  between  Gainesville  and  the  Gap,  and  he 
retained  Eeynolds'  division  at  Buckland  Mills  to  operate 
against  the  flank  of  the  enemy  coming  through  the  Gap, 
or  to  march  to  Haymarket  as  might  be  thought  best. 

With  King's  and  Eicketts'  divisions,  he  proposed  himself 
to  find  out  what  had  become  of  Jackson. 

These  dispositions  show  very  clearly  that  General  McDow- 
ell fully  realized  the  gravity  of  the  situation,  and  that  he 
had  no  idea  of  allowing  a  junction  to  be  effected  between 
the  forces  of  Longstreet  and  Jackson,  if  it  could  be  avoided. 
He  knew  that  time  was  all  important  for  us  ;  that  if  Jackson 
could  be  kept  isolated  for  twenty-four  hours  longer,  he  ought 
to  be  overwhelmed,  horse,  foot,  and  dragoons.  And  he  did 
not  hesitate  in  this  emergency  to  detach  half  of  his  force  to 
retard  the  advance  of  Longstreet. 

Near  midnight  General  Pope's  order  of  9  p.m.  arrived,  di- 
recting him  to  march  with  his  whole  command  upon  Manas- 
sas Junction  at  daylight.    This  necessitated  a  change  of  the 

*  p.  V.  C,  McDoweirs  Rep.,  p.  41 ;  Lloyd's  Rep.,  p.  136  ;  McDoweirs  statemcrxt, 
p.  88  ;  A.  N.  v.,  Longstreet's  Rep.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  81. 
tP.  V.  C,  p.  41. 


68 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


dispositions  previously  made  by  McDowell.  Sigel,  whose 
advance  was  at  Gainesville,  was  ordered  to  march  immedi- 
ately, witli  his  right  resting  on  the  railroad.  Reynolds  was 
ordered  to  march  in  echelon  with  Sigel,  and  on  his  left ; 
King  in  echelon  with  Keynolds,  and  on  his  left ;  so  as  to 
carry  out  the  intention  of  General  Pope,  which  was,  as  is 
stated  in  his  order,  that  the  left  shonld  be  thrown  well  to 
the  east.  These  orders  were  delivered  before  3  a.m.  of  the 
28j1i.  Early  in  the  morning,  cavalry  were  sent  to  the  Gap 
to  reconnoitre,  and,  on  their  report  that  the  enemy  were 
advancing  through  the  Gap,  Ricketts'  division,  which  was  to 
bring  up  the  rear,  and  which  was  to  have  followed  on  King's 
left  and  marched  to  Manassas  Junction,  was  detached  and 
sent  to  the  Gap  by  way  of  Hay  market,  where  it  arrived  at 
3  P.M.  Ricketts  was  seriously  delayed^  by  wagon  trains  in 
marching  from  his  bivouac  of  the  night  before,  west  of  Buck- 
land  Mills,  to  the  road,  where  he  turned  off  to  the  left  to  go 
to  Haymarket  and  the  Gap.  However,  his  troops  delayed 
the  passage  of  Longstreet's  command  through  the  Gaj)  dur- 
ing the  rest  of  the  day  and  early  part  of  the  evening ;  and 
the  enemy  were  obliged  to  send  three  brigades  through 
Hopewell  Gap,  to  the  north  of  Thoroughfare  Gap,  before 
our  troops  retired.  After  dark  Eicketts  fell  back  to  Gaines- 
ville. 

This  action  of  McDowell's,  taken,  as  it  was,  on  his  own 
responsibility,  and  contrary  to  the  letter  of  the  order  of  9  p.m., 
directing  him  to  march  on  Manassas  Junction  "  with  his  whole 
force,"  undoubtedly  secured  for  us  the  whole  day  of  the  28th 
in  which  to  fight  Jackson  without  interruption.  T\'e  have 
before  expressed  our  wonder  that  Thoroughfare  Gaj)  should 
not  have  been  strongly  held  several  days  before.    But  the 


*  Sec  Appendix  B. 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  JACKSON. 


69 


step  taken  by  General  McDowell,  though  taken  late,  was 
taken  without  orders,  and  it  would  seem  that  even  when 
General  Pope  wrote  his  report,^'  he  still  disapproved  of 
McDowell's  course. 

With  the  remainder  of  his  corps,  consisting  of  the  divi- 
sions of  King  and  Eeynolds,  and  with  Sigel's  corps,  McDow- 
ell proceeded  to  obey  the  nine  o'clock  order.   He  says  f  that 


August  28,  8  am. 


SigeFs  wagons,  carried  along  contrary  to  express  orders,  en- 
cumbered the  road,  and  that  he  could  not  get  him  to  move 
with  any  promptness  at  all.  Moreover,  when  the  troops  did 
get  started,  Sigel  somehow  misconstrued  the  order  directing 
the  right  of  the  line  to  rest  on  the  Manassas  Gap  Bailroad 


*  p.  R.,  pp.  147,  151. 


t  P.  V.  C,  McDowell's  Rep.,  p.  4->. 


70 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


as  referring  to  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad.  All  these 
causes  delayed  the  march,  so  that  it  was  late  in  the  after- 
noon before  they  got  anywhere  near  Manassas.  Pope's 
order,  moreover,  proceeded  on  the  supposition  that  McDow- 
ell's whole  command  was  at  Gainesville,  whereas  the  larger 
part  of  it  w^as  in  rear  of  this  town  along  the  road  from 
New  Baltimore  to  Gainesville.  But  it  really  mattered  not, 
except  for  the  useless  fatigue  of  the  men ;  for,  as  we  have 
seen,  they  could  not  possibly,  had  they  been  at  daybreak 
where  Pope  supposed  they  were,  and  marched  promptly  and 
rapidly  oij  Manassas,  have  found  a  man  of  Jackson's  corps 
near  Manassas.  The  whole  movement  on  Manassas  was  a 
mistake. 

But  the  most  remarkable  thing  about  this  tiresome  and 
useless  march  of  McDowell's  this  day  of  the  28th,  is  the 
curious  missing  of  the  great  opportunity  to  engage  Jackson. 
General  McDowell's  *  account  of  this  is  as  follows  : 

"As  soon  as  the  Warrenton  road  was  free  [from  Sigel's 
wagons,  etc.]  Reynolds'  division  pushed  forward  across  the 
railroad  [going  east  a  short  distance  on  the  pike  before 
turning  southward  toward  the  Junction],  and  after  a  short 
march  the  head  of  his  column  found  itself  opposed  by  the 
enemy  with  a  battery  of  artillery  posted  on  a  hill,"  situated 
on  the  north  of  the  pike.  "  The  attack,  commenced  by  the 
enemy  as  soon  as  we  came  in  view,  caused  Reynolds  to  de- 
ploy his  column,  to  bring  up  his  artillery,  and  send  out  his  - 
skirmishers.  After  a  short  engagement  the  enemy  retired, 
so  that  when  our  skirmishers  occupied  the  hill  he  left  he 
was  nowhere  to  be  seen.  Supposing  from  the  movements  of 
this  force  that  it  was  some  rear  guard  or  cavalry  party  with 
artillery  sent  out  to  reconnoitre,  the  march  of  the  division, 


*  p.  v.  C,  McDoweirs  Rop.,  p.  43.    Cf.  McDoweirs  statement,  p.  54  et  seq. 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  JACKSON. 


71 


after  caring  for  the  killed  and  wounded,  was  resumed,  and  it 
turned  off  to  the  south  of  the  road  to  go  to  Manassas."  To 
the  same  effect  Eeynolds  in  his  report.  *  General  Sigel  j 
alone  seems  to  have  divined  the  truth,  "and  to  have  recog-. 
nized  that  the  column  had  already  met  Jackson's  corps. 
This  force  was  the  brigade  of  Bradley  T.  Johnson,  the 
Second  (Campbell's)  Brigade  of  Taliaferro's  (Jackson's)  divi- 
sion, the  same  brigade  which  received  the  brunt  of  our  at- 
tack at  Cedar  Mountain.  His  account  J  does  not  materially 
differ  from  that  of  McDowell.  His  brigade  had  been  thrown 
forward  to  Groveton,  to  guard  against  an  attack  coming 
from  the  direction  of  Gainesville. 

Here  then  was  our  opportunity,  and  a  first-rate  one.  Had 
not  McDowell  felt  himself  bound  by  Pope's  order  of  the 
previous  evening  to  go  to  Manassas  Junction  after  Jackson, 
he  would  doubtless  have  found  out  all  about  this  attack  on 
his  column,  and  the  capture  of  a  single  prisoner  would  have 
revealed  the  whole  thing  to  him.  A.  P.  Hill  had  probably 
not  arrived  from  Centreville  at  this  time,  so  that  we  might 
have  been  able  to  attack  the  divisions  of  Ewell  and  Talia- 
ferro with  the  two  corps  of  Sigel  and  McDowell. 

On  arriving  at  Manassas  Junction  about  noon,  General 
Pope,  as  we  have  seen,  found  that  his  bird  had  escaped,  and 
that  the  march  to  Manassas,  which  he  had  prescribed  to  the 
northern  wing  of  his  army  under  McDowell,  must  be  coun- 
termanded, and  the  force  sent  in  some  other  direction.  But 
in  what  direction  was  the  question  to  be  settled. 

At  first,  apparently,  he  was  inclined  to  think  that  Jackson 
had  retired  upon  Centreville  with  the  intention  of  making 
Aldie  Gap.  Accordingly,  shortly  after  one,  he  |  ordered  Mc- 
Dowell to  move  on  Gum  Spring,  a  place  on  the  Little  Eiver 


*  p.  V.  C,  Reynolds'  Rep.,  pp.  67,  68. 
t  A.  N.  v.,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  243,  i>44. 


t  lb.,  p.  83. 

§  P.  V.  C,  p.  43. 


72 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


Turnpike,  which  leads  to  that  Ga^D,  and  some  fifteen  miles 
to  the  north  of  Manassas  Junction. 

Soon  after  sending  this  order,  however,  he  reconsidered  it, 
and  told  McDowell  that  he  did  not  wish  him  to  carry  it  out 
if  he  deemed  it  too  hazardous ;  said  that  he  wanted  from 
McDowell  an  expression  of  his  views,  and  that  he  wonld 
support  him  in  any  way  he  might  suggest  by  pushing  for- 
ward from  Manassas  Junction  across  the  turnpike.  He  also 
said,  that  he  intended  that  evening  to  push  forward  Beno  to 
Gaines\dlle  and  to  follow  with  Heintzelman,  unless  there 
should  be  a  large  force  of  the  enemy  at  Centreville,  which  he 
did  not  then  believe  there  was.  Had  General  Pope  carried 
out  the  intentions  expressed  in  this  despatch,  he  would  have 
had  nearly  his  whole  force  on  the  turnpike  that  afternoon, 
and  in  the  engagement  which,  as  we  shall  see,  took  place 
that  evening,  we  should  have  decidedly  outnumbered  the 
enemy.  Besides  this,  we  should  have  been  able  to  recom- 
mence the  fight  the  next  morning  with  the  troops  in  iDosition. 

But,  unfortunately  for  General  Pope,  he  received  informa- 
tion during  the  afternoon  that  misled  him  as  to  the  enemy's 
position.  At  a  quarter  past  four  he  writes  to  McDowell"^ 
that  the  enemy  was  reported  in  force  on  the  other  side  of 
Bull  Bun  on  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Bailroad,  that  is, 
between  Manassas  Junction  and  Alexandria,  as  also  at  Cen- 
treville, which  is  on  the  Warrenton  and  x4Llexandria  Turn- 
pike ;  and  that  he  has,  therefore,  ordered  Sigel  (who  f  had 
reported  personally  to  him)  to  march  on  Centreville  immedi- 
ately, as  also  Kearny  and  Beno,  with  Hooker  as  reserve ; 
and  that  he  wishes  him  (McDowell)  to  march  immediately 
on  Centreville  from  where  he  then  was. 


*  p.  V.  C,  p.  43,  Note  2.    McDoweirs  statement,  p.  57. 

t  P.  V.  C,  SigeFs  Rep.,  p.  83.  The  contradiction  of  this  in  the  note  is  alto- 
gether inexplicable. 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  JACKSON. 


73 


It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  General  Pope  was  thor- 
oughly puzzled.  He  seems  to  have  had  no  trustworthy  in- 
formation of  the  enemy's  doings.  His  negligence  early  that 
morning,  in  not  having  Jackson's  movements  observed,  was 
one  cause  of  this  perplexity.  Then  he  had  no  available 
cavalry.  The  horses,  overworked  and  ill-fed,  had  completely 
broken  down.  Jackson  had  taken  the  initiative,  so  impor- 
tant a  thing  in  war,  and  he  evidently  meant  to  kee]3  it.  All 
this,  of  course,  would  have  been  prevented  by  a  retreat  on 
the  25th  and  26th  to  the  line  from  Thoroughfare  Gap  to 
Manassas  Junction,  but  that  was  not  done,  and  there  was  no 
use  now  regretting  it.  Jackson  was  a  person  whose  inten- 
tions it  was  indeed  difficult  to  anticipate.  What  if  the  in- 
formation should  be  correct  about  his  being  in  force  on  the 
other  side  of  Bull  Bun,  between  the  army  and  Washington  ? 
Pope  could  not  afford  to  have  him  burning  bridges  and  tear- 
ing up  tracks  and  destroying  magazines  of  supplies,  again. 
It  is  true,  Lee  was  expected  very  soon  to  come  through 
Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  it  was  likely  on  most  accounts  that 
Jackson  would  retire  to  some  place  near  there  and  await  his 
coming.  But  in  the  end  General  Pope  decided  to  look  after 
his  rear  and  to  send  his  troops  to  Centreville. 

Here,  however.  Pope  repeated  his  mistake  of  that  morn- 
ing, in  ordering  almost  the  whole  army  on  this  chase.  lb 
would  have  been  quite  sufficient  to  send  Heintzelman  or 
Reno  first,  and  see  what  came  of  it.  Jackson  could  do 
them  no  harm  and  they  were  quite  strong  enough  to  detain 
him  until  reinforcements  could  be  sent.  It  was  possibl 
that  Lee  could  be  kept  off  a  little  longer  yet,  and  it  was, 
therefore,  unwise  to  give  up  the  position  at  Gainesville. 
At  least  it  was  unwise,  if  there  was  any  possibility  of /Jack- 
son having,  during  the  day,  retired  to  the  north  /of  the 
turnpike. 

Vol.  IV.— 4 


74 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


These  dispositions  did  not  include  either  Bicketts  or  Por- 
ter. To  them  no  orders  were  sent.  Banks  was  directed  to 
move  his  trains  to  Kettle  Run  Bridge,  half-way  between  Cat- 
lett's  and  Bristoe  Stations,  and  repair  the  damage  done  to  the 
track  there. 

Late  in  the  afternoon,  then,  the  various  corps  proceeded  to 
execute  this  order  to  march  on  Centreville.  The  southern 
wing,  composed  of  Heintzelman's  and  Reno's  troops,  went  off 
at  once,  as  we  have  before  stated. 

But,  curiously  enough,  Jackson  himself  prevented  the 
northern  wing  from  going  to  Centreville,  by  discovering  to 
them  the  very  object  of  their  search.  Laboring  under  the 
impression  that  we  were  all  in  full  retreat  for  Alexandria,  he 
undertook  to  harass  us.  He  sent  down  his  cavalry  and 
skirmishers  south  of  the  -pike  on  the  Sudley  Springs  road, 
and  they  ran  into  SigeFs  troops.  That  officer,  who  had  ap- 
parently since  the  encounter  of  the  morning  believed  that 
Jackson  was  on  the  west  side  of  Bull  Bun,  at  once  ceased  his 
preparations  for  crossing  and  pushed  his  force  northward  to 
the  pike  along  the  Sudley  Springs  road,  skirmishing  all  the 
way  up.  Reynolds  heard  his  guns  and  also  those  of  King 
(of  which  we  are  soon  to  speak)  and  at  once  marched  toward 
the  pike  from  near  Bethlehem  Church,  reaching  at  night  a 
point  about  a  mile  from  Groveton  ^  in  the  immediate  neigh- 
borhood of  Sigel's  corps. 


*  McDovveirs  statement,  p.  58. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


THE  BA.TTLE  OF  GAINESVILLE. 

King,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  brought  up  the  rear  of 
McDowell's  column  in  the  march  of  the  morning,  and  had 
not  in  the  afternoon  got  very  far  beyond  Gainesville  on  his 
road  to  Manassas.  He  therefore  had  only  a  short  distance  to 
make  before  again  finding  himself  on  the  pike,  and  he  ac- 
cordingly complied  with  the  order  to  march  on  the  pike  to 
Centreville,  at  once.  By  five  o'clock  or  thereabouts  he  was 
marching  along  the  turnpike  eastwardly  toward  Centreville, 
perfectly  unaware  of  there  being  any  force  of  the  enemy 
upon  his  left  flank. 

Our  movements  this  day  had  completely  puzzled  General 
Jackson.  When  he  saw  our  troops  march  off  in  the  forenoon 
toward  Manassas,  he  thought  *  we  were  "  in  full  retreat," 
and  sent  word  to  A.  P.  Hill,  who  was  at  Centreville,  to 

move  down  to  the  fords  [of  Bull  Eun]  and  intercept  us." 
Hill,  however,  having  captured  some  of  our  dispatches,  knew 
that  Pope  had  no  thought  of  retreating,  but  only  of  attack- 
ing Jackson,  and  he  proceeded  to  rejoin  his  corps  with  all 
speed  on  the  Bull  Kun  battlefield.  Informed  by  General 
Bradley  T.  Johnson  of  our  movements  toward  Manassas,  and 
yet  seeing  that  large  bodies  of  our  troops  were  still  coming 
on  the  pike  from  Gainesville,  in  their  march  from  Buckland 
Mills,  Jackson  made  his  dispositions  to  attack  us,  based,  as 


*  A.  N.  v.,  Hill's  Rep.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  124. 


76 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


he  says,"^  "  on  the  idea  that  we  should  continue  to  press  for- 
ward on  the  turnpike  toward  Alexandria."  But,  fearing  that 
King's  division  was  intending  to  leave  the  road  and  incline 
toward  Manassas,  he  advanced  the  divisions  of  Ewell  and 
Taliaferro,  and  attacked  with  his  customary  impetuosity. 
But  he  was  soon  undeceived  if  he  thought  that  this  column 
was  intending  to  escape.  Our  men  turned  savagely  upon 
their  assailants.  Their  batteries  were  at  once  enfiladed  and 
compelled  to  change  their  position.  Our  skirmishers  were 
immediately  advanced  and  supported  by  the  infantry  in  line, 
and  our  troops  crossed  the  road  and  fiercely  advanced  upon 
the  enemy.  On  their  side  their  troops  pushed  forward  with 
their  customary  hardihood  to  close  quarters,  and  there  en- 
sued, says  Taliaferro,!  "  one  of  the  most  terrific  conflicts  that 
can  be  conceived.  .  .  .  For  two  hours  and  a  half,  with- 
out an  instant's  cessation  of  the  most  deadly  discharges  of 
musketry,  round  shot  and  shell,  both  lines  stood  unmoved, 
neither  advancing,  and  neither  broken  nor  yielding,  until  at 
last,  about  nine  o'clock  at  night,  the  enemy  slowly  and  sul- 
lenly fell  back  and  yielded  the  field  to  our  victorious 
troops." 

As  to  our  having  had  the  worst  of  it,  however.  General 
Taliaferro  is  in  error.  He  is  doubtless  misled  by  the  fact 
that  when  General  King  withdrew  to  Manassas,  as  we  shall 
see  that  he  did,  about  one  o'clock  in  the  morning,  he  aban- 
doned the  field  of  battle.  But  there  was  no  falling  back  for 
hours  after  the  engagement  had  ceased.  On  the  contrary, 
our  troops  held  all  the  ground  north  of  the  turnpike,  to 
which  they  had  advanced  in  the  beginning  of  the  action,  un- 
til they  took  up  their  line  of  march  in  the  middle  of  the  night 
for  Manassas  Junction. 

*  A.  N.  v.,  Jackson's  Rep.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  94. 
t  A.  N.  v.,  Taliaferro's  Rep.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  201. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GAINESVILLE. 


77 


General  Taliaferro  was  wounded  in  the  action  himself, 
and  may  not  have  known  the  result  from  personal  observation. 
General  Stafford,*  whose  brigade  seems  to  have  been  trans- 
ferred from  A.  P.  Hill's  to  Taliaferro's  division,  says,  "the 
battle  commenced  at  five  o'clock  p.m.,  and  lasted  till  nine 
o'clock  P.M.,  resulting  in  the  repulse  of  the  enemy,  we  holding 
the  battle-ground."  '  Major  Pelham,f  too,  whose  battery  was 


August  28th,  6  P.M. 


engaged,  says,  "we  drove  the  enemy  back."  All  that  these 
officers  claim  is  that  they  held  their  own,  which  is  admitted 
by  the  Federal  authorities.  It  was,  in  fact,  a  drawn  battle. 
The  attack  made  by  us  was  repulsed,  but  that  was  all. 


*  Stafford's  Rep.,  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  359. 
t  Pelham's  Eep.,  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  421. 


78  THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 

Our  forces  engaged  consisted  only  of  the  brigades  of  Gib- 
bon and  Doubleday,  but  these  were  strong  brigades  and 
among  the  best  in  the  army  and  admirably  commanded. 
The  whole  division  of  Taliaferro  and  two  brigades  of  Ewell's 
division,  at  least,  those  of  Lawton  and  Trimble,  constituted 
the  force  of  the  enemy.  We  w^ere  no  doubt  considerably 
outnumbered.  Why  this  was  so,  with  the  brigade  of  Hatch 
in  front  and  that  of  Patrick  in  the  rear,  is,  perhaps,  remark- 
able. Doubtless  the  darkness  of  the  night  prevented  these 
troops  from  participating  in  the  action. 

The  losses  on  both  sides  were  very  severe.  The  enemy 
lost  Generals  Ewell  and  Taliaferro  wounded,  the  former 
losing  a  leg,  besides  three  colonels,  one  lieutenant-colonel, 
and  four  majors,  killed  and  wounded.  On  our  side  it  is 
stated  ^  that  "  more  than  one-third  of  the  Federal  com- 
mand were  left  dead  or  wounded  on  the  field."  Truly,  a 
*^  fierce  and  sanguinary  conflict,"  as  Stonewall  Jackson  calls 
it.  It  was  also  a  purely  accidental  one.  Jackson,  no  doubt, 
thought  he  was  attacking  the  rear  guard  of  a  demoralized 
army  in  full  retreat  for  the  defences  of  Washington.  But, 
instead  of  meeting  troops  in  retreat  before  him,  he  met 
troops  who  had  been  all  day  in  search  of  him,  and  he  cer- 
tainly had  his  fill  of  fighting  before  the  action  closed. 

On  the  other  hand.  General  Pope  undoubtedly  believed 
that  Jackson  was  retreating  from  him,  and  that  this  battle 
arose  out  of  King's  division  attempting  to  bar  his  retreat. 
The  account  which  he  gives  in  his  report  f  of  what  happened 
that  afternoon  may  well  claim  our  attention. 

After  stating  X  that  he  reached  Manassas  Junction  with 
Kearny's  division  and  Reno's  corps  about  noon,  less  than 
an  hour  after  Jackson  in  person  had  retired,  which  is  cer- 


*  Gordon,  p.  223. 


t  P.  K.,  p.  147. 


t  P.  R.,  p.  147. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GAINESVILLE. 


79 


tainly  not  the  case,  he  states  that  he  immediately  pushed 
forward  Hooker,  Kearny,  and  Eeno  upon  Centreville,  and 
sent  orders  to  Porter  to  come  forward  from  Bristoe  to  Ma- 
nassas. The  orders  to  Porter  have  never  been  produced, 
nor  any  evidence  of  their  ever  having  been  sent,  proffered. 
As  for  pushing  Hooker,  Kearny,  and  Reno  forward  to  Cen- 
treville immediately,  we  know  that  he  contemplated  sending 
them  to  Gainesville  as  late  as  1.20  p.m.,*  and  that  it  was  not 
till  4.15  P.M.  that  he  notified  McDowell f  that  he  had  decided 
to  send  them  to  Centreville.  General  Pope  is  certainly  not 
to  blame  for  taking  a  few  hours  to  consider  such  an  impor- 
tant matter ;  but  his  taking  time  to  consider  is  a  fact,  which 
should  be  stated  exactly,  if  alluded  to  at  all.  Then  he  says  X 
that  he  wrote  to  McDowell  and  stated  the  facts,  and  di- 
rected him  to  call  back  the  whole  of  his  force  that  had  come 
in  the  direction  of  Manassas  Junction,  and  to  move  forward 
upon  Centreville,  but  that  McDowell,  having  detached 
Eicketts'  division  to  Thoroughfare  Gap,  that  division  was 
not  available  in  this  movement.  This  is  true ;  but  the 
movements  of  the  day  had  been  so  anomalous,  that  no  one 
can  guess  where  Ricketts'  division  would  have  been  at  six 
in  the  afternoon,  if  it  had  not  been  sent  to  Thoroughfare 
Gap.  General  Pope  then  proceeds  to  say  that  Kearny 
drove  the  enemy's  rear  guard  out  of  Centreville,  and  that 
the  enemy  retreated  toward  Gainesville,  burning  bridges  in 
their  rear ;  and  finally,  that  McDowell  with  his  whole  force, 
consisting  of  his  own  corps  (except  Eicketts' division),  Sigel's 
corps,  and  the  division  of  Eeynolds,  marching  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Centreville,  encountered  the  advance  of  Jackson's 
force  retreating  toward  Thoroughfare  Gap  about  six  o'clock 
in  the  evening  of  the  28th.    In  this  statement  General  Pope 


*P.  R.,p.  149. 


t  P.  V.  C,  p.  43,  n.  2. 


t  P.  R.,  p.  147. 


80 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


shows  that  he  had,  very  naturally,  misconstrued  Jackson's 
movements.  The  ^'retreat"  of  A.  P.  Hill  from  Centreville 
was  simply  the  march  by  which  that  ofl&cer  rejoined  the 
other  two  di^dsions  of  his  corps.  Jackson,  in  fact,  had  no 
thought  of  retreating  toward  Thoroughfare  Gap,  but  took 
up  a  position  in  which  he  could  flank  any  movement  of  our 
troops  on  the  "Warrenton  Pike,  and  also  be  ready  to  unite 
wdth  Longstreet  so  soon  as  he  should  get  through  the  Gaj). 
Nor  was  McDowell  "with  his  whole  force  (except  Eicketts' 
division)  marching  on  the  pike  in  the  direction  of  Centre- 
ville." On  the  contrary,  Sigel  and  Eeynolds  were  south  of 
the  -pike,  coming  near  to  it  by  the  Sudley  Springs  road,  and 
King  alone  was  marching  in  the  pike.  The  im^Dression 
which  a  careless  reader  of  the  report  might  get,  that  the 
forces  of  McDowell  and  Sigel  might  well  have  been  suc- 
cessful in  this  conflict  had  it  not  been  for  the  unauthor- 
ized detention  of  Eicketts  at  the  Gap,  though  perhaps 
unintentionally  conveyed,  *  may  well  here  be  expressly 
guarded  against.  Any  such  impression  would  be  wholly 
unfounded. 

The  fact  is,  that  until  noon  that  day  Ewell  and  Taliaferro 
were  open  to  attack ;  that  even  after  Hill  joined  them,  about 
noon,  they  took  up  no  such  position  as  they  did  the  next 
morning ;  that  if  the  whereabouts  of  the  enemy  had  been 
ascertained  early  in  the  morning,  and  the  army  concentrated 
upon  him,  he  must  have  been  beaten  ;  but  that  our  army 
was  marched  and  coimtermarched  in  the  vain  endeavor  to 
find  him  until,  toward  the  close  of  the  day,  he  discovered 
himself  to  us.  Our  battle  with  Jackson  should  have  been 
fought  on  the  28th. 


*  Compare  Pope's  Report,  p.  151,  where  he  says  that  "  the  disposition  of  the 
troops  on  the  west  of  Jacksnn  failed  through  Riclcetts'  movement  toward  Thor- 
oughfare Gap  and  the  consequent  (sio)  withdrawal  of  King."" 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GAINESVILLE. 


81 


After  the  battle  was  over,  General  King  felt  himself  to  be 
in  a  somewhat  critical  position.  Eicketts  had  retired  from 
Thoroughfare  Gap,  after  dark,  and  reported  the  imminent 
-advent  of  Longstreet  in  the  morning.  The  fact  stared  them  in 
the  face,  that  probably  nothing  which  they  could  now  do  could 
prevent  the  union  of  the  two  wings  of  the  Confederate  army. 
And  it  was  equally  plain  that  the  first  brunt  of  the  attack 
would  fall  on  them.  Unfortunately  for  our  side,  they, 
neither  of  them,  clearly  understood  the  tactical  importance 
of  the  positions  which  they  held.  And,  still  more  unfortu- 
nately, their  corps  commander,  McDowell,  who  had  gone  to 
Manassas  to  see  Pope  and  confer  with  him,  had  not  suc- 
ceeded in  rejoining  his  command.  Left  to  their  own  unas- 
sisted reason,  they  decided  to  fall  back  by  way  of  Gainesville, 
Eicketts  to  Bristoe  and  King  to  Manassas,  which  was  as  use- 
less a  thing  as  they  could  have  done. 

It  would  not  be  difficult  to  say  stronger  things  about  this 
uncalled  for  and  unmilitary  retreat.  Eeynolds  had  been 
wdth  King  that  evening,  having  ridden  over  from  his  own  di- 
vision, only  a  mile  or  so  off,  and  King  knew  that  Eeynolds' 
division,  \7hich  belonged  to  his  own  corps,  was  uncovered  by 
this  falling  back.  They  also  knew  that  Sigel  was  close  to 
the  pike  near  the  Sudley  Springs  road.  King  knew,  of 
course,  that  the  only  object  of  his  being  ordered  to  Manassas 
that  morning  was  to  find  Jackson,  and  he  knew  now,  from 
the  bloody  experience  of  the  evening,  exactly  where  Jackson 
w^as.  They  knew,  therefore,  that  against  the  three  divisions 
of  Jackson's  corps  they  could  at  daybreak  unite  their  own 
divisions,  Eeynolds'  division  and  the  two  divisions  of  Sigel ; 
and  they  knew  enough  of  General  Pope  by  this  time  to  be 
sure  that  if  they  attacked  Jackson  in  the  morning.  Pope 
would  bring  up  Heintzelman  and  Eeno  with  all  speed  to 
help.  Whatever  mistakes  they  may  have  laid  to  Pope's 
4* 


82 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


charge,  neither  they  nor  anyone  else  ever  questioned  his 
stomach  for  a  fight ;  and  they  knew  to  a  certainty,  that  se- 
verely as  Jackson  had  been  handled  that  evening  by  only 
two  of  our  brigades,  an  attack  upon  him  the  next  morning  at 
daybreak  with  the  whole  force  at  their  disposal  was  the  plain 
dictate  of  common  sense,  and  was  just  what  General  Pope 
desired,  and  desired  most  strenuously.  It  is  difficult  to  be 
charitable  in  face  of  such  a  blunder ;  but  we  ought  to  re- 
member that  King's  health  completely  broke  down  the  next 
day,  and  it  may  have  been  that  his  nerve  gave  way  that  even- 
ing, and  that,  being  the  ranking  officer,  his  judgment  im- 
posed upon  Eicketts,  who  was  undoubtedly  a  faithful  and 
gallant  soldier.  It  could  not,  however,  impose  upon  Rey- 
nolds, whose  admirable  military  instinct  kept  him  at  the  post 
of  duty,  though  both  his  colleagues  deserted  him. 

These  two  officers,  by  their  ill-judged  retreat,  prevented 
their  two  divisions  from  participating  at  all  in  the  action  of 
the  next  day,  except  that  at  six  or  half-past  six  in  the  after- 
noon. Hatch  took  King's  wearied  division  in  for  a  brief  but 
unsuccessful  struggle. 

It  is  not  too  much  to  say,  in  fact  it  is  perfectly  clear,  that 
this  retreat  of  King  and  Eicketts  affected  the  battle  of  the 
next  day  infinitely  more  than  the  inaction  of  Porter,  of  which 
so  much  has  been  said.  Porter  undoubtedly  retained  a  large 
part  of  Longstreet's  command  in  front  of  him  all  the  after- 
noon. King  and  Eicketts  simply  left  the  stage  for  twenty- 
four  hours. 

Yet  they  sat  on  Fitz  John  Porter's  court-martial. 


CHAPTEK  m 


Mcdowell  and  porter. 

In  tlie  belief,  as  we  have  seen,  that  Jackson  was  in  full  re- 
treat toward  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  had  no  thought  but  of 
escaping  our  pursuit.  Pope  welcomed  the  sound  of  Gibbon's 
guns  on  the  evening  of  Thursday,  the  28th,  as  being  evidence 
that  Jackson's  retreat  had  been  checked,  and  that  he  could 
be  overwhelmed  by  our  superior  forces  in  the  morning. 
Hardly  had  the  sound  of  the  firing  died  away,  when  Pope 
writes  from  his  headquarters  near  Blackburn's  Ford  the  fol- 
lowing despatch*  to  General  Kearny  at  Centreville  : 

Headquarters  Army  of  Virginia, 
Near  Bull  Run,  August  28,  1862,  9.05  p.m. 
General  :  General  McDowell  has  intercepted  the  retreat  of  the  ene- 
my and  is  now  in  his  front,  Sigel  on  the  right  of  McDowell.  Unless  he 
can  escape  by  by-paths  leading  to  the  north  to-night,  he  must  be  cap- 
tured. I  desire  you  to  move  forward  at  one  o'clock  to-night,  even  if 
you  can  carry  with  you  no  more  than  two  thousand  men,  though  I  trust 
you  will  carry  the  larger  part  of  your  division.  Pursue  the  turnpike 
from  Centreville  to  Warrenton.  The  enemy  is  not  more  than  three 
and  a  half  miles  from  you.  Seize  any  of  the  people  of  the  town  to 
guide  you.  Advance  cautiously  and  drive  in  the  enemy's  pickets  to- 
night, and  at  early  dawn  attack  him  vigorously.  Hooker  shall  be  close 
behind  you.  Extend  your  right  well  toward  the  north,  and  push  for- 
ward your  right  wing  well  in  the  attack.  Be  sure  to  march  not  later 
than  one,  with  all  the  men  you  can  take. 

JOHN  POPE, 
Major- General  Commandmg, 

Major-General  Kearny. 


*  P.  K.,  p.  150. 


84 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


A  similar  order*  was  sent  at  10  p.m.  to  Heintzelman,  at  or 
near  Bull  Eun,  to  carry  Hooker's  division  to  Centreville,  and 
thence  bj  the  turnpike  a  mile  and  a  half,  to  act  as  reserve  to 
Kearny. 

At  3  A.M.  of  the  29th  the  following  order  was  sent  to  Por- 
ter, at  Bristoe  Station  : 

Headquahters,  Army  of  Virginia, 
Near  Bull  Run,  August  29,  1862,  3  a.m. 
General  :   McDowell  has  intercepted  the  retieat  of  Jackson.  Sigel 
is  immediately  on  the  right  of  McDowell.    Kearny  and  Hooker  march 
to  attack  the  enemy's  rear  at  early  dawn.    Major-General  Pope  directs 
you  to  move  upon  Centreville  at  the  first  dawn  of  day,  with  your  whole 
command,  leaving  your  trains  to  follow.    It  is  very  important  that  you 
should  be  here  at  a  very  early  hour  in  the  morning.    A  severe  engage- 
ment is  likely  to  take  place,  and  your  presence  is  necessary. 
I  am,  General,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GEORGE  D.  RUGGLES, 

Colonel  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

Major-General  Porter. 

Similar  verbal  orders  were  sent  to  General  Beno,  whose 
corps  was  in  bivouac  between  Bull  Run  and  Centreville,  to 
move  at  once  by  cross  roads  to  the  turnpike,  and  thence  to 
push  forward  in  support  of  Heintzelman  in  the  direction  of 
Gainesville. 

We  must  pause  a  moment  to  notice  the  evident  careless- 
ness in  prescribing  to  Porter  the  route  to  Groveton  by  way 
of  Centreville.  Porter  was  at  Bristoe,  or  between  that  place 
and  Manassas,  and  he  should  have  been  ordered  to  march 
via  Bethlehem  Church  and  Newmarket,  ujd  the  Sudley 
Si^rings  road,  which  would  have  saved  him  an  unnecessary 
march  of  ten  miles,  and  brought  him  on  the  field,  of  course, 
much  earlier.    Porter,  in  fact,  did  not  know  what  to  make 


*  p.  B.,  p.  150. 


Mcdowell  and  porter. 


85 


of  the  order,  as  it  seemed  to  indicate  the  imminence  of  a 
serious  struggle  at  Centreville,  whereas  -  he  knew  that  the 
enemy  were  all  west  of  Bull  Eun.  However,  he  obeyed  it  at 
once,  and  his  troops  had  passed  Manassas  Junction  some  dis- 
tance on  their  way  to  Centreville,  when  he  met  a  staff-ofii- 
'  cer  ^  of  General  Pope's,  who  gave  him  the  purport  of  a 
written  order  which  he  was  carrying  to  General  McDowell, 
which  was  to  the  effect  that  Porter  was  to  take  King's  divi- 
sion and  move  to  Gainesville.  Porter  at  once  counter- 
marched his  column,  and  about  half-past  nine,  when  Manas- 
sas Junction  had  been  repassed,  he  received  a  written  order 
from  General  Pope,  confirming  the  other. 

The  fact  was,  that  since  the  issuing  of  the  orders  of  the 
evening  before  to  Kearny,  Heintzelman,  and  Eeno,  and  the 
order  of  three  o'clock  that  morning  to  Porter,  General  Pope 
had  learned,  to  his  great  surprise  and  indignation,  of  the  fall- 
ing back  of  the  divisions  of  King  and  Ricketts.  Full  of  the 
idea  that  Jackson  was  bent  on  retreating  to  Thoroughfare 
Gap,  his  confidence  that  he  could  not  escape,  expressed  so 
fully  in  the  despatch  just  quoted  to  Kearny,  was  succeeded 
by  the  gravest  doubts  as  to  whether  he  could  possibly  be 
detained  by  Sigel  and  Reynolds,  or  headed  off  by  Porter. 
However,  he  would  at  any  rate  do  what  he  could  to  caj^ture 
him.  Accordingly,  he  sent  orders  f  at  daylight  to  Sigel, 
who  was,  it  will  be  remembered,  in  close  proximity  to  Jack- 
son's forces,  supported  by  Reynolds'  division,  ^'to  attack  the 
enemy  vigorously  as  soon  as  it  was  light  enough  to  see,  and 
bring  him  to  a  stand,  if  it  were  possible  for  him  to  do  so." 
And  he  sent  to  Porter  the  above-mentioned  order,  the  tenor  J 
of  which  is  as  follows  : 


*  Captain  J.  H.  Piatt,  B.  O.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  1142. 

tp.R.,  p.  151.  +c.  M.,  p.  sa 


86 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


Headquarters,  Army  of  Virginia, 
Centreville,  August  29,  1863. 
Push  forward  with  your  corps  and  King's  division,  which  you  will 
take  with  you,  upon  Gainesville.    I  am  following  the  enemy  down  the 
Warrenton  Turnpike.    Be  expeditious,  or  we  will  lose  much. 

JOHN  POPE, 
Major-  6 eneral  Commandin g. 

Major-General  Porter. 

Hooker  and  Kearny  needed  no  new  orders.  Nor  did  the 
written  order  to  Eeno,  dated  5  a.m.,  differ  essentially  from 
the  verbal  instructions  sent  before.  As  for  Eicketts'  divi- 
sion, Pope  did  not  know  where  that  was.  King's  he  attached 
to  Porter's  corps,  because  he  had  not  been  able  to  find 
McDowell. 

These  orders  were  all  clear,  vigorous,  and  well  intended 
to  effect  their  object,  which  was  the  prevention  of  Jackson's 
retreat  and  his  capture  by  the  united  efforts  of  all  the  corps 
in  the  army. 

One  or  two  things,  however,  had  for  the  moment,  appar- 
ently, escaped  General  Pope's  mind,  so  far  as  we  can  judge 
from  the  tenor  of  these  despatches.  One  was  the  imminent 
probability,  we  may  rather  say,  the  certainty,  that  General 
Lee  would  come  through  the  Gap  that  morning,  there  being 
no  one  to  oppose  him,  and  the  other  was,  the  necessity  of 
revictualling  the  army.  For  the  last  day  or  two,  both  men  and 
officers  had  hardly  had  anything  to  eat.  How  far  this  state 
of  things  was  unavoidable,  is  a  matter  which  may  perhaps 
be  doubtful.    But  it  was  an  urgent  question  that  morning. 

Then  there  was  the  expected  advent  of  Lee,  or  rather  of 
Longstreet,  for  it  was  his  corps  which  the  Commander-in- 
chief  accompanied  in  person.  This,  as  we  know,  had  not 
only  been  expected,  but  the  retirement  of  Eicketts  from 
Thoroughfare  Gap  the  afternoon  before  had  been  caused  by 


Mcdowell  and  porter.  87 

the  pressure  upon  him  of  Longstreet's  superior  forces.  He 
and  King  in  fact  brought  back  the  unwelcome  intelligence 
that  the  two  wings  of  the  Confederate  army  would  be  be- 
yond question  united  in  the  morning  of  the  29th.  No  human 
power  could  now  prevent  this.  Unwelcome  though  the  in- 
telligence might  be,  it  was  none  the  less  true,  and  it  raised, 
or  rather,  it  should  have  raised,  in  General  Pope's  mind,  the 
very  serious  question,  w^hether  it  was  possible  for  his  ex- 
hausted and  half-starved  army  to  beat  Jackson  and  Long- 
street  together,  that  is,  the  w^hole  army  of  General  Lee ;  in 
other  words,  whether  he  ought  not  first  to  get  large  reinforce- 
ments. Another  question,  also  of  the  first  importance,  was, 
whether  it  w^ould  be  wise  to  fight  this  battle  on  the  westerly 
side  of  Bull  Eun,  a  stream  crossed  by  only  two  or  three 
biidges,  and  though  fordable  in  places,  yet  a  formidable  ob- 
stacle to  artillery.  That  it  would  be  well  worth  while  to  call 
upon  the  Army  of  Virginia  for  an  unusual  effort  if  there  was  a 
good  chance  of  overw^helming  the  corps  of  J ackson  before  he 
could  be  reinforced,  may  well  be  granted.  But  if  Jackson 
w^ere  now  joined  by  the  rest  of  Lee's  army,  would  it  not  be 
wiser  to  fall  back  to  Centreville,  there  take  up  a  strong  po- 
sition behind  Bull  Eun,  obtain  reinforcements  and  supplies, 
and  receive  the  enemy's  attack  there  ?  There  seems  no  rea- 
sonable doubt  as  to  the  answer  to  this  question  ;  nor  do  we 
r'magine  that  General  Pope  intended  at  this  time  to  fight 
his  great  battle  on  the  old  battle-field  of  Bull  Eun.  What 
he  was  trying  this  morning  to  do  w^as  precisely  what  he  had 
been  trying  to  do  all  the  day  before,  and  that  was  to  concen- 
trate his  whole  army  upon  Jackson  before  Longstreet  could 
come  up.  No  one  can  read  the  despatches  to  Kearny  and 
Heintzelman  and  Porter,  and  come  to  any  other  conclusion. 
Had  Pope  been  intending  to  engage  the  whole  army  of  Lee. 
would  he  have  begun  his  battle  by  ordering  Sigel  and  Eey- 


88 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


nolds,  alone  and  unsupported,  to  attack  as  soon  as  it  was  light 
enough  to  see,  and  have  trusted  to  his  corps  and  division  com- 
manders to  fetch  their  troops  from  the  four  corners  of  the 
field  in  season  to  form  a  line  of  battle  ?  General  Pope  was  no 
such  tjro  as  this.  It  is  perfectly  clear  that  his  movements 
this  day  were  made  for  the  purpose  of  surrounding  and  captur- 
ing the  three  divisions  of  Jackson,  Ewell,  and  A.  P.  Hill,  and 
that  he  had  no  intention  of  undertaking  to  do  anything  else. 

Still,  as  the  advent  of  Lee  and  Longstreet  was  believed  by 
General  Pope  to  be  not  far  distant,  it  was  necessary  to  issue 
some  instructions  to  guide  his  lieutenants  if,  on  arriving  at 
the  front,  this  emergency  should  be  found  to  have  arisen. 

Accordingly,  we  find  that  while  the  orders  above  cited 
unmistakably  show  that  General  Pope's  sole  purpose  in  the 
dispositions  which  he  made  that  Friday  morning  was  to  at- 
tack Jackson's  corps  only,  and  that  he  still  believed  that 
this  could  be  done,  he  yet  did  not  leave  his  lieutenants  with- 
out a  perfectly  clear  expression  of  his  intentions  in  the  event 
of  its  being  found  that  Jackson  had  been  joined  by  Long- 
street.  Thus  he  sent  the  following  despatch  from  Centre- 
ville  about  noon  to  Generals  Heintzelman,  Beno,  and  Sigel. 

Headquarters,  Army  of  Virginia, 
August  29,  1863. 
To  Generals  Heintzelman,  Reno,  and  Sigel  : 

If  you  find  yourselves  heavihj  pressed  hy  supe7Hor  number's  of  the 
enemy ^  you  will  not  \ push  matters  farther. 

Fitz  John  Porter  and  King's  division  of  McDowell's  corps  are  moving 
on  Gainesville  from  Manassas  Junction,  and  will  come  in  on  your  left. 
They  have  about  twenty  thousand  men.  f  The  command  must  return 
to  this  place  to-night  or  by  morning,  on  account  of  s^ibsistence  and 
forage. 

JOHN  POPE, 

Major-  General  Commanding. 


*  Porter  s  statement,  aovt.  ed.,  1879,  p.  23,  note.  i  The  italics  are  ours. 


Mcdowell  and  porter. 


89 


The  "  superior  numbers  of  the  enemy  "  here  spoken  of  as 
possibly  "  heavily  pressing  "  the  three  corps  of  our  army  com- 
manded by  Heintzelman,  Reno,  and  Sigel,  were,  of  course, 
the  forces  of  Jackson  augmented  by  those  of  Longstreet. 
Jackson's  corps  alone  did  not  equal  these  three  corps  of  our 
army.  If  they  found  these  new  troops  fighting  them,  they 
were  not  "  to  push  matters  farther,"  but  to  stand  on  the  de- 
fensive. 

The  explicit  statement  that  our  troops  must  "  to-night  or 
by  morning"  return  to  this  place  (Centreville,  from  which 
some  of  them  had  started  in  the  morning),  is  also  significant 
of  its  not  being  General  Pope's  plan  to  enter  upon  any  deci- 
sive operations  on  this  day.  The  army  needed  subsistence 
and  forage,  and  any  j^rotracted  effort  was  therefore  not  con- 
templated by  him. 

To  the  same  effect  are  certain  expressions  in  an  order  is- 
sued somewhere  about  nine  or  half -past  nine  this  morning  to 
Generals  McDowell  and  Porter,  known  as  the  Joint  Or- 
der,"*   It  reads  as  follows  : 

General  Orders,  No.  5. 

Headquarters,  Army  of  Virginia, 
Centreville,  August  29,  186:3. 

Generals  McDowell  and  Porter  : 

You  will  please  move  forward  with  your  joint  commands  toward 
Gainesville.  I  sent  General  Porter  written  orders  to  that  effect  an 
hour  and  a  half  ago.  Heintzelman,  Sigel,  and  Reno  are  moving  on  the 
Warrenton  Turnpike,  and  must  now  be  not  far  from  Gainesville.  I 
desire  that,  as  soon  as  communication  is  established  between  this  force 
and  your  own,  the  whole  command  shall  halt,  t  It  may  he  necessary 
to  fall  hack  hehind  Bull  liunat  Centreville  to-night.  1  presume  it  iviJl 
he  so  on  acco^mt  of  our  supplies. 

I  have  sent  no  orders  of  any  description  to  Ricketts,  and  none  to  in- 


*  r.  E.,  p.  152. 


t  Th3  itahcs  arc  ours. 


90 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


terf  ere  in  any  way  with  the  movements  of  McDowell's  troops,  except 
what  1  sent  by  his  aide-de-camp  last  night,  which  were,  to  hold  his  po- 
sition on  the  Warrenton  pike  until  the  troops  from  here  should  fall 
upon  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear.  I  do  not  even  know  Ricketts'  position, 
as  I  had  not  been  able  to  find  out  where  General  McDowell  was  until  a 
late  hour  this  morning.  General  McDowell  will  take  immediate  steps 
to  communicate  with  General  Ricketts,  and  instruct  him  to  rejoin  the 
other  divisions  of  the  corps  as  soon  as  practicable. 

If  any  considerable  advantages  are  to  be  gained  by  departing  from 
this  order,  it  will  not  be  strictly  carried  out.  Oiie  thing  must  he  had 
in  view — that  the  troops  must  occupy  a  position  from  which  they  can 
reach  Bull  Run  to-night  or  by  morning.  The  indications  are,  that  the 
v^hole  force  of  the  enemy  is  moving  in  this  direction  at  a  pace  that  will 
bring  them  here  by  to-morrow  night  or  next  day. 

My  own  headquarters  will  be  for  the  present  with  Heintzelman's 
corps,  or  at  this  place.* 

JOHN  POPE, 

Major-General  Commanding. 

In  this  order  General  Pope  first  repeats  to  the  officers 
commanding  his  left  wing  the  same  direction  as  to  the 
necessity  of  recrossing  Bull  Run  that  evening,  on  account  of 
supplies,  that  he  had  already  given  to  the  officers  command- 
ing his  right  wing.  The  operations  of  the  day,  it  is  thus 
implied,  are  to  be  of  a  merely  temporary  character.  All  the 
officers  of  rank  in  the  army  have  now  been  informed  of  this. 

Then,  the  injunction  that  ^'  the  troops  must  occupy  a  po- 
sition from  which  they  can  reach  Bull  Run  to-night  or  by 
morning  "  is  reiterated,  but,  it  will  be  observed,  for  a  differ- 
ent reason,  namely,  because  "the  whole  force f  of  the  enemy" 
— the  two  wings  of  General  Lee's  army  under  Jackson  and 
Longstreet  united — is  likely  to  be  at  Centreville  to-morrow 

*  Centreville. 

t  The  order  says  that  *'  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy  is  moving  in  this  direc- 
tion at  a  pace,  etc."  This  is  evidently  a  slip  of  the  pen.  Jackson  was  not  moving 
"  in  this  direction  :  "  Longstreet,  however,  was,  and  when  their  junction  should 
be  effected,  the  whole  force  would  move  in  the  direction  of  Centreville. 


Mcdowell  and  porter. 


91 


night  or  the  next  day.  Therefore,  says  General  Pope,  you 
must  be  able  to  reach  Bull  Run  to-night  or  by  morning. 
This  is  in  fact  saying :  "  Our  movement  to-day  is  to  press 
Jackson  and  fight  him  if  he  will  stand ;  after  to-day  Jackson 
will  be  reinforced  by  Longstreet,  and  we  shall  fight  the 
united  army,  not  here,  but  behind  Bull  Run  at  Centreville." 

No  exception  can  be  taken  to  these  orders.  They  show, 
indeed,  that  General  Pope  entertained  a  more  hopeful  belief 
as  to  the  situation  of  Longstreet's  corps  than  the  facts  really 
warranted — that  ifc  was  even  now  twenty-four  hours,  or  per- 
haps forty-eight  hours  distant.  But  it  must  be  remembered, 
that  he  had  not  yet  seen  General  Ricketts,  nor  heard  his  re- 
port. And  besides.  General  'Pope  was  a  sanguine  man.  But 
the  orders  show,  also,  that  he  was  perfectly  well  aware  of  the 
exhausted  condition  of  his  men,  and  that,  as  a  prudent  gen- 
eral, he  had  no  intention  of  fighting  the  united  Confederate 
army  until  he  had  got  his  supplies  and  had  taken  up  a  more 
advantageous  position.  He  may  reasonably  also  have  ex- 
pected to  meet  reinforcements  at  Centreville,  Franklin's 
corps  or  Sumner's,  or  both. 

These  two  orders  of  Friday  morning  the  29th,  the  order  to 
Heintzelman,  Reno,  and  Sigel,  and  the  order  to  McDowell 
and  Porter,  must  be  kept  clearly  before  our  minds  if  we  are 
to  understand  the  story  of  this  eventful  day.  They  give  us 
the  key  to  the  object  which  General  Pope  had  in  view,  the 
hopes  which  he  entertained,  and  the  course  he  purposed  tak- 
ing in  case  things  should  not  turn  out  as  he  expected. 

We  may,  therefore,  be  pardoned  for  dwelling  on  them 
still  a  little  longer. 

His  object  was  the  capture  or  destruction  of  Jackson's 
force.  This  no  one  ever  questioned.  But  there  were  two 
things  that  might  prevent  his  attaining  this  object — Jackson 
might  retreat  to  Thoroughfare  Gap,  or  he  might  be  joined 


92 


THE  ARMY  UIS'DER  POPE. 


by  Longstreet.  In  the  early  morning,  Pope,  it  will  be  re- 
membered, supposed  that  McDowell's  corps  was  barring 
that  retreat.  In  this  belief  he  ordered  all  his  forces  to  the 
attack,  promising  them  success.  Then  he  learned  that 
McDowell's  corps  had  fallen  back,  and  that  Jackson  could 
escape  if  he  chose.  He  abated  nothing  of  his  purpose  on 
hearing  this,  however,  but  instantly  ordered  Porter  to  move 
with  all  speed  n^Don  Gainesville,  taking  King's  division  with 
him,  and  head  Jackson  off,  if  possible.  Still  later,  the  other 
possible  relief  for  Jackson  occurred  to  him — the  possibility 
of  his  being  joined  by  the  rest  of  Lee's  army — and  though 
he  did  not  deem  this  likely  to  occur  during  that  day,  still  he 
recognized  it  as  a  thing  which  might  occur ;  and  having  no 
intention  of  fighting  their  whole  army  in  his  present  posi- 
tion, and  with  his  troops  exhausted  as  they  were  for  want  of 
sux3plies,  he  tells  Heintzelman,  Eeno,  and  Sigel,  that  if  they 
find  that  Jackson  has  been  reinforced,  so  that  they  are 
pressed  by  superior  numbers,  they  are  not  to  "  -push  matters 
further,"  and  he  revokes  his  order  to  Porter  to  go  to  Gaines- 
ville, and,  instead,  directs  him  and  McDowell  to  proceed  in 
the  direction  of  Gainesville  until  communication  is  estab- 
lished "  with  the  forces  on  the  turnpike,  when  it  is  his  inten- 
tion, he  says,  that  ''the  whole  command  shall  halt."  He  is 
evidently  rather  skeptical  as  to  Jackson's  remaining  to  be 
attacked,  as  he  tells  McDowell  and  Porter  in  the  Joint  Order, 
that  Heintzelman,  Sigel,  and  Eeno  must  now  be  ''not  far 
from  Gainesville."  He  impresses  ujDon  all  his  lieutenants 
the  necessity  of  having  their  respective  commands  behind 
Bull  Eun  that  evening  or  the  next  day.  And  he  tells  Porter 
and  McDowell  that  he  looks  for  the  whole  Confederate  army 
at  Centreville  the  next  day,  or  the  next  day  but  one,  which  is 
stated  as  an  additional  reason  why  the  forces  under  their 
command  must  be  behind  Bull  Eun  that  night. 


Mcdowell  and  porter. 


93 


The  Joint  Order,  qnoted  in  full  above,  was  received  by 
Generals  McDowell  and  Porter  at  about  the  same  time.  In 
obedience  to  the  order  directing  him  to  take  King's  division 
and  march  with  all  speed  to  Gainesville,  Porter  had,  as  we 
know,  repassed  Manassas  Junction.  He  then  pushed  his 
troops  past  Bethlehem  church — Morell's  division  in  the  ad- 
vance, then  Sykes',  then  King's — until  the  head  of  his  column 
had  reached,  about  half-past  eleven  o'clock,  a  little  (and 
almost  dry)  stream  called  Dawkins'  Branch,  where  the  ene- 
my was  perceived. 

The  command  was  then  halted,  the  leading  brigade,  But- 
terfield's,"^  partially  deployed  across  the  creek,  and  skirmishers 
thrown  out.  Porter  had  his  own  two  divisions,  the  brigade  of 
Piatt,  and  the  division  of  King,  some  17,000  men  in  all.  He 
was  making  arrangements  to  move  upon  the  enemy  in  his 
front,  when  he  received  the  Joint  Order,  and  immediately 
afterward  he  was  joined  by  General  McDowell.  It  was 
about  noon.  Our  skirmishers  and  those  of  the  enemy  were 
exchanging  a  few  shots  with  each  other. f  Two  or  three 
miles  to  the  northward,  near  Groveton,  the  generals  could 
see  the  shells  rising  high  in  the  air,  indicating  a  distant  artil- 
lery engagement.  Here  Sigel  and  Keynolds  were  contend- 
ing with  Jackson.  In  front  and  somewhat  to  the  right  they 
could  see  clouds  of  dust  on  the  i^ike,  showing  the  march  of 
Longstreet's  corps  to  reinforce  Jackson.  Eicketts,  as  they 
had  learned  that  morning,  had  retired  from  the  Gap  the 
evening  before.  McDowell  showed  Porter  the  following 
despatch : 

Headquarters  Cavalry  Briga.de,  9.30  a.m. 
Seventeen  regiments,  one  battery,  and  five  hundred  cavalry  passed 
through  Gainesville  three-quarters  of  an  hour  ago  on  the  Centreville 


*  Bulterfield's  evidence,  B.  O.,  p.  461  et  seq. 
t  C.  M.,  McDowelFs  evidence,  p.  84. 


94 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


road.  I  think  this  division  should  join  our  forces  now  engaged  at 
once.    Please  forward  this. 

JOHN  BUFORD, 

Brigadier-  General. 

General  Ricketts. 

The  van  of  Longstreet's  command  had  then  arrived  at 
Gainesville  at  a  quarter  before  nine,  more  than  three  hours 
ago.  And  since  that  time  the  stream  had  without  doubt  been 
pouring  down  the  pike.  The  junction  of  Longstreet's  forces 
with  Jackson's  had  been  effected,  there  was  no  longer  any 
question  on  that  point.    What  was  best  to  be  done  ? 

In  the  first  place,  it  was  j)liiin  that  thev  could  not  march 
peaceably  forward  along  the  Gainesville  road,  or  the  railroad, 
until  communication  should  be  established  between  their 
own  forces  and  those  of  Sigel  and  Reynolds.  If  they  under- 
took to  establish  this  communication  by  ^'mo^dng  forward 
toward  Gainesville,"  as  the  Joint  Order  directed,  they  must 
make  the  necessary  dispositions  for  carrying  the  heights  op- 
posite, they  must  prepare,  in  fact,  to  fight  a  battle.  There 
was  certainly  a  chance  here  for  a  bold  and  telling  blow. 
Without  counting  Ricketts,  they  had  some  17,000  men.  He 
had  some  7,000  more,  though  they  were  a  good  deal  fatigued. 
Then  there  was  Banks  with  nearly  10,000  more  men  a  short 
distance  off,  at  Bristoe.  It  was  quite  likely  that  the  forma- 
tion of  Longstreet's  line  had  not  been  completed.  At  any 
rate  there  was  an  opportunity  here  to  strike  a  powerful  blow 
partly  on  his  front  and  partly  on  his  flank.  But  this  idea 
was  apparently  not  suggested.  The  terms  of  the  Joint  Order, 
indeed,  did  not  encourage  such  a  coui'se. 

In  the  next  place,  they  could  not  establish  the  communi- 
cation with  the  right  wing  which  the  J oint  Order  directed, 
by  pushing  their  troops  up  through  the  country  lying  be- 
tween the  railroad  and  the  turnpike  ;  it  was  too  rough  and 


McDowell  and  porter. 


95 


broken ;  entirely  impracticable  for  artillery,  and  very  diffi- 
cult for  infantry.  McDowell  and  Porter  rode  from  the  head 
of  the  column  to  the  railroad  track,  about  half  a  mile,  looked 
at  this  region,  and  concluded  not  to  attempt  to  traverse  it. 

In  this  emergency,  either  McDowell  or  Porter,"^  it  is  not 
certain  which,  suggested  that,  as  King's  division  of  McDow- 
ell's command  was  near  Bethlehem  Church,  where  the  road  on 
which  they  then  were  turns  into  the  Sudley  Springs  road, 
McDowell  should  take  that  division  up  the  Sudley  Springs 
road,  leaving  Eicketts  to  follow.  This  suggestion,  from 
whomsoever  it  came,  met  with  the  approval  of  both  ;  and 
with  a  few  very  hurried  w^ords,  General  McDowell  galloped 
back  along  the  track  to  the  fork  of  the  roads,  and  gave 
King's  division  the  order  to  march  by  the  Sudley  Springs 
road  toward  the  turnpike. 

In  taking  this  action,  the  two  Generals  may  be  supposed 
to  have  intended  to  carry  out  the  spirit  of  the  Joint  Order, 
though  deviating  from  its  strict  letter,  as  the  Order  itself 
authorized  them  to  do.  The  intention  of  the  Joint  Order 
was  that  the  right  wing  of  the  army  should  move  west  on 
the  turnpike  and  the  left  wing  northwest  on  the  Manassas 
and  Gainesville  road,  until  they  should  establish  some  sort 
of  communication  with  each  other,  when  a  more  or  less  con- 
tinuous line  should  be  formed, f  and  the  whole  army  should 
halt.  Now,  McDowell  and  Porter  found  that  the  enemy 
were  barring  the  westward  march  of  the  right  wing,  contrary 
to  what  the  Joint  Order  indicated  was  General  Pope's  expec- 
tation, and  they  also  found  the  enemy  in  their  own  front.  It 
was  then  impossible  for  the  two  wings  to  establish  commu- 
nication by  marching  on  converging  lines.  Nor  could  they 
establish  this  communication  by  moving  across  the  interven- 

*  McDoweirs  evidence,  B.  O.,  p.  813 ;  Porter's  statement,  Gov.  ed.,  p.  24. 
t  Cf .  McDoweirs  testimony,  C.  M.,  p.  8-3. 


96 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


ing  country  to  the  pike,  because  the  intervening  country  was 
so  wooded  and  broken  as  not  to  admit  of  the  passage  of  artil- 
lery, or  even  of  infantry  in  any  regular  formation.  If,  how- 
ever, part  of  the  troops  could  take  the  road  in  rear  and  man- 
age to  come  out  again  to  the  front  half  way  or  so  from  their 
present  position  to  the  pike,  the  general  purpose  of  the 
Joint  Order  would  have  been  gained.  And  this  is  what 
might  have  been  accomplished  by  McDowell's  march  by  the 
Sudley  Springs  road.  There  was  a  road — the  old  Warren- 
ton  and  Alexandria  road — south  of  and  substantially  paral- 
lel to  the  turnpike,  which  McDowell  might  have  turned 
into,  at  the  village  of  Newmarket,  from  the  Sudley  S^Drings 
road,  and  it  would  have  led  him  to  a  point  about  midway 
between  the  place  where  the  head  of  the  column  was  and 
the  turnpike.  That  he  would  do  this,  or  something  equiva- 
lent to  this,  was  undoubtedly  Porter's  expectation,  and,  per- 
haps McDowell's  ^  also,  at  the  time.  "When  he  rode  away, 
shortly  after  twelve  o'clock,  it  was  with  the  intention,  not 
indeed  of  forming  a  continuous  line,  but  at  any  rate  of  get- 
ting the  army  more  together,  so  as  not  to  have  the  troops  so 
separated  as  they  then  were. 

McDowell  testified  f  that  he  said  to  Porter :  "  You  put 
your  force  in  here,  and  I  will  take  mine  up  the  Sudley 
Springs  road  on  the  left  of  the  troops  engaged  at  that  point 
with  the  enemy,"  or  words  to  that  effect.  "  I  left  General 
Porter,"  he  says  with  the  belief  and  understanding  that  he 
would  put  his  force  in  at  that  point." 

It  is  understood  that  Porter  admits  having  heard  this 
direction;  and  assuming  that  he  did  hear  it,  it  is  plain 
that  the  direction  as  it  stood  required  further  explanation. 
WJien  was  Porter  to  put  his  corps  in  there  ?    Was  he  to 


*B,  O.,  p.  794,  McDoweirs  evidence, 
t  C.  M.,  85,  92. 


Mcdowell  and  porter. 


97 


commence  operations  at  once,  on  his  own  account,  so  to 
speak^  or  was  he  to  wait  till  McDowell  had  succeeded  in  the 
object  of  his  movement,  until  he  had  placed  his  troops 
somewhere  between  the  left  of  the  troops  engaged  on  the 
turnpike  and  Porter's  corps?  If  McDowell  said  nothing- 
more  to  Porter  than  what  he  testified  he  did  say,  the  imi3li- 
cation  clearly  was  that  Porter  was  to  await  the  accomplish- 
ment of  McDowelFs  movement.  The  Joint  Order,  by  which 
they  were  both  bound,  contained,  indeed,  a  proviso,  that  if 
any  considerable  advantages  could  be  gained  by  departing 
from  it,  it  need  not  be  strictly  carried  out."  But  to  carry 
out  an  order  in  a  different  mode  from  the  one  provided  is  one 
thing,  and  to  do  something  utterly  unlike  what  the  order 
directs  should  be  done  is  surely  another  and  a  very  different 
thing.  That  McDowell's  troops  could,  by  interposing  some- 
where between  the  forces  on  the  pike  and  Porter's  corps, 
establish  that  communication  between  the  left  wing  and  the 
forces  on  the  pike,  which  the  Joint  Order  directed  should  be 
established,  more  easily  than  by  marching  toward  Gaines- 
ville or  attempting  to  get  through  or  move  in  front  of  the 
woods  and  broken  ground  north  of  the  railroad,  seemed  quite 
likely.  To  do  this  was  entirely  within  the  latitude  allowed 
in  the  Order ;  it  was  carrying  the  Order  out,  but  it  was  not 
carrying  it  out  strictly.  But  for  McDowell  to  leave  Porter 
where  he  was,  at  Dawkins'  Branch,  and  go  up  and  join  the 
main  army  by  a  road  in  the  rear,  without  establishing  or 
seeking  ^  to  establish  any  communication  between  his  corps 
and  Porter's,  is  such  a  total  departure  from,  or  rather  viola- 
tion of  the  Joint  Order,  that  no  one  can  be  surprised  that 
Porter  never  understood  it  to  be  intended  by  McDowell. 

*  McDowell  did,  on  his  arrival  at  the  pike,  direct  King  to  take  post  on  the  left 
of  Reynolds,  but  this  was  countermanded  by  Pope,  P.  V.  C,  p.  45.  B.  0.,  p. 
tOl,  ad  finem. 

YoL,  IV,— 5 


98 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


Most  certainly  any  such  radical  departure  from  their  instruc- 
tions should  have  been  made  matter  of  explicit  nnderstand- 
ing ;  there  should  have  been  no  room  left  for  misconception. 
McDowell  should  have  said  something  equivalent  to  this : 
"  You  will  act  to-day  entirely  independent  of  me ;  I  shall 
very  likely  be  where  you  cannot  connect  with  me  or  commu- 
nicate with  me  at  all ;  you  must  act  on  your  own  responsi- 
bility." Otherw^ise,  it  was  as  clearly  implied  as  possible  that 
Porter  was  to  wait  for  communication  with  McDowell's  corps 
to  be  established  before  undertaking  anything  of  a  serious 
character.  We  say,  implied  as  clearly  as  possible,  and  we 
mean  it. 

The  two  officers  had  been  acting  together ;  they  had  been 
addressed  together  in  o.  joint  order;  the  movement  of 
McDowell  would  not  have  been  thought  of*  except  as  a 
more  expeditious  mode  of  putting  King  and  Ricketts  on 
Reynolds'  left  and  so  establishing  the  communication  be- 
tween the  wings  of  the  army  enjoined  by  the  Joint  Order.  If 
then,  the  understanding  was  that  McDowell's  corps  was  to 
reappear  shortly  somewhere  to  the  north  of  the  railroad  and 
communicate  with  Porter,  it  Vv'ould  have  been  simi:)ly  culpa- 
ble, if  Porter  had,  while  the  movement  was  being  made, 
compromised  his  corps  by  attacking  before  McDowell  was  in 
a  position  to  support  the  attack.  It  would  have  been 
repeating  the  mistake  of  Banks  at  Cedar  Mountain. 

That  Porter  supposed  that  McDowell's  object  in  going 
around  by  the  back  road  was  to  effect  this,  is,  in  our  judg- 
ment, beyond  question.  He  certainly  had  a  right  to  suppose 
so,  unless  explicitly  informed  that  McDowell  intended  to 
separate  the  commands  definitely  for  the  rest  of  the  day,  and 
he  certainly  was  not  so  informed.  He,  therefore,  expected 
during  the  afternoon,  and  he  had  a  right  to  expect,  that 


*B.  0.,  McDowell's  evidence,  p.  791. 


Mcdowell  and  porter. 


99 


McDowell  would  get  into  some  position  whicli  would  enable 
him  to  establish  some  sort  of  communication  with  his  corps. 
And  during  this  period  of  exT)ectation  he  could  do  nothing- 
else  than  stand  on  the  defensive.  And  he  expected,  and  ho 
had  a  right  to  expect,  to  be  informed  the  moment  McDowell 
had  succeeded  in  his  movement. 

If  McDowell,  as  would  seem  likely,  took  a  different  view 
of  the  latitude  allowed  to  him  under  the  Joint  Order,  that 
ifc  warranted  liim'^  in  "  dissolving  the  joint  operations  of  the 
two  corps,"  all  we  can  say  is  that  it  is  i^erfectly  i>lain  that  this 
should  have  been  clearly  communicated  to  General  Porter. 
McDowell  says,t  that  when  he  left  Porter,  he  had  arranged 
to  separate  the  two  corj^s,  "  leaving  him  alone  on  the  Gaines- 
ville road,  whilst  I  went  ui?  the  Sudle}^  Springs  road."  He 
also  claims  J  that  his  order  to  Porter,  to  put  his  troops  in 
there,  given  as  it  was  whilst  they  were  both  at  a  distance  from 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  was  binding  on  Porter, §  under  the 
62d  Article  of  War,  and  that  he  was  bound  by  it  until  ifc 
should  be  revoked  by  superior  authority.  It  is  too  obvious 
to  need  any  argument  that  there  are  very  serious  difficulties 
in  the  way  of  the  conclusion  at  which  General  McDowell  ar- 
rived, in  regard  to  liis  latitude  of  action  under  the  Joint 
Order.  The  Order  contemj^lated  joint  action  by  the  two 
corps ;  for  this  he  substituted  their  independent  action.  The 
Order  contemplated  the  establishment  of  communication  be- 
tween the  widely  apart  wings  of  the  army ;  he  deprived  the 
left  wing  of  half  its  strength,  and  lef  fc  it,  separated  by  broken 
and  difficult  country  from  the  right  wing.  The  Order,  by 
necessary  implication,  postponed  active  operations  until  this 

*  C.  M.,  p.  92.  t  C.  M  ,  p.  87.  t  C.  M.,  p.  92,  B.  O.,  p.  802. 

§  It  does  not  seem  to  us  that  McDowell  concerned  himself  particularly  as  to  the 
situation  of  P  )rtcr  after  he  sho  Id  have  left  him.  He  does  not  f-eem  to  have 
realized  the  responsibility  invo  ved  in  giving  such  an  order. 


100 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


communication  should  have  been  established  between  the 
wings  of  the  army ;  he  undertook  to  order  a  separate  and 
isolated  attack  on  an  enemy  of  unknown  strength  by  one 
corps.  Finally,  the  Joint  Order  insisted  upon  a  return  be- 
hind Bull  Eun  that  night,  and  not  only  coupled  this  injunc- 
tion with  a  reminder  as  to  the  lack  of  subsistence  and  forage, 
but  repeated  it  in  connection  with  the  expected  advent  of  the 
balance  of  Lee's  army,  thereby  giving  the  corps  commanders 
to  know  that  the  commanding  general  intended  that  the  great 
battle,  which  was  certainly  impending,  between  the  army  of 
which  they  were  component  parts  and  the  united  army  of  Gen- 
eral Lee,  was  not  to  be  fought  there,  where  they  were,  on  the 
west  side  of  Bull  Run,  but  at  Centreville.  Yet  McDowell,  as 
he  claims,  ordered  Porter  to  attack  the  troops  of  Longstreet 
which  they  saw  coming  from  Gainesville,*  and  that  at  a  time 
when,  for  all  that  they  knew,  or  could  infer  from  the  distant 
artillery  fire  going  on  near  Groveton,  General  Pope  might 
adhere  to  his  resolution  not  to  risk  a  general  engagement 
that  day. 

Now,  we  need  not  insist  further  that  General  McDowell 
was  not  justified  in  the  interpretation  which  he  put  upon 
the  Joint  Order ;  but  we  do  say,  that  whether  he  was  or  was 
not  so  justified,  General  Porter  should  have  been  informed 
in  most  explicit  terms  about  this  interpretation  of  McDow- 
ell's, and  as  to  the  situation  in  which  he  would  be  left,  and 
as  to  the  independent  operation  which  it  was  expected  he 
would  undertake.  All  this  being  in  direct  contravention  of 
the  plain  object  to  gain  which  the  Joint  Order  was  issued, 
Porter  should  have  been  explicitly  informed  that  he  was  to 
act  independently,  and  was  expected  to  fight.  And  he  cer- 
tainly was  not  so  informed.    Not  having  been  so  informed, 

*  I  took  it  for  granted  that  there  would  be  other  forces  come  up."  McDoweira 
evidence,  B.  O.,  p.  803. 


Mcdowell  and  porter. 


101 


he  remained  under  the  impression  that  the  Joint  Order  was 
to  be  carried  out. 

He  decided  that  for  him  to  undertake  active  operations  in 
his  isolated  situation  would  have  been  to  disobey  his  orders, 
and  besides,  he  was,  after  the  first  two  hours  or  so,  mo- 
mentarily expecting  to  hear  from  McDowell.  Not  hearing 
from  him,  he  sent  scouting  parties  through  the  woods  to  the 
north,  to  see  if  they  could  find  anything  of  his  corps,  and 
he  communicated  with  him  by  the  Sudley  Springs  road  from 
time  to  time  during  the  afternoon ;  but  inasmuch  as  Mc- 
Dowell never  succeeded  in  putting  King's  division  in  on  the 
left  of  Reynolds,  Porter's  scouts  could  find  nothing,  of 
course.  Thus  Porter  remained  quiescent  during  the  after- 
noon, finishing  the  posting  of  his  infantry  and  artillery,  so 
as  to  cover  the  approaches  to  his  front,  throwing  his  skir- 
mishers across  the  Branch  into  the  woods  opposite ;  watch- 
ing the  enemy,  and  waiting  for  orders."^ 


*  See  Appendix  C. 


CHAPTEE  Vin. 


THE  BA.TTLE  OF  GROVETOK 

It  is  time  that  we  return,  from  wliat  has,  we  are  afraid, 
X:>rovecl  a  tedions  discussion,  though  a  necessary  one,  to  the 
operations  of  the  right  wing. 

At  daybreak  on  Friday,  the  29th,  it  will  be  remembered, 
Slgel  and  Eeynolds  were  on  or  near  the  turnpike  in  imme- 
diate proximity  to  Jackson's  forces.  General  Eeynolds'  divi- 
sion was  near  Groveton,  on  the  south  side  of  the  turnpike. 
General  Sigel's  two  divisions  under  Generals  Schenck  and 
Schurz,  witli  the  independent  brigade  of  Milroy  were  farther 
to  the  eastward,  near  the  crossing  of  the  Sudley  Springs 
road.  At  daylight  our  troops  were  put  in  motion  to  attack 
the  enemy. 

Jackson  was  found  to  occupy  a  long  line,  stretching  from 
Catharpin  Creek,  near  Sudley  Springs,  on  the  north,  to  a 
point  near  and  on  the  heights  above  the  turnpike  near 
Groveton ;  he  was  fronting  east  or  southeast.  Jackson's  old 
division  under  Starke,  Taliaferro  having  been  wounded  the 
evening  before,  occupied  the  right ;  Ewell's  division  under 
Lawton,  Ewell  having  been  also  wounded  the  evening  be- 
fore, held  the  centre  ;  while  A.  P.  Hill's  division  was  on  the 
loft.  Their  main  line  rested  on  the  excavation  *  of  an  un- 
finished railroad,  which  ran  in  a  northeasterly  direction  to- 
ward Sudley  Mill.    In  front  of  the  greater  part  of  this  old 


*  Jackson's  Eep.,  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  95. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GBOVETOK. 


103 


railroad  were  tolerably  thick  woods,  wliich  were  occupied 
bj  their  skirmishers. 

Our  forces  advanced,  moving  westerly,  Eeynolds  being  on 
the  extreme  left,  as  he  was  already  the  farthest  in  the  front. 
Next  to  him,  and  on  his  right,  came  Schenck.  Both  these 
divisions  moved  on  the  south  side  of  the  turnpike.  Just 
north  of  the  pike  and  next  to  Schenck,  came  Milroy's  inde- 
pendent brigade  ;  then,  on  our  extreme  right,  the  division  of 
Schurz.  The  troo^os  advanced  with  spirit,  their  batteries 
shelling  the  woods,  and  their  skirmishers  driving  the  enemy 
before  them.  On  our  extreme  left,  Eeynolds,  on  arriving 
near  the  battlefield  of  the  evening  before,  changed  front  to 
the  north  and  advanced  Meade's  brigade  across  the  pike 
with  the  intention  of  turning  the  enemy's  right.  Whatever 
might  have  come  of  this  attack,  however,  had  it  been  prop- 
erly supjDorfced,  ifc  soon  ceased,  owing  to  General  Schenck, 
who  was  supporting  the  movement,  being  obliged  to  send 
one  of  his  brigades,  Stahel's,  to  the  temporary  relief  of  Mil- 
roy,  who  was  hard  pressed.  Our  line  then  fell  back,  Eey- 
nolds retiring  some  distance  behind  Schenck.  The  contest 
here  in  the  morning  was  mostly  with  artilleiy  and  skir- 
mishers. 

On  the  right  of  the  turnpike,  Milroy  advanced  his  brigade, 
with  skirmishers  deployed  beyond  Groveton,  Schurz's  divi- 
sion being  on  his  right.  Near  the  i^iece  of  woods  on  the  field 
of  battle  of  the  evening  before  he  turned  away  from  the  pike 
and  inclined  to  the  right,  Schurz  having  also  more  or  less  got 
separated  from  him  by  inclining  to  the  north.  There  was 
then  a  gap  between  Milroy  and  Schenck,  and  another  between 
Milroy  and  Schurz.  The  latter  was  filled  by  Schurz,  but  at 
the  expense  of  weakening  his  line.  The  former  was,  as  we 
have  seen,  filled  by  Schenck's  detaching  Stahel's  brigade  to 
come  in  on  Milroy's  left.    But  the  line  was  too  thin.  Per- 


104 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPK 


ceiving  this,  the  enemy  adTanced  vigoronslY  from  theii*  jdo- 
sition  from  behind  the  raih'oad  embankment*  and  broke 
Schni'z's  line.  At  this  juncture  there  was  a  good  deal  of 
musketry  as  well  as  of  artillery  firing.  Toward  noon  Schurz 
renewed  the  attack,  drove  the  enemy  through  the  woods, 
and  Schimmelpfening's  brigade  even  gained  possession  of  a 
portion  of  the  raili"oad  embankment,  and  held  it  against  the 
re]3eated  attacks  of  the  enemy,  until  about  two  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon,  when  the  whole  division  was  relieved  by  fi-esh 
troops. 

On  the  whole,  the  work  of  the  forenoon  had  equalled 
expectations.  Our  forces  had  moved  with  commendable 
promptitude  and  activity ;  had  asceiiained  the  exact  location 
of  the  enemy's  line ;  had  diiven  him  from  his  cover  in  the 
outlying  woods  to  his  raih'oad  intrenchment,  for  such  it 
really  was ;  and  had  paved  the  way  for  such  telling  blows  as 
might  be  delivered  when  the  rest  of  the  army  should  arrive. 

An  hour  or  two  before  noon  Heintzelman  came  up  with 
the  two  divisions  of  Kearny  and  Hooker,  and  Eeno  with 
his  own  and  Stevens'  divisions.  By  this  time  Sigel's  troops, 
who  had  been  manoeuvring  and  fighting  since  five*  o'clock, 
were  exhausted ;  and  as  General  Pope  expected  the  co- 
operation of  McDowell  and  Porter  in  the  afternoon,  the 
troops  were  allowed  to  rest,  and  nothing  of  importance  f  oc- 
curred from  twelve  to  about  four  in  the  afternoon.  Some 
severe  skirmishing  took  place,  and  there  was  constant  artil- 
lery firing,  of  course  ;  but  this  was  mainly  a  time  of  rest 
and  of  preparation  for  the  heavy  blows  which  General  Pope 
intended  to  deliver  so  soon  as  he  should  hear  from  his  left; 
wing. 


*  In  some  places  this  is  an  embankment  and  in  others  an  excavation. 
+  P.  K.  pp.,  153,  154. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GROVETON. 


105 


He  had  no  doubt  now  of  winning  his  long-deferred  vic- 
tory over  Jackson.  He  had  heard  nothing  of  the  arrival  of 
Longstreet,  nor  were  any  of  Longstreet's  troops,  up  to  five 
or  six  o'clock,  oj)posed  to  our  advance  in  this  part  of  the 
field.  He,  therefore,  expected  that  McDowell  and  Porter 
would  move  up  from  the  railroad  across  the  country,  and 
strike  Jackson  in  flank  and  rear.  So  far  as  he  knew,  there 
not  only  was  no  reason  why  they  should  not  do  this,  but 
every  reason  in  the  world  why  they  should. 

There  is  a  curious  statement  in  General  Pope's  first  or 
original  report^  dated  September  3,  1862,  only  five  days  af- 
ter this  battle,  which  shows  us  exactly  what  he  expected. 

As  soon  as  I  found  that  the  enemy  had  been  brought  to  a 
halt,  and  was  being  vigorously  attacked  along  the  Warren- 
ton  turnpike,  I  sent  orders  to  McDowell  to  advance  rapidly 
on  our  left,  and  attack  the  enemy  on  his  flank,  extending 
his  right  to  meet  Reynolds'  left,  and  to  Fitz  John  Porter  to 
keep  his  right  well  closed  on  McDowell's  left  and  to  attack 
the  enemy  in  flank  and  rear  while  he  was  pushed  in  front. 
This  would  have  made  the  line  of  battle  of  McDowell  and 
Porter  at  right  angles  to  that  of  the  other  forces  engaged." 
General  Pope's  memory  was  at  fault  here,  as  he  sent  no  such 
order  as  he  here  speaks  of ;  but  he  may  very  possibly  have 
had  it  in  his  mind  to  send  such  an  order,  and  at  any  rate 
this  shows  us  exactly  what  he  expected  would  be  done  by 
McDowell  and  Porter.  It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  ex- 
pectation is,  that  they  would  act  together,  and  together  at- 
tack the  enemy  in  flank  and  rear. 

Accordingly,  towards  the  latter  part  of  the  afternoon 
General  Pope  ordered  Heintzelman  to  organize  two  simul- 
taneous attacks,  to  be  made  by  the  divisions  of  Hooker  and 


5* 


*  B.  0.,  1115,  1116. 


106 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


Kearny.  General  Hooker  selected  Grover's  brigade  to  lead 
his  attack,  whicli  was  to  be  directed  against  the  centre  of  the 
enemy's  line.  The  brigade  consisted  of  the  First,  Eleventh, 
and  Sixteenth  Massachusetts  regiments,  the  Second  New 
Hampshire,  and  the  Twenty-sixth  Pennsylvania.  The  charge 
was  one  of  the  most  gallant  and  determined  of  the  war.  The 
men  were  ordered  to  load  their  pieces,  fix  bayonets,  move 
slowly  and  steadily  until  they  felt  the  enemy's  fire,  then 
deliver  their  own  fire,  and  then  cany  the  i3osition  by  main 
force,  reh-ing  on  the  bayonet  only.  These  orders  were 
literally  obeyed.  The  railroad  embankment  was  carried  after 
a  brief  but  des^jerate  resistance,  in  which  bayonets  and 
clubbed  muskets  were  freely  used.  Beyond  the  embank- 
ment this  gallant  brigade  pursued,  overtln*owing  a  second 
line  of  their  o^Dponents,  until  overpowered  by  superior  num- 
bers, when  it  reared,  ha^dng  lost  nearly  five  hundi*ed  men 
in  about  twenty  minutes.  It  seems  almost  certain  that  if 
this  splendid  assault  had  been  properly  supioorted,  it  v>'ould 
have  succeeded  in  breaking  the  centre  of  Jackson's  line. 
Why  it  was  not  sup^Dorted  we  do  not  know.  If  there  were 
not  troops  enough  to  sustain  it,  it  ought  not  to  have  been 
ordered. 

General  Kearny's  attack  was  to  have  been  made  simulta- 
neously with  that  of  Grover,  but  farther  on  his  right,  against 
A.  P.  Hill's  division.  For  some  reason  not  given,  it  was  not 
made  until  Grover  had  been  driven  back.  It  was  gallantly 
led  by  that  gallant  soldier  General  Kearny,  and  was  sui3- 
l^orted  well  by  the  division  of  the  equally  gallant  Stevens. 
At  first  it  was  successful.  Hill's  troops  had  suffered  greatly 
in  all  the  skirmishing  and  fighting  of  the  day,  and  had  now 
run  short  of  ammunition.  Kearny's  attack,  so  violent  and 
determined,  rolled  uj)  their  line,  and  it  seemed  as  if  their 
left  was  really  turned.    Hill  says  that  the  chance  of  victory 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GROVETON. 


107 


trembled  in  the  balance.  His  own  troops  could  hardly 
stand  this  new  charge.  Gregg's  brigade  lost  613  officers  and 
men  killed  and  wounded,  including  all  the  field-officers  in 
the  brigade  but  two.  But  Crregg  told  Hill  that  he  would 
hold  his  position  with  the  bayonet.  The  tenacity  of  the 
soldiers  could  be  relied  on  to  the  last.  Yet  the  Federals  in 
their  impetuous  outset  bore  them  down  as  it  were  by  main 
force.  Fortunately  for  Hill,  he  was  able  to  call  in  two  bri- 
gades of  Ewell's  division  on  his  right,  those  of  Lawton  and 
Early,  and  these  troo^os,  striking  ours  when  exhausted  and 
disorganized,  as  troops  always  are,  even  by  a  victorious 
charge,  drove  us  out  of  the  xDosition  we  had  so  hardly  won. 

Finally,  betw^een  five  and  six  o'clock  in  the  afternoon, 
McDowell  arrived,  bringing  King's  division  with  him,  com- 
manded by  Hatch,  as  King  had  broken  down  with  severe 
illness.  Bicketts'  division  had  not  yet  been  able  to  come  up. 
When  Hatch  arrived,  the  enemy  was  readjusting  his,  line  of 
battle  after  all  the  fighting  of  the  day,  and  the  impression 
arose  in  the  minds  of  our  generals  that  he  was  retreating. 
Nothing  as  yet  api:)ears  to  have  been  known  by  our  generals 
here  of  the  arrival  of  Longstreet.  Hatch  was,  therefore, 
huiTied  along  the  pike  toward  Groveton,  to  press  them  in 
their  retreat  and,  if  possible,  convert  it  into  a  rout.  He 
carried  with  him  three  of  his  brigades.  About  half  past  six 
he  encountered  the  enemy  advancing  to  meet  him.  It  w^as 
a  part  of  Hood's  division  of  Longstreet's  corj^s,  Hood's  Texas 
brigade  and  Colonel  Law's  brigade.  The  action  was  very 
sharp,  and  veiy  bloody.  It  is  said  *  that  "  at  one  period 
General  Hatch  sat  complacently  on  his  horse,  while  every 
man  who  approached  him  pitched  and  fell  headlong  before 
he  could  deliver  his  message."     The  action  lasted  some 


*  Gordon,  p.  335. 


108 


THE  ARMY  Ul!^DER  POPE. 


three  quarters  of  an  hour,  when  Hatch's  wearied  men  re- 
tired in  good  order,  leaving  one  gun  in  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.*  This  gun,  says  Colonel  Law,t  "  continued  to  fire, 
until  my  men  were  so  near  it  as  to  have  their  faces  burnt  by 
its  discharges."  What  higher  praise  could  be  given  either 
to  the  gunners  or  to  their  antagonists? 

On  our  extreme  left,  south  of  the  pike,  Eeynolds  under- 
took, late  in  the  afternoon,  to  renew  the  attack,  but  the 
artillery  fire  of  the  enemy  in  his  front  was  too  severe  to  be 
encountered,  and  he  retired. 

This  ended  the  battle  of  Groveton.  Like  all  the  battles 
in  this  campaign,  it  was  desperately  fought.  There  is  abso- 
lutely no  criticism  to  make  on  the  behavior  of  the  troops  on 
both  sides.  The  Federals  fought  to  win  to-day,  and  they  at- 
tacked with  great  daring  and  perseverance.  The  Confed- 
erates fought  that  they  might  win  to-morrow,  and  they  re- 
sisted with  inflexible  resolution  and  courage.  The  losses 
had  been  severe  on  our  side.  General  Pope  estimated  his 
loss  at  six  or  eight  thousand  men.J  He  also  estimated  the 
loss  of  the  enemy  as  twice  as  great  as  our  own.  In  this  he 
was  probably  in  error,  as  we  were  almost  uniformly  the  at- 
tacldng  party.  §  The  only  attack  made  upon  us  was  made  at 
the  close  of  the  day  upon  tiatcli's  division,  and  then  it  was 
itself  advancing  to  the  attack  of  the  enemy. 

Among  the  losses  on  the  Confederate  side  were  Brigadier- 
General  Field,  and  Colonel  Forno,  commanding  Hays'  brigade, 
both  of  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  and  Brigadier-General  Trimble, 
of  Ewell's  division,  all  severely  wounded.  On  our  side  no 
general  officer,  singularly  enough,  seems  to  have  been  hit. 


*  This  even  was  not  carried  off ;  its  wheels  were  cut  down,  and  it  was  left  on 
the  ground.    Longstreet's  Rep.,  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  82. 
t  Law's  Rep.,  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  307. 

tP.  R.  p.  155  ;  C.  W.,  vol.  i.,  1st  series,  p.  466.  §  See  Appendix  D. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GROVETON. 


109 


General  Pope  apparently  considered  the  result  as  a  great 
victory.  This  estimate  of  his  success  was  excessive  indeed, 
although  the  advantage  had  certainly  been  with  his  army. 
It  had  driven  the  enemy  from  a  great  deal  of  ground  which 
they  held  in  the  morning.  This  retirement  of  the  enemy's 
line,  and  other  movements  of  theirs  which  we  now  know  were 
merely  preparatory  to  taking  the  offensive  the  next  day,  were 
naturally  misinterpreted  by  Pope  as  indicating  that  they  felt 
themselves  defeated,  and  intended  to  retreat.  His  despatch 
is  couched  in  most  triumphant  and  encouraging  language. 
It  begins  thus ; 

Headquarters,  Battle,  near  Groveton,  Va.,  5  a.m.,  30. 

We  fought  a  terrific  battle  here  j'esterday  with  the  combined  *  forces 
of  the  enemy,  which  lasted  with  continuous  fury  from  daylight  until 
dark,  by  which  time  the  enemy  was  driven  from  the  field,  which  we  now 
occupy.  Our  troops  are  too  much  exhausted  yet  to  push  matters, 
though  I  shall  do  so  in  the  course  of  the  morning,  as  soon  as  General 
F.  J.  Porter  comes  up  from  Manassas.  The  enemy  is  still  in  our  front, 
but  badly  used  up.  We  have  lost  not  less  than  8,000  men,  killed  and 
wounded,  but  from  the  appearance  of  the  field,  the  enemy  lost  at  least 
two  to  our  one.  He  stood  strictly  on  the  defensive,  and  every  assault 
was  made  by  ourselves.  The  battle  was  fought  on  the  identical  battle- 
fieivi  of  Bull  Run,  which  greatly  increased  the  enthusiasm  of  the  men. 
The  news  just  reaches  me  from  the  front,  that  the  enemy  is  retiring 
toward  the  mountains ;  I  go  forward  at  once  to  see.  We  have  made 
great  captures,  but  I  am  not  able  yet  t  to  form  an  idea  of  their  extent. 
Our  troops  behaved  splendidly. 

JOHN  POPE, 

Major-  Q  eneral. 

Major-General  Halleck, 

General-in-  Chief. 


*  Jackson's  and  Longstreet's  corps. 


t  Kor  are  we  now. 


110 


THE  ar:?j[y  uxder  pope. 


"^'e  have  no  doubt  in  our  own  minds  that  Pope,  who  was, 
as  we  have  said,  a  sanguine  man,  oveiiDersuaded  himself  into 
belieTiiig  that  this  estimate  of  the  day's  doings  was  sub- 
stantially a  correct  one.  Yet  this  only  shows  the  tenible  mis- 
take which  a  man  makes  who  closes  his  eyes  to  facts.  We  had 
not  driven  the  enemy  from  their  xDosition  behind  the  railroad 
embankment :  we  had  not  in  any  way  disintegrated  their 
ai-my ;  there  it  was,  in  line  of  battle,  every  unwounded  man 
with  his  colors,  every  battery  in  position.  And  what  was 
vastly  more  important.  Pope  now  knew  for  a  certainty  that 
Longstreet  had  joined  Jackson.  He  says  this  in  his  despatch. 
Was  there,  then,  such  gTound  for  trium^jh  as  he  tries  to  be- 
lieve there  was?  There  was  assuredly  no  reason  to  feel  de- 
spondent ;  there  was  eveiy  reason  to  feel  cheer-ful ;  Porter  and 
Bicketts  would  be  up  in  the  morning,  which  would  give  us 
more  than  fifteen  thousand  additional  trooiDS  ;  but  still  the 
situation  was  a  grave  or_e=  The  Confederate  anny  was  all  there 
before  him  :  and  it  was  a  serious  question  what  had  better  be 
done.  Our  troops  were  exhausted  from  hard  marching,  hard 
fighting,  and  want  of  food.  Would  it  not  have  been  wiser  to 
adhere  to  the  detennination  formed  in  the  morning,  before 
the  elation  of  this  x:)artial  victory  had  disturbed  his  judgment, 
and  to  have  fallen  back  to  the  other  side  of  Bull  Eun  ? 
This,  however,  does  not  seem  to  have  occurred  to  General 

Before  we  leave  the  consideration  of  this  hard-fought  bat- 
tle, we  desire  to  recall  what  we  have  said  in  regard  to  the 
uselessness  of  Jackson's  brilliant  i-aid  on  our  communications. 
Here  we  find  him  standing  on  the  defensive  all  day,  having 
lost  two  of  his  best  lieutenants  and  many  valuable  officers 
and  men  in  a  drawn  battle  the  evening  before,  and,  notwith- 
standing the  chapter  of  accidents,  which  we  have  given  at 
length,  had  i30stponed  the  day  of  his  trial  till  Lee  had  come 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GROVETON. 


Ill 


up  and  supx)orted  him  with  Longstreet's  corps,  still  very 
sorely  pressed  and  in  great  -peTil.  And  when  we  remember 
also,  that  it  was  due  to  no  foresight  of  his  that  this  battle 
was  not  fought  on  the  day  before,  that  it  was  the  merest  ac- 
cident in  the  world  that  the  attack  upon  Reynolds  by  Brad- 
ley Johnson's  brigade  early  on  Thursday  morning  did  not 
draw  down  upon  the  divisions  of  Ewell  and  Taliaferro  the 
entire  Federal  army,  we  should  abate  something  of  that  pop- 
ular belief  that,  by  his  march  to  Manassas,  Jackson  brought 
about  the  defeat  of  Pope's  army.  On  the  contrary,  he  did 
nothing  of  the  sort,  but,  instead,  he  came  wiihin  an  ace  of 
seeing  his  own  corps  routed  and  captured.  In  a  word,  the 
rules  of  war  allow  of  no  such  dangerous  movement  as  Jack- 
son's, unless  the  object  is  a  far  more  important  one  than  the 
one  which  on  this  occasion  he  j)roposed  to  himself. 

The  attack  which  he  made  on  the  Eleventh  coi*ps  at  Chan- 
cellorsville  may  be  said  to  have  in  its  results  justified  the 
daring  flank  march  by  which  he  arrived  on  our  extreme 
right,  and  the  situation  of  Lee's  army  that  night  was  one  that 
called  for  desperate  measures.  But  no  such  emergency  had 
arisen  on  the  Eappahannock,  when  on  August  25,  1862, 
Jackson  entered  on  an  expedition  which  for  forty-eight  hours 
put  it  in  the  i^ower  of  the  Federal  army  to  overwhelm  him. 
He  succeeded,  indeed,  and  doubtless  his  handling  of  his 
troops  was  admirable,  and  his  courage  and  skill  perfect; 
but,  after  all,  great  is  the  fortune  of  war  ! 


CHAPTEK  IX. 
LONGSTREET  AND  PORTER. 

Geneeal  Lee  accompanied  tlie  inarch  of  Lieutenant-Gen 
eral  Longstreet,  who  commanded  the  divisions  which  were 
soon  afterward  organized  as  the  First  Corps  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia.  The  troops  under  him  consisted  of  the 
divisions  of  Hood,  Kemper,  D.  E.  Jones,  and  "Wilcox,  and 
the  brigade  of  Evans,  comprising  twelve  brigades  of  in- 
fantry, besides  artillery,  making  a  force  of  about  25,000  to 
30,000  men."^  Following  these  troops,  but  at  a  considerable 
distance,  was  the  division  of  E.  H.  Anderson,  some  6,500 
strong  or  thereabouts. 

We  left  Longstreet's  command  emerging  from  Thorough- 
fare Gap.  Buf  ord  had  seen  a  portion  of  them — estimated  by 
himf  at  about  14,000  men,  and  there  was  no  officer  in  the 
army  better  qualified  to  observe  the  enemy  than  General 
Buf  ord  was — passing  through  Gainesville  shortly  before  nine 
on  Friday  morning,  as  has  been  already  stated. These 
troops  undoubtedly  got  into  position  between  ten  and  eleven 
o'clock  in  the  forenoon. 

There  is  no  earthly  reason  to  suppose  that  there  was  any 
needless  delay  in  the  arrival  of  Longstreet's  troops  upon  the 
ground,  but  the  time  of  Longstreet's  arrival  and  his  disposi- 
tions after  his  arrival  have  been  so  much  controverted  that 
we  must  devote  a  brief  space  to  considering  them. 


*B.  0.,  Marshall,  p.  168.  tC.  M.,  p.  188.  $  Ante,  p.  93. 


LONGSTREET  AND  PORTER.  113 

General  Lee  says  in  his  Official  Eeport  *  tliat  Jones  and 
Wilcox  bivouacked,  on  the  night  of  the  28th,  east  of  the 
mountain  at  Thoroughfare  Gap,  "  and,  on  the  morning  of  the 
29th,  the  whole  command  resumed  the  march,  the  sound  of 
the  cannon  at  Manassas  announcing  that  Jackson  was  al- 
ready engaged."  Longstreet  himself  reports  f  as  follows : 
"Early  on  the  29th  the  columns  were  united,^  and  the  ad- 
vance to  join  General  Jackson  w^as  resumed.  The  noise  of 
battle  was  heard  before  we  reached  Gainesville.  The  marcli 
was  quickened  to  the  extent  of  our  capacitij.\  The  excitement 
of  battle  seemed  to  give  new  life  and  strength  to  our  jaded 
men,  and  the  head  of  my  column  soon  reached  a  position  in 
rear  of  the  enemy's  left  flank  and  within  easy  cannon  shot.'* 
General  Hood  ||  says  in  his  Report :  ''Our  forces  were  able 
to  bivouac  for  the  night  beyond  the  Gap.  .  .  .  Early  in 
the  day  we  came  up  with  the  main  body  of  the  enemy  on  the 
plains  of  Manassas,  engaging  General  Jackson's  forces."  Gen- 
eral Kemper's  report  we  do  not  have.^  General  D.  R.  Jones 
reports  that  on  the  night  of  the  28th  he  bivouacked  beyond 
the  Gap. "^'^  He  continues:  ''Early  on  the  morning  of  the 
29th  I  took  up  the  line  of  march  in  the  direction  of  the  old 
battle-ground  of  Manassas,  whence  heavy  firing  was  heard  ; 
arriving  on  the  ground  about  noon,  my  command  w^as  sta- 
tioned on  the  extreme  right  of  our  whole  line."  Wilcox, ff 
who  went  through  Hopew^ell  Gap,  says  that  they  bivouacked 

*  A.  N.  v.,  vol.  i.,  p.  2'1  +  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  81. 

X  That  is,  those  which  had  gone  round  by  Hopewell  Gap  and  those  which  had 
moved  by  a  footpath  were  united  to  the  main  force  which  took  the  road  through 
Thoroughfare  Gap. 

§  The  italics  are  ours  in  this  and  in  the  citations  which  follow. 

II  A.  N.  v.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  209. 

If  General  Corse,  commanding  Kemper"'s  brigade  of  Kemper''s  division,  says  that 
he  *'  halted  about  three  miles  east  of  Gainesville  about  12  o'clock."  Southern 
Hist.  Soc,  vol.  viii.,  p.  538. 

**  A.  N.  v.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  m.  ft  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  227. 


114 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


beyond  the  pass  :  "Early  tlie  following  morning  our  march 
was  resumed  and  the  command  *  rejoined  at  half  past  nine 
A.M.  the  remainder  of  the  division  f  at  the  intersection  of  the 
two  roads  leading  from  the  Gaps  above  mentioned."  This  is 
about  a  mile  to  the  westward  of  Haymarket,  and  about  two 
miles  and  a  half  from  Gainesville.  He  then  continues  : 
"Pursuing  our  line  of  march,  together  with  the  division,! 
we  passed  by  Gainesville,  and  advancing  some  three  miles 
beyond,  my  three  brigades  w^ere  formed  in  line  of  battle  on 
the  left  and  at  right  angles  to  the  turnpike."  Evans  says 
nothing  about  the  hour  of  his  arrival  in  his  report. 

General  Wilcox  testified  before  the  Board  J  of  Officers  in 
the  Porter  Hearing  that  his  division,  on  arriving  at  the  in- 
tersection of  the  roads,  found  the  rest  of  the  corps  passing 
over  the  Gainesville  road,  and  that  he  w^aited  to  let  them 
go  by. 

As  regards  the  placing  of  the  troops,  General  Longstreet 
says  in  his  report  :  §  "  On  approaching  the  field,  some  of 
Brigadier  General  Hood's  batteries  were  ordered  into  posi- 
tion, and  his  division  was  deployed  on  the  right  and  left  of 
the  turnpike  at  right  angles  with  it  and  supported  by  Briga- 
dier General  Evans'  brigade.  .  .  .  Three  brigades,  under 
General  Wilcox,  were  throwm  forward  to  the  support  of  the 
left,  and  three  others,  under  General  Kemper,  to  the  sup- 
port of  the  right  of  these  commands.  General  T>.  E.Jones' 
division  was  jDlaced  upon  the  Manassas  Gap  Eailroad,  to  the 
right  and  in  echelon  with  the  last  three  brigades."  At  the 
Board  Hearing,  an  aide  ||  of  General  Jones  testified  that  the 


*  Consisting-  of  three  brigades. 

t  He  means  Longstreet's  division,  so-called,  consisting  of  Kemper's  and  Wil- 
cox's divisions.    Southern  Hist.  Soc.,  vol.  viii.,  p.  217. 

$  B.  0.,  p.  230.  §  xl.  N.  v.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  81. 

II  Williams'  evidence,  B.  0.,  p.  221. 


LONGSTREET  AND  PORTER. 


115 


division  was  in  position  on  the  railroad  before  twelve 
o'clock. 

At  tlie  same  hearing  General  Longstreet  testified  ^'  that  he 
thought  his  troops  had  been  deployed  by  eleven  o'clock.  It 
conld  not,  he  thought,  have  been  later  than  that.  He  also 
said  that  Jones'  division  extended  a  li!:tl3  beyond  the  rail- 
road. 

At  the  same  hearing,  Colonel  Charles  Marshall,  of  General 
Lee's  staff,  testified  f  to  the  same  efi'ect.  He  found  the 
divisions  of  Hood,  Kemper,  and  Jones  in  or  near  the  turn- 
pike, not  very  far  from  Groveton,  not  later  than  half  past 
nine.    Part  of  the  troox^s  had  not  then  been  deployed. 

At  the  same  hearing  General  Robertson,  who  commanded 
a  brigade  of  cavalry  in  Lee's  army,  testified  t  that  he  rode 
over  to  meet  General  Lee  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  and 
found  him,  between  eight  and  half  past  eight,  not  yet  ar- 
rived at  Gainesville,  but  that  at  that  time  one-third  of  the 
troops,  probably  one-half,  had  passed  the  point  where  Gen- 
eral Lee  was.  This  evidence,  i!:  will  be  observed,  tallies  re- 
markably with  the  statement  made  by  our  General  Buford 
of  what  he  saw  passing  through  Gainesville  shortly  before 
nine. 

General  Robertson  then  goes  on  to  state  that  he  assisted 
personally  in  j)utting  the  troops  in  position,  locating  their 
batteries,  and  so  forth  ;  and  that  when  Longstreet's  line  was 
formed,  he  took  his  position  on  D.  R.  Jones'  right,  trJiich  ex- 
tended across  the  Manassas  Gap  Bailroad  some  distance.  He 
says  that  the  line  was  complete  at  Imlf  past  eleven  o'clock. 

As  regards  the  position  of  Longstreet's  corps,  the  lines  in- 
dicated on  the  Warren  maj),  used  at  the  Hearing,  by  General 
Longstreet,  by  Mr.  Williams,  who  Avas  jn  General  Jones' 


*  B.  O.,  pp.  60,  73. 


tB.  0.,  p.  158. 


JB.  0.,  p.  175. 


116 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


staff,  and  by  General  Robertson,  who  was,  as  we  have  seen, 
familiar  with  the  location  of  Jones'  division  (it  being  the 


August  29th,  12  M. 


nearest  body  of  troops  to  his  own  brigade)  agree  substan- 
tially. 

D.  E.  Jones'  division  occupied  a  wooded  height  situated 
athwart  the  Manassas  Gap  Eailroad,  and  about  a  mile  from 
Dawkins  Branch.    This  ridge  runs  about  north  and  south ; 


1 


LONGSTREET  AND  PORTER.  117 

tlie  enemy's  batteries  were  placed  on  the  eminences ;  their 
infantry  were  generally  concealed  by  the  woods,  into  which 
their  skirmishers  were  advanced.  In  echelon  with  J  ones,  and 
occupying  the  same  general  line  farther  to  the  north,  was 
the  division  of  Kemper,  reaching  to  the  pike.  Kemper's 
division  is  stated  by  General  Longstreet  to  have  numbered 
about  6,100  men;  Jones'  about  6,300  men. 

Then,  on  the  left  of  the  turnpike,  supporting  Jackson's 
command,  was  the  division  of  Hood  and  Evans'  brigade,  and 
for  a  time,  supporting  them,  the  division  of  Wilcox,  consist- 
ing of  about  6,300  men. 

At  a  late  hour  in  the  day,"  says  General  Longstreet  in 
his  report,*  "  Major-General  Stuart  reported  the  approach 
of  the  enemy  in  hea\y  columns  against  my  extreme  right.  I 
withdrew  General  Wilcox  with  his  three  brigades  from  the 
left,  and  placed  his  command  in  iDOsition  to  support  Jones, 
in  case  of  an  attack  against  my  right.  After  some  few  shots 
the  enemy  withdrew  his  forces,  moving  them  around  to- 
ward his  front,  and  about  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  be- 
gan to  press  forward  against  General  Jackson's  position." 
Wilcox's  brigades  were  moved  back  to  their  former  position. 

General  Wilcox  in  his  report  says,f  "  At  half  past  four  or 
five  P.M.,  the  three  brigades  were  moved  across  to  the  right 
of  the  turnpike  a  mile  or  more  to  the  Manassas  Gap  Rail- 
road. While  here,  musketry  was  heard  to  our  left  on  the 
turnpike.  This  firing  continued  with  more  or  less  vivacity 
until  sundown.  Now  the  command  was  ordered  back  to  the 
turnpike." 

What  it  was  exactly  which  excited  the  alarm  of  General 
Stuart,  and  caused  him  to  ask  for  this  reinforcement  to  be 
sent  to  the  extreme  right,  we  do  not  precisely  know.    It  was, 


*  A.  N.  v.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  82. 


tA.  N.  v.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  228. 


118 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


however,  beyond  doubt,  some  movement  made  by  Porter's^ 
command. 

But,  at  any  rate,  this  was  not  the  occurrence  mentioned  by 
General  Stuart  in  his  report,^  which  has  been  the  subject  of 
so  much  controversy.  He  says  that  he  met  the  head  of  Long- 
street's  column  before  it  had  arrived  at  Gainesville  ;  he  there 
saw  General  Lee  ;  then  rode  down  directly  toward  Manas- 
sas. General  Eobertson,  who  was  nearer  Manassas,  reported 
the  enemy  in  his  front.  Stuart  then  ordered  detachments  of 
cavalry  to  drag  brush  up  and  down  the  road  from  the  direc- 
tion of  Gainesville  to  deceive  the  enemy — "  a  ruse  which," 
he  says,  ''Porter's  report  shows  was  successful,"  and  notified 
Lee  that  Longstreet's  flank  and  rear  were  seriously  threat- 
ened, and  of  the  importance  of  the  ridge  which  he,  Suuarfc, 
then  held.  "  Immediately  upon  the  receij^t  of  that  intelli- 
gence," he  goes  on  to  state,  "Jenkins',  Kemper's,  and  D.  R. 
Jones'  brigades,  and  several  pieces  ox  artillery,  were  ordered 
to  me  by  General  Longstreet,  and  being  i^laced  in  position 
fronting  Bristoe,  awaited  the  enemy's  advance.  After  ex- 
changing a  few  shots  vrith  rifle  pieces,  the  corps  f  withdrew 
toward  Manassas,  leaving  artillery  and  supports  to  hold  the 
position  till  night." 

General  Stuart  is  here  endeavoring  to  claim  for  himself 
the  credit  of  having  had  Jones'  division  placed  in  posi- 
tion between  eleven  and  twelve  in  the  morning  as  far  to 
the  enemy's  right  as  the  railroad.  It  may  be  that  he  is 
entitled  to  it ;  though  it  is  quite  likely  that  this  position 
.on  the  commanding  ridge  occupied  by  Jones  w^ould  have 
been  selected  for  him  to  occupy,  independently  of  any 
suggestion  by  General  Stuart.  What  makes  it  certain  thau 
he  is  referring  to  this  and  not  to  the  subsequent  transfer 


*  A.N.  v.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  145. 


t  /.  e.,  the  Federal  corps. 


1 


LONGSTHEET  AND  PORTER.  119 

of  "Wilcox  from  the  left  of  their  line,  is,  in  tlie  first  place, 
the  time  of  the  occurrence, — it  was  immediately  after  he  had 
seen  General  Lee  ;  secondly,  that  Longstreet  says  that  Wil- 
cox was  sent  to  supi^ort  Jones,  not  Stuart ;  and  lastly,  the 
7i(imes  of  tlie  hrigades  which  he  says  were  sent  to  him  by 
General  Longstreet,  The  first  two  points  are  sufficiently 
obvious  ;  we  will,  however,  dwell  for  a  moment  on  the  last,  a^ 
it  has,  we  believe,  hitherto  escaped  observation.  The  brigade,! 
sent  were  Jackson's,  Kemper's,  and  D.  R.  Jones'  brigades. 

It  will  be  granted  that  Stuart  refers  either  to  W^ilcox'  i 
division  or  to  D.  R.  Jones'.  Now,  at  the  time  of  the  battle, 
Wilcox"^  had  his  own  brigade  (so-called),  and  those  of  Pryor 
and  Featherston.  D.  B.  Jones'  division  f  consisted  of  tho 
brigades  of  Anderson,  Drayton,  a-nd  Toombs.  Anderson'::; 
brigade,  vvhich  consisted  J  of  the  First,  Seventh,  Eighth, 
Ninth,  and  Eleventh  Georgia  Regiments,  was  originally 
known  as  D.  R.  Jones'  brigade. ?  One  of  the  three  brigade.] 
he  had  under  him,  then,  at  Manassas,  was  known  in  the 
army  as  D.  R.  Jones'  brigade.  Then  we  find  that  on  the 
6th  of  Sex^tember  Jones'  command  ||  was  enlarged  by  add- 
ing to  it  Pickett's  brigade,  and  also  Kemper's  and  Jenkins' 
brigades ;  so  that,  on  the  6th  of  September,  which  was  loss 
than  ten  days  after  the  battle,  Jenkins',  Kemper's,  and  D.  R. 
Jones'  brigades  were  all  under  the  command  of  General  D. 
R.  Jones.  Stuart,  writing  his  report  in  February,  1863, 
made  a  mistake  as  to  two  of  the  brigades.  He  named,  in- 
deed, one  that  was  at  that  time  in  Jones'  division ;  he  made 
a  natural  mistake  about  the  two  others,  which  did  not  go 
under  J  ones'  control  until  a  few  days  afterwards  ;  but  in 

*  Wilcox's Rop.,  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  ii.,  pp.227,  231. 

t  Jones'  Rep.,  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  216.  $  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  i.,  p.  50. 

§  Cf.  Jones'  Rep.,  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  i.,  109,  with  Longstreet's  Report,  A.  N.  V.,  vol. 
i.,  p.  128.    Also  Longstreet's  Rep.,  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  ii  ,  pp.  80,  85,  87. 
II  D.  E.  Jones'  Rep.,  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  218. 


120 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


speaking  of  the  forces  sent  by  Longstreet  that  morning  he 
is  unquestionably  speaking  of  the  division  of  D.  E.  Jones. 
He  says,  moreover,  that  Porter's  column  was  seen  "ap- 
proaching," that  he  then  notified  General  Lee,  who  was 
close  by — "  then  opposite  to  me  on  the  turnpike  " — and  that 
the  three  brigades  were  sent  "immediately."  This  force, 
being  then  "placed  in  position,"^  "awaited  the  enemy's 
(our)  advance."  This,  of  course,  implies  that  it  was  in 
position  before  we  withdrew,  i.e.,  before  Butterfield's  bri- 
gade fell  back  across  Dawkins'  Branch,  a  movement  which 
was  mistaken,  for  the  moment,  by  Stuart  for  the  withdrawal 
of  the  whole  force. 

Under  the  erroneous  supposition  that  Stuart's  narrative 
referred  to  the  sending  of  Wilcox's  division  to  support 
Jones,  some  very  elaborate  arguments  have  been  made  to 
show  that,  until  "Wilcox  arrived,  at  five  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon, there  was  no  force  in  front  of  Porter  but  a  few  cav- 
alry, t 

As  for  his  retiring,  the  withdrawal  of  Butterfield's  brigade, 
just  after  its  advance  at  twelve  o'clock,  from  beyond  Daw- 
kins'  Branch  to  the  woods  in  its  rear,  where  it  supported  our 
batteries  during  the  rest  of  the  afternoon,  is  beyond  question 
referred  to.  When  the  division  of  King  was  withdrawn  and 
General  McDowell  went  away  to  take  up  another  position, 
going  round  by  the  Sudley  Springs  road.  Porter  relin- 
quished his  preparations  for  an  attack,  and  withdrew  Butter- 
field's brigade. 

As  for  the  brush.  General  Eosser's  deposition,!  which  was 
put  in  evidence  before  the  Board,  was  to  the  effect  that  he  did 
see  to  it  in  person,  on  Meadowville  lane,  which  runs  in  the 

*  Fronting  Bristoe,"  says  General  Stuart.  At  its  extreme  right,  Jones'  di vi- 
sion made  a  crotchet  to  its  right,  so  that  a  portion  of  the  command  faced  Bristoe. 
A.  N.  v.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  145.  t  B.  O.,  p.  1152  et  seq. 

J  See  Appendix  F. 


LONGSTREET  AND  PORTER. 


121 


rear  of  the  position  taken  up  by  Longs treet's  right.  It  seems 
certainly  not  unlikely  that  it  may  have  deceived  our  officers, 
though  its  effect  was  probably  much  exaggerated  by  Stuart. 
At  any  rate,  it  appears  from  Stuart^ s  repoi^t,  that  when  our 
forces  appeared  to  withdraw,  that  is,  when  Butterfield  re- 
tired, i.e.,  at  noon,  Jones  was  in  position  on  the  crest ;  and  that 
General  Porter's  skirmish  line  was  not  long  in  finding  this 
out,  no  one  can  have  any  reasonable  doubt. 

It  is  possibly  rather  remarkable  that  Stuart  should  not 
have  mentioned  his  sending  again,  late  in  the  afternoon,  for 
reinforcements  to  be  sent  to  support  Jones  ;  but  he  wrote  his 
report  long  after  the  battle  ;  and,  after  all,  Wilcox,  though 
sent,  was  not  needed,  and  was  soon  withdrawn,  and  it  cer- 
tainly was  nothing  to  boast  of  that  he,  Stuart,  should  have 
unnecessarily  procured  the  withdrawal  of  troops  from  the 
left,  where  they  were  really  needed. 

One  thing,  however,  is  certain,  and  that  is,  that  the  pres- 
ence of  Porter's  corps  that  afternoon  not  only  retained  Jones 
on  the  railroad,  but  for  a  certain  space  of  time  brought  over 
"Wilcox  also  from  the  turnpike. 

It  is  understood  that  General  Lee  wanted  to  attack  that 
day,  and  that  General  Longstreet  was  opposed  to  it.  If  he 
had  attacked  that  day,  he  would  have  had  certain  advantages 
which  he  did  not  have  the  following  day.  The  divisions  of 
King  and  Ricketts,  as  well  as  those  of  Porter,  were  all  out 
of  position  on  Friday.  If  Lee  had  attacked  Reynolds  and 
Schenck  at  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  when  McDowell's 
corps  was  in  the  Sudley  Springs  road,  with  the  divisions  of 
Hood  and  Wilcox,  and  the  brigade  of  Evans,  supported,  if 
need  be,  by  a  portion  of  KemxDer's  division,  leaving  Jones 
and  the  balance  of  Kemper's  troops  to  prevent  Porter  from 
flanking  his  attack,  he  might  have  been  successful.  Or,  he 
might  have  attacked  Porter  with  the  divisions  of  Jones, 
G— IV. 


122  THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 

Kemper,  and  Wilcox.  Wliatever  the  reason,  General  Lee 
did  very  little  on  Friday  afternoon.  He  may  have  exagger- 
ated the  force  of  our  left  wing,  though  this  is  hardly  likely. 
But  so  long  as  this  force  was  there,  a  turning  movement  like 
that  of  the  next  day  would  have  been  exposed  to  Porter's 
flank  fire,  and  a  portion  of  his  force,  probably  a  large  portion, 
would  have  been  required  to  observe  or  defeat  Porter. 

Aitev  General  McDowell  left  him.  General  Porter  threw 
out  his  skirmishers  into  the  woods  which  sku'ted  Dawkins' 
Branch  on  his  left  front,  and  pushed  them  well  out  to  the 
enemy's  x^osition.  Between  the  road  on  which  he  had 
marched  up  and  the  railroad,  a  distance  of  about  half  a 
mile,  he  planted  his  guns,  and  posted  his  infantry  in  the 
woods  near  them,  as  a  support.  On  this  front,  the  ground 
was  open  for  a  mile  or  so.  From  time  to  time  he  made  more 
or  less  movement  in  his  command,  but  at  no  time  did  he  do 
anything  to  invite  or  to  threaten  an  attack.  He  was  ready 
to  meet  one  had  it  come.  He  was  satisfied,  from  his  own 
observation  and  from  the  reports  of  the  officers  in  the  skir- 
mish line,  that  he  was  confronted  by  a  large  force  of  the 
enemy — how  large,  of  course  he  could  not  know  without 
making  a  reconnoissance — and  not  having  heard  anything 
from  General  McDowell  as  to  his  having  reached  a  place 
from  which  communications  might  be  opened,  he  very  justly 
felt  that  he  was  in  no  position  to  undertake  anything  of  an 
offensive  character. 

One  thing  certainly  was  clear,  and  it  grew  clearer  during 
the  afternoon.  It  w^as  not  possible  for  him  to  go  across  the 
country  and  strike  Jackson's  command  in  flank.  In  making 
such  a  movement  as  this,  he  would  have  exposed  his  own 
left  flank  to  the  batteries  and  infantry  now  facing  him.  The 
moment  he  should  emerge  from  his  position  and  march  out 


LONGSTREET  AND  PORTER. 


123 


to  the  north  or  northwest,  across  the  broken  though  open 
country  to  his  right  and  front,  and  endeavor  to  make  his 
way  over  the  two  miles  or  so  that  separated  him  from  the 
turnpike,  he  would  be  assailed  from  all  the  batteries  on  the 
lidge,  and  would  be  compelled  to  halt  and  carry  them  first. 
The  question,  therefore,  was — Was  this  expected  of  him? 
Was  it  in  accordance  with  his  orders  ?  Was  it  the  dictate 
of  common  sense  and  of  a  soldier's  feelings  ? 

Let  us  stop  a  moment  here.  The  question  with  him  was, 
not  whether  he  should  march  to  the  sound  of  the  cannon, 
to  the  relief  of  his  brothers  in  arms  on  the  turnpike,  but 
whether  he  should  engage  the  enemy  in  his  own  front,  who 
were  not  fighting  his  brothers  in  arms  on  the  turnpike,  but 
were  quietly  observing  him ;  that  is,  whether  he  should  have 
a  little  battle,  all  by  himself,  in  this  part  of  the  field. 

The  considerations  in  such  a  case  are,  of  course,  the  usual 
ones  which  should  be  weighed  before  fighting  any  battle. 
And  first  of  all  comes  this :  Is  it  a  part  of  the  general  ]3lan 
that  I  should,  here  and  now,  hazard  a  battle?  We  have 
already  intimated  that  the  Joint  Order  cautioned  the  offi- 
cers to  whom  it  was  addressed  against  compromising  them- 
selves in  a  battle  with  the  combined  forces  of  the  enemy.  It 
seems  to  us  that  it  is  a  necessary  inference  from  the  Joint 
Order,  that  if  Longstreet  should  be  found  to  have  actually 
joined  Jackson,  the  general  commanding  did  not  intend  to 
take  the  offensive. 

It  is  almost  needless  to  say,  or  rather  it  ought  to  be,  that 
unless  the  general  commanding  an  army  can  impress  upon 
his  subordinates  the  duty  of  waiting  until  his  preparations 
are  made  and  his  positions  selected,  all  strategy  is  at  an  end. 
If  every  general,  every  time  he  comes  across  the  enemy  is 
going  to  pitch  right  in,"  regardless  of  orders,  regardless  of 
supports,  like  an  Irishman  at  a  Donnybrook  Fair,  we  may 


124 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


as  well  shut  up  our  Military  Schools.  It  might  very  possi- 
bly have  been  the  duty  of  General  Porter,  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances, to  make  just  such  an  attack  as  this,  but  in  this 
particular  case  he  was  without  supports  and  reserves,  with- 
out even  communication  with  McDowell — Banks  several 
miles  away.  There  was,  moreover,  no  possibility  of  his 
assisting  in  the  contest  that  was  going  on  on  the  pike,  un- 
less, indeed,  the  troops  observing  him  were  so  few  in  num- 
ber that  Lee  would  be  obliged  to  detach  reinforcements  to 
aid  them  from  the  troops  in  front  of  Pope,  which  of  course 
was  certainly  possible,  though  contrary  to  his  own  observa- 
tion and  information.  Then  there  was  the  chance  of  failure, 
which  might  very  seriously  interfere  with  the  plans  of  his 
commanding  officer.  Besides,  he  was  detaining  in  front  of 
his  corps  a  considerable  body  of  the  enemy  already ;  and  last 
of  all,  he  had,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  good  reason  to  infer, 
from  the  language  of  the  Joint  Order,  that  no  battle  was  to  be 
fought  on  this  ground  with  the  united  forces  of  the  enemy. 

General  Eobertson  *  was  asked  what  in  his  judgment  would 
have  been  the  result  if  Porter's  force  had  undertaken  to 
pass  up  to  the  right  in  front  of  the  woods  and  over  Dawkins' 
Branch,  so  as  to  make  a  connection  with  the  other  Federal 
troops  in  the  neighborhood  of  Groveton,  and  he  replied, 
"I  think  it  would  have  been  perfectly  ruinous  to  do  that. 
.  .  .  From  the  position  that  the  Federal  troops  (Porter's 
command)  held  at  that  time,  to  go  to  the  right  and  effect 
a  junction  with  General  Eeynolds  .  .  .  they  had  to  pass 
over  a  table  land  in  front  of  artillery,  in  front  of  our  troops. 
I  think  if  it  had  been  made,  with  no  roads  to  facilitate  the 
movement,  that  it  would  have  been  a  very  disastrous  one ;  I 
tliink  the  result  would  have  been  fatal  to  them." 


*  B.  O.,  llobertson's  evidence,  p.  ITS. 


LONGSTREET  AND  PORTER. 


125 


General  Eobertson,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  on  that 
part  of  the  field,  and  his  judgment  is,  therefore,  of  value. 

General  Porter  acted  under  the  Joint  Order  till  about  six 
o'clock,  unless  it  be  thought  that  General  McDowell  had 
given  him  orders  which  he  was  bound  to  obey  after  that 
officer  left  him.  For  our  part,  we  do  not  regard  the  Sixty- 
second  Article  of  War  as  conferring  upon  the  senior  officer 
the  power  to  compel  the  obedience  of  his  junior,  except 
where  both  officers  are  together  in  the  absence  of  the  officer 
who  commands  them  both.  The  power  conferred  by  the 
Sixty-second  Article  of  War  is  conferred  simply  to  secure 
unity  of  action  at  a  given  place  and  at  a  particular  time ; 
not  to  enable  a  lieutenant,  by  giving  orders  to  his  junior  in 
the  absence  of  their  common  superior,  to  control  the  action 
of  that  junior  after  he  leaves  him.  We  therefore  hold  that 
it  is  entirely  immaterial  what  orders  McDowell  gave  to 
Porter ;  McDowell  went  away  at  once,  after  giving  what  he 
chose  to  call  an  order ;  and  at  once  Porter's  obligation  to 
obey  ceased.  He  remained  bound  to  obey  the  orders  of 
their  common  superior,  General  Pope,  and  of  no  one  else. 

But,  after  all,  it  is  to  our  mind  clear  that  Porter  supposed 
that  all  the  change  that  McDowell  undertook  to  make  in  the 
carrying  out  of  the  Joint  Order  was  a  change  as  to  the  mode 
of  carrying  it  out,  as  we  have  before  fully  explained,  and 
that  it  was  still  for  them  both  to  act  together,  as  soon  as 
McDowell  should  have  taken  his  new  position.  For  this, 
accordingly,  he  waited,  and  waited  anxiously.  His  situation 
he  knew,  was  open  to  misconstruction.  He  tried  to  commu- 
nicate with  McDowell's  corps  through  the  woods,  but  he 
tried  in  vain.^  He  saw  the  impossibility  of  marching  across 
the  country  to  the  turnpike.    He  saw  he  was  holding  some 


*  See  Appendix  C. 


126 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


of  the  enemy's  troops  in.  front  of  liim,  and  therefore  he 
thought  he  ought  not  to  fall  back  and  rejoin  the  army  by  the 
Sudley  Springs  road.  He  heard  nothing  and  conld  have 
heard  nothing  till  late  in  the  afternoon,  of  an  infantry  en- 
gagement near  Groveton,  for,  as  we  know,  until  four  or  five 
o'clock  there  was  nothing  but  skirmishing  and  artillery  fire 
to  hear.*  He  thought  at  one  time  the  army  was  falling  back 
behind  Bull  Eun,  and  he  thought  that  if  this  were  so  he 
ought  to  fall  back  likewise  ;  and  in  this,  he,  commanding 
an  isolated  wing  of  the  army,  was  clearly  right.  He  was 
left,  by  the  retirement  of  McDowell,  exactly  in  the  position 
in  which  an  outlying  body  of  cavalry  is  often  left  on  one  wing 
of  the  army,  watching  the  enemy,  bound  of  course  to  fall 
back  if  the  main  army  does.  The  construction  placed  upon 
the  despatch  of  General  Porter's,  in  which  he  expresses  to 
General  McDowell  this  decision,  has  always  seemed  to  us 
monstrously  unfair.  In  the  position  in  which  he  was,  so  long 
as  it  was  an  isolated  position,  he  could  do  nothing  else  but 
follow  the  example  of  the  main  army.  If  it  fell  back,  he 
must  fall  back.  If  you  complain  of  him  for  remaining  in 
that  isolated  position,  the  question  arises,  How  is  he  going 
to  get  out  of  it  ?  He  can  get  out  of  it  only  in  two  ways, 
first,  by  attacking  the  enemy,  against  what  he  had  every  rea- 
son to  suppose  was  the  plan  of  his  superiors  and  against  his 
own  judgment  as  to  the  result  of  an  attack,  or  by  retreating, 
which,  so  long  as  the  main  army  held  its  advanced  position 
at  Groveton,  he  did  not  dream  of  doing.  He  did  neither, 
and  he  did  right. 

Finally,  however,  about  six  o'clock,  came  an  order  f  from 
the  Commanding  General  : 


*  Ante,  p.  104. 


t  C.  M.,  p.  r. 


LONGSTREET  A]N'D  PORTER. 


127 


Headquarters  in  the  Field, 
August  29th,  4.30  p.m. 
Your  line  of  march  brings  you  in  on  the  enemy's  right  flank.  I  de- 
sire you  to  push  forward  into  action  at  once,  on  the  enemy's  flank,  and 
if  possible,  on  his  rear,  keeping  your  right  in  communication  with  Gen- 
eral Reynolds.  The  enemy  is  massed  in  the  woods  in  front  of  us,  but  can 
be  shelled  out  as  soon  as  you  engage  their  flank.  Keep  heavy  reserves 
and  use  your  batteries,  keeping  well  closed  to  your  right  all  the  time. 
In  case  you  are  obliged  to  fall  back,  do  so  on  your  right  and  rear,  so  as 
to  keep  you  in  close  communication  with  the  right  wing. 

JOHN  POPE, 
Major -General  Commanding. 

Major-General  Porter. 

The  first  thing  that  strikes  one  about  this  order  is  that  it 
is  a  conditional  order.  It  orders  a  certain  attack  made,  be- 
cause, in  the  mind  of  the  Commanding  General,  certain  con- 
ditions exist — which  is  the  same  thing  as  making  the  per- 
formance of  the  order  to  depend  on  the  existence  of  these 
conditions.    These  conditions  are  : 

1.  That  Porter's  line  of  march  brings  him  in  on  the  enemy's 
right  flank.  This,  as  well  as  the  statement  that  the  enemy 
is  massed  in  the  woods  in  front  of  General  Pope,  was  no 
doubt  true,  if  the  enemy  be  Jackson,  and  Jackson  only  ;  but 
how,  if  in  addition  to  the  enemy,  whose  flank  is  exposed  to 
Porter's  march,  there  is  another  enemy  directly  in  front  of 
Porter  ?  How  if,  in  addition  to  the  enemy  massed  in  the 
woods  in  front  of  General  Pope,  there  is  another  enemy 
occupying  in  force  the  heights  directly  in  Porter's  front  ? 

2.  That  his  right  should  be  kept  in  communication  with 
General  Eeynolds.  But  his  corps  was  nowhere  near  Gen- 
eral Reynolds'  division.  Porter  was  isolated  from  every  one, 
unless,  by  some  independent  operations  of  his  own,  under- 
taken in  face  of  a  new  enemy  posted  directly  opposite  to 
him,  he  could  establish  some  communication  with  the  rest  of 


128 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


the  army.  It  was  absolutely  impossible  for  him  to  fulfil  this 
condition. 

The  order  was  one  that  by  its  very  terms  did  not  demand 
obedience  in  any  of  the  modified  forms  in  which  obedience 
could  be  rendered.  In  truth  it  could  not  be  literally  obeyed. 
Had  the  order  been  received  at  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon, 
there  would  have  been  nothing  for  Porter  to  do  but  to  report 
to  Pope  the  precise  state  of  affairs,  and  ask  for  further 
orders. 

Yet  this  order  was  construed  by  the  court-martial  as  if  it 
had  read:  "You  will  move  at  once  to  strike  the  flank  of 
Jackson's  corps,  keeping  as  near  to  my  left  as  you  can." 

The  question  of  how  the  order  could  be  obeyed  was, 
however,  not  a  practical  one.  The  order  was  not  received 
until  it  was  too  late  to  be  obeyed.  For  Porter  to  have 
marched  out  in  the  front  of  the  enemy  on  the  ojDposite 
heights,  after  dark,  and  endeavored  to  make  his  way  to  Rey- 
nolds, or  to  strike  the  right  of  Jackson,  would  have  been 
simply  folly.  And  how  could  he  have  carried  his  guns  with 
him  on  that  ground  ? 

This  will  end  what  we  have  to  say  about  the  conduct  of 
Major-General  Fitz  John  Porter.  We  fear  we  have  already 
spoken  at  more  length  about  this  controversy  than  our 
readers  will  approve.  But  it  is  a  question  where  it  is  -pev- 
fectly  possible  for  persons  who  have  not  mastered  the  facts 
of  the  case,  to  take  a  very  unjust  view.  In  our  judgment 
General  Fitz  John  Porter  tried  as  hard  to  do  his  duty — and 
his  task  was  a  very  perplexing  one  after  McDowell  left  him — 
on  that  day  of  the  twenty -ninth  of  August,  as  any  officer  in  the 
army. 


CHAPTER  X. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS, 

The  next  day  was  fought  the  Second  Battle  of  Bull  Run, 
as  we  call  it ;  the  battle  of  Manassas,  as  the  Confederates 
call  it.  As  they  won  it,  perhaps  they  have  the  best  right  to 
give  it  a  name. 

It  was  the  morning  of  Saturday,  the  thirtieth  day  of  Au- 
gust, 1862.  General  Pope  had,  as  we  have  seen,  got  it  into 
his  head  that  the  enemy  were  bent  upon  retreating,  that 
they  had,  on  the  day  before,  suffered  a  severe  defeat.  He 
found  indications  in  the  morning  that  confirmed  him.  The 
enemy  were  readjusting  their  line,  and  had  really  fallen 
back  over  ground  which  had  been  disputed  the  evening 
before. 

Then,  although  he  knew,  from  the  fact  of  Hatch  having 
been  repulsed  by  Hood's  and  Evans'  commands  late  in  the 
previous  afternoon,  that  a  part  of  Longstreet's  force  had 
joined  Jackson,  this  very  fact,  that  nothing  had  been  seen 
of  them  till  very  late  in  the  day,'  convinced  him,  being,  as  we 
have  before  remarked,  a  sanguine  man,  that  the  reinforcement 
had  been  but  small,  and  that  ifc  had  only  come  up  late  in  the 
afternoon. 

General  Porter,  who  had  been  sent  for  during  the  night 
to  join  the  main  army,  and  had  come  up  early  in  the  morn- 
ing, saw  General  Pope  and  endeavored  to  disabuse  his  mind 
of  the  belief  that  the  mass  of  Longstreet's  command  was  not 


130 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


yet  up.  He  recounted  his  own  observation,  and  that  of  his 
officers.  But  in  General  Pope's  preoccupied  mind,  these 
facts,  when  stated  by  Porter,  partook  rather  of  the  character 
of  excuses  for  very  culpable  inactivity  and  disobedience  of 
orders,  than  of  information  of  the  enemy's  position  and 
strength.  He  could  not,  or  would  not,  see  that  it  was  all- 
important  to  him  to  know  the  facts  as  to  Lee's  strength 
south  of  the  turnpike  the  afternoon  before ;  and  that  it 
stood  to  reason,  that  by  sending  for  Porter,  Morell,  Butter- 
field,  and  others,  he  would  get  the  facts.  He  preferred  to 
act  on  the  belief  which  his  own  limited  observation  of  the 
field  justified,  and  he  w^ould  not  listen  to  information  com- 
ing from  officers  of  whose  good  faith  he  chose  to  entertain 
doubts.  Such  a  course  by  a  general  in  his  position  was  ex- 
tremely culpable  ;  it  was  thoroughly  wrong-headed. 

We  need  not,  we  are  sure,  do  more  here  than  to  remind 
our  readers  that  it  was,  on  the  morning  of  the  day  before, 
very  clearly  General  Pope's  judgment,"^"  that  it  would  not  be 
wise  for  him  to  engage  the  united  forces  of  Jackson  and 
Longstreet  on  the  westerly  side  of  Bull  Eun,  but  that  it 
w^ould  be  better,  in  the  event  of  the  junction  of  the  two 
wdngs  of  the  enemy's  army,  to  retire  behind  Bull  Eun  to 
Centreville,  supply  his  exhausted  army,  and  receive  such  re- 
inforcements from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  as  General  Hal- 
leck  might  be  able  to  send  him.  This  opinion  was  clearly  a 
sound  one,  warranted  by  the  highest  military  reasons,  and 
in  his  cool  moments  General  Pope  entertained  it,  and  meant 
to  act  on  it.  But  his  mind  was  now  disturbed  by  two  causes : 
first,  by  the  excitement  of  the  bloody  battle  which  he  had 
been  fighting,  and  by  the  success,  such  as  it  was,  which  he 
had  gained  in  it ;  and  secondly,  by  vexation  and  indignation 


*  See  ante,  pp.  88  etscq. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS. 


131 


at  Porter's  not  having  snx)ported  him  by  an  attack  on  Jack- 
son's flank  ;  and  he  would  listen  to  nothing  in  excuse  or  ex- 
planation of  this.  It  unfortunately  happened  that  the  very 
things  which  Porter  had  to  urge  by  way  of  excuse  and  ex- 
planation were  the  most  important  things  Pope  could  have 
known,  with  reference  to  his  plan  of  action  on  Saturday — 
that  is,  they  were  the  results  of  Porter's  observation  and  in- 
formation as  to  the  strength  and  dispositions  of  the  enemy. 
But  he  would  not  hearken  to  anything  of  the  sort. 

Accordingly,  having  sent  out  reconnoissances  in  his  front, 
north  of  the  pike,  and  ascertained,  as  he  supposed,  that  the 
enemy  were  in  full  retreat,  he  issued  the  following  order :  * 

[Special  Order  No.—] 

Headquarters,  near  Groveton, 
August  30,  1862,  12  m. 
The  following  forces  will  be  immediately  thrown  forward  in  pursuit 
of  the  enemy,  and  press  him  vigorously  during  the  whole  day.  Major- 
General  McDowell  is  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  pursuit. 

Major-General  Porter's  corps  will  push  forward  on  the  Warre nton  turn- 
pike, followed  by  the  divisions  of  Brigadier-Generals  King  and  Reynolds. 

The  division  of  Brigadier- General  Ricketts  will  pursue  the  Hay  mar- 
ket road,  followed  by  the  corps  of  Major-General  Heintzelman  ;  the 
necessary  cavalry  will  be  assigned  to  these  columns  by  Major-General 
McDowell,  to  whom  rei^ular  and  frequent  reports  will  be  made. 

The  General  Headquarters  will  be  somewhere  on  the  Warren  ton  turn- 
pike. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Pope. 

GEO.  D.  RUGGLES, 

Colonel  a7id  Chief  of  Staff. 

*  P.  V.  C.  p.  47.  It  is  difRcnlt  to  reconcile  the  sanguine  and  confident  tone  of 
this  order  with  what  General  Pope  tells  us  in  his  Report,  p.  15(3,  of  his  feeling 
that  morning  discouraged  and  nearly  hopeless  of  any  successful  i^sne  to  his  opera- 
tions ;  that  his  object  in  fighting  this  battle  was  to  cripple  the  enemy  as  much  as 
possible,  and  delay  his  further  advance  toward  the  capital.  These  reflections 
and  intentions,  we  are  disposed  to  think,  should  bear  a  date  subsequent  to  this 
Order  of  Pursuit, 


132 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


It  will  be  observed  that  the  corps  of  Sigel  and  Eeno  are 
not  mentioned  in  this  order,  Thej  were  to  constitute  the 
reserves. 

A  brief  glance  at  the  field  will  be  in  place  here. 


Positions  on  August  SOth,  6  p.m. 


The  Warrenton  turnpike  rnns  east  and  west ;  the  Sndlej 
Springs  road  runs  north  and  south ;  the  Haymarket  road 
runs  parallel  to  the  Warrenton  pike,  and  about  a  mile  and  a 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS. 


133 


half  to  the  north  of  it.  The  forces  marching  on  the  Hay- 
market  road  were  therefore  attempting  to  turn  the  enemy's 
left,  and  even  cut  him  off  from  Haymarket  and  the  Gap. 

On  the  sonth  of  the  turnpike  were  woods,  mostly  very 
thick,  with  occasional  clear  places.  There  were  two  consid- 
erable hills  south  of  the  turnpike  and  near  to  it,  with  more 
or  less  clear  land  near  them — the  Henry  House  Hill,  just  east 
of  the  crossing  of  the  Sudley  Springs  road  with  the  turn- 
pike, and  the  Bald  Hill,  some  distance  to  the  west  of- the 
Henry  House  Hill,  but  still  east  of  Groveton.  Near  the  Bald 
Hill  was  a  house  known  as  the  Chinn  House."  The  pos- 
session of  these  was  of  the  first  importance  to  us,  as  will 
presently  appear. 

The  reconnoissances  which  our  forces  had  made  in  the 
forenoon  seem  to  have  satisfied  General  Lee  that  his  adver- 
sary was  j)reparing  to  attack  him  on  the  north  side  of  tlio 
turnpike.  Seeing  that  we  were  making  a  mistake,  he  al- 
lowed our  movement  to  go  on.  He  desired  that  w^e  should 
expend  a  portion  of  our  strength  in  attacking  again  Jackson's 
embankment,  the  approaches  to  which  the  guns  of  Long- 
street,  now  advanced  somewhat,  swept  with  a  destructive 
fire.  Lee  had  been  reinforced  during  the  night  by  the  di- 
vision of  E.  H.  Anderson,  of  Longstreet's  command. 

General  Pope's  plan  was  that  Porter's  corps  should  move 
forward,  their  left  on  the  turnpike,  supported  by  King's 
division,  under  Hatch.  On  Porter's  left  and  on  the  south 
of  the  pike  was  to  be  Eeynolds,  to  look  out  for  the  left  flank. 

On  the  right  of  Porter  were  to  be  Heintzelman's  two  divi- 
sions under  Hooker  and  Kearny,  and,  supporting  them,  the 
division  of  Eicketts. 

Shortly  before  the  engagement  fairly  opened,  Eeynolds 
discovered  the  enemy  in  force  on  the  south  of  the  pike,  and 
facing  it,  concealed  in  the  woods,  and  preparing  a  seriouri 


131  THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 

attack  on  our  flank.  On  reporting  tliis  lie  was  ordered  to 
form  his  division  to  resist  this  attack,  which  he  proceeded 
to  do. 

Porter,  meantime,  about  four  o'clock,  pushes  Morell's  divi- 
sion in  front,  the  brigades  of  Barnes  and  Butterfield  ^  lead- 
ing. They  drive  the  enemy  from  the  outlying  woods,  back 
upon  the  old  railroad  entrenchment.  Sykes'  division  of  reg- 
ulars is  in  reserve.  To  the  right.  Hatch  pushes  in  King's 
division.  The  attack  is  made  with  great  resolution.  Jack- 
son's veterans  resist  with  their  never-failing  tenacity  and 
pluck.  Our  officers  and  men  push  up  to  the  embankment. 
It  is  a  powerful  attack  and  is  pressed  home,  and  for  a  mo- 
ment Jackson  is  afraid  he  cannot  resist  it.  He  sends  to  Lee 
for  reinforcements,  says  he  is  "  severely  pressed  "  and  Lee 
orders  Longstreet  to  send  them  from  his  hitherto  unem- 
ployed command.  But  that  officer  has,  with  a  soldier's  eye 
for  position,  placed  his  guns  where  their  fire  enfilades  any 
trooj)s  attacking  the  front  of  Jackson's  position.  There  is 
no  need  of  reinforcements,  the  guns  do  the  work.  "As  it 
was  evident,"  says  General  Longstreet,  **that  the  attack 
against  General  Jackson  could  not  be  continued  ten  minutes 
under  the  fire  of  these  batteries,  I  made  no  movement  with 
my  troops.  Before  the  second  battery  could  be  placed  in 
position  the  enemy  began  to  retire,  and  in  less  than  ten 
minutes  the  ranks  were  broken,  and  that  portion  of  the  army 
put  to  flight." 

Jackson  says  his  "  entire  line  was  engaged  in  a  fierce  and 
sanguinary  struggle.  As  one  line  was  repulsed,  another 
took  its  place,  and  pressed  forward,  as  if  determined,  by 
force  of  numbers  and  fury  of  assault,  to  drive  us  from  our 
positions.    So  impetuous  and  well- sustained  were  these  on- 


*  Only  Barnes'  and  Buttcrficld's  brigades  were  ;:iresen1.,  Griffin's  having,  by  an 
unaccountable  blunder,  gone  to  Ccntrevillc. 


THE  BATTLE  OP  MANASSAS. 


135 


sets  as  to  induce  me  to  send  to  tlie  Commanding  General  for 
reinforcements." 

Porter's  and  Hatch's  attack  had  failed,  but  it  is  plain,  from 
what  Jackson  himself  says  of  it,  that  it  was  a  very  gallant 
and  a  very  well-sustained  attack."^  It  may  be  that  had  it  not 
been  for  the  enfilading  fire  of  Longstreet's  guns,  our  brave 
troops  might  have  effected  a  lodgment  in  the  embankment. 
General  Hatch  was  slightly  wounded. 

On  the  extreme  right,  Hooker's  division,  or  rather  a  part 
of  it,  for  Gr over's  brigade  was  not  put  in  again  after  its 
heavy  losses  the  day  before,  drove  the  enemy  from  some 
woods,  but  does  not  seem  to  have  made  a  serious  attack. 
Fm'ther  to  our  right,  Kearny  and  Eicketts  were  to  have  at- 
tacked by  the  Haymarket  road.  The  movement  failed,  owing 
to  the  withdrawal  of  a  large  portion  of  Eicketts'  command, 
to  be  used  on  the  Warrenton  pike,  or  to  the  south  of  it, 
against  the  enemy,  who  were  rapidly  developing  a  very  seri- 
•ous  movement  against  our  left  flank. 

On  the  retirement  of  Morell  and  Hatch,  General  Pope  in- 
cautiously ordered  Eeynolds  to  leave  the  commanding  posi- 
tion which  he  had  taken  up  on  the  left  flank  of  the  army, 
south  of  the  turnpike,  and  cross  over  to  the  north  of  the 
turnpike  and  sup^Dort  Porter's  corps.f  This  seems  to  have 
been  unnecessary,  as  well  as  incautious,  for  Sykes'  division 
had  not  been  severely  engaged  in  the  attack.    The  effect  of 

*  Pope,  in  his  Report,  p.  157,  says  the  attack  of  Porter  was  neither  vigoyon<? 
nor  persistent.  This  is  entirely  unwarranted.  Early,  commanding  Eweil's  di- 
vision, says  it  was  a  "  determined  attack,'"'  and  Johnson,  commanding  a  brigade 
in  Jackson's  division,  says,  ''the  fight  was  most  obstinate."  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  ii., 
pp.  185,  245. 

t  General  Reynolds  (P.  V.  C,  p.  69)  says  he  was  not  ordered  away  from  his  po- 
sition south  of  the  pike  till  after  Porter  was  repulsed.  Porter  himself,  however 
(Statement,  Gov.  ed.,  p.  52).  says  it  was  before  the  repulse.  Sykes  says  it  was  just 
previous  to  the  attack.  It  was  no  doubt  after  a  portion,  of  the  troops  had  become 
engaged  that  Reynolds  was  ordered  over  tj  support  the  movement. 


•  136 


THE  ARMY  UXDER  POPE. 


this  change  in  Eeynolcls'  position  \ras  to  expose  the  left  flank 
of  the  trooiDS  who  were  attacking  Jackson.  Of  course  they 
conld  make  no  headway  in  front,  if  their  left  flank  was  at- 
tacked, and,  as  we  have  seen,  the  enemy  was  massing  south 
of  the  pike  for  this  pmpose.  T\'arren,  with  gTeat  prom23ti- 
tude,  takes  his  little  brigade,  with  Sykes'  apj)roval,  to  the 
left,  and  endeavors  to  maintain  himself  against  a  heavy  at- 
tack which  the  enemy  do  not  fail  to  make  immediately  upon 
his  small  command.  But  he,  as  well  as  Anderson,  whose 
brigade  of  Eeynolds'  division  had  been  left  on  the  son':h  of 
the  -pike  when  the  remainder  of  the  division  crossed  it,  was 
overwhelmed  by  superior  numbers. 

Major-General  McDowell,  though  charged  at  noon  wilh 
the  conduct  of  a  "pursuit,"  very  soon  recognized  that  the 
enemy  were  fully  aware  of  our  great  tactical  mistakes,  and 
were  determined  to  avail  themselves  of  them  with  their  cus- 
tomary energy.  We  had  made  all  our  arrangements  on  the 
theory  that  the  enemy  would  not  put  in  an  appearance  south 
of  the  turnpike.  Eeno,  Heintzelman,  King,  and  Eicketts, 
Porter,  and  Sigel  were  all  north  of  the  i^ike,  and  before  any 
adequate  measures  could  be  taken  to  guard  our  left  flank, 
half  of  these  troops  had  become  heavily  engaged ;  and  more 
than  that,  had  been  repulsed  with  loss.  But  McDowell  was 
equal  to  the  occasion.  He  gave  up  all  thought  of  oversee- 
ing the  progress  of  the  pursuit ;  he  devoted  himself  entirely 
to  the  defence  of  the  turnpike  against  an  attack  coming  from 
the  south  or  southwest.  And  General  Pope,  now  seeing  his 
danger,  was  prompt  to  take  such  steps  as  were  yet  available 
to  ward  off  disaster.  And  gallant  and  determined  as  was  the 
assault,  and  bloody  as  was  the  repulse  of  Porter  and  Hatch 
on  the  north  of  the  i3ike,  the  chief  military  interest  attaching 
to  this  battle  ^vt.11  always  attach  to  the  struggle  for  the  turn- 
pike. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS.  137 

The  enemy  went  into  it  with  a  rush.  "  Mj  whole  line," 
says  Longstreet,  "  was  rnshed  forward  at  a  charge.  The 
troops  sprang  to  their  work,  and  moved  forward  with  all  the 
steadiness  and  firmness  that  characterize  war-worn  veterans. 
.  .  .  The  attack  was  led  by  Hood's  brigade  *  closely  sup- 
ported by  Evans'.  These  were  rapidly  reinforced  by  Ander- 
son's division  from  the  rear,  Kemper's  three  brigades,  and 
D.  R.  Jones'  division  from  the  right,  and  Wilcox's  brigade  f 
from  the  left.  The  brigades  f  of  Brigadier-Generals  Feather- 
ston  and  Pryor  became  detached  and  operated  with  a  portion 
of  General  Jackson's  command.  The  attacking  columns 
moved  steadily  forward,  driving  the  enemy  from  his  differ- 
ent positions  as  rapidly  as  he  took  them.  My  batteries  were 
thrown  forward  from  jDoint  to  point,  following  the  move- 
ments of  the  general  line." 

His  brief  summary  is,  however,  altogether  too  favorable 
for  his  own  side.  The  enemy  were  doubtless  generally  suc- 
cessful, for  they  were  the  stronger  at  the  point  of  contact. 
We  had  left  our  line  of  retreat,  the  turnpike,  exposed,  under 
the  '.nistaken  supposition  that  the  principal  forces  of  the 
enemy  were  those  of  Jackson,  who  was,  we  knew,  behind  the 
railroad  embankment,  north  of  the  turnpike,  assisted  on  his 
right  by,  perhaps,  one  of  Longstreet's  divisions.  Instead  of 
this,  Longstreet  was  able  to  advance  on  the  south  of  the  pike, 
from  beyond  Groveton  to  the  Sudley  Springs  road,  the  five 
divisions  of  Evans, J  Anderson,  Kemper,  Jones,  and  Wilcox. 
These  troops  could  be  concealed  in  a  great  part  of  their 
movements  by  the  woods.  But  when  they  reached  the 
neighborhood  of  the  pike,  they  found  our  batteries  in  posi- 

*  We  take  it  that  this  is  a  misprint  for  "  division." 

t  The  brigades  of  Wilcox,  Featherston,  and  Pryor  constituted  Wilcox's  divi- 
sion.   See  ante,  p.  119. 

X  Evans'  division  consisted  of  his  own  brigade,  formerly  Whiting's,  and  of  two 
brigades,  Hood's  and  Law's,  under  Hood,  and  known  as  Hood's  division. 


138 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


tion  and  infantry  supporting  them.  There  was  not,  to  be 
sure,  a  regular  line  of  battle,  but  the  two  principal  emi- 
nences, the  Bald  Hill  and  the  Henry  House  Hill,  were  occu- 
-pied,  and  the  troops  from  the  right  were  hurried  down  to 
the  south  of  the  road  as  fast  as  Pope  and  McDowell  could 
get  them  there. 

Fortunately  for  us,  Sigel's  corps  had  not  joined  in  the  attack, 
and  was  therefore  available  both  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the 
divisions  of  Morell  and  King,  and  to  occupy  and  hold  Bald 
Hill.  Two  brigades  of  Eicketts'  division  were  sent  for  at 
once,  under  General  Tower,  with  tw^o  batteries  ;  they  also 
went  to  the  Bald  Hill.  To  the  Henry  House  Hill  were  sent 
two  brigades  from  the  fine  division  of  Sykes,  consisting  main- 
ly of  regulars.  The  other  brigade,  that  of  General  Warren, 
had,  as  we  have  seen,  lost  very  heavily  near,  or  rather  beyond 
the  Bald  Hill,  early  in  the  action.  Beynolds,  also,  with  his 
two  excellent  brigadiers,  Meade  and  Seymour,  was  near  the 
Henry  House  Hill. 

On  the  north  of  the  turnj)ike  Reno  and  Heintzelman  re- 
sisted the  advance  of  Jackson,  wdio,  as  soon  as  he  saw  Long- 
street  moving  forward,  ordered  a  general  advance  of  his  own 
line. 

The  struggle  for  the  ijossession  of  the  Bald  Hill  was  most 
obstinate  and  sanguinary.  McLean's  brigade  of  Schenck's 
division  was  first  sent  to  hold  it,  and  did  hold  it  handsomely, 
repulsing  several  attacks  both  in  front  and  rear,  until  the 
command  was  reduced  to  a  skeleton.  Schenck  himself 
was  severely  wounded  at  the  head  of  the  reinforcements 
which  he  was  leading  to  McLean's  support.  The  other  bri- 
gade of  Schenck's  division,  Stahel's,  was  maintaining  the 
ground  on  the  north  side  of  the  road,  and  Schenck  could 
not  withdraw  it.  But  Sigel,  seeing  the  danger,  sent  Schurz's 
division  to  the  aid  of  McLean.    The  two  brigades  of  Koltes 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSA.S. 


139 


and  Kryzanowski  were  put  in,  and  for  a  time  stayed  tlio  ad- 
vancing tide.  The  losses  were  very  severe,  as  the  enemy 
were  in  large  force.  The  brave  Colonel  Koltes  here  fell, 
sword  in  hand,  at  the  head  of  his  men.  In  the  conflict 
around  this  hill  General  Tower  was  severely  wounded  at  the 
head  of  two  of  Eicketts'  brigades,  and  Colonel  Fletcher 
Webster,  of  the  Twelfth  Massachusetts,  a  son  of  the  great 
statesman,  was  killed  while  leading  his  regiment. 

In  their  first  violent  attack  on  this  strong  position,  even 
the  impetuosity  of  Hood's  Texans  failed  to  make  any  im- 
pression. Hood  *  was  compelled  to  fall  back,  and  all  that 
could  be  done,  says  Evans,  who  commanded  the  division,  was 
to  hold  the  enemy  with  the  other  brigade  until  Anderson's 
division  came  up.  In  one  of  his  brigades  631  officers  and 
men  were  killed  and  wounded,  probably  one-fourth  of  the 
actual  force  present  on  the  field.  Two  colonels  were  killed, 
and  one  wounded. 

D.  R.  Jones  f  also  found  his  way  to  the  neighborhood  of 
the  Chinn  House,  and  the  two  brigades  w^hicli  he  had  with 
him  "  went  in  most  gallantly,  suffering  severe  loss."  In  one 
of  these  brigades,  Anderson's,  consisting  of  five  regiments, 
but  one  field  officer  was  untouched.  They  had  to  fall  back, 
however,  and  were  evidently  very  severely  handled.  The  ac- 
count which  Generals  Benning  J  and  Anderson  |  give  of  their 
experience  with  these  two  brigades  is  very  interesting.  It 
was  evident  that  the  troops  Vvdio  held  the  hill  held  it  with 
obstinate  courage,  and  that  they  yielded  only  to  the  assaults 
of  fresh  troops.  Jones'  division  got  no  further  than  the 
Chinn  House  that  day. 


*  Evans'  Rep.,  A.N.  V. ,  vol.  ii.,  p.  228. 

t  D.  R.  Jones'  Rep.,  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  ii.,  d.  217. 

X  Bonning's  Rep.,  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  302  et  seq. 

§  Anderson's  Rep.,  A.  N.  V.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  316  et  seq. 


140 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


In  spite,  however,  of  this  heroic  resistance,  the  enemy  car- 
ried the  position  by  main  force.  They  snffered  heavily,  but 
fresh  relays  pressed  on  with  great  enthusiasm,  and  they 
finally  drove  our  forces  from  the  Bald  Hill. 

"We  pass  now  to  the  struggle  for  the  Henry  House  Hill. 
Here  were  Sykes'  regulars,  in  first-rate  order,  and  ready  to 
receive  the  enemy.  Buchanan,  an  old  veteran  of  the  war  with 
Mexico,  who  had  with  his  own  hand  forced  open  the  door  of 
the  Molino  del  Bey,  commanded  one  brigade  ;  Chapman,  his 
comrade  in  the  same  gallant  fight,  the  other.  Here,  too, 
were  gathered  all  the  troops  that  could  be  collected  from 
the  front.  It  was  a  post  of  the  last  importance.  We  could 
not  afford  to  lose  it.  There  was  no  position  west  of  Bull 
Bun  which  offered  such  advantages  for  defence  as  this. 
The  army  was  in  full  retreat,  though  in  orderly  retreat ;  but 
that  orderly  retreat  would  be  changed  into  a  rout  if  the 
enemy  should  drive  us  from  our  position  on  the  Henry 
House  Hill  and  its  neighborhood.  There  would  be  nothing 
between  them  and  the  Stone  Bridge  across  Bull  Eun. 

And  they  did  not  carry  it.  Their  exertions  had  been 
severe  before  they  reached  this  position.  They  had  marched 
a  considerable  distance  and  over  difficult  country.  They 
attacked,  however,  with  their  customary  energy  and  courage, 
and  while  they  suffered  much,  they  inflicted  heavy  losses 
upon  the  regulars  of  Sykes.  But  fortunately  for  the  Federal 
army,  darkness  came  on,  and  the  exhausted  Confederates 
ceased  from  farther  assaults  upon  their  obstinate  antago- 
nists. 

AVhen  Buchanan  and  Chapman  were  withdrawn,  after 
suffering  heavy  losses,  McDowell,  who  had  charged  himself 
with  the  defence  of  this  vital  position,  stationed  Gibbon 
there  with  his  brigade,  and  that  force  remained  there  some 
two  hours  after  dark.    Schurz,  who  also  placed  the  brigade 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MAKASSAS. 


141 


of  Schimmelpfenning  on  the  Henry  House  Hill,  withdrew  it 
about  eight  o'clock  by  orders  of  General  Sigel,  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Bull  Eun. 

By  this  time  everything  was  quiet.  The  retreat  of  the 
Federal  army  had  been  assured.  "  The  artillery  continued 
to  fire,"  says  General  Wilcox,*  "  after  the  musketry  had 
ceased,  but  by  half-past  eight  o'clock  it  had  all  ceased.  My 
brigade  bivouacked  at  this  point  of  the  field,  which  was 
the  most  advanced  point  reached  by  our  infantry,  and  near 
the  hill  where  Bee  and  Barfcow  fell,  on  the  2Ist  July,  1861, 
the  first  battle  of  Manassas."  This  hill  was  the  Henry  House 
Hill. 

Schurz,  with  his  one  brigade,  crossed  Young's  Branch 
about  nine,  and  remained  between  that  stream  and  Bull 
Run,  guarding  the  bridge  and  the  neighboring  ford  till 
eleven  o'clock.  Betw^een  eleven  and  twelve  they  crossed 
Bull  Run,  but  still  continued  near  the  bridge.  About  one 
in  the  morning  they  were  joined  by  Colonel  Kane's  bat- 
talion of  Pennsylvania  Bucktails,  which  General  McDowell 
had  assigned  to  the  duty  of  covering  the  retreat.  Tlie 
bridge  was  then  destroyed,  and  they  all  marched  to  Centre- 
ville. 

Thus  ended  the  Second  Battle  of  Bull  Run.  It  was  a 
severe  defeat  for  General  Pojoe ;  but  it  was  nothing  else.  It 
was  not  a  rout,  nor  anytliing  like  a  rout.  The  army  retired 
under  orders,  and  though,  of  course,  there  were  many 
stragglers,  it  retreated  in  good  order.  The  advance  of 
the  enemy  had  been  definitely  checked,  and  there  was  no 
pursuit. 

In  fact,  there  was  no  battle  fought  in  the  whole  war  in 
which  the  beaten  army  acquitted  itself  more  creditably  than 


*  Wilcox's  Hep.,  A.  N.  v.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  231. 


142 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


did  General  Pope's  army  on  this  bloody  day.  Compromised 
as  its  line  of  retreat  was  by  the  unexpected  appearance  of 
Longstreet's  powerful  corps  on  the  south  of  the  turnpike, 
confusing  and  embarrassing  as  was  the  attack  of  this  corps, 
made  as  it  was  upon  troops  who  had  been  disposed  upon 
a  different  part  of  the  field  and  who  had  been  repulsed 
with  heavy  loss  in  their  assaults  upon  Jackson's  strong  posi- 
tion, terrible  as  were  the  charges  of  the  fresh  divisions  which 
Longstreet  hurled  upon  our  hungry  and  wearied  men,  the 
Federal  army,  like  a  noble  ship  struck  by  a  sudden  squall, 
soon  righted  itself,  and  all,  from  the  Commanding  General 
and  his  able  lieutenant,  to  the  brave  regiments  under  Meade, 
Reynolds,  Buchanan,  Tower,  McLean,  Koltes,  and  their  other 
gallant  commanders,  in  the  confusion  of  this  flank  attack 
and  in  the  gathering  shades  of  the  evening,  rallied  on  the 
hills  and  faced  their  determined  foes  with  indomitable  pluck 
and  unyielding  fortitude.  Beaten  they  were,  but  not  put  to 
flight.  They  retreated,  indeed,  but  in  good  order,  and 
carrying  off  all  their  artillery  that  had  not  been  lost  in 
actual  combat. 

The  battle  was  indeed  one  of  which  General  Lee  had  good 
reason  to  be  proud.  It  would  be  hard  to  find  a  better  in- 
stance of  that  masterly  comprehension  of  the  actual  condi- 
tion of  things  which  marks  a  great  general  than  was  exhib- 
ited in  General  Lee's  allowing  our  formidable  attack,  in 
which  more  than  half  the  Federal  army  was  taking  part,  to 
be  fully  developed  and  to  burst  upon  the  exhausted  troops 
of  Stonewall  Jackson,  while  Lee,  relying  upon  the  ability  of 
that  able  soldier  to  maintain  his  position,  was  maturing  and 
arranging  for  the  great  attack  on  our  left  flank  by  the  power- 
ful corps  of  Longstreet. 

Lee  claims  to  have  captured  in  these  engagements  30 
pieces  of  artillery  and  7,000  unwounded  prisoners.    So  far 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS.  143 

as  we  know,  no  statement  has  been  made  of  these  losses  by 
any  Federal  authority,  except  the  very  inaccurate  one  in 
General  Pope's  despatch  to  General  Halleck,  written  the 
evening  of  the  battle,  in  which  he  claims  to  have  lost  neither 
guns  nor  wagons.^ 

Among  the  casualties  on  our  side  were  Brigadier-Generals 
Hatch,  Schenck,  and  Tower,  wounded.  On  the  other  side, 
Colonel  Baylor,  commanding  the  Stonewall  brigade,  was 
killed. 

*  See  Appendix. 


/ 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE   BATTLE  OF  CHANTILLY. 

The  Army  of  Virginia  arrived  at  Centreville  on  the  even- 
ing of  the  30th.  Of  course  there  were  many  stragglers,  but 
the  organizations  were  perfectly  preserved.  General  Lee's 
army  had  suffered  in  these  battles  very  seriously  ;  and,  con- 
sidering its  very  inadequate  means  of  repairing  its  losses,  we 
were  really  in  every  respect,  except  in  point  of  morale,  in  a 
better  position  than  were  the  enemy  to  take  the  offensive. 
Not  that  the  retreat,  which  Pope  in  his  report  almost  apolo- 
gizes for  making,  was  unwise  ;  on  the  contrary,  he  should,  in 
our  judgment,  have  been  behind  Bull  Run  on  the  morning, 
instead  of  on  the  evening,  of  the  SOtli ;  but  we  mean  to  say, 
that,  at  Centreville,  the  Army  of  Virginia,  reinforced  as  it 
was  by  the  corps  of  Sumner  and  Franklin,  numbering  20,000 
fresh  troops,  was,  in  point  of  numbers  and  in  all  material 
respects,  a  very  formidable  body  of  troops. 

There  is  no  denying,  however,  that  we  had  lost  prestige 
by  the  defeat  of  Manassas.  The  army  was  at  Centreville, 
very  near  to  Washington,  and  alarmists  were  not  wanting  to 
prophecy  that  this  defeat  would  soon  be  followed  by  the* 
capture  of  the  capital.  The  most  exaggerated  stories  pre- 
vailed regarding  the  losses  of  the  campaign,  and  the  strength 
of  the  enemy.  There  was  not  the  least  reason  for  alarm,  but 
in  war,  more  than  in  most  things,  excitement  and  prejudice 


^THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANTILLY. 


145 


take  the  place  of  reason  in  times  of  danger,  and  impede  the 
avenues  by  which  the  exact  truth  can  reach  the  mind. 

General  Pope  summed  up  the  situation  fairly  enough, 
though  with  a  certain  amount  of  favorable  coloring,  in  his 
despatch  to  Halleck  on  the  evening  of  the  battle.  He  says :  ^ 

We  have  had  a  terrific  battle  again  to-day.  The  enemy,  largely 
reinforced,  assaulted  oar  position  early  to-day.  We  held  our  ground 
firmly  until  six  o'clock  p.m.,  when  the  enemy,  massing  very  heavy  forces 
on  our  left,  forced  back  that  wing  about  half  a  mile.t  At  dark  we  held 
that  position.  X  Under  all  the  circumstances,  both  horses  and  men  hav- 
ing been  two  days  without  food,  and  the  enemy  greatly  outnumbering 
us,  I  thought  it  best  to  move  back  to  this  place  at  dark.  The  move- 
ment has  been  made  in  perfect  order  and  without  loss.  The  troops  are 
in  good  heart  and  marched  off  the  field  without  the  least  hurry  or  con- 
fusion.   Their  conduct  was  very  fine. 

The  battle  was  most  furious  for  hours  without  cessation,  and  the 
losses  on  both  sides  very  heavy.  The  enemy  is  badly  whipped,  and  we 
shall  do  well  enough.  Do  not  be  uneasy.  We  will  hold  our  own  here. 
The  labors  and  hardships  of  this  army  for  two  or  three  weeks  have  been 
beyond  description.  We  have  delayed  the  enemy  as  long  as  possible 
without  losing  the  army.  We  have  damaged  him  heavily,  and  I  think 
the  ari^.y  entitled  to  the  gratitude  of  the  country.  Be  easy  ;  every- 
thing will  go  well. 

JOHN  POPE, 

JfaJ  07'- General. 

We  have  quoted  this  despatch  in  full  (except  the  post- 
script which  we  have  before  referred  to)  because  it  seems  to 
us  to  breathe  the  right  spirit.  Somebody  must,  of  course,  be 
beaten  in  every  battle  ;  and  a  man  who  cannot  bear  defeat 
has  mistaken  his  profession  if  he  goes  into  the  army. 
Whoever  was  demoralized  after  the  Second  Bull  Eun,  it  is 
certain  that  General  Po^dc  was  not.  And  for  this  he  deserves 
hearty  commendation. 

*  P.  R.,  160.  t  This  refers  probably  to  their  carrying  Bald  Hill, 

t  The  Henry  Hill  House. 

7— IV. 


146 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


Unfortunately  for  him,  however,  the  country  was  in  no 
mood  for  looking  calmly  and  resolutely  at  the  state  of  affairs. 
People  saw  only  an  uninterrupted  retreat  from  the  Eapidan 
to  Centreville.  They  had  seen  the  campaign  opened  by  that 
most  unfortunate  proclamation  in  which  the  army  was  to  see 
only  the  backs  of  its  enemies,  and  lines  of  supplies  and  bases 
of  communication  were  to  be  discarded.  They  now  saw  the 
army  retreating  before  a  victorious  enemy,  after  a  sanguinary 
struggle,  after  its  supplies  had  been  captured  and  its  com- 
munications more  than  once  seriously  threatened.  They  took 
no  account  whatever  of  the  counterbalancing  circumstances ; 
they  saw  only  w^hat  they  termed  results  ;  and  they  were  un- 
just to  General  Pope.  Moreover  the  strong  partisanship 
which  existed  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  for  McClellan 
rendered  many,  if  not  most,  of  the  Peninsula  officers  harsh 
critics  of  their  new  general.  It  was  no  use  arguing  with 
them.  It  was  no  use  reminding  them  how  Porter  had  been 
driven  from  the  field  of  Gaines'  Mill,  in  full  sight  of  60,000 
troops,  who  might  either  have  taken  Richmond  or  have 
strengthened  his  corps  so  that  it  might  have  held  its  own. 
It  was  no  use  reminding  them  that  while  it  was  true  that 
General  Pope  delayed  too  long  on  the  Rappahannock,  and 
thus  allowed  Jackson  to  capture  his  stores  at  Manassas, 
McClellan,  after  being  informed  of  the  junction  of  Jackson's 
command  with  Lee's  army,  delayed  deciding  on  his  course 
until  the  defeat  of  his  right  wing  at  Gaines'  Mill  had  made 
his  movement  to  the  James  a  retreat,  and  a  very  hazardous 
one  too.  These  comparisons  only  the  cooler  heads  could 
make.  The  multitude  were,  as  w^e  have  said,  unjust  to  Pope 
and  to  his  army. 

Halleck  at  first  stood  by  him.  He  said,  "  You  have  done 
nobly.  Don't  yield  another  inch  if  you  can  avoid  it.  All  re- 
serves are  being  sent  forward.    .    .    .    Can't  you  renew  the 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANTILLY. 


147 


attack  ?  I  am  doing  all  in  my  power  for  yon  and  yonr  noble 
army.    God  bless  you  and  it." 

Bnt  Halleck  was  not  really  a  strong  man  in  any  way,  and 
as  a  practical  soldier  lie  was  absolutely  useless.  It  does  not 
appear  that  lie  ever  even  saw  the  army.  What  General  Pope 
needed  was  a  victory. 

He  had,  it  will  be  remembered,  with  him  now  the  two 
corps  of  Sumner  and  Franklin,  the  Second  and  Sixth  Corps 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  numbering  about  20,000  excel- 
lent troops,  in  excellent  trim,  and  admirably  commanded. 
Here  was  his  corps  d' elite.  With  this  very  powerful  force, 
as  strong  as  Jackson's  command,  and  two-thirds  as  strong  as 
Longstreet's,  he  could  certainly  take  advantage  of  any  mis- 
take made  by  the  enemy  with  all  needful  promptitude. 

The  day  after  the  battle  was  rainy,  and  the  fords  near  the 
turnpike  were  rendered  impassable.  General  Lee  felt,  how- 
ever, the  necessity  of  promptly  following  up  his  victory,  and 
he  therefore  pushed  his  troops  off  in  the  course  of  the  after- 
noon, the  ever  active  Jackson  taking  the  advance,  followed 
by  Longstreet. 

They  crossed  Bull  Eun  high  up,  at  Sudley  Ford,  and  then 
pursued  their  way  by  cross  roads  to  Little  River  turnpike,  a 
fine  road  which  runs  from  Aldie  Gap  through  Fairfax  Court 
House  to  Alexandria.  Turning  then  to  the  southwest,  they 
marched  for  Fairfax  Court  House,  which  is  seven  miles  east 
of  Centreville  ;  hoj)ing  to  strike  the  line  of  communication 
of  the  Federal  army,  and  bring  about  a  hasty  retreat  of  our 
forces,  defeated,  as  they  knew  they  had  been,  and  demoral- 
ized, as  they  doubtless  supposed  them  to  be. 

This  movement  of  Jackson's,  like  his  previous  one  to  Man- 
assas Junction,  was  conducted  with  what  we  should  call — 
were  we  not  speaking  of  Stonewall  Jackson — a  heedless  dis- 
regard of  suppoi-ts.    Longstreet  was  so  far  behind  him  that 


148 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


the  action  known  as  the  battle  of  Chantilly,  which  took  place 
this  afternoon,  was  over  before  he  arrived. 

Jackson's  march  had  been  perceived  by  the  detachments 
which  Sumner  had  sent  out  in  compliance  with  an  order  of 
Pope's,  dated  3  a.m.,  of  September  1st.*    Jackson  left  his 


The  Field  of  Chantilly. 


bivouac  at  Sudley  Ford  early  that  morning,  marched  down 
the  turnpike,  and  just  after  passing  Ox  Hill,  which  is  on  the 
right  of  the  road,  finding  himself  to  be  opposed  by  our 
forces,  which  had  by  General  Pope's  order  been  falling  back 
during  the  day  to  the  neighborhood  of  Fairfax  Court  House, 
formed  his  line  of  battle.  Jackson  recklessly  moved  his 
troops  by  a  cross  road  to  their  right,  so  that  the  right  of 


*  It  would  seem  that,  separated  as  he  was  from  Longstreet,  Jackson  might 
have  been  advantageously  attacked  by  Franklin  and  Sumner,  supported  by 
Reno  and  Heintzelman,  before  it  was  so  late  in  the  afternoon. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANTILLY. 


149 


A.  P.  Hill's  division  was  close  to  the  Warrenton  turnpike, 
and  at  right  angles  to  it,  while  the  left  of  Jackson's  old  di- 
vision was  on  the  Little  Eiver  turnpike.  Ewell's  division, 
commanded  by  Early,  was  in  the  centre.  The  whole  line 
thus  faced  east. 

Here,  then,  was  a  chance  for  a  success.  An  attack  by 
Sumner's  corps  on  the  right  flank  of  this  line,  while  its  left 
and  front  was  assaulted  by  Franklin  and  other  troops,  would 
have  been  simply  fatal  to  Jackson.  He  had  absolutely  no 
retreat.  In  the  rear  of  the  cross  road  were  woods  and  difficult 
country.  By  moving  down  the  cross  road  towards  the  War- 
renton pike  he  had  jeopardized  his  line  of  retreat.  A  vigor- 
ous attack  on  Franklin's  corps  on  his  left  might  have 
cut  him  off  from  the  Little  Eiver  pike,  and  a  flank  *  attack 
on  his  right  and  rear  by  Sumner  would  have  given  Pope  his 
revenge. 

Luckily  for  Jackson,  it  was  nearly  dark,  and  came  on  to 
rain  very  heavily.  Our  officers  could  not  well  discover  the 
position  of  the  enemy.  By  good  luck,  too,  for  Jackson, 
neither  Franklin  nor  Sumner  were  anywhere  near  him,  and 
he  was  opposed  by  troops  which  had  been  fighting  him  at 
Manassas.  But,  as  it  w^as,  there  was  no  success  in  store  for 
him  that  afternoon.  Branch's  brigade  of  Hill's  division, 
which  was  on  his  extreme  right,  was  thrown  into  great  dis- 
order by  a  flanking  fire,  and  its  commander.  General  Lane, 
says  the  engagement  was  considered  by  the  brigade  as  one 
of  its  severest.  Gregg's  brigade,  that  lost  so  many  men  at 
Manassas,  here  again  suffered  heavily.  Hays'  brigade  got 
into  confusion  and  fell  back.  Trimble's  brigade  evidently 
had  a  severe  experience.  And  all  that  is  claimed  is  that 
they  held  their  position,  which  they  certainly  did. 


*  See  Sumner's  testimony-,  C.  W.,  vol.  i.,  p.  367. 


150 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


The  brunt  of  the  battle  was  borne  by  Eeno's  divisions,  and 
Kearny's  division  of  Heintzelman's  corps.  The  action  was 
very  severe,  though  short.  Stevens'  division  fell  back,  and 
Stevens,  an  excellent  officer,  was  killed.  The  gallant  Kearny 
also  was  killed,  while  reconnoitering  in  front  of  his  troops ; 
a  loss  which  was  very  deeply  felt.  He  was  a  man  who  was 
made  for  the  profession  of  arms.  In  the  field  he  was  always 
ready,  always  skilful,  always  brave,  always  untiring,  always 
hopeful,  and  always  vigilant  and  alert. 

These  severe  losses  and  the  indecisive  character  of  the 
engagement,  which  after  all  was  only  a  repulse  of  the 
enemy,  could  not  restore  the  morale  of  the  army.  The 
enemy  pursued  his  design  of  outflanking  our  right.  Long- 
street  was  up  in  the  course  of  the  night.  On  September 
2d,  at  noon,  the  army  being  weary  and  the  Government 
evidently  subjected  to  great  pressure,  the  order  was  given  to 
withdraw  the  troops  within  the  lines  of  "Washington,  and 
the  campaign  of  the  army  under  Pope  was  ended. 


CHAPTER  Xn. 


HALLECK  AND  McCLELLAN. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  as  lias  been  already  stated,* 
consisted  of  Reynolds'  division,  tlie  Second  Corps  under 
Sumner ;  the  Third  Corps  under  Heintzelnian  ;  the  Fourth 
Corps  under  Keyes  ;  the  Fifth  Corps  under  Porter  ;  and  the 
Sixth  Corps  under  Franklin,  besides  the  cavalry.  Of  these 
troops,  the  Fourth  Corps  was  left  to  garrison  Fort  Monroe  ; 
the  division  of  Reynolds  and  the  Third  and  Fifth  Corps 
joined  Po^ie  some  days  prior  to  the  heavy  lighting;  the 
Second  Corps  and  Sixth  Corps  did  not  join  him  until  just 
before  the  action  at  Chantilly.  The  question  why  they  did 
not  join  him  earlier  has  been  a  subject  of  much  dispute. 
General  McClellan  has  been  accused  of  having  purposely  de- 
layed the  forwarding  of  these  troops  to  Poj^e^s  army  ;  and 
we  cannot  avoid  a  discussion  of  this  charge. 

On  the  evening  of  August  23,  1862,  General  McClellan 
sailed  with  his  staff  from  Fortress  Monroe,  and  arrived  at 
Aquia  Creek  at  daylight  the  next  morning,  and  at  once  re- 
ported by  telegram  to  General  Halleck  for  orders.  At  two 
o'clock  P.M.  of  the  28th  he  telegraphed  to  Halleck  such  in- 
formation as  he  could  pick  up  of  the  state  of  things  at  the 
front.  The  communication  was  then  open  between  Aquia 
Creek  and  the  fords  of  the  Rappahannock.  In  fact  Porter's 
corps  was  at  that  time  at  the  fords. 


*  Ante,  pp.  35,  36. 


152 


THE  AHMY  UNDER  POPE. 


No  troops  arrived  at  Aquia  on  the  25tli,  and  on  the  26th, 
at  11  A.M.,  Halleck  suggests  his  leaving  Burnside  at  Aquia 
Creek,  and  coming  himself  to  Alexandria.  He  adds  :  ^  "  Gen- 
eral Franklin's  corps  will  march  as  soon  as  it  receives  trans- 
portation." 

On  receiving  this,  General  McClellan  immediately  sailed 
for  Alexandria,  arriving  that  evening,  and  at  eight  o'clock 
on  the  morning  of  the  27th  reported  to  General  Halleck. 

McClellan  found  Franklin's  corps  already  at  Alexandria, 
where  it  had  arrived  on  the  afternoon  of  the  26th.  As 
General  Halleck  had  made  up  his  mind,  as  we  have  seen,  at 
eleven  that  forenoon,  to  send  Franklin's  corps  to  the  front, 
as  soon  as  it  should  receive  transportation,  it  was  clearly  his 
fault,  McClellan  being  at  Aquia  Creek,  that  the  pro]3er 
amount  of  wagons  was  not  forthcoming,  so  that  the  corps 
might  be  ready  on  the  morning  of  the  27th.  There  were 
horses,  wagons,  and  quartermasters  enough  in  Washington. 
Here  we  see  a  good  instance  of  Halleck's  utter  incapacity 
for  actual  work.  What  need  of  troubling  McClellan  about 
Franklin  at  all  ?  Why  could  not  Franklin  have  been  sent 
out  just  as  Heintzelman  was  a  few  days  before?  or,  if  he 
needed  supplies,  have  the  necessary  supplies  issued  at  once  ? 

At  ten  the  next  morning,  the  27th,  however,  we  find  Hal- 
leck t  telegraphing  to  McClellan  that  Franklin's  corps  should 
march  in  the  direction  of  Manassas  as  soon  as  possible. 

McClellan  acknowledged  this  at  10.20  a.m.,  and  says  that 
he  has  ordered  %  Franklin  to  prepare  to  march  at  once,  and 
to  repair  to  his  headquarters  to  inform  him  as  to  his  means 
of  transportation. 

At  noon,  Halleck,  in  a  despatch?  which  quotes  from  a 
letter  from  Porter  to  Burnside,  that  a  general  battle  is  im- 


tC.  W.,  vol.  i.,  p.  456. 
§lb.,  p.  -157. 


IIALLECK  AND  McCLELLAN. 


153 


minent,  says  "Franklin's  corps  shonld  move  out  by  forced 
marches,  carrying  three  or  four  days'  provisions,  and  to  be 
supplied  as  far  as  possible  by  railroad." 

About  the  same  time  McClellan  makes  the  sensible  sug- 
gestion *  that  it  would  be  wiser  to  have  Sumner's  corps  at 
Alexandria  than  at  xiquia  Creek,  so  that  it  might  move  on 
with  Franklin  to  Centreville. 

The  order  which  McClellan  had  sent  to  Franklin  at  10.20 
A.M.  found  t  that  officer  with  some  of  his  lieutenants  in 
Washington  ;  however,  General  McClellan  says  he  has  given 
*^the  order  to  the  next  in  rank  to  i^lace  the  corps  in  readi- 
ness to  move  at  once." 

At  a  quarter  past  one  p.m.,  the  same  day,  the  27th,  Mc- 
Clellan telegraphs  %  that  Franklin's  artillery  has  no  horses 
except  for  four  guns  without  caissons,  and  that  he  can  pick 
up  no  cavalry. 

He  then  reiterates  his  suggestion  as  to  bringing  up  Sum- 
ner to  Alexandria,  and  raises  the  important  question  whether 
Franklin  without  his  artillery  or  cavalry  can  effect  any  use- 
ful purj^ose. 

On  the  receipt  of  this  despatch.  General  Halleck  seems  to 
have  absolutely  done  nothing  beyond  yielding  to  the  sugges- 
tion about  bringing  Sumner  up  from  Aquia  Creek.  Yet  he 
was  General-in-Chief  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States. 
Every  officer  was  bound  to  obey  him.  In  Washington  there 
was  an  abundance  of  horses,  of  wagons,  of  supplies,  of  every- 
thing, and  the  keys  of  all  these  stores  were  not  in  the  hands 
of  General  McClellan,  but  in  those  of  General  Halleck.  Yet 
he  does  absolutely  nothing  to  supply  Franklin's  deficiencies. 
It  is  all  very  well  to  blame  McClellan  for  throwing  obsta- 
cles in  the  way  of  forwarding  these  troops,  if  he  did  so ;  but 


*C.  W.,  vol.  i.,  p.  457, 

7* 


+  Ib.,  p.  458. 


154 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


it  was  entirely  out  of  his  province  and  entirely  out  of  liis 
power  to  supply  these  imperative  needs  in  the  transporta- 
tion service  of  General  Franklin's  corps.  It  was  Halleck's 
duty  to  see  to  this,  and  at  once,  too.  For  utter  neglect  of 
this  he  stands  condemned. 

On  this  day,  the  27th,  General  McClellan's  authority  was 
defined  in  these  words  by  the  General-in-Chief  :^  "  Take  en- 
tire direction  of  the  sending  out  of  the  troops  from  Alexan- 
dria. Determine  questions  of  priority  in  transportation, 
and  the  places  they  shall  occupy."  At  1.35  p.m.  of  the  27th 
McClellan  learns  f  of  the  disaster  which  befell  General  Tay- 
lor's New  Jersey  brigade  at  Manassas  Junction  that  morning. 
He  notifies  the  General-in-Chief  of  this,  and  also  says  that,  in 
view  of  these  facts,  he  thinks  that  our  policy  should  be  to 
make  the  fortifications  perfectly  safe,  sc.,  by  properly  man- 
ning the  works,  and  to  mobilize  a  couple  of  corps  as  soon  as 
possible,  but  not  to  advance  them  until  they  can  have  their 
artillery  and  cavalry. 

One  great  trouble  with  Halleck  seems  to  have  been  that  he 
did  not  answer  despatches.  He  not  only  does  not  seem  to 
have  made  the  least  effort  to  supply  the  deficiencies  that 
were  brought  to  his  attention,  but  he  does  not  deign  to  take 
the  least  notice,  at  this  time,  so  far  as  appears  by  any  writ- 
ten orders,  at  any  rate,  of  McClellan's  plan  of  detaining  the 
two  corps  until  these  deficiencies  should  be  supplied.  That 
plan  may  or  may  not  have  been  a  good  one  ;  there  was  some- 
thing to  be  said,  probably,  on  both  sides  of  that  question ; 
but,  at  any  rate,  it  was  in  the  highest  degree  important  that 
his  subordinate  should  be  made  fully  acquainted  with  his 
decision  of  the  question. 

Later  in  the  day,  however.  General  McClellan  seems  to 


*  McClellan's  Rep.,  p.  324. 


t  lb.  p.  327. 


HALLECK  AND  McCLELLAN. 


155 


havo  decided  this  qnestioii  for  himself,  and  to  have  made  up 
his  mind  that  the  troops  which  he  had  at  Alexandria  oughfc 
to  be  sent  off  at  once,  in  their  present  state  of  unreadiness. 
At  six  o'clock  P.M.  he  sends  the  following  despatch  : 

Alexandria,  August  27,  1862,  0  p.m. 
Major-General  H.  W.  Halleck, 

Commanding  TJ.  S.  Army  : 
I  have  just  received  the  copy  of  a  despatch  from  General  Pope  to  you, 
dated  10  a.m.  this  morning,  in  which  he  says  :     All  forces  now  sent 
forward  should  be  sent  to  my  right  at  Gainesville." 

I  have  now  at  my  disposal  here  about  (10,000)  ten  thousand  men  of 
Franklin's  corps,  about  (2,800)  twenty-eight  hundred  of  General  Tyler  s 
brigade,  and  Colonel  Tyler's  First  Connecticut  Artillery,  which  I  rec- 
ommend should  be  held  in  hand  for  the  defence  of  Washington. 

If  you  wish  me  to  order  any  part  of  this  force  to  the  fronts  it  in  t  in 
readiness  to  march  at  a  momenVs  notice  to  any  point  you  may  indicate. 

In  view  of  the  existing  state  of  things  in  our  front,  I  have  deemed  it 
best  to  order  General  Casey  to  hold  his  men  for  Yorktown  in  readiness 
to  move ;  but  not  to  send  them  oft'  till  further  orders. 

G.  B.  McCLELLAN, 

Major-General 

Later  that  evening  he  writes  J  to  Halleck  a  despatch, 
w^hich  the  latter  received  at  nine  o'clock  p.m.,  in  which  ho 
says  that  he  has  seen  "  the  remains  of  the  Twelfth  Pennsyl- 
vania Cavalry,"  and  that  they  report  the  enemy  in  force  at 
Bristoe,  Gainesville,  and  Manassas.  He  adds:  "I  found 
part  of  Cox's  command  under  orders  to  take  the  cars ;  will 
halt  it  with  Franklin  until  morning." 

This  was  certainly,  in  \dew  of  the  disaster  which  had  be- 
fallen Taylor's  brigade,  a  judicious  step  as  respected  General 
Cox's  command  ;  but  the  remark  certainly  implied  that  both 
Cox  and  Franklin  were  to  go  in  the  morning.    At  any  rate 


*  McClellan's  Eep.,  p.  328.      t  The  italics  are  ours.     $  C.  W.,  vol.  1,,  p.  459. 


156 


THE  ARMY  Ui^^DEIl  POPE. 


McClellan  had  now  explicitly  informed  Halleck  that  Frank- 
lin's corps  was  ready  to  go  at  a  moment's  notice,  and  Gen- 
eral Halleck  had  a  right  to  rely  on  that  assurance. 

It  would  appear  that  McClellan  went  to  Washington  that 
evening,  and  had  an  interview  with  his  chief,  and  that  he  re- 
mained with  him  till  two  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  28th, 
and  that  at  the  interview  it  was  understood  by  Halleck  that 
Franklin  was  to  move  with  his  corps  on  the  28th  toward 
Manassas  Junction,  to  drive  the  enemy  from  the  railroad. 
Accordingly,  Halleck,  finding,  probably  by  trying  in  vain  to 
communicate  by  telegraph  with  McClellan,  that  that  officer 
had  not  returned  to  Alexandria,  telegraphs  direct  to  Frank- 
lin, and  tells  him  that  if  he  has  not  received  such  an  order  to 
march  from  McClellan,  to  act  on  this. 

It  may,  perhaps,  be  contended  on  behalf  of  General  McClel- 
lan, that  there  was  in  this  midnight  interview  between  him 
and  Halleck  a  lack  of  explicitness  as  to  the  condition  in 
which  Franklin's  corps  should  be  in  before  it  should  go. 
It  certainly  should  have  been  definitely  settled  either  that 
Franklin  should  go  as  he  was,  ready  or  not  ready,  wagons  or 
no  wagons,  artillery  or  no  artillery,  cavalry  or  no  cavalry,  or 
that  he  should  not  go  until  he  was  entirely  ready.  The 
order  to  Franklin  is  hardly  explicit  enough  to  govern  him, 
considering  that  the  question  had  been  raised.  Had  he  been 
in  marching  order,  this  despatch  would  have  been  all  that 
was  needed.  But  he  was  confessedly  not  fully  equipped. 
Still,  after  McClellan  had  in  his  despatch  of  6  p.m.  told  Hal- 
leck that  Franklin's  corps  was  "  in  readiness  to  march  at  a 
moment's  notice,"  the  blame  attaching  to  any  lack  of  ex- 
plicitness as  regards  Franklin's  movements  must  certainly 
fall  on  General  McClellan. 

Franklin,  it  seems,  did  not  consider  this  as  a  peremptoiy 
order,  for  we  find  that  he  brought  it  over  to  McClellan  dur- 


HALLECK  AND  McCLELLAN. 


157 


ing  the  forenoon  of  the  28th.  McClellan,  on  reading  it, 
telegraphs  ^  to  Halleck  at  1  p.m.  that  he  is  doing  all  he  can 
to  hurry  artillery  and  cavalry,  and  that  "the  moment  Frank- 
lin can  be  started  with  a  reasonable  amount  of  artillery,  he 
shall  go."  He  says  the  enemy  is  in  so  much  force  near 
^Manassas,  that  it  is  necessary  to  move  in  force. 

It  seems  to  us  most  extraordinary  that  even  General  Mc- 
Clellan could  have  thus  written  to  General  Halleck,  if  it  had 
been  definitely  agreed  between  them,  the  night  before,  that 
Franklin  was  to  go,  ready  or  not  ready.  At  any  rate  we  find 
Halleck,  f  at  3.30  p.m.,  after  having  received  this  despatch, 
which  was  received,  as  he  admits,  at  five  minutes  after  one, 
not  only  waiting  two  hours  and  a  half  before  writing  any- 
thing, but  then  merely  saying,  in  a  general  way,  that  ''not  a 
moment  must  be  lost  in  j)ushing  as  large  a  force  as  possible 
toward  Manassas,  so  as  to  communicate  with  Pope  before 
the  enemy  is  reinforced."  After  this,  but  exactly  at  what 
hour  we  are  not  informed,  he  X  tells  McClellan  to  "  keep  up 
telegraphic  communication  with  Franklin,  so  that  we  may 
determine  how  far  to  push  him  forward."  This  seems  to 
indicate  uhat,  having  carelessly  read  McClellan's  last  de- 
spatch, he  thinks  Franklin  has  actually  started. 

General  McClellan  seems,  on  this  28th  day  of  August,  to 
have  receded  entirely  from  his  statement  of  six  in  the  even- 
ing before,  that  Franklin  was  ''ready  to  move  at  a  moment's 
notice."  He  is  quite  clear  on  the  subject  now,  only  it  is  now 
against  his  judgment  to  send  out  Franklin's  corps  until  ifc 
can  be  properly  equipped.  On  receiving  this  last-mentioned 
despatch,  which  seems  to  imply  that  Franklin  had  gone,  he 
telegraphs  Halleck, §  at  4.45  p.m.,  that  his  despatch  is  re- 
ceived ;  that  "  neither  Franklin's  nor  Sumner's  corps  is  now 


*  C.  W.,  vol.  i.,  p.  459. 
t  lb.,  p.  4C0. 


t  Ibid. 
§Ib. 


158 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


in  condition  to  move  and  fight  a  battle ;  that  it  would  be  a 
sacrifice  to  send  them  out  now ;  that  he  has  sent  aids  to 
ascertain  the  condition  of  the  commands  of  Cox  and  Tyler ; 
but  he  still  thinks  that  a  premature  movement  in  small  force 
will  accomplish  nothing  but  the  destruction  of  the  troops 
sent  out.  This  despatch  was  received  at  6.15  p.m.  A  de- 
spatch ^  sent  five  minutes  earlier  was  not  received  till  7.30 
P.M.  It  is  to  the  same  e£fect:  that  Franklin  is  not  in  condi- 
tion to  move. 

These  despatches  finally  extorted  from  Halleck  a  distinct 
and  explicit  decision  on  the  question,  whether  Franklin, 
without  his  artillery  and  cavalry,  could  eflect  any  useful  pur- 
pose in  the  front.  For  thirty-six  hours  Halleck  had  either 
carelessly  delayed  deciding  this  question,  or,  what  is  not  un- 
likely, had  supposed  that  he  had  decided  it.  At  last,  how- 
ever, at  8.40p.m.  of  the  29th,  Halleck  telegraphs  his  decision  if 
"  There  must  be  no  further  delay  in  moving  Franklin's  corps 
toward  Manassas.  They  must  go  to-morrow  morning,  ready 
or  not  ready.  If  we  delay  too  long  to  get  ready,  there  will 
be  no  necessity  to  go  at  all,  for  Pope  will  either  be  defeated 
or  victorious  without  our  aid.  If  there  is  a  want  of  wagons 
the  men  must  carry  provisions  with  them  till  the  wagons  can 
come  to  their  relief." 

McClellan,J  at  ten  o'clock  on  the  same  evening,  telegraphs 
Halleck  that  Franklin's  corps  has  been  ordered  to  march  at 
six  o'clock  to-morrow  morning,  the  29th. 

At  10.30  A.M.  of  the  29th  he  telegraphs  |  that  Franklin's 
corps  did  start  at  six  o'clock.  He  says  that  it  is  not  in  a 
condition  to  accomplish  much  if  he  meets  strong  resistance, 
that  he  has  but  forty  rounds  of  ammunition  and  no  wagons 
to  move  more. 


*  C.  W.,  vol.  i.,  p.  463. 
$Ib. 


t  lb.,  p.  461. 
§  lb. 


HALLECK  AND  McCLELLAN. 


139 


An  hour  and  a  half  later  McClellan  has  become  anxious 
about  Franklin.  He  telegraphs*  the  General-in-Chief  :  "Do 
you  wish  the  movement  of  Franklin's  corps  to  continue  ?  He 
is  without  reserve  ammunition,  and  without  transportation." 

A  few  minutes  afterward,  in  a  despatch  relating  to  the 
placing  of  Sumner's  corps,  he  says,  tentatively :  "  Franklin 
has  only  between  10,000  and  11,000  ready  for  duty.  How  far 
do  you  wish  this  force  to  advance  ?  " 

At  1  P.M.,  in  another  despatch f  to  Halleck,  McClellan  asks  : 

Shall  I  do  as  seems  best  to  me  with  all  the  troops  in  this  vicin- 
ity, including  Franklin,  who  I  really  think  ought  not,  under 
the  present  circumstances,  to  proceed  beyond  Anandale  ?  ' ' 

Anandale  is  not  quite  nine  miles  from  Alexandria. 

Halleck,  after  waiting  for  upwards  of  an  hour,  replies  J  at 
three  o'clock  :  "I  want  Franklin's  corps  to  go  far  enough  to 
find  out  something  about  the  enemy.  PerhajDS  he  may  get  such 
information  at  Anandale  as  to  prevent  his  going  farther.  Other- 
wise he  will  push  on  toward  Fairfax.  Try  to  get  something 
from  direction  of  Manassas,  either  by  telegram,  or  through 
Franklin's  scouts.  Our  people  must  move  more  actively,  and 
find  out  where  the  enemy  is.    I  am  tired  of  guesses." 

All  that  General  Halleck  then  purposed  accomplishing 
with  Franklin's  corps  was  the  obtaining  of  information  !  It 
is  necessary  to  be  explicit  about  this,  for  this  matter 
has  been  greatly  misunderstood.  Halleck  did  not  send 
Franklin  out  on  the  morning  of  the  29th  to  join  Pope,  as  he 
had  sent  out  Heintzelman  and  Reno  the  w^eek  before.  Not 
at  all.  He  intended  to  retain  Franklin's  (and  Sumner's 
corps,  as  we  shall  ^ee  presently)  for  the  defence  of  Wash- 
ington; and  while  the  communications  were  interrupted, 
and  it  was  uncertain  whether  there  might  not  be  raiding 


*  C.  W.,  vol.  i.,  p.  462.  t  lb.,  p.  463. 


160 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


bodies  of  the  enemy  between  Washington  and  the  army  of 
General  Pope,  Franklin's  corps  was  sent  out  to  obtain  infor- 
mation. "  Perhaps  he  may  get  such  information,"  says  Hal- 
leck,  "  at  Anandale,  as  to  prevent  his  going  further."  Noth- 
ing can  be  clearer  than  this. 

No  wonder  that  General  McClellan  was  dissatisfied  and 
uneasy.  Why  send  out  Franklin  at  all  into  a  region  wdiere 
he  may  have  to  fight  a  battle,  unless  for  an  object  commen- 
surate with  the  risk  ?  If  Franklin  is  required  for  the  de- 
fence of  the  capital  let  him  stay  there  ;  if  he  is  not,  let  him 
make  the  best  of  his  way  to  Pope  and  add  his  troops  to  the 
Army  of  Virginia. 

Accordingly,  when  President  Lincoln,  at  half -past  two  that 
afternoon,  asks  McClellan  What  news  from  direction  of 
Manassas  Junction  ?  What  generally  ?  "  McClellan  replies 
as  follows :  f 

Headquarters  Army  of  Potomac, 
Near  Alexandria,  Virginia, 
August,  29,  1862,  2.45  p.m. 
The  last  news  I  received  from  the  direction  of  Manassas  was  from 
stragglers,  to  the  effect  that  the  enemy  were  evacuating  Centreville  and 
retiring  through  Thoroughfare  Gap.    This  is  by  no  means  reliable. 

I  am  clear  that  one  of  two  courses  should  be  adopted  :  first,  to  con- 
centrate all  our  available  forces  to  open  communication  with  Pope ; 
second,  to  leave  Pope  to  get  out  of  his  scrape,  and  at  once  use  all  our 
means  to  make  the  capital  perfectly  safe.  No  middle  course  will  now 
answer.  Tell  me  what  you  wish  me  to  do,  and  I  will  do  all  in  my 
power  to  accomplish  it.  I  wish  to  know  what  my  orders  and  authority 
are.  I  ask  for  nothing,  but  will  obey  whatever  orders  you  give.  I 
only  ask  a  prompt  decision,  that  I  may  at  once  give  the  necessary 
ordersc    It  will  not  do  to  delay  longer. 

GEORGE  B.  McCLELLAN, 

Major-General. 

A.  Lincoln,  President, 


*  C.  W.,  vol.  i.,  p.  463. 


tib.. 


HALLECK  AND  McCLELLAN. 


161 


To  which  Mr.  Lincoln  replied  :^  "I  think  your  first  al- 
ternative, to  wit.  '  to  concentrate  all  our  available  forces  to 
open  communication  with  Pope/  is  the  right  one.  But  I 
wish  not  to  control.  That  I  now  leave  to  General  Halleck, 
aided  by  your  counsels." 

There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  indignation  felt  at  the  ex- 
pression made  use  of  by  General  McGlellan,  to  present  his 
second  alternative,  viz.,  to  leave  Pope  to  get  out  of  his 
scrape."  We  take  it  as  clear  enough  to  any  reasonable  man 
that  this  was  simply  a  short  mode  of  stating  the  idea.  There 
were  two  courses,  either  of  which  was  recommended  by  pow- 
erful reasons.  The  one  was,  to  use  all  the  disjDosable  force 
in  and  about  Washington,  in  opening  communications  with 
Pope ;  the  second  was  to  make  no  such  attempt,  but  to  se- 
cure the  city  in  the  possible  event  of  a  raid,  or  of  a  reverse  to 
Pope.  The  latter  was  in  the  hurry  of  the  moment  couched 
by  General  McGlellan  in  the  ungracious  terms  of  which  we 
have  spoken.  The  words  were  certainly  infelicitous,  but 
time  pressed.  They  certainly  conveyed  the  idea.  What 
McGlellan  wanted  to  prevent  was,  the  exposure  of  troops 
who  might  be  useful,  when  used  in  masses,  either  to  open 
communication  with  Pope  and  reinforce  his  army,  or  to  man 
the  forts  around  Washington,  in  isolated  bodies,  without 
cavalry  or  artillery,  as  Franklin's  corps  was  there  exposed 
for  the  mere  purpose  of  picking  up  information  at  Anan- 
dale.  And  he  was  quite  right.  It  was  with  this  intention 
that  he  had  got  Halleck  to  bring  up  Sumner  from  Aquia 
Greek. 

Mr.  Lincoln  no  doubt  went  to  see  General  Halleck  on  the 
receipt  of  this  despatch  from  General  McGlellan,  and  Gen- 
eral Halleck  found  it  convenient  to  assume  that  he  had  sent 


*  C.  W.,  vol.  i.,  p.  464. 


162 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


out  Franklin's  corps  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  the 
course  of  which  Mr.  Lincoln  had  just  expressed  his  approval, 
namely,  to  open  communication  with  Pope's  army.  Accord- 
ingly we  find  a  very  testy  despatch  of  his  to  McClellan,  sent 
at  7.50  P.M.  of  the  29th:  "I  have  just  been  told  that  Frank- 
lin's corps  stopped  at  Anandale,  and  that  he  was  this  evening 
at  Alexandria.  This  is  all  contrary  to  my  orders.  Investi- 
gate and  report  the  fact  of  this  disobedience.  That  corps 
must  push  forward,  as  I  directed,  to  protect  the  railroad  and 
open  our  communications  with  Manassas."^ 

The  reader  will  observe  that  General  Halleck  had  not  in 
his  despatch  of  three  o'clock  that  afternoon  directed  any- 
thing of  the  sort ;  and  that,  for  all  that  General  Halleck  knew. 
Franklin  might  at  that  moment  be  giving  to  McClellan  the 
information,  which,  as  General  Halleck  had  exjDressly  said, 
might  prevent  his  going  further  than  Anandale. 

McClellan  answered  f  him  in  a  despatch,  showing  that  he 
was  not  pleased  at  this  gratuitous  suggestion  of  disobedience 
of  orders,  and  asking  for  explicit  instructions  in  the  future. 
No  answer  coming,  McClellan  at  10  p.m.  ordered  Franklin  to 
advance  from  Anandale  as  soon  as  possible,  and  place  him- 
self in  communication  with  General  Pojie,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  cover  the  transit  of  Pope's  su^Dplies,  which  were  at 
that  time  being  forwarded  to  him  from  x4.1exandria.  Frank- 
lin accordingly  left  Anandale  the  next  morning — the  30th, 
and  arrived  at  Centre\dlle  about  6  p.m.,  too  late,  of  course, 
to  proceed  beyond  Bull  Eun  and  take  part  in  the  battle. 

We  may  as  well  say  here  what  we  have  to  say  about  Sum- 
ner's corps,  and  Cox's  and  Tyler's  troops  ;  it  is  not  much. 
Whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  detention  of  these  troops  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Washington,  it  was  done  by  Halleck's 


*  C.  W.,  vol.  i.,  1).  465. 


tib. 


HALLECK  AND  McCLELLAX.  163 

express  orders.  In  a  despatch  to  McCiellan  of  August  29th, 
he  says:  "I  think  you  had  better  X3lace  Sumner's  corps,  as 
it  arrives,  near  the  fortifications,  and  particularly  at  the 
Chain  Bridge.  The  principal  thing  to  be  feared  now  is  a  cav- 
alry raid  into  this  city,  especially  in  the  night-time.  Use 
Cox's  and  Tyler's  brigades  and  the  new  troops  for  the  same 
object,  if  you  need  them."  General  Pope  had  certainly  no 
cause  of  complaint  with  General  McCiellan  for  the  detention 
of  these  troops. 

On  reviewing  the  evidence  in  the  matter  of  Franklin's 
corps,  we  are  disjDOsed  to  think  that  General  Halleck  deter- 
mined at  first,  on  the  27th,  to  send  it  right  out  by  forced 
marches  to  join  the  army ;  that  he  was  led  by  General  Mc- 
Ciellan, on  the  evening  of  that  day,  to  believe  that  it  could 
move  at  a  moment's  notice ;  that  he  expected  that  it  would 
move  on  the  28th ;  that  the  news  received  on  the  28th,  of 
the  rupture  of  our  communications,  induced  him  to  hesitate 
in  his  purpose  about  Franklin's  destination,  so  that,  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  29th,  he  had  limited  his  intentions  to  the 
obtaining  of  information  about  the  army ;  that  he  then 
changed  his  mind  again,  after  seeing  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  so 
notified  General  McCiellan,  who  immediately  ordered  Frank- 
lin upon  Centreville.  We  are  also  inclined  to  think  that, 
after  the  communications  had  been  broken,  McCiellan  be- 
came, naturally  perhaps,  anxious  for  the  fate  of  Franklin's 
corps  in  its  iDrojected  march,  and  that  while  we  doubt  not 
he  exerted  himself  to  supply  its  needs,  he  did  not  think  it 
ought  to  proceed  very  far  unless  it  should  be  accompanied 
by  the  corps  of  Sumner.  We  are  inclined  to  think  that  he 
allowed  it  to  remain  in  Alexandria  after  he  knew  that  Gen- 
eral Halleck  had  supposed  it  had  gone.  But,  in  view  of  Gen- 
eral Halleck's  infirmity  of  purpose  and  want  of  explicit  di- 


164 


THE  ARMY  U^^DER  POPE. 


rections,  we  cannot  bear  hard  U23on  McClellan  in  this  mat- 
ter. After  the  communications  with  the  army  had  "been 
broken,  he  was  perfectly  right  in  the  opinion  that  any  at- 
tempt to  reopen  them  should  be  made  by  all  the  disposable 
forces,  and  not  by  isolated  bodies  of  troops.  He  had  clear 
ideas  of  his  own,  and  there  was  much  to  be  said  for  them, 
too,  while  the  General-in-Chief  was  weak  and  vacillating. 
That  Franklin's  and  Sumner's  corps  could  both  have  been 
supplied  on  the  27th  and  28th,  by  the  energetic  administra- 
tion of  all  the  resources  at  the  command  of  the  General-in- 
Chief,  and  sent  forward  on  the  afternoon  of  the  28th  or  the 
morning  of  the  29th,  fully  equipped  with  everything  need- 
ful, we  have  not  a  particle  of  doubt.  But,  instead  of  the  way 
being  prepared  for  this  by  the  exercise  of  the  supreme  au- 
thority of  the  General-in-Chief,  who  should  in  this  emer- 
gency have  authorized  General  McClellan  and  his  corps- 
commanders  to  impress  into  their  service  any  and  everything 
that  the  quartermaster's  department  supplied,  we  find  that 
Franklin  and  Sumner  besieged  that  department  in  vain  for 
days  to  get  sufficient  wagons  for  their  reserve  ammuni- 
tion, and  that  McClellan  had  to  load  up  his  own  headquarter 
wagons  for  this  purpose. 

The  fact  is  that  Halleck  was  in  doubt  what  to  do  with 
Franklin  for  some  time,  and  that,  for  the  delay  of  his  corps 
and  Sumner's  in  and  about  Alexandria,  Halleck  is  in  the 
main  responsible. 

Too  much  has,  however,  as  we  have  before  intimated,  been 
made  of  this  matter.  General  Pope's  army  was  perfectly 
well  able  to  take  care  of  itself.  If  it  found  itself  outnum- 
bered, Halleck  had  a  right  to  suppose  it  would  retire  on 
"Washington.  Perhaps  it  would  have  been  better  to  have 
formed  a  strong  column  of  the  two  corps,  and  sent  them  to 


HALLECK  AND  McCLELLAN. 


165 


Centre ville  ;  probably  it  would  have  been,  but  it  was  not,* 
the  fact  that  these  troops  were  not  in  the  battle  of  Bull  Eun 
that  was  the  cause  of  the  defeat.  The  circumstances  were 
not  in  the  least  those  of  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  for  example. 
Pope  did  not  begin  his  battle  relying  on  Franklin,  as  Wel- 
lington did  on  Bliicher. 

*  Cf,  Pope's  language  in  his  despatch  to  Halleck  of  August  31st  (P.  R.,  p.  162) : 
*'  I  think pe?' haps  it  would  have  been  greatly  better  if  Sumner  and  Franklin  had 
been  here  three  or  four  days  ago," 


/ 


CHAPTER  Xin. 


FINAL  REFLECTIONS. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  army  within  the  lines  of  Washing- 
ton was  almost  immediately  followed  by  relieving  General 
Pope  from  further  duty  with  the  Army  of  Virginia,  and  by 
the  appointment  of  General  McClellan  to  the  command  of  all 
the  forces,  the  greater  portion  of  which  now  took  the  field 
under  the  old  name  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

We  do  not  wonder  that  General  Pope  should  have  felt  in- 
censed. He  was  received  at  first,  as  he  tells  us,^  by  the 
General-in-Chief,  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  the  President, 
with  great  cordiality,  and  each  one  of  these  high  function- 
aries expressed,  in  the  most  decided  manner,  his  appreciation 
of  his  services,  and  of  the  conduct  of  his  military  operations. 
Then  they  went  on  to  speak  with  great  indignation  of  the 
treacherous  and  unfaithful  conduct  of  certain  officers  of  high 
rank,!  who  were  directly  or  indirectly  connected  with  these 
operations. 

But  in  a  day  or  two  there  was  a  change.  The  "iVIcClellan  in- 
fluence became  predominant,  and  that  officer  was  reappointed 
to  the  command  of  the  army.  "  In  what  was  then  consid- 
ered by  the  Government  a  serious  crisis,"  General  Pope  goes 
on  to  say,J  "I  was  constrained  to  submit,  for  the  supposed 
benefit  of  the  public  interests,  to  reproach,  misrepresenta- 


*  p.  R.,  p.  189. 


+  Sc.  Porter,  Griffin,  and  McClellan,  as  we  suppose, 
t  P.  R.,  p.  189. 


FINAL  REFLECTIONS. 


167 


tion  and  calumny  concerning  a  campaign  which  the  Govern- 
ment, to  me,  personally,  and  to  the  numerous  friends  of  my- 
self and  of  justice,  constantly  and  freely,  not  only  then,  but 
ever  since,  proclaimed  to  have  been  conducted  with  eminent 
skill  and  vigor,  and  to  have  accomplished  greater  results 
than  any  one  believed  possible  with  such  a  force  and  under 
such  circumstances,  and  when  triumphant  success  was  only 
lost  by  the  bad  conduct  of  those  who  had  been  just  rewarded 
for  their  treachery  by  the  very  object  they  sought  to  accom- 
plish by  it." 

Where  General  Pope  is  wrong,  as  it  seems  to  us,  is  in  at- 
tributing his  ill-success  in  the  field  to  the  lack  of  co-opera- 
tion or  treacherous  conduct  on  the  part  of  these  evil-dis- 
posed officers.  He  can  refer  only  to  the  failure  of  Porter  to 
take  part  in  the  battle  of  the  29th,  and  to  the  failure  of  Griffin 
to  take  part  in  the  battle  of  the  30th.  McClellan  might,  no 
doubt,  have  sent  him  more  troops,  or,  rather,  have  sent  him 
the  troops  he  did  send  him  at  an  earlier  period,  but  McClel- 
lan certainly  interfered  in  no  way  with  any  of  his  battles. 

We  shall  not  discuss  the  Porter  controversy  again  ;  in  our 
judgment  General  Pope  is  entirely  mistaken  in  his  notion  as 
to  the  cause  of  the  inactivity  of  the  Fifth  Corps  on  the  29th. 
The  absence  of  Griffin's  brigade  of  Morell's  division  on  the 
30th  was  certainly  a  matter  which  demanded  investigation, 
but  it  did  not  perceptibly  atfect  the  fortunes  of  the  day. 
Very  possibly,  the  presence  of  the  corps  of  Sumner  and 
Franklin  might  have  prevented  the  defeat  of  Bull  Eun  ;  but 
it  must  be  remembered  that  Pope  was  not  forced  into  this 
battle,  but  was  the  attacking  party.  He  lost  the  battle,  not 
because  he  had  not  men  enough,  but  because  he  entirely 
misconceived  the  situation,  supposing,  as  he  did,  that  Long- 
street  had  not  arrived  in  force,  and,  moreover,  that  the  enemy 
were  in  full  retreat. 


168 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


General  Pope,  in  fact,  does  not  do  justice  to  his  own  cam- 
paign, when  he  speaks  of  it  in  the  bitter  language  which  he 
uses  in  the  latter  portions  of  his  report.  The  fact  is,  that 
General  Pope's  finding  himself  back  at  Centreville  at  the 
end  of  the  month,  was  just  what  he  should  have  expected. 
That  there  should  be  unlooked-for  delays  in  bringing  up  the 
army  from  the  Peninsula  should  not  have  surprised  him, 
nor,  even,  that  there  should  have  been  some  delay  caused  by 
unwillingness  to  put  the  whole  Army  of  the  Potomac  under 
his  command.  Something  of  the  kind,  human  nature  being 
what  it  is,  was  to  have  been  expected.  But  these  delays 
were  matters  of  no  great  consequence,  provided  that  the 
armies  were  finally  united,  and  provided  that,  in  the  mean- 
time. General  Pope's  force,  which  was  in  actual  contact  with 
the  enemy,  had  suffered  no  disaster.  The  place  of  their 
union,  whether  on  the  Eappahannock  or  behind  Bull  Eun, 
was  not  a  very  important  matter ;  it  was  only  a  few  rails, 
bridges,  cars,  and  engines,  more  or  less.  There  was,  there- 
fore, no  good  reason  why  General  Pope  should  not  have  been 
quite  content,  in  order  to  get  the  reinforcement  of  the  corps 
of  Sumner  and  Franklin,  to  fall  back  behind  Bull  Eun. 
These  troops  might,  no  doubt,  have  joined  him  further  to 
the  front.  But  that  they  did  not,  was  certainly  not  his  fault. 
Nor  was  it  for  him  to  complain  that  they  did  not ;  what  he 
had  to  do,  was  simply  to  take  care  of  the  force  under  his 
own  control,  and  delay  the  enemy  as  long  as  he  could  with- 
out allowing  his  communications  to  be  endangered  by  his 
forward  position.  When  these  were  endangered,  or  when 
he  saw  that  he  would  be  obliged  to  accept  battle  with 
superior  forces  of  the  enemy  if  he  remained  so  far  out,  it 
was  clearly  his  policy  to  retire,  and  approach  his  base,  and 
get  further  reinforcements.  There  not  only  was  nothing  dis- 
graceful in  such  a  retreat,  but  it  was  exactly  what  the  situa- 


FINAL  REFLECTIONS. 


169 


tion  demanded.  And  there  was  in  this  nothing  really  to 
comi3lain  of. 

Had  Genera]  Pope  stuck  to  his  decision — for  we  have  no 
doubt  that  he  did  make  substantially  such  a  decision — that 
he  was  not  strong  enough  to  fight  Lee's  whole  army  without 
the  reinforcement  of  the  Second  and  Sixth  Corps,  he  would 
have  brought  his  army  back  to  Centreville  without  having 
suffered  certainly  any  greater  loss  than  he  had  inflicted. 

A  year  later,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  found  themselves  in  the  position  in  which, 
as  we  have  seen,  the  armies  of  Pope  and  Lee  were  from  the 
21st  to  the  25th  of  August,  1862.  General  Lee  was  again 
trying  to  cross  the  Eappahannock  at  Sulphur  Springs  and 
Waterloo  Bridge,  and  so  turn  the  right  of  the  Federal 
army.  This  time  he  succeeded.  At  first  Meade  delayed, 
being  misinformed  as  to  the  enemy's  movements  ;  but  when 
he  did  ascertain  them,  he  retreated  with  admirable  skill  and 
success  back  to  Centreville.  General  Lee  went  after  him, 
but  did  nr.t  dare  to  hazard  a  battle  there,  and,  finding  the 
country  would  not  suj^port  his  army,  marched  back  again  to 
the  Eappahannock,  and  in  fact  to  the  Eapidan,  having,  to 
use  the  language  of  the  law,  "taken  nothing  by  his  motion." 
During  the  retreat  of  our  army,  moreover,  the  Second  Corps 
was  able  to  strike  a  smart  blow  at  the  enemy,  capturing  five 
guns  and  some  hundreds  of  prisoners.  Some  such  a  cam- 
paign as  this  might  have  been  General  Pope's,  with  the  ad- 
ditional element  in  his  favor,  that  when  he  should  finally 
take  the  offensive,  it  would  be  with  his  army  largely  aug- 
mented. 

General  Pope's  actual  campaign  differed  from  the  one 
which  we  have  sketched  out  in  two  respects. 

First. — He  did  not  fall  back  on  the  25th  and  26th  to  cover 
his  communications.  If  he  had,  he  would  have  prevented 
8-IV. 


170 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


the  loss  of  his  stores,  and  would  probably  have  been  able 
to  concentrate  his  whole  army  upon  Jackson  long  before 
Longstreet  joined  him. 

Second. — He  joined  battle  with  the  entire  army  of  Lee  be= 
fore  having  received  all  the  reinforcements  which  he  expect- 
ed from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Had  General  Pope  not  made  these  mistakes,  his  campaign 
would  in  all  probability  have  been  a  successful  attempt  to 
delay  the  advance  of  Lee's  army  until  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac had  been  brought  up  from  the  Peninsula,  illustrated 
by  a  severe  action  between  his  army  and  Jackson's  isolated 
corps,  in  which  the  latter  would  have  been  worsted. 

As  it  was,  there  was,  as  we  have  before  pointed  out,  noth- 
ing to  be  very  much  cast  down  about.  The  battles  had  all 
been  fought  creditably,  so  far  as  the  actual  fighting  went. 
The  spirit  of  his  army,  its  readiness,  pluck,  and  endurance 
had  been  admirable.  The  last  battle  was  certainly  a  defeat, 
but  it  was  nothing  more.  Lee,  moreover,  had  sutfered  greatly, 
as  was  soon  shown  at  South  Mountain  and  Antietam. 

General  Po|)e  himself  thoroughly  appreciated  all  this. 
On  September  3d  he  writes  to  General  Halleck  as  follows  :  ^ 

We  ought  not  to  lose  a  moment  in  pushing  forward  the 
fresh  troops  to  confront  the  enemy.  In  three  days  we  should 
be  able  to  renew  the  offensive  in  the  direction  of  Little  River 
pike  beyond  Fairfax  Court  House.  We  must  strike  again 
with  fresh  men,  while  the  enemy  is  wearied  and  broken 
down.  I  am  ready  to  advance  again  to  the  front  with  fresh 
troops  now  here.  Those  I  brought  in  can  remain  for  two 
days.  Somebody  ought  to  have  the  supreme  command  here. 
Let  us  not  sit  down  quietly,  but  push  forward  again."  This 
despatch  shows  a  perfectly  just  appreciation  of  the  state  of 
the  two  combatants  at  that  moment. 

*  p.  11.,  p.  188. 


FINAL  REFLECTIONS. 


171 


What  General  Pope  needed  in  order  to  accomplish  in  the 
month  of  September  what  General  McClellan  accomplished 
with  the  army,  was  the  confidence  of  his  officers  and  men. 
It  mnst  be  confessed  that  he  did  not  seem  to  understand  how 
to  acquire  this.  His  original  address  to  his  army  was  in  very 
questionable  taste.  He  was  a  Western  man,  appointed  to 
command  in  the  East,  and  instead  of  letting  his  actions  speak 
for  themselves,  he  began  by  contrasting  the  Western  with 
the  Eastern  armies,  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  latter.  Then 
his  General  Orders,  and  many  of  his  despatches,  were  curt, 
peremptory,  and  seemingly  harsh  in  their  tone.  Much  of 
this,  doubtless,  would  have  worn  off  in  time,  but  the  time 
was  not  allowed  him. 

On  the  other  hand.  Pope  was  a  vigorous,  active,  resolute 
man.  He  had  many  of  the  peculiarly  military  virtues,  cour- 
age, persistency,  confidence  in  himself.  He  was  outgener- 
alled,  it  is  true,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  he  was 
much  hampered  in  his  movements  by  General  Halleck's  ob- 
stinate adherence  to  the  line  of  the  Eappahannock,  and  that 
he  was  opposed  by  the  best  generals  of  the  enemy.  When 
he  met  his  antagonists,  he  fought  them  with  a  courage  and 
persistency  which  extorted  their  admiration. 


APPENDIX  A. 


ADDEESS  TO  THE  AEMY,  AND  GENEKAL  OEDEES 
NOS.  5,  6,  7,  AND  11. 

Address. 

Washington,  Monday,  July  14th. 

To  the  Officers  and  Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  Virginia  : 

By  special  assignment  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  I  have 
assumed  command  of  this  army.  I  have  spent  two  weeks  in  learning 
your  whereabouts,  your  condition,  and  your  wants ;  in  preparing  you 
for  active  operations,  and  in  placing  you  in  positions  from  which  you 
can  act  promptly  and  to  the  purpose. 

I  have  coir.e  to  you  from  the  West,  where  we  have  always  seen  the 
backs  of  our  enemies — from  an  army  whose  business  it  has  been  to  seek 
the  adversary,  and  to  beat  him  when  found,  whose  policy  has  been  at- 
tack and  not  defence. 

In  but  one  instance  has  the  enemy  been  able  to  place  our  Western 
armies  in  a  defensive  attitude.  I  presume  that  I  have  been  called  here 
to  pursue  the  same  system,  and  to  lead  you  against  the  enemy.  It  is  my 
purpose  to  do  so,  and  that  speedily. 

I  am  sure  you  long  for  an  opportunity  to  win  the  distinction  you  are 
capable  of  achieving — that  opportunity  I  shall  endeavor  to  give  you. 

Meantime  I  desire  you  to  dismiss  from  your  minds  certain  phrases 
which  I  am  sorry  to  find  much  in  vogue  amongst  you. 

I  hear  constantly  of  taking  strong  positions  and  holding  them — of 
lines  of  retreat  and  of  bases  of  supplies.    Let  us  discard  such  ideas. 

The  strongest  position  a  soldier  should  desire  to  occupy  is  one  from 
which  he  can  most  easily  advance  against  the  enemy. 

Let  us  study  the  probable  lines  of  retreat  of  our  opponents,  and  leave 


174  THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 

our  own  to  take  care  of  theraselves.  Let  us  look  before  us  and  not  be- 
hind. Success  and  glory  are  in  the  advance.  Disaster  and  shame  lurk 
in  the  rear. 

Let  us  act  on  this  understanding,  and  it  is  safe  to  predict  that  your 
banners  shall  be  inscribed  with  many  a  glorious  deed,  and  that  your 
names  will  be  dear  to  j^our  countrymen  forever. 

JOHN  POPE, 
Major- General  Commanding. 

[General  Orders,  No.  5.] 

Headquarters  Army  of  Virginia, 
Washington,  July  18,  1862. 
Hereafter,  as  far  as  practicable,  the  troops  of  this  command  will 
subsist  upon  the  country  in  which  their  operations  are  carried  on.  In 
all  cases  supplies  for  this  purpose  will  be  taken  by  the  ofi&cers  to  whose 
department  they  properly  belong,  under  the  orders  o^  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  troops  for  whose  use  they  are  intended.    Vouchers  will  be 
given  to  the  owners,  stating  on  their  face  that  they  will  be  payable  at 
the  conclusion  of  the  war,  upon  sufficient  testimony  being  furnished 
that  such  owners  have  been  loyal  citizens  of  the  United  States  since 
the  date  of  the  vouchers.    Whenever  it  is  known  that  supplies  can  be 
furnished  in  any  district  of  the  country  where  the  troops  are  to  oper- 
ate, the  use  of  trains  for  carrying  subsistence  will  be  dispensed  with  as 
f  ai-  as  possible. 
By  <3ommand  of  Major-General  Pope. 

GEORGE  D.  RUGGLES, 
Colonel^  Assistant  Adjutaiit- General  a7id  Chief  of  Staff. 

[General  Orders,  No.  6.] 

Headquarters  Army  of  Virginia, 
Washington,  July  18,  1862. 
Hereafter,  in  any  operations  of  the  cavalry  forces  in  this  command 
no  supply  nor  baggage  trains  of  any  description  will  be  used,  unless  so 
stated  specially  in  the  order  for  the  movement.  Two  days'  cooked 
rations  will  be  carried  on  the  persons  of  the  men,  and  all  villages  or 
nsdhborhoods  through  which  they  pass  will  be  laid  under  contribution 
in  the  manner  specified  by  General  Orders  No.  5,  current  series,  from 


APPENDIX  A. 


175 


these  headquarters,  for  the  subsistence  of  men  and  horses.  Movements 
of  cavalry  must  always  be  made  with  celerity,  and  no  delay  in  such 
movements  will  be  excused  hereafter  on  any  pretext.  Whenever  the 
order  for  the  movement  of  any  portion  of  this  army  emanates  from 
these  headquarters,  the  time  of  marching,  and  that  to  be  consumed  in  the 
execution  of  the  duty,  will  be  specifically  designated,  and  no  departure 
therefrom  will  be  permitted  to  pass  unnoticed  without  the  gravest  and 
most  conclusive  reasons.  Commanding  officers  will  be  held  responsible 
for  strict  and  prompt  compliance  with  every  provision  of  this  order. 

By  command  of  Major  General  Pope. 

^  GEORGE  D.  RUGGLES, 
Colonel^  Assistant  Adjutant- General  and  Chief  of  Staff, 


[General  Orders,  No.  7.] 

Headquarters,  Army  of  Virginia, 
Washington,  July  20,  1862. 
The  people  of  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  and  throughout  the  re- 
gion of  operations  of  this  army,  living  along  the  lines  of  railroad  and 
telegraph,  and  along  the  routes  of  travel  in  rear  of  the  United  States 
forces,  are  notified  that  they  will  be  held  responsible  for  any  injury 
done  to  the  track,  line,  or  road,  or  for  any  attacks  upon  trains  or  strag- 
gling soldiers  by  bands  of  guerillas  in  their  neighborhood.  No  privi- 
leges and  imiiiunities  of  warfare  apply  to  lawless  bands  of  individuals 
not  forming  part  of  the  organized  forces  of  the  enemy,  nor  wearing  the 
garb  of  soldiers,  who,  seeking  and  obtaining  safety  on  pretext  of  being 
peaceful  citizens,  steal  out  in  rear  of  the  army,  attack  and  murder 
straggling  soldiers,  molest  trains  of  supplies,  destroy  railroads,  tele- 
graph lines  and  bridges,  and  commit  outrages  disgraceful  to  civilized 
people  and  revolting  to  humanity.  Evil-disposed  persons  in  rear  of 
our  armies,  who  do  not  themselves  engage  directly  in  these  lawless  acts, 
encourage  them  by  refusing  to  interfere  or  give  any  information  by 
which  such  acts  can  be  prevented  or  the  perpetrators  punished.  Safety 
of  life  and  property  of  all  persons  living  in  the  rear  of  our  advancing 
armies  depends  upon  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  quiet  among  them- 
selves, and  of  the  unmolested  movement  through  their  midst  of  all 
pertaining  to  the  military  service.  They  are  to  understand  distinctly 
that  this  security  of  travel  is  their  only  warrant  of  personal  safety. 
It  is,  therefore,  ordered  that  whenever  a  railroad,  wagon -road,  or  tele- 


176 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


graph  is  injured  by  parties  of  guerillas,  the  citizens  living  within  five 
miles  of  the  spot  shall  be  turned  out  in  mass  to  repair  the  damage, 
and  shall,  besides,  pay  the  United  States,  in  money  or  in  property,  to 
be  levied  by  military  force,  the  full  amount  of  the  pay  and  subsistence 
of  the  whole  force  necessary  to  coerce  the  performance  of  the  work 
during  the  time  occupied  in  completing  it.  If  a  soldier,  or  a  legiti- 
mate follower  of  the  army  be  fired  upon  from  any  house,  the  house 
shall  be  razed  to  the  ground,  and  the  inhabitants  sent  prisoners  to  the 
headquarters  of  this  army.  If  such  an  outrage  occur  at  any  place  dis- 
tant from  settlements,  the  people  within  five  miles  around  shall  be  held 
accountable  and  made  to  pay  an  i:^emnity  sufficient  for  the  case. 
Any  persons  detected  in  such  outrages,  either  during  the  act  or  at  any 
time  afterward,  shall  be  shot  without  awaiting  civil  process,  X o  such 
acts  can  influence  the  result  of  this  war,  and  they  can  only  lead  to  heavy 
afflictions  to  the  population  to  no  purpose.  It  is  therefore  enjoined 
upon  all  persons,  both  for  the  security  of  their  property  and  the  safety 
of  their  own  persons,  that  they  act  vigorously  and  cordially  together  to 
prevent  the  perpetration  of  such  outrages.  While  it  is  the  wish  of  the 
general  commanding  this  army  that  all  peaceably  disposed  persons,  who 
remain  at  their  homes  and  pursue  their  accustomed  avocations,  shall  be 
subjected  to  no  improper  burden  of  war,  yet  their  own  safety  must  of 
necessity  depend  upon  the  strict  preservation  of  peace  and  order  among 
themselves,  and  they  are  to  understand  that  nothing  will  deter  him 
from  enforcing  promptly,  and  to  the  full  extent,  every  provision  of 
this  order. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Pope. 

GEO.  D.  RUGGLES, 

Colonel,  Assistant  Adjutant- General  and  Chief  of  Staff. 


[General  Orders,  No.  11.] 

Headquarters  Army  of  Virginia, 
Washington,  July  23,  1862. 
Commanders  of  army  corps,  divisions,  brigades,  and  detached  com- 
mands will  proceed  immediately  to  arrest  all  disloyal  male  citizens 
within  their  lines,  or  within  their  reach,  in  rear  of  their  respective  sta- 
tions. Such  as  are  willing  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United 
States,  and  will  furnish  sufficient  security  for  its  observance,  shall  be 
permitted  to  remain  at  their  homes,  and  pursue  in  good  faith  their  ac- 


APPENDIX  A. 


177 


customed  avocations.  Those  who  refuse  shall  be  conducted  south, 
beyond  the  extreme  pickets  of  this  army,  and  be  notified  that  if  found 
again  anywhere  within  our  lines,  or  at  any  point  in  rear,  they  will  be 
considered  spies  and  subjected  to  the  extreme  rigor  of  military  law.  If 
any  person  having  taken  the  oath  of  allegiance  as  above  specified,  be 
found  to  have  violated  it,  he  shall  be  shot,  and  his  property  seized  and 
applied  to  the  public  use.  All  communication  with  any  persons  what- 
I  ever  living  within  the  lines  of  the  enemy,  is  positively  prohibited  except 
through  the  military  authorities,  and  in  the  manner  specified  by  mili- 
tary law;  and  any  person  concerned  in  writing  or  in  carrying  letters  or 
messages  in  any  other  way,  will  be  considered  and  treated  as  a  spy 
within  the  lines  of  the  United  States  army. 
By  command  of  Major-General  Pope. 

GEO.  D.  RUGGLES, 
Colonel^  Assistant  Adjutant-General  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

8* 


/ 


APPENDIX  B. 


POETEE'S  NIGHT  MAECH. 

An  illustration  of  the  good  judgment  displayed  by  Gen- 
eral Porter  in  yielding  to  the  remonstrances  of  his  division 
commanders  as  regards  the  hour  of  starting  is  furnished  by 
the  experience,  on  this  very  night,  of  General  Eicketts,  who 
undertook  to  march  his  division  at  2  a.m.  over  a  "  fine  turn- 
pike road."  His  march  was  encumbered  by  some  two  hun- 
dred wagons  belonging  to  the  corps  of  General  Sigel.  "We 
quote  from  General  McDowell's  Statement,  made  before  his 
Court  of  Inquiry,  the  whole  passage  relating  to  this  march, 
for  it  is  very  pertinent  and  interesting.  The  italics,  except 
the  very  last  one,  are  ours  : 

"I  provided  for  the  contingency  of  an  attack  from  Long- 
street,  from  the  direction  of  Thoroughfare  Gap,  which  the 
information  I  received  left  no  doubt  would  be  made  if  we 
did  not  get  forward  most  expeditiously  and  at  the  earliest 
moment.  To  make  sure  of  this  I  ordered  the  troops  to  march 
at  2  A.M. ;  General  Sigel's  rear  division  had  been  ordered,  in 
my  preliminary  order  of  11.30  p.m.  of  the  27th,  to  march 
upon  Gainesville  immediately,  and  should  have  been  in  mo- 
tion before  the  others.  The  orders  I  gave  General  Slgel  at 
"Warrenton,  to  march  on  the  turnpike  from  that  place  (see 
January  7th),  directed  him  as  follows  :  *  No  wagons  but  for 
ammunition  will  accompany  your  corps  on  this  road.  Your 


APPENDIX  B. 


179 


baggage  trains  will  immediately  proceed  to  Catlett's.*  Not- 
withstanding this,  which  was  also  given  to  my  own  command, 
and  enforced  in  it  (I  had  myself  nothing  but  my  horse),  Gen- 
eral Sigel  had  with  his  corps  nearly  two  hundred  wagons, 
wMcJi  Tcept  blocking  up  the  road  and  retarding  the  movement ; 
and  notwithstanding  I  had  seen  him  on  the  morning  of  the 
28th,  before  he  left,  and  had  urged  on  him  personally  to 
march  immediately  and  rapidly,  and  had  shown  him  General 
Pope's  orders  to  me  requiring  this  to  be  done,  yet  his  advance 
was  so  slow  that  the  note  written  to  me  by  Captain  Leski 
at  Thoroughfare  Gap,  at  10.15  a  m.,  and  received  by  me  near 
Gainesville,  and  then  sent  to  General  Eicketts,  reached  him 
just  this  side  of  Buckland  Mills,  a  distance  of  about  three 
miles  from  his  bivouac  of  the  night  before.  His  division  had 
been  on  their  feet  since  2  a.m.,  over  nine  hours,  and  in  that  time 
had  not  gone  twice  the  lengtli  of  the  division  front  from  ivhere 
tliey  started.  For  an  account  of  the  efforts  made  to  get  the 
troops  forward  over  this  fine  turnpike  road,  which  General 
Sigel  states  had  no  obstructions  on  it,  see  evidence  of  Gen- 
eral Eicketts,  Colonel  Schriver,  Major  Barstow,  and  Captain 
Haven,  from  which  it  wall  be  seen  that  the  jDrovision  I  had 
made  for  Longstreet,  and  which  General  Pope  says  was  not 
in  compliance  with  his  orders,  and  could  only  be  justified  by 
the  danger  I  might  find  myself  in  from  an  attack  on  the  rear 
of  my  column,  was  owing  entirely  to  the  delays,  for  which, 
certainly,  I  was  not  responsible.  I  knew  well  the  difficulties 
in  moving  so  large  a  body  of  men,  artillery,  etc.,  over  the 
same  road,  under  the  most  favorable  circumstances,  and 
wished  therefore  it  might  be  unobstructed.  The  first  battle 
of  Bull  Eun  was  seriously  affected  by  a  small  baggage  train 
getting  into  the  column,  as  in  this  case,  contrary  to  orders. 
^Ye  had  great  delay  and  confusion,  on  account  of  baggage 
wagons,  at  Culpeper,  and  on  the  march  to  Warrenton. 


180 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


Hence  my  rigid  order  tliat  no  wagons  should  go  on  this 
road." 

Porter's  road,  it  must  be  remembered,  was  not  a  "  fine 
turnpike  road,"  but  a  narrow  country  road.  His  march 
was  encumbered  not  with  200  wagons,  but  with  f  2,000  to 
b,000  wagons. 

That  the  experience  of  General  Eicketts'  division  would 
have  been  the  experience  of  General  Porter's  corps,  had 
the  latter  officer  put  his  troops  in  motion  at  1  o'clock,  no 
unprejudiced  man  can  doubt.  In  face  of  these  facts  it  does 
seem  gratuitous  persecution  to  accuse  Porter,  Sykes,  Morell, 
and  Butterfield  %  of  disloyalty  or  half-heartedness  because, 
as  experienced  soldiers,  they,  on  this  night,  took  the  wisest 
course  they  could  have  taken. 

It  may  be  well  to  add  here,  w^hat,  it  is  true,  the  public  is 
supposed  to  know,  that  the  whole  subject  of  General  Por- 
ter's guilt  was  examined  most  patiently  and  carefully  by  a 
board  of  officers  convened  by  President  Hayes,  and  consist- 
ing of  Major-General  Schofield,  Brigadier-General  Terry,  and 
Colonel  Getty.  Their  conclusions  completely  exonerated 
Porter  from  the  charges  on  which  he  was  found  guilty  by 
the  court-martial.  It  is  difficult  to  see  any  good  reason  why 
this  decision  should  not  be  considered  as  final.  The  officers 
are  men  of  eminent  ability,  high  character,  and  entirely  free 
from  any  personal  relations  to  the  campaign  in  which  Gen- 
eral Porter  took  part. 

*  Heintzelman's  testimony,  C.  M.,  p.  80  ;  Monteith's  testimon}',  C.  M.,  p.  126. 
+  Myers'  testimony,  C.  M.,  p.  110. 

X  Thej  all  were  equally  guilty.  In  fact,  Porter  yielded  to  their  urgent  protests 
and  requests. 


APPENDIX  C. 


POETEE'S  OEDEES  AND  DESPATCHES  ON  THE 
29th— EXTEACTED  EEOM  POETEE'S  STATEMENT, 
Pp.  74-78. 

(No,  30.) 

General — Colonel  Marshall  reports  that  two  batteries  have  come 
down  in  the  woods  on  onr  right  toward  the  railroad,  and  two  regi- 
ments of  infantry  on  the  road.  If  this  be  so,  it  will  be  hot  here  in  the 
morning. 

GEORGE  W.  MORELL, 

IfaJ  07'- General. 

Endorsed  as  follows : 

Move  the  infantry  and  everything  behind  the  crest,  and  conceal  the 
guns.  We  must  hold  that  place  and  make  it  too  hot  for  them.  Come 
the  same  game  over  them  they  do  over  us,  and  get  your  men  out  of 
sight. 

F.  J.  PORTER. 


(No.  31.) 

General  Porter — I  can  move  everything  out  of  sight  except  Haz- 
litt's  battery.  Griffin  is  supporting  it,  and  is  on  its  right,  principally 
in  the  pine-bushes.  The  other  batteries  and  brigades  are  retired  out  of 
sight.    Is  that  what  you  mean  by  everything  ? 

GEORGE  W.  MORELL, 

Major-  General, 


182 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


Endorsed  asfoUovjs  : 

General  Morell — I  think  you  can  move  Hazlitt's,  or  the  most  of 
it,  and  post  him  in  the  bushes  with  the  others,  so  as  to  deceive.  I 
would  get  everything,  if  possible,  in  ambuscade.  All  goes  well  with 
the  other  troops. 

F.  J.  P. 


(No.  29.) 

Generals  McDowell  and  King — I  found  it  impossible  to  com- 
municate by  crossing  the  woods  to  Groveton.  The  enemy  are  in  force 
on  this  road,  and,  as  they  appear  to  have  driven  our  forces  back,  the 
fire  of  the  enemy  having  advanced  and  ours  retired,  I  have  deter- 
mined to  withdraw  to  Manassas.  I  have  attempted  to  communicate 
with  McDowell  and  Sigel,  but  my  messages  have  run  into  the  enemy. 
Thej  have  gathered  artillery  and  cavalry,  and  infantry,  and  the  advan- 
cing masses  of  dust  show  the  enemy  coming  in  force.  I  am  now  going 
to  the  head  of  the  column  to  see  what  is  passing  and  how  affairs  are 
going,  and  T  will  communicate  with  you.  Had  you  not  better  send  your 
train  back  ? 

F.  J.  PORTER, 

Major- General. 

General  Heintzelman's  diary  recites  the  substance  of  this 
despatch  and  shows  it  was  received  by  General  Pope  at  forty- 
five  minntes  past  five. 

The  following  despatch  is  but  a  duplicate  of  the  forego- 
ing. The  duplicate  was  sent  by  another  messenger,  so  that, 
in  case  the  one  should  not  reach  its  destination,  the  other 
would  do  so. 

(New.) 

Produced  by  General  McDowell.    Board  Record,  p.  810. 
(29a.) 

General  McDowell — The  firing  on  my  right  has  so  far  retired 
that,  as  I  cannot  advance,  and  have  failed  to  get  over  to  you,  except  by 
the  route  taken  by  King,  I  shall  withdraw  to  Manassas.    If  you  have 


APPENDIX  C. 


183 


anything  to  communicate,  please  do  so.  I  have  sent  many  messages  to 
you  and  General  Sigel,  and  get  nothing. 

F.  J.  PORTER, 

Major-  General. 

An  artillery  duel  is  going  on  now — been  skirmishing  for  a  long  time. 

F.  J.  P. 

In  pursuance  of  the  purpose  expressed  in  these  despatches, 
I  sent  to  Morell  the  following  order  : 

(No.  28.) 

August  29,  1863. 
General  Morell — Push  over  to  the  aid  of  Sigel  and  strike  in  his 
rear.  If  you  reach  a  road  up  which  King  is  moving,  and  he  has  got 
ahead  of  you,  let  him  pass ;  but  see  if  you  cannot  give  help  to  Sigel. 
If  you  find  him  retiring,  move  back  toward  Manassas,  and,  should  ne- 
cessity require  it,  and  you  do  not  hear  from  me,  push  to  Centreville. 
If  you  find  the  direct  road  filled,  take  the  one  via  Union  Mills,  which 
is  to  the  right  as  you  return. 

F.  J.  PORTER, 

Major-  General. 

Look  to  the  points  of  the  compass  for  Manassas. 

But  soon,  finding  he  was  mistaken  as  to  the  main  army 
retiring,  and  before  anything  was  done  by  Morell  in  execu- 
tion of  it,  I  sent  him  the  following : 

(No.  33.) 

General  Morell — Hold  on,  if  you  can,  to  your  present  place. 
What  is  passing  V 

F.  J.  PORTER. 


(No.  32.) 

General  Morell  : — Tell  me  what  is  passing  quickly.  If  the  ene- 
my is  coming,  hold  to  him,  and  I  will  come  up.  Post  your  men  to  re- 
pulse him. 

F.  J.  PORTER, 

Major-  General. 


184 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


(No.  34.) 

General  Morell — The  enemy  must  be  in  a  much  larger  force  than 
I  can  see— from  the  commands  of  the  officers,  I  should  judge  a  brigade. 
They  are  endeavoring  to  come  in  on  our  left,  and  have  been  advancing. 
Have  also  heard  the  noise  on  left,  as  the  movement  of  artillery.  Their 
advance  is  quite  close. 

E.  G.  MARSHALL, 

Colonel  Thirteenth  New  York, 


(No.  35.) 

General  Porter— Colonel  Marshall  reports  a  movement  in  front  of 
his  left.  I  think  we  had  better  retire.  No  infantry  in  sight,  and  I  am 
continuing  the  movement.    Stay  where  you  are  to  aid  me,  if  necessary. 

MORELL. 


(No.  36.) 

General  Morell — I  have  all  within  reach  of  you.  I  wish  you  to 
give  the  enemy  a  good  shelling  without  wasting  ammunition,  and  push 
at  the  same  time  a  party  over  to  see  what  is  going  on.  We  cannot  re- 
tire while  McDowell  holds  his  own. 

F.  J.  P. 

Next  follows  in  order  the  despatcli  from  General  Warren, 
who  had  read  the  above  to  General  Sykes  : 

(No.  36a.) 

5h.  45m.  P.M.,  August  29,  1862. 
General  Sykes — I  received  an  order  from  Mr.  Cutting  to  ad- 
vance and  support  Morell.  I  faced  about  and  did  so.  I  soon  met 
Griffiu's  brigade  withdrawing,  by  order  of  General  Morell,  who  w^as  not 
pushed  out,  but  returning.  I  faced  about  and  marched  back  two  hun- 
dred yards  or  so.  I  met  then  an  orderly  from  General  Porter  to  Gen- 
eral Morell,  saying  he  must  push  on  and  press  the  enemy,  that  all  was 
going  well  for  us,  and  he  was  returning.  Griffin  then  faced  about,  and 
I  am  following  him  to  support  General  Morell,  as  ordered.  None  of  the 
batteries  are  closed  up  to  me. 

Respectfully, 

G.  K.  WARREN. 


APPE^^DIX  C. 


185 


This  despatch  nndoubtedly  refers  to  one  of  the  despatches 
last  to  General  Morell.  The  date,  5.45  p.m.,  shows  about  the 
hour  at  which  those  despatches  were  received  and  sent  back. 

(No.  37.) 

August  29th. 

General  Morell — I  wish  you  to  push  up  two  regiments,  supported 
by  two  others,  preceded  by  skirmishers,  the  regiments  at  intervals  of 
two  hundred  yards,  and  attack  the  section  of  artillery  opposed  to  you. 
The  battle  works  well  on  our  right,  and  the  enemy  are  said  to  be  retir- 
ing up  the  pike.    Give  the  enemy  a  good  shelling  as  our  troops  advance. 

F.  J.  PORTER, 
Major-  General  Commanding, 

(No.  38.) 

General  Morell — Put  your  men  in  position  to  remain  during  the 
night,  and  have  out  your  pickets.  Put  them  so  that  they  will  be  in  po- 
sition to  resist  anything.  I  am  about  a  mile  from  you.  McDowell  says 
all  goes  well  and  we  are  getting  the  best  of  the  fight.  I  wish  you  would 
send  me  a  dozen  men  from  the  cavalry.  Keep  me  informed.  Troops 
are  passing  up  to  Gainesville,  pushing  the  enemy ;  Ricketts  has  gone, 
also  King. 

F.  J.  PORTER, 

Major-  General, 

After  the  time  of  these  occurrences,  I  sent  the  following : 

(No.  38a.) 

Newly  produced  by  McDowell,  p.  810. 

General  McDowell  or  King — I  have  been  wandering  over  the 
woods,  and  failed  to  get  a  communication  to  you.  Tell  how  matters  go 
with  you.  The  enemy  is  in  strong  force  in  front  of  me,  and  I  wish  to 
know  your  designs  for  to-night.  If  left  to  me,  I  shall  have  to  retire  for 
food  and  water,  which  I  cannot  get  here.  How  goes  the  battle  ?  It 
seems  to  go  to  our  rear.    The  enemy  are  getting  to  our  left. 

F.  J.  PORTER, 
Major-  General  Volunteers. 


186 


THE  ARMY  U^DER  POPE. 


(No.  38b.) 

Newly  produced  by  McDowell,  p.  810. 

General  McDowell — Failed  in  getting  Morell  over  to  you.  Af- 
ter wandering  about  the  woods  for  a  time  I  withdrew  him,  and,  while 
doing  so,  artillery  opened  upon  us.  My  scouts  could  not  get  through. 
Each  one  found  the  enemy  between  us,  and  I  believe  some  have  been 
captured.  Infantry  are  also  in  front.  I  am  trying  to  get  a  battery,  but 
have  not  succeeded  as  yet.  From  the  masses  of  dust  on  our  left,  and 
from  reports  of  scouts,  think  the  enemy  are  moving  largely  in  that 
way.  Please  communicate  the  way  this  messenger  came.  I  have  no 
cavalry  or  messengers  now.  Please  let  me  know  your  designs — whether 
you  retire  or  not.  I  cannot  get  water  and  am  out  of  provisions.  Have 
lost  a  few  men  from  infantry  firing. 

F.  J.  PORTER, 
Major- General  Volunteers. 

August  29th,  6  p.m. 

Tlie  two  despatches  last  sent  out  are  evidently  duplicates 
of  each  other.  They  were  sent  by  different  messengers,  and 
jDrobably  by  different  routes,  so  as  to  secure  that  one  of  them 
should  reach  the  intended  destination.  It  is  quite  evident 
that  they  intended  to  describe,  in  short,  the  movement  of 
Morell  over  to  the  right,  the  inability  to  communicate  the 
moving  of  the  enemy  on  his  right,  and  to  ask  for  such  infor- 
mation as  would  enable  me  to  determine  what  I  should  do 
for  the  night,  which  was  then  approaching.  It  is  a  mistake 
to  suppose  that  these  despatches  intended  to  describe  events 
occurring  immediately  before  their  date  (6  p.m.).  They  run 
hurriedly  over  the  events  of  the  afternoon,  so  as  to  give  an 
idea  of  the  situation  at  that  time. 

These  desxDatches  contain  intrinsic  evidence  that  they  were 
written  before  I  had  received  the  4.30  order.  The  language 
found  in  them  could  not  have  been  used  by  me  if  I  had 
already  received  the  order  to  attack,  as  contained  in  the  4.30 
order.    In  fact,  the  following  despatch  shows  that  at  that 


APPENDIX  C. 


187 


hour  (Eicketts  not  having  passed  at  sunset)  I  did  not  know 
General  Pope  was  at  Groveton. 

(No.  38c.) 

Newly  discovered  (Board  Record,  p.  304). 
Genekal  Morell — Send  down  some  energetic  men  to  General  Pope 
at  Centreville.    Get  hold  of  Colonel  Beckwith  and  get  some  rations. 
Bring  beef  up  to  kill ;  we  have  nothing  else  ;  and  get  enough  to  last 
two  or  three  days. 

F.  J.  PORTER, 

Major-  General. 

Ricketts  has  gone  up,  also  King. 

After  this,  and  certainly  after  sunset,  I  received  the  follow- 
ing order ; 

(No.  39.) 

Headquarters  in  the  Field. 
August  29,  1863,  4.30  p.m. 
Major-General  Porter — Your  line  of  march  brings  you  in  on 
the  enemy's  right  flank.    I  desire  you  to  push  forward  into  action  at 
once  on  the  enemy's  flank,  and,  if  possible,  on  his  rear,  keeping  your 
right  in  communication  with  General  Reynolds. 

The  enemy  is  massed  in  the  woods  in  front  of  us,  but  can  be  shelled 
out  as  soon  as  you  engage  their  flank.  Keep  heavy  reserves  and  use 
your  batteries,  keeping  well  closed  to  your  right  all  the  time.  In  case 
you  are  obliged  to  fall  back,  do  so  to  your  right  and  rear,  so  as  to  keep 
you  in  close  communication  with  the  right  wing. 

JOHN  POPE, 
Major-General  Commanding. 

Immediatelv  on  receipt  of  the  above  order  I  sent  Colonel 
Locke  with  verbal  orders  to  General  Morell  to  attack  with 
his  whole  force,  and  after  acknowledging  the  receipt  of  the 
order,  went  myself  to  Morell,  and  then  the  events  occurred 
which  are  described  by  General  Morell  in  his  evidence  and 
in  the  evidence  of  Colonel  Locke  : 


188 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


(No,  40.) 

Headquarters,  Army  of  Virginia, 
In  the  Field  Near  Bull  Run, 
August  29,  1863,  8.50  p.m. 
General — Immediately  upon  receipt  of  this  order,  the  precise  hour 
of  receiving  which  you  will  acknowledge,  you  will  march  your  command 
to  the  field  of  battle  of  to-day,  and  report  to  me  in  person  for  orders. 
You  are  to  understand  that  you  are  expected  to  comply  strictly  with 
this  order,  and  to  be  present  on  the  field  within  three  hours  after  its 
reception,  or  after  daybreak  to-morrow  morning. 

JOHN  POPE, 
Major-  General  Commanding. 

Major-General  F.  J.  Porter, 

Received  3.30  a.m.,  August  30th. 

Thongli  the  above  order  from  General  Pope  was  de- 
spatched from  and  delivered  at  the  same  points  as  the  4.30 
order,  only  five  miles  a^Dart,  six  hours  and  a  half  were  occu- 
pied in  the  delivery. 

(No.  41.) 

General  Morell — Lose  not  a  moment  in  withdrawing  aild  coming 
down  the  road  to  me.  The  wagons  which  went  up  send  down  at  once 
and  have  the  road  cleared,  and  send  me  word  when  you  have  aU  in 
motion.    Your  command  must  follow  Sykes'. 

F.  J.  PORTER, 
Major-  General  Commanding, 

The  following  despatch  (B.  E.,  p.  717),  written 'at  the  same 
time  as  No.  41,  came  to  light  for  the  first  time  in  the  evi- 
dence of  General  Sturgis.  If  it  had  been  brought  forward 
before  the  court-martial  in  1862,  it  certainly  would  have  re- 
lieved me  of  all  suspicion,  and  of  the  charge  that  knowingly 
I  permitted  Piatt's  brigade  and  Griffin's  to  wander  to  Gen- 
treville,  and  would  have  tended  to  destroy  the  impression  of 
an  evil  animus  on  my  part. 


APPENDIX  C. 


189 


(Xo.  ila.) 

Gen.  Sturgis — Please  put  your  command  in  motion  to  follow 
Sykes  as  soon  as  he  starts.  If  you  know  of  any  other  troops  who  are 
to  join  me,  I  wish  you  to  send  them  notice  to  follow  you. 

We  march  as  soon  as  we  can  see. 

F.  J.  PORTER, 

Afajor-  General. 


APPENDIX  D. 


THE  LOSSES  IN  BATTLE. 

It  is  not  claimed  that  the  Federal  Army  lost  either  guns  or 
prisoners  at  the  battles  of  Gainesville  and  Groveton,  on  the 
28th  and  29th.  The  one  gnn  which  was  taken  on  the  even- 
ing of  the  29 th,  was  left  on  the  ground.^  Xor  did  we  sus- 
tain any  loss  of  this  kind  at  Chantilly.  The  only  loss  in 
guns  and  prisoners  suffered  on  the  iDlains  of  3Ianassas  wari 
suffered  in  the  battle  of  Saturday,  xiugust  30th. 

General  Pope  gives  us  no  information  on  this  subject. 

General  Longstreet  f  claims  to  have  caiDtured  three  bat- 
teries, and  General  Jackson  t  claims  eight  guns — in  all, 
twenty-six  guns. 

We  are,  therefore,  at  a  loss  to  see  what  authority  General 
Lee  §  has  for  claiming  30  guns.  He  is  sj^eaking,  x)i'obably,  in 
round  numbers,  as  he  unquestionably  is  when  he  claims  to 
have  captured  20,000  small  arms,  when  those  claimed  by 
Longstreet,  12,000,  and  by  Jackson,  6,520,  together  amount 
to  only  18,520. 

It  is  harder  to  account  for  the  large  number  of  iDrisoners 
which  General  Lee  claims !|  to  have  captured.     He  says: 

More  than  seven  thousand  prisoners  were  taken,  in  , addi- 
tion to  about  2,000  wounded  lefb  in  our  hands."  General 


*  A.  N.  v.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  82,  Longstreet's  Report, 
i  Ibid.,  p.  Ii7.  §  A.  N.  v.,  vol.  i.,  p.  2G. 


tlbid.,  p.  S3. 
I  Ibid. 


APPENDIX  D, 


191 


Longstreet  says,"^  "  a  large  number  of  prisoners"  were  taken. 
Seven  thousand  is  a  large  number,  doubtless ;  but  it  is  so 
large  a  number  that  Longstreet  would  have  been  sure  to 
have  given  some  sort  of  a  round  estimate  of  his  success  in 
this  regard.  Jackson  says  nothing  about  prisoners.  We  are 
very  decidedly  disjjosed  to  question  this  claim  to  the  capture 
of  any  such  number  of  unwounded  prisoners.  The  2,000 
wounded  were  doubtless  taken. 

In  regard  to  the  losses  in  killed  and  wounded,  the  reports 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  give  us  more  information 
than  we  can  procure  on  the  Federal  side.  The  official  list  of 
casualties  at  Manassas  Plains,  in  August,  1862,  gives  as  the 
killed  and  wounded  of  Jackson's  command,  3,743  men ; 
Longstreet's  command,  3,498  men ;  total  in  the  whole  army, 
7,241  men.    These  numbers  are  certainly  small. 

However,  General  Jackson  in  his  official  report  says  f  that 
his  total  loss  from  the  EaiDpaliannock  to  the  Potomac  was 
4,387,  which  is  an  increase  on  the  figure  given  above  of  644, 
or  nearly  one-sixth.  Doubtless,  the  report  was  made  up 
subsequently,  after  all  the  returns  had  come  in.  We  are  at 
liberty,  it  seems,  to  distribute  this  loss  of  4,387  between 
the  four  days  of  fighting,  28th,  29th,  30th  August,  and  1st 
of  September.  We  should  suppose  that  more  than  one-half 
of  this  number  were  killed  and  wounded  on  the  29th  of 
August. 

If  we  should,  by  analogy,  add  one-sixth  to  the  loss  of  Long- 
street's  command,  given  above,  we  arrive  at  a  total  of  4,081, 
nearly  all  of  which  was  suffered  on  the  30th. 

General  Pope,t  it  will  be  remembered,  estimated  his  own 
loss  at  6,000  or  8,000  killed  and  wounded  on  the  29th. 
These  figures  are  evidently  too  large.    If  the  Confederate 


*  A.  N.  v.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  83.  t  Ibid.,  p.  98. 

t  P.  R.,  p.  155.    Pope  to  Halleck,  C.  W.,  vol.  i.,  p.  4(56. 


192 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


estimate  of  casualties  giren  above  is  to  be  accepted  as  ex- 
haustive, General  Pope's  loss  conld  hardly  have  exceeded 
four  thousand  or  four  thousand  five  hundred  on  the  29th. 
On  the  30th  he  doubtless  lost  as  heavilv,  or,  perhaps,  more 
so.  But.  in  the  al'St-nee  of  returns,  one  can  only  conjectm-e, 
'svhich  is  hardly  worth  while. 


APPENDIX  E. 


THE  NUMBEES  OF  THE  TWO  AEIVOES. 
1 .  The  Army  of  Virginia. 

General  Pope  says  that*  when  he  was  appointed  to  the 
command,  on  June  26,  1862,  the  effective  strength  of  infantry 
and  artillery,  as  reported  to  him,  was  as  follows : 


Fremont's  corps   11,500 

Banks'  corps,  reported  at  14,500,  but  in  reality  only 

about   8,000 

McDowell's  corps   18.500 


Total,  infantry  and  artillery   38,000 

Cavalry  about   5,000 

Total  of  the  three  arms  43,000 


In  our  estimate  we  accept  the  size  of  Banks'  corps  as  re- 
ported by  himself,  because  it  is  quite  clear  (as  we  have  re- 
marked in  the  text)  that  General  Pope  bases  his'  figures  en- 
tirely on  the  numbers  which  Banks  took  into  the  battle  of 
Cedar  Mountain,  which,  as  General  Pope  justly  says,f  did 
not  exceed  8,000  men.  But  on  that  day  the  corps  was 
greatly  weakened  by  detachments.  "  Of  Greene's  brigade 
of  Augur's  division,  less  than  five  hundred  men  were  pres- 


*  r.  R  ,  p.  109. 
9— IV. 


tib.,  p.  117. 


194 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


ent.  One  regiment  was  at  Sulphur  Springs,  one  at  Eappa- 
liannock  Station,  one  with  the  trains  of  the  army,  and  five 
companies  were  on  the  Alexandria  Railroad. 

"  From  Geary's  brigade  of  the  same  division,  a  detachment 
of  about  one  thousand  men  had  been  sent  to  Pony  Mountain, 
while  a  force  of  about  three  thousand  five  hundred  infantry 
and  artillery  was  detached  to  Front  Eoyal.  If  to  these  de- 
tachments are  added  the  extra  and  daily  duty  men,  and  the 
sick  between  July  31st "  (the  day  on  which  Banks  re^Dorted 
his  corps  as  numbering  14,567  men)  **and  August  9th,  it 
appears  that  the  discrepancy  that  so  puzzled  Pope  is  ac- 
counted for,  and  that  Banks'  report  was  substantially  cor- 
rect." ^  We  therefore  have  felt  ourselves  justified  in  adding 
6,500  to  General  Pope's  estimate,  and  in  putting  the  strength 
of  the  three  corps  of  Sigel,  Banks,  and  McDowell,  including 


the  cavalry,  about  July  1st,  at   49,500  men. 

Our  loss  at  Cedar  Mountain  was  about   2,500 

This  reduces  the  army  to   47,000 

On  August  14th,  Reno  f  joined  the  army  with 

about   8,000  " 

And  before  the  25th,  Reynolds  I  also  with  about  2,500  " 

And  Kearny  t   4,500 

Heintzelman's  corps  consisted.  Pope  says,  |  of 
10,000  strong,  which  would  make  Hooker's 

division  consist  of   5,500  " 

67,500  " 

General  Pope  gives  us  no  estimate  of  the 
strength  of  Porter's  corps ;  we  have  esti- 
mated it  on  the  authority  of  the  Board  of 

Officers  (Eeport,  p.  1815)  at   9,000  " 


*  From  a  paper  read  before  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts, 
by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Charles  P.  Horton. 
t  P.  R.,  p.  122.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  124.  §  Ibid.,  p.  139. 


APPENDIX  E. 


195 


And  Piatt  testified  (B.  O.,  p.  1047)  that  he  had 

in  his  brigade  about   1,000  men. 

Grand  Total   77,500  « 

From  this  number  we  must  deduct  the  losses  by  death, 
wounds,  and  sickness,  prior  to  the  battles  of  the  28th,  29th, 
and  30th,  which  General  Pope  estimates  *  as  follows : 

Bigel's  corps,  originally  11,500 

"     on  27th  9,000 

Loss    2,500 

Banks'  corps,  originally,  according 

to  Pope   8,000 

Banks'  corps  on  27th   5,000 

8,000 

Already  deducted  by  ns   2,500 

Loss  now  to  be  deducted. . .   500 

McDowell's  corps,  originally  18,400 

Reynolds'  division   2,500  30,900 

Same  troops  on  27th   15,500 

Loss     5,400 

Reno's  twc  divisions,  originally   8,000 

on  27th   7^000 

Loss    1,000 

Heintzelman's  corps,  originally  10,000 

Porter  and  Piatt,  originally  10,C00  20,000 

Same  troops  on  27th   18,000 

Loss    2,000 

Cavalry,  originally   5,000 

on  27th   500 

Loss    4,500 

Total  loss    15, 900  men. 

Which  leaves  an  available  force  of  only   61,600  men. 

From  which  must  be  deducted,  if  General  Pope's  estimate 

of  Banks'  corps  is  to  be  accepted,  a  further  number  of    6,500  men. 

Leaving   55, 1 00  men. 

And  a  farther  deduction  in  respect  to  McDowell's  corps  of       100  men. 

Leaving,  as  Pope  claims,  only   55,000  men. 


*  P.  R.,  p.  142. 


196 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


We  have  no  means  of  verifying  these  estimates.  The  losses 
in  McDowell's  command  strike  us  as  unaccountably  large. 

It  must  be  confessed  that  the  withdrawal  from  the  Penin- 
sula had  affected  the  strength  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
to  an  extraordinary  degree. 

The  strength  of  the  Second  Corps,  under  General  Sumner, 
as  shown  by  the  morning  report  ^  of  July  20,  1862,  exclusive 
of  those  on  special  duty,  sick,  in  arrest,  and  absent,  was 
16,952.  But  Sumner  himself  testified  f  that  at  the  time  of 
the  second  battle  of  Bull  Eun,  he  had,  as  he  supposed,  only 
about  ten  thousand  men  in  his  corps.  This,  if  true,  shows 
a  falling  off  of  41  per  cent.  But  General  McOlellan,  more 
con'ectly,  doubtless,  speaks  of  his  corps  as  numbering  14,000 
men  without  cavalry  or  artillery,  which  would  show  no  ap- 
preciable loss. 

The  third  corps  under  General  Heintzelman  numbered  on 
July  20,  16,276  men.  Yet  Pope  J  calls  his  corps  only  10,003 
strong,  and  Gordon,  in  his  "  Army  of  Virginia,"  §  calls  it  only 
10,500  strong. 

In  like  manner  the  Pifth  Corps  under  General  Porter  was 
stated  as  numbering  21,077  on  July  20th;  ||  yet  we  have  found 
the  troops  actually  under  that  officer  not  to  have  exceeded 
9,000  men. 

We  cannot  fully  account  for  these  discrepancies.  We  can 
only  suggest  that  there  were  portions  of  these  commands 
no  doubt  left  behind  for  the  time  being,  to  be  transported 
subsequently  to  the  main  body  of  their  comrades ;  that  other 
portions  may  have  been  landed  at  places  from  which  they 
could  not  during  the  campaign  rejoin  their  respective  corps, 
and  so  on.  In  every  removal,  a  great  deal  is  ud avoidably  lost. 
We  find  that  these  corps  became  stronger  in  a  few  days  after 

*  C.  W.,  vol.  i.,  p.  344.     t  lb.,  p.  367.     t  P.  E,-,  P-  I'^^O.     §  Gordon,  p.  484. 
II  This  number,  however,  included  Keynolds'  division,  Hunt's  Reserve  Artillery, 
Tylers  Connecticut  Artillery,  etc. 


APPENDIX  E. 


197 


landing  at  Alexandria.  Thus  Porter's  corps,  wHen  it  went  to 
Antietam,  numbered  12,930  men.^ 

Our  conclusion  is  that  General  Pope  had  on  August  27th 
a  force  of  at  least  65,000  men. 

Colonel  Walter  H.  Taylor,  in  his  "Four  Years  with  General 
Lee,"  discusses  the  numbers  of  the  two  armies  in  this  cam- 
j)aign. 

He  saysf  that  the  strength  of  Jackson's  and  Swell's  di- 
visions before  the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain  could  not  have 
exceeded  8,000  men,  and  that  A.  P.  Hill's  strength  was  10,- 
623,  making  Jackson's  entire  force  that  day  18,623. 

Mr.  Thomas  White,  however,  who  was  chief  clerk  in  the 
office  of  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia, increases  J  this  estimate  to  21,500  men. 

Colonel  William  Allan,  late  Chief  of  Ordnance  of  Jack- 
son's corps,  the  author  of  a  valuable  work  on  Jackson's  Val- 
ley Campaign,  and  also,  in  conjunction  with  Colonel  Hotch- 
kiss,  of  a  very  important  work  on  the  Campaign  of  Chan- 
cellor sville,  puts  Jackson's  entire  force  at  23,823,  of  whom 
the  brigades  of  Lawton  and  Gregg,  consisting  of  about  3,800 
men,  were  not  on  the  ground.  |  His  study  of  the  numbers 
on  both  sides  in  this  action,  is  very  thorough  ;  and  his  esti- 
mate that  the  strength  of  Jackson's  command  at  Cedar 
Mountain  was  about  20,000  men  is  entitled  to  great  weight. 

He  finds  that  the  cavalry  of  Bayard  was  not  included  in 
the  estimate  of  8,000,  in  which  we  think  he  is  in  error.  Gor- 
don, in  his  "  Second  Massachusetts  and  Stonewall  Jackson," 
page  168,  gives  Banks'  infantry  and  artillery  at  6,289,  with 
1,000  or  1,200  cavalry  in  addition.  If  Colonel  Allan's  figures 
are  to  be  accepted,  the  Federal  forces  numbered  about 

*McClellan^sBep.,  p.  398. 

t  Taylor's  Four  Years,  p.  60.  $  lb.,  p.  157. 

§  Soiitlieru  Historical  Society  Papers,  vol.  viii.,  p.  181. 


198 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


9,200,  and  their  opponents  20,000  ;  if  Gor clones  figures  are  to 
be  taken,  our  available  army  did  not  exceed  7,500  men. 

Of  the  23,823  men  constituting,  according  to  Colonel  Al- 
lan, Jackson's  command  at  Cedar  Mountain,  he  lost  about 
1,323,  reducing  his  force  to  22,500  men. 

The  force  which  General  Lee  brought  up  with  him  from 
Richmond  consisted  of  what  had  been  known  as  Longstreet's 
division,  composed  of  the  brigades  of  Kemper,  Jenkins, 
Pickett  (or  Grarnett),^  Wilcox,   Pry  or,  and  Featherston,t 


numbering  in  all   8,486  men. 

The  division  of  I>,  R.  Jones,  composed  of  the 
brigades  of  Toombs  and  G.  T.  Anderson 
(D.  R.  Jones),  numbering   3,713  " 

To  which  the  brigade  of  Draylon  was  attached 

before  the  battles,  numbering  about   1,725  " 

The  division  of  Hood,  comprising  the  brigades 

of  Whiting  and  Hood   3,852 

To  which  Evans'  brigade  was  attached  before 

the  battles,  numbering  about  „   2,875  " 

The  division  of  R.  H.  Anderson,  consisting  of 
the  brigades  of  Mahone,  Wright,  and  Armi- 
stead     6,117  " 

The  cavalry  of  Fitz  Hugh  Lee   2,500  " 

Artniery  . . . .   2,500  " 

Total  brought  up  by  General  Lee  . ,   31,768 

Add  Jackson's  force  as  above  given   22,500  " 

Grand- total    54,268 


*  These  three  brigades  were  known  as  Kemper^s  division, 
t  These  were  known  as  Wilcox's  division. 


APPENDIX  E. 


199 


This  Colonel  Allan  believes  "to  be  an  outside  estimate  of 
the  Confederate  strength." 

This  exceeds  Colonel  Taylor's  estimate  by  5,191  men.  He 
gives  only  49,077  men. 

Mr.  White  gives  only  47,000  men. 

It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  General  Pope's  army  out- 
numbered that  of  his  antagonist,  on  August  30th,  by  about 
10,000  men.  It  may  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  state  our 
conviction  that,  had  General  Pope  supposed  that  he  was  to 
fight  General  Lee's  whole  army  that  day,  he  would  have 
made  such  dispositions  as  would  have  secured  him  against 
defeat.  The  gallantry  and  obstinacy  of  our  troops  was  most 
marked  in  this  campaign  ;  there  was  not  the  least  reason  to 
fear  the  event  of  any  fight  where  we  were  not  placed,  as  we* 
were  on  the  30th,  at  a  great  disadvantage.  On  that  day 
almost  the  entire  army  was  thrown  forward  in  a  supposed 
pursuit  of  the  enemy ;  our  line  of  retreat  was  left  exposed 
to  the  attpck  of  Longstreet's  whole  command,  and  was  de- 
fended only  by  such  movements  of  our  troops  as  could  be 
hastily  improvised. 


APPENDIX  F. 


TIME  OF  THE  AEEIVAL  OF  KEMPEE'S  DF^ISION. 

Besides  the  supposition  given  in  the  text,  that  it  was 
D.  E.  Jones'  division  which  was  sent  to  the  Manassas  Gap 
Eiilroad  on  Stuart's  application,  early  in  the  forenoon,  there 
is  another  supposition  which  is  also  tenable,  and  may  be  the 
true  one. 

In  the  Southern  Historical  Society  Papers,  vol.  viii.,  page 
538,  is  the  report  of  Colonel  M.  D.  Corse,  who  commanded 
Kemper's  brigade  in  this  campaign.  The  report  is  dated 
September,  1862,  and  is  made  to  General  J.  L.  Kemper, 
who  commanded  Kemper's  division,  which  consisted  of 
three  brigades,  Kemper's,  Pickett's  (formerly  Garnett's), 
commanded  by  Colonel  Hunton,  and  Jenkins'.  Colonel 
Corse  says : 

On  the  morning  of  the  29th  this  brigade  marched,  with 
the  others  of  your  command,  from  its  bivouac  near  Thorough- 
fare Gap,  and  halted  about  three  miles  east  of  Gainesville, 
about  12  o'clock.  "We  were  at  once  placed  in  line  of  battle, 
in  rear  of  Jenkins'  brigade,  near  the  Manassas  Gap  Eailroad. 
After  remaining  in  this  position  for  a  short  time  the  brigade 
moved  forward  east  of  the  railroad.  The  Twenty-fourth 
Virginia  was  here  detached  and  sent  to  support  Eogers'  bat- 
tery, stationed  near  the  house.   The  rest  of  the  brigade, 

by  your  order,  was  then  moved  west  of  the  railroad,  forming 
line  of  battle  a  few  yards  from  the  outskirts  of  a  wood.  The 


APPENDIX  F. 


201 


Seventh  Virginia  went  forward  in  skirmishing  order  across  a 
field,  some  three  hundred  yards  to  the  front.  In  the  last 
movement  the  brigade  was  subjected  to  a  heavy  shelling 
from  a  battery  of  the  enemy,  distant  about  twelve  hundred 
yards.  Eemaining  in  this  position  for  half  an  hour,  I  re- 
ceived, through  your  Acting  Adjutant-General,  Captain  Fry, 
an  order  to  move  forward,  and  to  the  right ;  to  withdraw  the 
Seventh,  connect  it  with  my  line,  and  occupy  a  wood  in 
front,  distant  about  four  hundred  yards. 

"In  obeying  this  order  the  brigade  was  forced  to  move  in 
full  view  of  the  above-mentioned  battery,  which  kept  a  con- 
stant fire  upon  us.  Nothing  daunted,  however,  the  line 
moved  steadily  forward  and  took  the  position  designated. 
I  threw  out  Captain  Simpson's  company  (Seventeenth  Regi- 
ment) as  skirmishers  to  the  front  and  right.  In  a  short 
time  he  encountered  the  enemy's  skirmishers  on  our  right 
and  in  rear  of  our  line.  Not  being  aware  that  any  of  our 
troops  were  on  my  right,  and  seeing  the  enemy  a  few  mo- 
ments before  display  a  considerable  force  in  front,  which 
at  once  moved  to  the  right  under  cover  of  a  wood,  I  deemed 
it  prudent  to  fall  back  a  short  distance,  feeling  sure  that  the 
enemy  was  in  force  behind  his  skirmishers.  I  now  sent 
Major  Herbert  (Seventeenth  Eegiment)  to  ascertain  whether 
or  not  we  had  any  troops  on  my  right.  On  his  return,  he 
informed  me  *  there  were  none  immediately  on  our  right.' 
At  this  time  Major  Palmer  rode  up,  and  I  made  him  ac- 
quainted with  the  fact.  I  informed  him  of  our  situation, 
and  suggested  that  some  troops  should  be  placed  on  our  right. 
He  went  off,  and  in  a  short  time  General  Drayton  (with  his 
brigade)  reported  with  orders  to  relieve  me.  I  then  moved 
east  of  the  railroad,  and  connected  with  the  Twenty-fourth 

in  line  in  rear  of  the  house,  keeping  in  front  a  line  of 

9* 


2C2 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


pickets  until  the  morning  of  the  30th,  connecting  with  Gen- 
eral Drajton  on  the  right,  and  Colonel  Benning,  command- 
ing Toombs'  brigade,  on  the  left." 

It  is  a  pitj  that  we  have  not  the  report  of  General  Kemper 
hijnself.  But  it  is  plain  from  this  narrative  that  the  bri- 
gades of  D.  R.  Jones'  and  Kemper's  divisions  were  all  in  line 
together.  The  brigades  between  which  Corse  took  up  his 
final  position  belonged  to  D.  B.  Jones'  division.  It  would 
seem  as  if  Kemper's  brigade,  being  the  right  brigade  of  Kem- 
per's division,  was  moved  to  the  south  across  the  railroad 
in  the  direction  of  the  Vessel  House,  and  somewhat,  no  doubt, 
in  rear  of  the  front  line  of  D.  E.  Jones'  division,  being  sub- 
jected to  the  fire  of  Porter's  batteries  in  so  doing,  and  that 
Corse  then  threw  out  skirmishers  in  the  wood  that  lies  south 
of  the  railroad,  there  encountering  Porter's  skirmishers.  It 
appears  that  two  of  D.  B,  Jones'  brigades,  at  least,  were  in 
immediate  proximity  to  Kemper's  brigade  ;  and  there  is,  of 
course,  no  reason  to  doubt  that  the  two  divisions  of  Kemper 
and  Jones  were  supporting  each  other.  It  also  appears  dis- 
tinctly that  the  enemy's  movements  were  cautiously  made, 
and  that  they  fully  recognized  that  their  antagonists  were 
"  in  force  "  opposite  them.  It  would  seem  that  Kemper's  bri- 
gade was  marched  to  the  south  of  the  railroad,  and  in  face  of 
Porter's  skirmishers,  somewhere  about  one  o'clock.  Corse's 
movement  to  the  south  (or,  as  he  terms  it,  west)  of  the  rail- 
road was  recognized  ^  at  the  time  by  Colonel  E.  G.  Mar- 
shall, Thirteenth  New  York,  who  reported  to  General 
Morell  that  the  enemy  was  in  much  larger  force  than  he 
could  see — he  should  suppose  it  was  a  brigade — and  that 
they  were  endeavoring  to  come  in  on  his  left,  and  had  been 
advancing. 


*  Ante,  p.  184,  No.  34. 


APPENDIX  F. 


203 


The  two  divisions  of  Kemper  and  D.  K.  Jones  numbered 
about  10,000  men.    This  is  ascertained  as  follows  : 

Longstreet's  ^  division  consisted  of  Kemper's  brigade, 
composed  of  five  regiments ;  Jenkins'  brigade,  five  and 
one-half  regiments ;  Picketts'  (or  Garnett's),  five  regi- 
ments ;  under  Kemper.  Wilcox's  brigade,  four  regiments ; 
Prjor's  brigade,  four  regiments  ;  Featherston's  brigade,  three 
and  one-half  regiments  ;  under  Wilcox.  Total,  twenty-seven 
regiments.  His  entire  strength  was  8,486  men.  As  the  three 
brigades  under  Kemper  comprised  fifteen  and  one-half  regi- 
ments out  of  these  twenty- seven,  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose 
that  they  numbered,  at  least,  4,562  men.  The  brigades  of 
Toombs  and  Anderson  (formerly  D.  R.  Jones)  numbered  3,713 
men.  The  brigades  of  Drayton  and  Evans  consisted,  Dray- 
ton's of  three,  and  Evans'  of  five  regiments,  together  num- 
bering 4,600  men,  of  which  Drayton's  proportion  is  1,725 
men,  making  in  all,  for  the  six  brigades,  10,000  men. 

This  fcx'ce  occupied  the  heights  opposite  Porter's  position 
during  the  entire  afternoon. 

*  Relative  Stren.^th  at  Second  Manassas.  By  Colonel  William  Allan,  late  Chief 
of  Ordnance,  Second  Corps,  A.  N.  V.  Southern  Historical  Society  Papers,  vol, 
viii.,  pp.  217  et  seq. 


APPENDIX  G. 


BOSTEE  OF  THE  FeDEEAL  AND  CoNFEDEEATE  AeMIES  AT  THE 

Battle  of  Manassas,  otheewise  called  the  Second 
Battle  of  Bull  Eun,  fought  on  Satueday,  August 
30,  1862. 

FEDEEAL  AEMY. 
Majoe-Geneeal  JOHN  POPE,  U.S.V.,  Commanding. 
FIRST  CORPS,  ARMY  OF  VIRGINIA. 
Major-General  FRANZ  SIGEL,  U.S.V. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
Major-General  EOBEET  C.  SCHENCK,*  U.S.V. 


First  Brigade. 

Brig. -Gen.  Julius  H.  Stahel,  U.S.V. 
27th  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  Bushbeck. 
8th  New  York,  Colonel  Hedterich. 
41st       "         Lieut.-Col.  Holmstedt. 
45th      "         Lieut.-Col.  Tkatislaw. 


Second  Brigade, 

Col.  N.  C.  McLean,  75th  Ohio. 
25th  Ohio,  Col.  Richardson. 
55th     "    Col.  J.  C.  Lee. 
73d       "    Col.  O.  Smith. 
75th     "    Major  Reilly. 


SECOND  DIVISION. 
Merged  in  the  others. 


THIRD  DIVISION. 
Brigadier-G-eneral  carl  SCHURZ,  U.S.V. 
First  Brigade,  f  Second  Brigade. 

Col.  A.  Schimmelpfennig.  Col.  W.  Krtzanowski. 

61st  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  McGroarty.      54th  New  York,  Lieut.-Col.  Ashby. 
74th  Pennsylvania,  Major  Blessing.    58th       "  Major  Henkel.J 

8th  Virginia.  75th  Pennsylvania,  Lieut.-Col.  Mahler. t 


Wounded  on  August  80th ;  appointed  Major-General  of  Volunteers  on  the 
same  day. 

t  Brigadier- General  Henry  Bohlen  had  been  killed  at  Freeman's  Ford  on 
August  22d. 
X  Wounded  on  August  30th. 


APPENDIX  G. 


205 


Third  Brigade,  Independent  Brigade. 

Col.  John  A.  Koltes.*  Brig.-Gen.  Robert  H.  Milroy,  U.S.V. 

29th  New  York,t  Major  Hartman.  2d  Virginia. 

68th        "  Lieut.-Col.  Kleefisch.t  3d 

73d  Pennsylvania,  Lieut. -Coi.  Miibleck.  5th      "      Col.  Zeigler. 

8th  " 
82d  Ohio.§ 


ARTILLERY  OF  THE  FIRST  CORPS,  A.  V. 

Battery  I,  1st  Ohio  Artillery,  Captain  H.  Dilger. 

Battery  K,     "  "        Lieutenant  George  B.  Haskins. 

Schirmer's  Battery,  Lieutenant  Blume. 

Dickman's  " 

Johnson's  " 

DeBeck's  " 

Romer's  ||  *' 

Hampton's  |!  " 

Battery  I,  1st  New  York  Artillery,  Captain  M,  Weidrick. 
Buell's  Battery,  Captain  Frank  Buell.* 


SECOND  CORPS,  ARMY  OF  VIRGINIA. 


Major-General  NATHANIEL  P.  BANKS,  U.S.V. 


FIRST  DIVISION. 


Beigamer-General  ALPHEUS  S.  WILLIAMS,  U.S.V. 
First  Brigade, 

Brig.-Gen.  Samuel  W.  Crawford,  U.S.V. 
10th  Maine,  Colonel  George  L.  Beal. 
46th  Pennsylvania. 
28th  New  York. 
5th  Connecticut. 

Second  Brigade, 

Merged  in  the  others. 

Third  Brigade, 

Brig.-Gen.  George  H.  Gordon,  U.S.V. 

2d  Massachusetts,  Colonel  George  L.  Andrews. 
29th  Pennsylvania. 

3d  Wisconsin,  Colonel  Thomas  H.  Ruger. 
27th  Indiana,  Colonel  Colgrove. 


*  Killed  on  August  SOth. 

t  Colonel  Soest  had  been  wounded  on  August  29th. 
X  Wounded  on  August  30th. 

§  Colonel  Cantwell  had  been  killed  on  August  29th. 

II  Belonging  to  the  Second  Corps,  A.  V.,  but  attached  temporarily  to  the  First 
Corps,  A,  V. 


206 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


SECOND  DIVISION.* 
Brigadier-Genebal  GEORGE  S.  GREENE,  U  S.V. 


First  Brigade.f 
5th  Ohio. 

7tli  " 
66th  " 
21)th  " 

26th.  Pennsylvania. 


iSecond  Brigade.^ 
111th  Pennsylvania. 
109th  Maryland. 
3d 

102d  New  York. 
8th  U.  S.  Infantry. 
12th  " 

4th  Maine  Infantry. 


Third  Brigade.% 
1st  District  of  Columbia. 
78th  New  York. 
6Uth 

Purnell  Legion,  Maryland. 


ARTILLERY  OF  THE  SECOND  CORPS,  A.V. 
McGilvery's  Battery.  Best's  Battery. 

Knapp'a  " 


Robinson's 
Geary's 


Muhlenberg's  Battery, 
Cothran'a  Battery, 


THIRD  CORPS,  ARMY  OF  VIRGIK[A. 
Major-General  IRVIN  McDOWELL,  U.S.V. 

FIRST  DIVISION.!! 
Beigadieb-General  JOHN  P.  HATCH, t  U.S.Y. 


First  BtHgade.  ** 
Col.  Sullivan. 
2d  N.  Y.  Sharpshooters,  Col.  Post. 
30th  "    Col.  Frisby.tt 
14th  "    Lieut.-Col.  Fowler.  1[ 
Third  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  M.  R.  Patrick,  U.S.V. 
20th  New  York,  Col.  Pratt. ft 
21st  " 
23d  " 
25th  " 


Second  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Abner  Doubledat,  XJ.fj.V. 
56th  Pennsylvania,  Lieut. Col.  Hoffmann. 

76th  New  York,  Col,  Wainwright. 
95th 

Fourth  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  John  Gibbon,  U.S.V. 
2d  Wisconsin.  §§ 

19th  Indiana,  Col.  S.  Meredith. 

6th  Wisconsin.  !|  || 

7th  Wisconsin. 


SECOND  DIVISION. 
Brigadier-General  JAMES  B.  RICKETTS,  U.S.V. 
First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

Gen.  A.  Duryee,  U.  S.  V.1"  Brig.-Gen.  L.  B.  Tower,^  U.  S.  V. 

94th  New  York,  Col.  Root.t 


*  Brigadier-General  C.  C.  Augur  had  bceen  wounded  at  the  battle  of  Cedar 
Mountain. 

t  Brigadier-General  John  W.  Geary  had  been  wounded  at  the  battle  of  Cedar 
Mountain. 

X  Brigadier-General  Henry  Prince  had  been  taken  prisoner  at  the  battle  of  Ce- 
dar Mountain. 

§  Brigadier- General  George  S.  Greene,  had  been  promoted  to  the  command  of 
the  division,  vice  Augur,  wounded. 

!|  Brigadier- General  Rufus  King  had  been  relieved  on  the  29th,  on  account  of 
illness. 

1"  Wounded  on  August  30th.  **  Formerly  Hatch's, 

ft  Killed  on  August  30th. 

§§  Colonel  O'Connor  had  been  killed  in  the  action  near  Gainesville  on  August 
28th. 

11  ll  Colonel  Gather  had  been  severely  wounded  on  the  28th. 
11  Colonel  Robertson,  Lieutenant -Colonel  Hamilton,  and  Major  Bells  had  been 
wounded  on  the  28th. 


APPENDIX  G. 


207 


Third  Brigade.'^  Fourth  Brigade. 

Col.  Stiles.  1st  Virginia,  Col.  Thorburn.t 

11th  Pennsylvania,  Col.  Coulter. 
88d  New  York. 
12th  Massachusetts. 
13th  Massachusetts. 

PENNSYLVANIA  RESERVES. 
Brigadier-General  JOH^T  F.  REYNOLDS.J 
First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  G-eorge  G.  Meade,  U.S.V.    Brig.-Gen.  Truman  Seymour,  U.S.V. 
1st  Rifles,  Col.  McNeil.  1st  Infantry,  Col.  Roberts. 

3d  Infantry, Col.  Sickles.  2d       "        Col.  McCandless.t 

4th      "      Col.  Magillon.  5th      "       Maj.  Fentmyet. 

7th      '*      Lieut.-Col.  Henderson.  6th      "       Col.  Sinclair. 

8th      *'      Capt.  Lemon. 

Third  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  C.  P.  Jackson. §  U.  S.  V. 
9th  Infantry,  Col.  ^  nderson. 
lUth       "       Col.  Kirk. 
11th       "      Lieut.  Col.  Jackson. 
12th  Col.  Hardin.t 

ARTILLERY  OP  THE  THIRD  CORPS,  A.V. 
Major  TELLSON,  Chief  of  Artillery. 
Battery  4th  New  York  Artillery.  Campbell's  Battery. 

Rhode  Island  Munroe's.  Leppier's 

"      A,  Ifet  Pennsylvania  Artillery.  Mathews'  '* 

"      B.  1st  "  "  Shippen's  " 

"      G,  1st  "  '*  Reynolds'  " 

C,  St*-.  Artiller3%  Ransom's.  Cooper's  '* 

*'      —  1st  Maine  Artillery,  Hall's.  Naylor's  " 

"     — 2d  Maryland  "      Thompson's.       Gerrish'a      "       of  Howitzers. 


CAVALRY  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  VIRGINIA. 

CAVALRY  OP  THE  PIRST  CORPS. 
Buford's  Brigade. 
Brig.  Gen.  John  Buford,||  U.  S.  V. 
9th  New  York,  Col.  J.  Beardsley. 
4th    "       "     Lieut.-Col.  P.  Nazet. 
6th  Ohio,  Col.  W.  R.  Lloyd. 
1st  Maryland,  Lieut.-Col.  Wetschky. 

CAVALRY  OP  THE  THIRD  CORPS. 

Bayard'f}  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  George  D.  Bayard,^  U.  S.  V. 
1st  New  Jersey,  Lieut.-Col.  Karge. 
1st  Pennsylvania,  Col.  Owen  Jones. 
1st  Rhode  Island,  Col.  Duffie. 
1st  Maine,  Col.  Allen. 


*  Brigadier- General  George  L.  Hartsuff  had  been  relieved  on  account  of  illness. 

t  Wounded  on  August  30  th. 

t  Killed  at  Gettysburg,  July  1,  1863. 

§  Killed  at  Predericksburg,  Dec.  13,  1862. 

II  Died  of  disease,  December  16,  1863. 

i  Died  of  wounds  received  at  the  battle  of  Predericksburg,  Dec.  14,  1862. 


203 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


THIRD  CORPS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 
Major-General  SAMUEL  P.  HEINTZELMAN,  U.S.V. 
riKST  DIVISION. 
Majoe-Genekal  PHILIP  KEARNY,*  U.S.V. 
Fi7'8t  Brigade,  Second  Brigade, 


Brig.-Gen.,  John  C.  Robinson,  U.S.V. 
20th  Indiana,  Col.  William  L.  Brown. t 
6Sd  Pennsylvania, Col.  Alexander  Hays.:|:  ~ 
lOSth  Capt.  Craig.  § 

30th  Ohio  (5  companies). 


Brig. -Gen.,  David  B.  Birney,  U.S.V. 
88th  New  York. 
40th       "         Col.  Egan. 
101st       "         Lieut.-Col.  Gesner. 
57th  Pennsylvania. 
3d  Maine,  Col.  Champlin, 
4th   ^'     Col.  Walker. 


Third  Brigade. 

Col.  O.  M.  Roe,  2d  Michigan  Volunteers. 
37th  New  York. 
2d  Michigan. 
3d 

5th  *' 

99th  Pennsylvania. 


SECOND  DIVISION. 
Major-General  JOSEPH  HOOKER,  U.S.V. 
Firbt  Brigade.  Second  (or  Excelsior)  Brigade, 

Brig. -Gen.  Cuvier  Grover,  U.S.V.  Col.  Taylor,  72d  New  York. 

1st  Massachusetts,  Col.  R.  Cowdin.  70th  New  York. 

2d  New  Hampshire,  Col.  G.  Marston.  71st  *' 

11th  Massachusetts,  Col.  W.  Blaisdell.|j  72d  " 

16th  "  Maj.  G.  Banks.  73d  " 

26th  Pennsylvania,  Maj.  R.  L.  Bodine.  74th  ' 


Third  Brigade. 

Colonel  Joseph  B.  Carr,  2d  New  York. 
2d  New  York,  Capt.  Park. 

5th  New  Jersey,  Lieut.-Col.  W.  J.  Sewell.  % 

6th         "         Lieut.-Col.  G.  C.  Burling. f 

7th         "         Col.  Joseph  W.  Revere. 

8th  "         Capt.  D.  Blauvelt,  Jr.** 

115th  Pennsylvania,  Lieut.-Col.  Robert  Thompson. 


ARTILLERY  OF  THE  THIRD  CORPS,  A.P. 
Graham's  Battery. 

Randolph's    "      E,  1st  Rhode  Island  Artillery. 


*  Killed  at  Chantilly  or  Ox  Hill,  September  1,  1862. 
t  Killed  on  August  80th. 

X  Wounded  on  August  30th.    Killed  as  Brigadier- General  of  Volunteers  at  the 
battle  of  the  Wilderness,  May  5.  1864. 
§  Wounded  on  August  30th. 
II  Killed  at  Petersburg,  June  23,  1864. 
1^  Colonel  G.  Mott  had  been  wounded  on  August  29th. 

**  Lieutenant-Colonel  William  Ward  had  been  wounded,  and  Acting-Major  Euite 
had  been  killed  on  August  29th. 


APPENDIX  G. 


2C9 


FIFTH  CORPS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 
Major-General  FITZ  JOHN  PORTER,  U.S.V. 
FIKST  DIVISION. 
Major-Geneeal  GEORGE  \V.  MORELL,  U.S.V. 

Fi7''st  Brigade. 
Col.  James  Barnes,  18th  Massachusetts. 
2d  Maine,  Col.  Charles  Roberts. 
18th  Massachusetts,  Capt.  Stephen  Thomas. 
22d  "  Major  Mason  W.  Burt. 

18th  New  York. 

1st  Michigan,  Col.  H.  S.  Roberts.* 


Second  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  Charles  Griffin,  U.S.V. 
Not  in  action. 


Third  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  Dan  Butterfifld,  U.S.V. 
17th  New  York,  Col.  Lansing. 
44th 
12th 

16th  Michigan. 

83d  Pennsylvaoia,  Lieut.-Col.  Campbell.f 
1st  U.  S.  Sharpshooters,  Col.  Berdan.t 


SECOND  DIVISION. 
Brigadier-General  GEORGE  SYKES,  U.S.V. 
First  Brigade. 
Lieut.-Col.  R.  C.  Buchanan.  4th  Infantry. 
3d  Infantry,  Capt.  John  D.  Wilkins. 
4th      "      Capts.  J.  B.  Collins  *  and  H.  Dryer. 
12th     "      1st  battalion,  Capt.  Blunt. 
14th     "      1st  Capt.  J.  D.  O'Connell.t 

14th     "      2d        "       Capt.  D.  B.  McKibben.t 


Second  Brigade. 
Lieut.-Col.  William  Chapman,  3d  In- 
fantry. 

2d  Infantry  )  -, 


10th 
6th 
11th 
17th 


Major  C.  S.  Lovell. 

Capt.  L.  C.  Bootes. 
Major  D.  L.  Floyd- Jones, 
Major  G.  L.  Andrews. 


Third  Brigade. 
Col.    GOUVERNEUR  K.  Warren,  5th 
New  York, 
5th  New  York,  Capt.  C.  Winslow. 
10th  Col.  Bendix. 


PiaWs  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  A.  Sanders  Piatt. 
Sfith  New  York,  Col.  Bailey. 
63d  Indiana,  Capt.  Bruce. 

ARTILLERY  OF  THE  FIFTH  CORPS,  A.  P. 
Smead's  %  Battery,  5th  U.  S.  Artillery.    Randol's  Battery,  1st  U.  S.  Artillery: 
Weed's  "  Martin's  Massachusetts  Artillery. 

Van  Reed's    '*  '*  Battery  C,  Rhode  Island  Artillery. 

Hazlett'a 


*  Killed  on  August  30th. 

t  Wounded  on  August  30th. 

X  Capt.  Smead  was  killed  on  August  30th. 


210 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


NINTH  CORPS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 
Brigadier-General  J.  L.  RENO,*  U.  S.  V. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
Brigadier-General  ISAAC  I.  STEVE^^S.t 

First  Brigade.  Seco?id  Brigade, 

Col.  Christ,  SOLIi  Pennsylvania.  Col.  Leasure. 

8th  Michigan.  100th  Pennsylvania, 

50th  Pennsylvania.  45th~N'ew  York, 

46th 

Third  Brigade. 
Col.  Farnsworth,  79th  New  York. 
79th  New  York. 
28th  Massachusetts. 

SECOND  DIVISION.$ 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

Col.  Nagle,  48th  Pennsylvania.  Col.  Ferrero,  51st  New  York, 
48th  Pennsylvania.  51st  New  York. 

I^d  Maryland.  51st  Pennsylvania. 

9th  New  Hampshire.  Slst  Massachusetts. 

6th       "  85th 

ARTTLLBRY  OP  THE  NINTH  CORPS,  A.  P. 

Battery  E,  2d  U.  S.  Artillery,  Captain  Benjamin,  and  doubtless  other  batteries. 
There  was  no  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 


AEMY  OF  NOETHEEN  VIEGINIA. 
General  EOBEET  E.  LEE,  CoMMANDiNa. 
EIGHT  WING. 


Lteutenant-General  JAMES  LONGSTEEET. 

INFANTRY. 
EYANS'  DIVISION. 

Brigadter-G-enbral  N.  GEORGE  EVANS. 
(Comprising  Whiting's  (or  Hood's)  Division.    Brigadier-General  John  B.  Hood.) 

Rood\s  Brigade. 
1st  Texas,  Lieut.-Col.  P.  A.  Work. 
4th     "     Lieut.-Col.  B.  F.  Carter. 
5th     "     Col.  J.  B.  Robertson.  § 
18th  Georgia,  Col.  W.  T.  WofEord. 
Hampton  Legion,  Lieut.-Col.  M.  W.  Gary. 


*  Killed  at  South  Mountain,  September  14,  1862. 
t  Killed  at  Chantilly,  or  Ox  Hill,  September  1,  1862. 
X  Under  the  special  command  of  Brigadier-General  Reno. 
§  Wounded  on  August  30th. 


APPENDIX  G. 


211 


W7iitmr/''s  {or  Law's)  Brigade, 

Col.  E.  M.  Law,  4th  Alabama. 
4th  Alabama,  Lieut.-Col,  McLemore. 
6th  North  Carolina.  Maj.  R.  F.  Webb. 
2d  Mississippi,  Col.  J.  M.  Stone. 
11th        "        Col.  P.  F.  Liddell. 


Evans'  Brigade, 

Col.  P.  F.  Stevens,  Holcombe  Legion. 
17th  South  Carolina,  Col.  J.  H.  Means.* 
l^th     "  "      Col.  J.  M.  Gadberry.t 

22d  u     .  ^ 

23d      "  "      Col.  H.  L.  Benbow.t 

Holcombe  Legion      Maj.  F.  G-.  Palmer. $ 


WILCOX'S  DIVISION. 

Brigadiek-Genekal  CADMUS  M.  WILCOX. 

Wilcox''s  Brigade. %  Pry  or' s  Brigade, 

8th  Alabama,  Maj.  Herbert.  Brig.-Grcn.  Roger  A.  Pryob. 

9th        "       Maj.  Williams.  5th  Florida. 

10th      "       JVjaj.  Cauldwell  8th 
11th      **      Capt.  Saunders.*  3d  Virginia. 

14th  Alabama, 

Feather  store  s  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  W.  S.  Featherston. 
12th  Mississippi. 
16th 
19th 

2d  " 


KEMPER  S  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  JAMES  L.  KEMPER. 

Kemver's  Brigade.  Jenkins'  B  igade. 

Col.  M.  D.  Corse,  17th  Virginia.  Brig.-Gen.  M.  Jenkins. 

1st  Virginia, -Lieut.-Col.  Skinner.  1st  South  Carolina. 

•  7th  Col.  W.  T.  PatLon.  5th  '* 

11th      "       Maj.  Clements.  6th     "  " 

17th  Lieut.-Col.  Marye.^  2d       "  "  Rifles. 

24th      "       Col.  W.  R.  Terry.  Palmetto  Sharpshooters. 

4th  SouLh  Carolina  Battalion. 


Pickett's  {or  Garnett's)  Brigade, 

Col,  Eppa  Hunton,  8th  Virginia, 
8th  Virginia. 
18th  " 
19th 

28th  " 
56  th  " 


*  Mortally  wounded  on  August  30th. 

t  Killed  on  August  £Or,h. 

X  Wounded  on  August  80th. 

§  Commanded  by  (4eneral  Wilcox  in  person. 

II  Killed  at  the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness,  May  6,  864. 


212 


THE  ARMY  UKDER  POPE. 


D.  K.  JONES'  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-GtENEral  DAVID  R.  JONES. 

Anderson'' s  (or  B.  JR.  Jone?:^)  Brigade.  Toonibs'  Brigade. 

Col.  GT.  T.  Anderson,  11th  Greorgia.  Col.  Henry  L.  Benning,  17th  Georgia. 

1st  Georgia,  Major  Walker.  2d  Georgia,  Lieut.-Col.  Holmes. 

Tth               Col.  W.  T.  Wilson.t  15th     "        Colonel  Willican. 

8th      *'       Lient.-Col.  J.  R.  Towers.  17th     "        Maj.  Pickett.t 

0th              Col.  Beck.  20th     '*       Maj.  Waddell. 
11th      "       Lieut.-Col.  Luffman. 

Braiiton^s  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  F.  Drayton, 
15th  South  Carolina. 
50th  Georgia. 
51st  " 

R.  H.  ANDERSON'S  DIVISION. 

Major-General  R.  H.  ANDERSON. 

Mahone''8  Brigade.  Wright's  Brigade.  ArmisteacTs  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Wm.  Mahone.  Brig.-Gen.  A.  R.  Wright.  Brig.-Gen.  L.  A.  Armis- 


6th  Virginia. 
12th 
16th 
41st 
49th 


3d  Georgia. 
22d  »' 
48th  " 
44th  Alabama. 


TEAD.<^ 

9th  Virginia. 
14th 

28th  " 
53d  " 
57th  « 


ARTILLERY. 
BATTALION  OP  LIGHT  ARTILLERY. 
Colonel  STEPHEN  D.  LEE. 


Eubank's  Battery. 
Parker's  " 


Rhett's  Battery, 
Jordan's  '* 


Taylor's  Battery. 
BATTALION  OF  WASHINGTON  ARTILLERY. 
Colonel  J.  B.  WALTON. 


Squiers'  Battery. 
Richardson's  Battery. 
Miller's  " 
Eshleman's  " 


Probers  Battalion,  Maj.  B.  W.  Frobel. 

Rcilly's  Battery. 
Bachman's  Battery. 
Garden's  " 


OTHER  COMMANDS. 

Dixie  Artillery.  Rodgers'  Battery. 

Stribling's  Battery.  Brown's  " 

Maurin's        "  Grimes'  " 

Leake's  "  Anderson's  Battery. 


*  A.  N.  v.,  Longstreet's  Rep.,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  80-81. 

+  Killed  August  30th. 

t  Wounded  August  30th. 

§  Killed  at  Gettysburg,  July  3,  1863, 


APPENDIX  G. 


213 


LEFT  WING. 
Major-General  THOMAS  J.  JACKSON.* 

EWELL'S  DIVISION. 
Brigadier-General  A.  R.  LAWTON.t 


Early's  Brigade. 

"Brig. -Gen.  J.  A.  Early. 
13th  Virginia,  Col.  J.  E,  B.  Terrill. 
25th 

31st       "       Col.  Hoffmann. 

44th       "      Col.  William  Smith. 

49th  " 

52d 

58th 


LaiDton''s  Brigade. 

Col.  M.  Douglass, i  13th  Georgia. 
13th  Georgia. 
20th 
31st 
38th 

6(jth  " 
61st 


Hays''  Brigade.% 

Colonel  Strong,  6th  Louisiana, 
5th  Louisiana,  Maj.  Meuger. 
6th 
7th 

8th        "        Maj.  Lewis 
9th 


Trimble'' s  Brigade.  || 

Captain  Brown.  1"  12th  Georgia. 
21st  Georgia,  Maj.  Glover. 
21st  North  Carolina,  Lieut.-Col.  Fulton. 
15th  Alabama,  Maj.  Luther. 
12th  Georgia. 


LIGHT  DIVISION. 

Major-General  AMBROSE  P.  HILL.** 

£r:^nc7i's  Brigade,  Gregg'' s  (afterward  Mc  Gowan's)  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Louis  O'B.  Branch. +t  Brig.-Gen.  Maxcy  Gregg. 

33d  North  Carolina.  Orr's  Rifles.tt 

7th               "  1st  South  Carolina.  §§ 

28th    "  12Lh|l|i  " 

37th    "         "  ISthlfl  " 

18th    "         *•  14th****' 


*  Died  of  wounds  received  at  Chancellorsville,  May  10,  1^63. 
t  Major-General  Richard  S.  Ewell  had  been  wounded  in  the  action  near  Gaines- 
ville, August  28th. 

X  Killed  at  Sharpsburg,  September  17,  1862. 

§  Colonel  H.  Forno,  5th  Louisiana,  who  commanded  the  brigade  Aug,;st  29th, 
had  been  wounded  on  that  day, 

II  Brigadier  J.  R.  Trimble  had  been  wounded  August  29th. 

i"  Killed  at  Chantilly,  September  1st. 

**  Killed  before  Petersburg,  April  2,  1865. 

tt  Killed  at  Sharpsburg,  September  17,  1S62. 

XX  Colonel  J.  Foster  Marshall  and  Lieutenant- Colon  el  D.  A,  Ledbetter  had  been 
killed  on  August  29th. 

§§^Lieutenant-Colonel  McCready,  commanding  this  regiment,  had  been  wounded 
on  August  29th. 

II II  Colonel  Dixon  Barnes  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  McCorkle  had  been  wounded  on 
Ausrust  29th.    Colonel  Barnes  was  killed  at  Sharpsburg,  Sepi  ember  17th. 

i"!  Colonel  O.  E.  Edwards  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  T.  S.  Farron  had  been 
wounded  on  August  29th. 

***  Colonel  S.  McGowan  had  been  wounded  on  August  29th. 


214 


THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE. 


Field's  Brigade.* 
Col.  J.  M.  Brockenbrough,  40th  Va. 
55th  Virginia. 
47th 

2d         "  Battalion, 


Pender's  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  William  D.  PBNDER.t 
22d  North  Carolina,  Major  Cole. 
Kith    "  "        Capt.  Stone.J 

88th    "  "       Capt.  Ashford.§ 

34th  "       Col.  Riddick.ll 


Archer'' s  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  J.  L.  Archer. 

1st  Tennessee,  Col,  P.  Turney. 
7th        "         Major  Sheppard. 
14th      "         Ci.l.  W.  A.  Forbes.t 
19th  Georgia,  Capt.  L.  Johnson. 
5t;h  Alabama,**  Battalion,  Lieut.  H 


Thomas''  Brigade. 
Col.  Edward  L.  Thomas,  35th  Ga. 

14th  Georgia,  Col.  R.  W.  Folsoin. 

35th  " 

45th       "      Major  W.  L.  Grice. 
49th      "      Lieut.-Col.  J.  R.  Man- 
ning. 


JACKSON'S  DIVISION.tt 
Brigadier-General  WILLIAM  E.  STARKE.tJ 
'■^  StoneioalV  Brigade.  CamphelVs  {or  J.  R.  Jo7ies')  Brigade. 

Col.  W.  S.  H.  Baylor, §§  5th  Va.  Col.  Bradley  T.  Johnson. 

2d  Virginia.ini  1st  Virginia  Battalion.  Capt.  Henderson. 

4th      '  "  21st  Capt.  Witcher. 

5th        "  Ao^y.     a    J  Lieut.  V.  Dabney.§ 
27thtir  "  I  Cant.  Goldsborough.§ 

33d***  "  42d      "       Capt.  Penn. 


Taliaferro's  Brigade.  Staford's  (or  Starke's)  Brigade. 

Col.  A.  G.  Taliaferro,  23d  Virginia.     Col.  L.  A.  Stafford,  9th  Louisiana. 

10th  Virginia.  1st  Louisiana,  Lieut.-Col.  Nolan. 

23d        "  2d  "       Col.  J.  M.  WiUiams. 

37th  9th 
47th  Alabama.  10th 

48th       "  15th        "        Col.  Edmond  Pendleton. 

Coppen's  Battalion. 


*  Brigadier-General  Charles  W.  Field  had  been  wounded  August  29th. 
t  Died,  July  18,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Gettysburg. 
t  Wounded  at  Ox  Hill,  or  Chantilly,  September  1,  1862. 

I  Wounded  on  August  30th. 

II  Mortally  wounded  at  Ox  Hill,  or  Chant  lly,  September  1,  1862. 

Mortally  wounrled  on  August  30th. 
**  Captain  Bush,  commanding  this  battalion,  had  been  killed  on  August  29i;h. 
tt  Brigadier  General  William  B.  Taliaferro  had  been  wounded  in  the  action  near 
Gainesville,  Ausrust  28th. 

Xt  Killed  at  Sharpsburg,  September  17,  1862. 
§1  Killed  on  August  SOth. 

nil  Colonel  Botts  had  been  mortally  wounded  on  August  28th. 

Colonel  Grigsby  had  been  woimdcd  on  August  28th. 
***  Colonel  Neff  had  been  killed  on  August  28th. 


APPENDIX  a 


215 


AETILLERY  OF  THE  LEFT  WING-. 
Colonel  STAPLETON  CRUTCHFlELD,  Chief  of  Artillery. 


Lieut.-Col.  R.  L.  Walker. 


Balthis' 

Brown's 

D'Aquin's 

Demerit's 

Latimer'' 3 
f  Braxton's 
j  Crenshaw's 
J  Davidson's 
*  1  Latham's 
!  Mcintosh's 
l^Pegram's 

Brockenbrough's 

Carpenter's 

C  aside's 

Poague's 

Raines' 

Wooding' s 

Cutchaw's 

Garber's 

Job  li  son's 

Rice's 


Battery  with  Swell's  Divisi 


Hill's 


Jackson's 


Unattached. 


CAVALRY  CORPS, 
Major-Gen ERAL  J.  E.  B.  STUART.* 


Fitz  Ru  jh  Lee's  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  Fitz  Hugh  Lee 
1st  Virginia,  Col.  Brien. 
3d 

Col.  Wickham. 
Col.  T.  M.  Rosser. 


4th 
5th 
9th 


Uohertson^H  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  B.  H.  Robertson. 
2(1  Virginia,  Col.  T.  T.  Munford. 
6th 


7th 
llth 
12th 
10th 


Col.  A.  W.  Harman. 
Battalion,  Col.  Funsten. 


Note. — The  Roster  above  given  is  necessarily  imperfect  in  some  of  its  details. 
Still,  it  is  in  the  main  correct.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  it  will  interest  the  survi- 
vors of  that  hard-fought  day. 


*  Died  of  wounds  received  at  Yellow  Tavern,  Virginia,  May  12,  1864. 


IKDEX. 


Note. — Regiments^  batteries,  etc.^  are  indexed  under  the  names  of 
their  States^  excepting  batteries  called  by  their  captain's  or  by  some 
other  special  name.    These  are  indexed  under  Batteries. 


Aldie  Gap,  Va.,  58,  63,  71,  147 
Alexandria,  51,  56,  72,  74,  76,  96, 

147,   152-156,  159,   160,  162- 

164,  194,  197 
Allan,  Colonel  William,  197-199, 

203 

Anandale,  lo9-163 
Anderson,  G.  T.,  50,  198 
Anderson,  General  R.  H.,  112,  119, 

133,  136,  137,  139,  198,  203 
Antietam,  170,  197 
Appendix  A,  173-177  ;  B,  178-180  ; 

C,  181-189;  D,  190-192;  E, 

193-199 ;  F,  200-203 ;  G,  204, 

205 

Aquia  Creek,  151-153, 161 
Archer,   General  J.  L.,  at  Cedar 

Mountain,  24  et  seq. 
Armistead,  198 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia:  its 
leaders  and  character,  33  et 
seq. 

Army  of  the  Potomac  :  its  compo- 
sition, 35-130,  146;  size  of, 
147,  151,  168-170,  191,  196 
10— IV. 


Army  of  Virginia :  its  strength 
and  composition,  3,  4 

Augur,  General  C.  C.  :  commands 
the  second  division  of  the 
Second  Corps,  A.  V. ,  3  ;  at  the 
battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  23 
et  seq.  ;  is  wounded  there,  28, 
193 

Bald  Hill,  133,  138,  140,  145 
Banks,  General  N.  P.  :  assigned  to 
the  Department  of  the  Shenan- 
doah, 2  ;  retreats  before  Jack- 
son, 2  ;  his  corps  in  the  Army 
of  Virginia,  3  ;  its  strength  and 
composition,  4,  note  ;  his  pre- 
vious history,  4 ;  ordered  to 
Little  Washington,  5  ;  ordered 
to  Culpeper,  16,  17  ;  his  orders 
prior  to  Cedar  Mountain,  20  et 
seq.  ;  strength  of  his  corps  and 
its  composition,  22  ;  fights  the 
battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  22 
et  seq.  ;  retreats  to  the  Rappa- 
hannock, 33  ;   movements  on 


218 


INDEX. 


the  Rappahannock,  41  et  seq.  ; 
is  ordered  to  provide  for  the 
trains  in  the  movement  to  the 
rear,  61-73 ;  at  Bristoe  on  the 
29th,  94,  98,  124,  193-195,  197 

Barnes,  General,  134 

Barstov^,  Major,  179 

Bartow,  General,  141 

Batteries:  Hazlitt's,  181,  182; 
Pelham's,  77;  Rogers',  200 

Bayard,  General  G.  D.  :  commands 
a  brigade  of  cavalry  of  the 
Army  of  Virginia,  4  ;  his  char- 
acter, 16 ;  on  the  Rapidan,  16, 
53,  171,  197 

Baylor,  Colonel,  143 

Bealeton  Station,  Va. ,  50,  53 

Beck  with,  Colonel,  187 

Bee,  General,  141 

Benning,  General,  139,  202 

Bethlehem  Church,  74,  84,  93,  95 

Blackburn's  Ford,  Va.,  59,  64,  65, 
66,  83 

Bliicher,  165 

Bohlen,  General  H.,  killed  in  ac- 
tion near  Beverly  Ford,  37 
Boswell,  Captain  J.  K.,  44,  note 
Branch,  General  L.  O'B.,  at  Cedar 

Mountain,  24  et  seq.,  149 
Bristoe  Station,  Va.,  50,  54,  55-57, 
60,  61,  63,  65,  66,  74,  79,  81, 
84,  94,  118,  155 
Broad  Run,  53,  54,  57 
Buchanan,  General,  140,  142 
Buckland  Mills,  53,  54,  66-68,  75, 
179 

Buford,  General  J.  :  commands  a 
brigade  of  cavalry  of  the  Army 
of  Virginia,  4  ;  his  character, 
16 ;  on  the  Rapidan,  16,  17 ; 
ordered  to  ascertain  the  direc- 
tion of  Jackson's  march,  50  ;  ' 


his  indefatigable  energy,  66, 
67 ;  his  despatch  to  Rickett's 
and  McDowell,  93,  94,  112, 
115 

Bull  Run,  Va.,  58,  59,  62-66,  72- 
75,  83-85,  87,  89,  90-92,  ICO, 
109,  110,  126  ;  battle  of,  129- 
143,  144,  147,  162,  165,  167, 

168,  179,  188,  196 

Burling,    Lieutenant-Colonel  G. 

C,  66,  note 
Burnside,  General,  152 
Butterfield,  General  D.  :  advises 

postponing  march  on  28th,  60  ; 

his  brigade   deployed  across 

Dawkir.s'  Branch,  93, 120,  121, 

130,  134,  180 

Campbell,  General,  71 

Carr,  Colonel  J.  B. ,  66,  note 

Casey,  General,  155 

Casualties  at  Cedar  Mountain,  30  ; 
at  Gainesville,  77 ;  at  Grove- 
ton,  108 

Catharpin  Creek,  102 

Catlett's  Station,  54,  58,  74,  179 

Cedar  Mountain,  battle  of,  19  et 
seq.,  55,  71,  98,  163,  194,  197, 
198 

Centre ville,  Va.,  57,  59,  65,  66, 
71-75,  79,  80,  83-92,  93,  100, 
130,  134,  141,  144,  146,  147, 
153,  160,  162,  163,  165,  168, 

169,  183,  187,  188 
Chain  Bridge,  163 
Chancellorsville,  Jackson's  attack 

there.  111,  197 
Chantilly,  battle  of,  144,  150, 151, 
190 

Chapman,  General,  140 
Chester  Gap,  50 
Chinn  House,  133,  139 


INDEX. 


219, 


Connecticut,  Battery  of  First,  155 
Corse,  Colonel  M.  D.,  113,  200, 
202 

Cox,  General,  51,  52,  155, 158,  162, 
163 

Crawford,  General  S.  W.  :  com- 
mands a  brigade  in  Williams' 
Division  of  Banks'  Corps,  16  ; 
is  ordered  to  Culpeper,  16; 
and  thence  to  Cedar  Mountain, 
17 ;  hicj  famous  charge  in  the 
battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  26 
et  seq.  ;  strength  and  loss  of 
his  brigade,  30 

Culpeper,  179 

Cunningham,  Lieutenant-Colonel, 
Twenty -first  Va.,  killed  at 
Cedar  Mountain,  26 

Dawkins'  Branch,  93,  97, 116,  120, 
122,  124 

Doubleday,    General   A.,  at  the 

battle  of  Gainesville,  77,  78 
Drayton,  General,  119,  201-203 

Early,  General  J.  A.  :  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  24  et  seq.  ;  crosses 
the  Rappahannock,  37 ;  re- 
crosses  the  river,  42 ;  report 
of,  55,  65,  107,  135,  149 

Ewell,  General  R.  S.  :  commands  a 
division  under  Jackson,  8  ;  at 
the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain, 
24  et  seq.  ;  is  attacked  and  de- 
feated by  Hooker  at  Bristoe, 
54,  55  ;  is  engaged  with  King's 
division  at  Gainesville,  76  ; 
and  severely  wounded,  77,  80, 
88,  102,  107,  108,  111,  197,  135, 
149 

Evans,  General  N.  G.  :  commands 
a  brigade  in  Longstreet's  com- 


mand, 112,  114,  117,  121,  129, 
137,  139,  198,  203 


Fairfax  Court  House,  147,  148, 

159,  170 
Fayette ville,  Va.,  50,  52,  54 
Featherston,    General,   119,  137, 

198,  203 

Field,  General  C.  L.  :  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  24  et  seq.  ;  is  severe- 
I        ly  wounded  at  Groveton,  108 

Forno,  Colonel :  at  Cedar  Moun- 
tain, 24  et  seq.,  65  ;  is  severe- 
ly wounded  at  Groveton,  108 

Fortress  Monroe,  151 

Franklin,  General :  his  division 
sent  to  McCleilan,  2 ;  com- 
mands the  Sixth  Corps,  A. P., 
36,  51,  91,  144,  147-149,  151- 
165,  167,  168 

Fremont,  General  J.  C. :  assigned 
to  the  Department  of  West 
Virginia,  2  ;  is  superseded  by 
Pope,  and  resigns,  4,  193 

Fry,  Captain,  201 

Front  Royal,  194 

Gaines'  Mills,  146 

Gainesville,  Va.,  51-57,  61-64,  67, 
68,  70-73,  75  ;  battle  of,  78,  79, 
81,  84-86,  89,  92-95,  97,  99, 
100,  112,  113,  114,  115,  118, 
155,  178,  179,  185,  190,  200 

Garnett,  Lieutenant-Colonel  T.  S.: 
at  Cedar  Mountain,  24  et  seq.  ; 
is  wounded  there,  26 

Geary,  General :  at  Cedar  Moun- 
tain, 22  et  seq.  ;  is  wounded 
there,  28,  194 

Georgia,  Regiments  of  :  First,  110  ; 
Seventh,    119;   Eighth,  119; 


220 


INDEX. 


Ninth,  119;    Eleventh,  119; 

Twelfth,  2? ;  Twenty-first,  56  | 
Getty,  Colonel,  180  \ 
Getty,  General  George  W. :  his  es-  j 

timate    of    the    strength  of ; 

Banks'  Corps,  4,  note  1 
Gibbon,  General  J. :  at  the  battle  i 

of  Gaiaesville,  77,  78,  83,  140 
Gordon,  General  G.  H.:  at  Cedar 

Mountain,  22  ;  his  share  in  the 

battle,  28,  29;  strength  and 

losses  of  his  brigade,  30,  196, 

198 

Greene,  General  George  S.,  at  Ce- 
dar Mountain,  23  et  seq.,  193 

Greenwich,  52,  54,  56,  61 

Gregg,  General  M.,  at  the  battle  of 
Groveton,  107,  149 

Griffin,  General,  3,  134,  181,  184, 
188 

Grover,  General  C,  his  famous  : 
charge  at  the  battle  of  Grove-  , 
ton,  1C6,  135  j 

Groveton,  Va.,  71,  74,  84,  93,  100;  I 
battle  of,  102,  103,  107-109, 
124, 126,  130, 131, 133, 137, 182, 
187,  190 

Gum  Spring,  Va.,  71 

Halleck,  General  H.  W.:  called 
to  the  chief  command  of  the 
army,  7 ;  his  character  and 
previous  services,  7 ;  decides 
to  remove  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac from  the  Peninsula,  11 ; 
his  reasons,  11  et  seq. ;  his 
correspondence  with  McClel- 
lan,  15,  16 ;  directs  Pope  to 
stand  firm  on  the  Rappahan- 
nock, 35,  50,  109,  130,  143, 
145-147,  151  ;  incapacity  of,  ' 
152-164,  166,  170,  171  ^ 


Hartsuff,  General  G.  L.,  at  Rap^ 
pahannock  Station,  36 

Hatch,  General  John  P.:  ordered 
to  seize  Gordonsville,  8 ;  at  the 
battle  of  Gainesville,  77  ;  com- 
mands King's  division  at  the 
battle  of  Groveton,  and  is  se- 
verely engaged,  107,  108,  129, 
133,  134 ;  wounded,  135,  136  ; 
wounded,  143 

Haupt,  General  H.,  engaged  in 
transporting  troops  to  the 
front,  51,  note 

Haven,  Captain,  179 

Hayes,  President,  180 

Haymarket,  Va.,  58,  67,  68,  114, 
131-133,  135 

Haynes,  Captain  C.  L.,  Twenty- 
seventh  Virginia  :  his  account 
of  Cedar  Mountain,  27,  note 

Hays,  General,  108,  149 

Hazlitt,  Captain,  181,  182 

Heintzeiman,  General  S.  P.  :  com- 
mands the  Third  Cori3s,  A.  P., 
36  ;  arrives  from  the  Peninsu- 
la, 47 ;  strength  of  his  corps, 
47 ;  his  character,  47,  48 ;  his 
niovements  near  Warrenton, 
50  et  seq.  ;  his  corps  ordered 
to  Centreville,  72  ;  and  thence 
toward  Groveton,  84 ;  is  or- 
dered, if  ' '  heavil}'  pressed  by 
superior  numbers,''  not  "  to 
push  matters  further,"  88; 
his  part  in  the  battle  of 
Groveton,  104  et  seq.,  ISl ; 
his  position  in  battle,  133,  130, 
1 38,  148 ;  bears  the  brunt  of 
battle,  150-152,  159,  180;  his 
diary,  182  ;  his  corps,  194-1C6 

Henry  House  Hill,  133,  138,  140, 
141 


INDEX. 


221 


Herbert,  Major,  201 

Hill,  Gerxcral  A.  P. :  is  sent  from 
Kichmond  to  join  Jackson,  8, 
9 ;  strength  and  composition 
of  his  division  at  Cedar  Moun- 
tain, 24  ;  his  share  in  the  bat- 
tle, 27  et  seq.  ;  arrives  at  Bris- 
toe  Station,  50,  51 ;  retreats  to 
Centre ville  and  Bull  Run  bat- 
tle-field, 59,  65,  notes ;  his 
position  at  the  battle  of 
Groveton  ;  is  attacked  by 
Kearny  and  Stevens,  but  re- 
pulses them,  106,  107 ;  at  the 
battle  of  Chantilly,  149,  197 

Hood,  General  J.  B.  :  at  the  battle 
of  Groveton,  107 ;  commands 
a  division  in  Longstreet's  com- 
mand, 112  ;  time  of  his  arrival 
on  the  field,  114,  115,  117,  121. 
1:29,  137,  139,  198 

Hooker,  General  J.  :  commands  a 
division  in  Heintzelman's 
corps,  47  ;  his  character.  48 ; 
defeats  Ewell  at  Bristoe  Sta- 
tion, 54,  55 ;  ordered  to  Centre- 
ville,  72  ;  his  part  in  the  battle 
of  Groveton,  104  et  seq.  ;  gal- 
lant charge  of,  106,  133,  135, 
194 

Hopewell  Gap,  68,  113,  114 
Horton,  Colonel  Chas.  P.,  194 
Hotchkiss,  Colonel,  197 
Hunton,  Colonel,  200 

Indiana,  Regiment  of :  Twenty- 
seventh,  29 

Jackson,  General  T.  J.  (Stone- 
wall) :  his  raid  in  the  Valley,  2, 
3;  joins  Lee,  3  ;  sent  to  Gor- 
donsville  with  two  divisions, 


8  ;  is  joined  by  A.  P.  Hill,  8  ; 
his  total  strength,  9  ;  advances 
from  Gordonsville,  17,  18 ; 
fights  the  battle  of  Cedar 
Mountain,  19  et  seq.  ;  retreats 
to  the  Rapidan,  31 ;  his  char- 
acter and  previous  services, 
34  ;  advances  to  the  Rappahan- 
nock, 36 ;  movements  on  the 
Rappahannock,  37  et  seq.  ;  his 
great  raid  in  rear  of  our  army, 
44,  45,  50,  51,  56  et  seq. ;  re- 
tires to  the  battlefield  of  Bull 
Run,  59,  65 ;  advances  upon 
Sigel,  73  ;  fights  the  battle  of 
Gainesville,  75  et  seq.;  fights 
the  battle  of  Groveton,  102  et 
seq. ;  comments  on  his  course, 
110,  111,  113, 117,  119,  122, 123, 
127 ;  joined  by  Longstreet's 
force,  129-131,  133-138,  142, 
146-149,  170  ;  number  of  guns 
he  claims  having  captured, 
190,  1 91 ;  strength  of  his  com- 
mand, 197,  198 
James  River,  146 

Jenkins,  Colonel,  118,  119,  193, 
200,  203 

Johnson,  Colonel  B.  T.  :  encoun- 
ters Reynolds'  division  on  the 
28th,  70,  71,  75,  111,  135 

Joint  Order. — See  McDowell,  Por- 
ter 

Jones,  General  D.  R. :  commands  a 
division  in  Longstreet's  com- 
mand, 112  ;  arrives  on  the  field 
of  Groveton,  113 ;  time  of  his 
arrival  and  his  position,  113  et 
seq., 121, 137,  139, 198,  200,  202, 
203 

Kane,  Colonel,  141 


222 


INDEX. 


Kearny,  General  P. :  commands  a 
division  inHeintzelman's  corps 
47 ;  his  character,  48 ;  is  or- 
dered to  Greenwich,  52;  thence 
to  Bristoe,  55 ;  to  Centreville, 
66,  72  ;  thence  toward  Grove- 
ton,  83  ;  arrives  on  the  field, 
104  ;  his  furious  attack  on  A. 
P.  Hill,  106,  107  ;  his  position 
in  battle  of  Manassas,  133, 135  ; 
killed  in  the  front  of  the  bat- 
tle of  Chantilly,  150,  194 

Kelly's  Ford,  50,  53 

Kemper,  General  J.  L. ,  commands 
a  division  in  Longstreet's 
command,  112 ;  time  of  his 
arrival  on  the  field  of  Grove- 
ton,  113,  note;  114,  115,  117- 
119, 121,  122,137, 178,  200,  2C2, 
203 

Kettle  Run  Bridge,  74 

Keyes,  General  E.  D.,  commands 
the  Fourth  Corps,  A.  P.,  151 

King,  General  Ruf  us  :  commands 
the  First  Division  of  the  Third 
Corps,  A.  v.,  and  its  strength, 
4 ;  his  division  at  Fredericks- 
burg, 5 ;  breaks  up  the  rail- 
road, 8  ;  joins  the  main  army 
on  the  11th  of  August,  31 ;  his 
movements  on  the  Rappahan- 
nock, 42  et  seq.  ;  is  ordered 
upon  Manassas,  68  et  seq,  ; 
brings  up  the  rear  of  the  corps, 
75 ;  his  division  at  the  battle 
of  Gainesville,  75  et  seq.  ;  re- 
treats to  Manassas,  80  et  seq.  ; 
his  health  fails,  82,  85-88,  92, 
93,  95,  97,  98,  101  ;  severe  ill- 
ness of,  107, 120,  121,  131,133, 
134,  136,  138,  151,  182,  183, 
185,  187 


Koltes,  Colonel,  John  A. ,  138  ;  fall 

of,  139,  142,  205 
Krzyanowski,  Colonel  W.,  139,  204 

Lane,  General  J.H.,  his  account  of 
Cedar  Mountain,  27,  note,  149 

Law,  Colonel  E.  M.,  at  the  battle 
of  Groveton,  107,  108,  137 

Lawton,  General  A.  R.,  commands 
E well's  division  at  the  battle 
of  Groveton,  102,  107,  197 

Layne,  Major,  Second  Virginia, 
mortally  wounded  at  Cedar* 
Mountain,  26 

Lee,  General  Fitz  Hugh,  198 

Lee,  General  R.  E. :  his  operations 
on  the  Peninsula,  3 ;  sends 
Jackson  to  Gordonsville,  8 ; 
determines  to  move  against 
Pope,  32 ;  strength  of  his  army, 
32 ;  forces  Pope  to  fall  back 
to  the  Rappahannock,  33  ;  his 
character  and  previous  ser- 
vices, 33,  34  ;  advances  to  the 
Rappahannock,  36 ;  operations 
on  that  river,  36  et  seq.  ;  de- 
termines on  sending  Jackson 
in  our  rear,  43,  44 ;  arrives  with 
Longstreet's  command  on  the 
29th,  112  ;  report  of,  113,  115, 
118-122,  124,  130;  takes  ad- 
vantage of  our  mistake,  133, 
134 ;  his  capture  in  battle  of 
Manassas,  142  ;  losses  of  his 
army,  144, 146  ;  pushes  on  after 
the  victory,  147 ;  crosses  the 
Rappahannock,  169,  190,  197- 
199 

Leski,  Captain,  179 

Lincoln,  President :  his  orders  to 
McClellan  disregarded,  1  ;  de- 
tains McDowell's    corps,   1  ; 


INDEX. 


223 


creates  new  departments,  2  ;  | 
assigns  Pope  to  command  of  \ 
the  corps  of  Fremont,  Banks, 
and  McDowell,  5  ;  he  asks  for 
news  from  Manassas,  160  ;  his 
correspondence  with  McClel- 
lan,  161-163,  166 

Little  River  Turnpike,  T.?,  147, 
149,  170 

Lloyd,  67 

Locke,  Colonel,  187 

Longstreet,  General  J.:  ordered 
from  Richmond  to  the  Rapi- 
dan,  32  ;  strength  of  his  com- 
mand, 32  ;  his  character  and 
services,  34  ;  advances  to  the 
Rappahannock,  36  ;  move- 
ments on  the  Rappahannock, 
37  et  seq.  ;  follows  Jackson, 
and  encounters  Buford  at 
White  Plains,  67 ;  is  delayed 
by  Ricketts  at  Thoroughfare 
Gap,  6S ;  arrives  on  the  bat- 
tle-field of  Groveton,  112 ; 
time  of  his  arrival  and  of  his 
taking  position,  113  et  seq.  ; 
report  of,  117-121,  123;  at 
Manassas,  129  et  seq.  ;  ordered 
to  reinforce  Jackson,  134,  135  ; 
his  description  of  the  charge, 
137,  138,  142,  147,  148,  note, 
150,167,  170,  178,  179;  num- 
ber of  guns  he  claims  having 
captured,  190,  191  ;  strength 
of  his  division,  198,  199,  203 

McCall,  General,  his  division 
sent  to  McClellan,  3 

McClellan,  General  George  B.  : 
distrust  of  him  by  the  Admin- 
istration, 1,  2,  6 ;  loses  the 
battle  of  Gaines'  Mill,  and  re- 


treats to  the  James,  6,  7 ; 
causes  of  the  distrust  felt  in 
him,  11  et  seq.  ;  the  removal 
of  his  army  from  the  Penin- 
sula, 11  et  seq.,  146  ;  vindica- 
tion of,  15L-154,  155-159;  re- 
port to  Lincoln,  160 ;  letters 
from,  161,  162-164,  166,  167, 
171,  196,  197 
McDowell,  General  Irvin  :  detach- 
ed from  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac, 2  ;  hi^  corps  in  the 
Army  of  Virginia,  3  ;  its 
strength  and  composition,  4 ; 
his  previous  services,  4,  5 ;  his 
movements  on  the  Rappahan- 
nock, 31  et  seq.;  orders  Buford 
to  follow  Jackson,  50  ;  marches 
upon  Buckland  Mills  and 
Gainesville,  53,  54  ;  is  ordered 
upon  Manassas,  61  ;  takes 
measures  to  hold  Thorough- 
fare Gap,  67  et  seq.  ;  moves 
upon  Manassas,  69 ;  receives 
the  joint  order,  89  et  seq.  ; 
situation  of  his  corps  and  Por- 
ter's, 93  ;  he  takes  his  corps  up 
the  Sudley  Springs  Road,  95 
et  seq. ;  arrives  on  the  field, 
107  ;  and  becomes  engaged 
with  Hood  and  Law,  107,  120- 
126,  128,  131  ;  perceives  our 
mistake,  136,  138,  140,  141; 
statement  before  Court  of  In- 
quiry, 178-180,  182-186,  193- 
196 

McGowan,  General  S.,  retires  from 

Manassas,  65 
McLean,  Colonel  N.  C,  138,  142, 

204 

Mahone,  General,  198 

Maine,  regiment  of  :  Tenth,  28,  29 


224 


INDEX. 


Manassas,  Va.,  50-57,  59-67,  69- 
73,  75,  76,  78,  79,  81,  84,  85, 
88,  93,  95,  109,  111,  113-115, 
117-119;  battle  of,  129-144, 
146,  147,  149,  152,  154-160, 
162,  182,  183,  190,  191.  200, 
203 

Maps:  August  28th,  8  a.m.,  67; 
August  28th,  6  P.M.,  77;  Au- 
gust 29th,  12  M.,  116  ;  August 
30,  132;  field  of  Chantilly, 
148 

Marshall,  Colonel  Charles,  115 
Marshall,  Colonel  E.  G.,  181,  184, 

202 

Marshall,  Colonel  L.  H.,  of  Pope's 
staff,  gives  Banks  an  order 
from  Pope  before  Cedar 
Mountain,  20 

Massachusetts,  regiments  of : 
First,  1C6  ;  second,  29,  197 ; 
Eleventh,  106  ;  Twelfth,  139 ; 
Sixteenth,  1C6 

Meade,  General  G.  G. :  commands 
a  brigade  in  Keynolds'  Divi- 
sion, 47  ;  commands  the  army 
at  Gettysburg,  47,  138,  143, 
169 

Meadowville  Lane,  120 
Mexico,  140 

Milroy,  General  R.  H. :  commands 
an  independent  brigade  in  the 
First  Corps,  A.V.,  3  ;  at  the 
battle  of  Groveton,  102  et  seq. 

Molino  del  Rey,  140 

Monroe,  Fort. — See  Fort  Monroe 

Monteith,  General,  180 

Morell,  General  G.  W.  :  commands 
a  division  in  Porter's  corps, 
47 ;  his  character,  48,  50,  53, 
60,  61,  93,  130,  134,  135,  138, 
167,  180,  181-187,  202 


Myer,  General,  180 

New  Baltimore,  Ya.,  70 

New  Hampshire,  Regiment  of: 
Second,  106 

New  Jersey   Brigade  unsuccess- 
fully attacks  Manassas  Junc- 
tion, 57 
j  Newmarket,  84,  96 

New  York,  Regiment  of:  Thir- 
teenth, 184,  202 

North  CaroHna,  Regiment  of : 
Twenty-first,  56 

OXHILL,  148 

Palmer,  Major,  201 

Patrick,  General,  78 

Pelham,  Major  J.,  at  the  battle  of 
Gainesville,  177 

Pelouze,  Major  L.  H.,  of  Banks' 
staff,  writes  down  Pope's  order 
to  Banks,  before  Cedar  Moun- 
tain, 20,  note 

Pender,  General  W.  D.,  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  24  et  seq. 

Pennsylvania,  Regiments  of : 
Twelfth  Cavalry,  155  ;  Twen- 
ty-sixth, 106 

Piatt,  Captain  J.  H.,  85,  note 

Piatt,  General  A.  S.,  commands  a 
brigade  in  Sturgis'  division, 
47,  note ;  93,  188,  195 

Pickett,  General,  119,  198,  200,  203 

Pony  Mountain,  194 

Pope,  General  John  :  appointed  to 
the  command  of  the  Army  of 
Yirginia,  1,  3 ;  his  previous 
services,  4 ;  concentrates  his 
army,  5 ;  sends  on  expedition 
against  Gordon  svilie,  6  ;  issues 
an  address  to  his  army,  and 


INDEX. 


225 


orders  as  to  the  treatment  of 
the  non-combatant  population 
in  Virginia,  9  et  seq. ;  ad- 
vances toward  Culpeper,  16  et 
seq. ;  his  orders  to  General 
Banks  before  Cedar  Mountain, 
20  et  seq. ;  battle  of  Cedar 
Mountain,  22  et  seq. ;  advances 
to  the  Rapidan,  31  ;  falls  back 
to  the  Rappahannock,  32,  33  ; 
operations  on  the  Rappahan- 
nock, 36  et  seq.;  learns  of 
Jackson's  raid,  53 ;  orders  the 
army  to  move  on  Gainesville, 
53  ;  action  at  Bristoe  Station, 
51;  orders  the  army  to  move 
on  Manassas,  61  et  seq.;  move- 
ments on  the  28th,  65  et  seq. ; 
battle  of  Gainesville,  75  et  seq. ; 
orders  Kearny  to  attack  Jack- 
son, 83  ;  his  orders  to  Heintz- 
elman,  Reno,  and  Porter  on 
the  29th,  84  et  seq.;  precau- 
tionary order  to  Heintzelman, 
Reno,  and  Sigel,  88,  89 ;  joint 
order  to  McDowell  and  Porter, 
89  et  seq. ;  fights  the  battle  of 
Groveton,  102  et  seq.;  his  ex- 
pectations of  support  from 
McDowell  and  Porter,  105 ;  his 
estimate  of  the  losses  on  both 
sides,  108  ;  his  dispatch  after 
the  battle,  109 ;  his  exaggera- 
ted estimate  of  his  success, 
110 ;  his  order  to  Porter,  127 ; 
his  misconception  of  the  ene- 
my's force,  129  et  seq.;  his 
special  order,  131  ;  his  defeat  ' 
at  Bull  Run,  141  ;  dispatch  of, 
145 ;  injustice  toward,  146 ; 
end  of  his  campaign,  150,  151, 
157-165 ;  reflections  on,  166, 

10* 


167  ;  his  address  to  his  army, 
173  ;  his  orders,  174-177,  179, 
182,  187,  190-197,  199,  204 

Porter,  General  F.  J.  :  commands 
the  Fifth  Corps,  A.  P.,  36; 
arrives  from  the  Peninsula, 
47  ;  strength  and  composition 
of  his  command,  47  ;  his  char- 
acter, 48 ;  ordered  to  march 
from  Warrenton  Junction  to 
Bristoe  at  1  a.m.  of  28th,  60; 
his  marching  at  3  a.m.,  60  and 
Appendix ;  is  not  ordered  to 
Manassas,  78 ;  is  ordered  to 
Centreville,  84  ;  and  to  Gaines- 
ville, 85,  86 ;  the  joint  order, 
89  et  seq.  ;  arrives  at  Dawkins' 
Branch,  93 ;  consultation  with 
McDowell,  93  et  seq.  ;  their 
understanding  with  each  other, 
96  et  seq.  ;  remains  at  Daw- 
kin's  Branch,  101,  104  ;  at  bat- 
tle of  Groveton,  105,  109,  110, 
114,  118-122,  124;  acts  under 
joint  order,  125  ;  misconstruc- 
tion of  dispatch  of,  126  ;  Pope's 
order  to,  127-131,  133-136,  151, 
152,  166,  167,  178  ;  completely 
exonerated,  180 ;  orders  of, 
181-189,  194-197,  202,  203 

Pratt,  General,  195 

Prince,  General  H.  :  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  22  et  seq. ;  is  taken 
prisoner  there,  28 

Pryor,  General,  119,  137,  198,  203 

Rapidan,  146,  169 

Rappahannock,  111,  146,  151,  ICS, 
169,  171,  191,  194 

Reno,  General  J.  L.  :  arrives  from 
North  Carolina  with  two  divi- 
sions of  Burnside's  (Ninth) 


226 


IISDEX. 


corps,  31  ;  his  character,  31  ; 
operations  on  the  Rappahan- 
nock, 33  et  seq.  ;  ordered  to 
Warrenton  and  Gainesville, 
52 ;  to  Greenwich,  54 ;  to 
Manassas,  61 ;  to  Centreville, 
66  ;  toward  Gainesville,  84,  86; 
precautionary  order  to  him,  88, 
91,  92 ;  arrives  on  the  field  of 
Groveton,  104,  132,  136  ;  with- 
stands Jackson's  advance  at 
battle  of  Manassas,  138,  148 ; 
brunt  of  battle  of  Chantiily 
borne  by  his  troops,  150  ;  sent 
to  join  Pope,  159,  194, 195 
Reynolds,  General  J.  F.  :  com- 
mands the  Pennsylvania  Re- 
serves, 35  ;  arrives  on  the  23d 
from  Aquia  Creek,  41 ;  strength 
of  his  division,  41-^  his  charac- 
ter, 47;  is  killed  at  Gettys- 
burg, 47  ;  his  movements  near 
Warrenton,  49  et  seq.  ;  is  or- 
dered to  Manassas,  69 ;  en- 
counters B.  T.  Johnson's 
brigade,  69,  70  ;  he  refuses  to 
retire  from  Groveton,  82 ;  at 
the  battle  of  Groveton,  102  et 
seq.,  103,  105,  108,  111,  121, 
124,  127,  128,  131,  133,  135, 
136,  138,  142,  151,  187,  194, 
195 

Richmond,  Va.,  146,  198 

Ricketts,  General  James  B. :  com- 
mands the  Second  Division 
of  the  Fifth  Corps,  A.  V., 
and  its  strength,  4;  his  divi- 
sion at  Manassas  Junction,  5  ; 
is  ordered  to  Waterloo  Bridge, 
5 ;  is  ordered  to  Culpeper  and 
beyond  it,  16,  17  ;  his  move- 
ments on  the  Rappahannock, 


42  et  seq. ;  is  ordered  to  Gaines- 
ville, 53  ;  is  sent  to  Thorough- 
fare Gap,  and  there  checks 
Longstreet's  advance,  68 ;  re- 
tires from  the  Gap,  and  re- 
treats to  Bristoe,  68  et  seq. ; 
this  movement  considered,  81, 
82  ;  marches  back  to  the  turn- 
pike, 95,  98,  107,  110,  121,  131, 
183  ;  withdraws  a  large  p-art  of 
his  command  from  battle  of 
Manassas,  135,  136 ;  part  of 
his  division  sent  for,  138,  139, 
178-180,  185,  187 

Roberts,  General  B.  S.,  of  Pope's 
staff:  at  Cedar  Mountain,  20, 
21 ;  selects  a  position  for  the 
corps,  22 ;  gives  an  unauthor- 
ized order  to  Sigel,  46 

Robertson,  General  B.  H.  :  near 
Beverly  Ford,  36  ;  arrives  on 
the  field  of  Groveton,  115  ; 
and  locates  the  position  of  D. 
R.  Jones'  division,  115,  116, 
118;  opinion  of,  respecting 
Porter,  124 

Rogers,  Captain,  200 

Ronald,  Colonel  C.  A.,  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  24  et  seq. 

Rosser,  Colonel  T.  L.,  at  Beverly 
Ford,  36,  120 

Ruggles,  Colonel  George  D.,  84, 
131,  174-177 

Salem,  51,  56,  67 

Schenck,  General  R.  C,  com- 
mands the  First  Division  of 
the  First  Corps,  A.  V.,  3,  54  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Groveton,  102 
et  seq.,  121  ;  severely  wound- 
ed, 138,  143 

Schimmelpfennig,  General  A.,  at 


INDEX. 


227 


the  battle  of  Groveton,  104, 
141,  204 

Schofield,  General  J.  M.,  his  esti- 
mate of  the  strength  of  Banks' 
corps,  4,  note  ;  180 

Schriver,  Colonel,  179 

Schurz,  General  C.  :  commands 
the  Third  Division  of  the 
First  Corps,  A.  V.,  3,  54  ;  at 
the  battle  of  Groveton,  103  et 
seq.  ;  sent  to  the  aid  of  Mc- 
Lean in  battle  of  Manassas, 
138 ;  withdraws  in  direction 
of  Ball  Run,  140,  141 ;  Third 
Division  of  Federal  Army 
under  him,  204 

Seymour,  General,  138 

Shenandoah,  Valley  of  the,  175 

Shields,  General  James,  his  divi- 
sion transferred  to  McDowelFs 
command,  2 

Sigel,  General  F.  :  numbv^rs  and 
composition  of  his  corps,  3 ; 
his  previous  services,  4 ;  or- 
dered to  Sperryville,  5  ;  his 
corps  needs  reorganization,  6  ; 
ordered  to  Calpeper,  17  ;  op- 
erations on  the  Rappahan- 
nock, 37  et  seq. ;  his  experi- 
ence at  Waterloo  Bridge,  46, 
47 ;  is  ordered  to  Gainesville, 
and  seizes  Buckland  Mills,  53  ; 
is  ordered  to  Manassas,  68 ; 
his  wagons,  69 ;  is  ordered  to 
Centreville,  72 ;  encounters 
Jackson's  forces,  73 ;  is  or- 
dered to  attack  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  29th,  85 ;  but  not 
to  push  matters  if  heavily 
pressed,  88;  at  the  battle  of 
Groveton,  102  et  seq.,  104,  132, 
136 ;  occupies  and  holds  Bald 


Hill,  138,  141  ;  his  wagons, 
178-179,  182,  183,  194,  195,  204 

Simpson,  Captain,  201 

Slaughter  Mountain,  or  Cedar 
Mountain,  18 

South  Mountain,  170 

Stafford,  Colonel  L.  A.  :  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  24  et  seq.  ;  at  the 
battle  of  Gainesville,  177 

Stahel,  General  J.  H.,  at  the  bat- 
tle of  Groveton,  103  et  seq., 
138,  204 

Stanton,  Edwin  M.,  Secretary  of 
War,  McClellan's  correspond- 
ence with  him,  2,  12,  106 

Starke,  General  W.  E.,  commands 
Jackson's  division  at  the  bat- 
tle of  Groveton,  102 

Stevens,  General  1. 1.  :  commands 
a  division  of  Reno's  command, 
31  ;  his  character,  31,  61  ;  at 
the  battle  of  Groveton,  104; 
attacks  A.  P.  Hill  there,  106  ; 
killed,  150 

Stone  Bridge,  140 

Stuart,  General  J.  E.  B.  :  his  Ad- 
jutant-General captured,  33 ; 
notice  of  him,  34  ;  on  the  Rap- 
pahannock, 36 ;  his  raid  on 
Catlett's  Station,  42  ;  attacks 
Manassas  Junction,  56,  57, 
117;  report  of,  118-121 

Sturgis,  General  S.  D.  :  expected 
by  Pope,  51,  52  ;  Piatt's  bri« 
gade  of  his  division,  47,  note  ; 
51,  52,  188,  189 

Sudley  Ford,  147,  148 

Sudley  Mill,  102 

Sudley  Springs,  59,  65,  74,  80,  81, 
84,  95,  96,  99,  101,  102,  120, 
121,  126,  133,  137 

Sulphur  Springs,  49,  50,  169,  194 


228 


INDEX. 


Sumner,  General  E.  V.,  commands 
the  Second  Corps.  A.  P.,  eS6, 
91,  144,  147,  148,  149,  151, 153, 
157,  159,  161-164,  167,  168, 
1C6 

Sykes,  General  G.  :  commands  a 
division  in  Porter's  corps,  47  ; 
his  character,  48  ;  commands 
the  Fifth  Corps  at  Gettysburg, 
48,  50,  53  ;  urges  Porter  to  de- 
lay marching  till  3  a.m.  of  the 
28th,  60,  61,  93,  136,  138,  140, 
180,  184,  188,  189 

Taliaferro,  Colonel  A.  G.,  at 
Cedar  Mountain,  24  et  seq. 

Taliaferro,  General  W.  B.  :  at 
Cedar  Mountain,  24  et  seq.  ; 
his  division  engaged  at  Gaines- 
ville, and  his  account  of  the 
battle,  76 ;  is  wounded  there, 
77,  78,  80,  102,  111 

Taylor,  Colonel  Walter  H. ,  197, 199 

Taylor,  General  G.  W.  :  gallantly 
and  unsuccessfully  attacks 
Manassas  Junction,  and  is 
killed,  57 ;  brigade  of,  154, 
155 

Terry,  General  Alfred  H.  :  his 
estimate  of  the  strength  of 
Banks'  corps,  4,  note,  180 

Thomas,  General  E.  C,  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  24  et  seq. 

Thoroughfare  Gap,  50,  51,  53,  56, 
58,  59,  63,  67,  68,  73,  79,  80,  81, 
83,  85,  86,  91,  112-114,  160, 
178,  179,  200 

Toombs,  General,  119, 198,  202,  203 

Tower,  General,  138;  severely 
wounded,  139,  142,  143 

Trimble,  General  L  E,.  :  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  24  et  seq. ;  captures 


Manassas  Junction,  56  etseq.-, 
severely  wounded  at  Groveton, 
108,  149 
Tyler,  General,  155,  158,  163 


Union  Mills,  183 


Vessel  House,  202 
Virginia,  Regiments  of  :  Seventh, 
201;  Thirteenth,  27;  Seven- 
teenth, 201  ;  Twenty-first,  26 ; 
Twenty-fourth,  200,  201  ; 
Twenty-seventh,  27  ;  Thirty- 
first,  27 ;  Forty-second,  26 ; 
Fifty  -  second,  27  ;  Fifty- 
eighth,  27  ;  First  Battalion,  26 

Walker,   Colonel  J.   A.,  Thir- 
teenth   Virginia,    at  Cedar 
Mountain,  27 
Warren,  General  G.  K.,  136,  138, 
184 

Warrenton  Junction,  Va.,  60,  52, 

54,  55,  58,  60 
Warrenton  Pike,  63,  72,  80,  86,  89, 
90,  96,  105,  131,  132,  135,  149, 
178 

Warrenton,  Va.,  49-54,  70,  83, 178, 
179 

Washington,  D.  C,  73,  78,  144, 
150, 152, 153, 155, 156, 159-162, 
164,  166 
Washington,  Va.,  51 
Waterloo,  Battle  of,  165 
Waterloo  Bridge,  49,  50,  169 
Webster,  Colonel  Fletcher,  139 
Wellington,  Duke  of,  165 
I  White  Plains,  51,  56,  62,  67 
I  White,  Thomas,  197,  199 
Whiting,  General,  137,  198 


INDEX. 


Wilcox,  General  CM.,  commands 
a  Division  in  Longstreet's  com- 
mand, 112;  arrives  on  the 
field  of  Groveton,  113  et  seq. ; 
report  of,  117-122,  137  ;  report 
of,  141,  198,203 
Williams,  C.  W.,  114,  115 
Williams,  General  A.  S.,  com- 
mands the  First  Division  of 
the  Second  Corps,  A.  V. ,  3  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Cedar  Moun- 
tain, 22  et  seq.,  205 


229 

Winder,  General  C.  S. :  commands 
Jackson's  Division,  A.  N.  V., 
8,  24  ;  is  killed  at  the  battle  of 
Cedar  Mountain,  24 

Wisconsin  regiment :  Third,  29 

Wright,  190 


YoRKTOWN,  Va.,  155 
Young's  Branch,  141 


MESSRS.  CH:\RLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


have  much  pleasure  in  announcing  that  an  undertaking  which 
they  have  had  in  progress  for  several  years  is  now  completed  ; 
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to  American  History. 

Under  the  general  title  of  THE 


they  will  issue  a  series  of  volumes,  contributed  at  their  soli- 
ciation  by  a  number  of  leading  actors  in  and  students  of  the 
great  conflict  of  1 86 1 -'65,  with  a  view  to  bringing  together, 
for  the  first  time,  a  full  and  authoritative  military  history  of 
the  suppression  of  the  Rebellion. 


The  final  and  exhaustive  form  of  this  great  narrative,  in  which  every 
doubt  shall  be  settled  and  every  detail  covered,  may  be  a  possibility 
only  of  the  futm-e.  But  it  is  a  matter  for  surprise  that  twenty  years 
after  the  beginning  of  the  Rebellion,  and  when  a  whole  generation 
has  grown  up  needing  such  knowledge,  there  is  no  authority  which  is 
at  the  same  time  of  the  highest  rank,  intelligible  and  trustworthy,  and 
to  which  a  reader  can  turn  for  any  general  view  of  the  field — for  a 
strong,  vivid,  concise  but  truly  proportioned  story  of  the  great  salient 
events. 

The  many  reports,  regimental  histories,  memoirs,  and  other  materi- 
als of  value  for  special  passages,  require,  for  their  intelligent  reading, 
an  ability  to  combine  and  proportion  them  which  tlie  ordinary  reader 
does  not  possess.  There  have  been  no  attempts  at  general  histories 
which  have  supplied  this  satisfactorily  to  any  large  part  of  the  public. 
Undoubtedly  there  has  been  no  such  narrative  as  would  be  especially 
welcome  to  men  of  the  new  generation,  and  would  be  valued  by  a  very 
great  class  of  readers;— and  there  has  seemed  to  be  great  danger  that 


Campaigns  of  the 


the  time  would  be  allowed  to  pass  when  it  would  be  possible  to  give 
to  such  a  work  the  vividness  and  accuracy  that  come  from  personal 
recollection. 

These  facts  led  to  the  conception  of  the  present  work.  Its  possi- 
bility depended  first  of  all  on  the  consent  of  the  circle  of  authors  to 
whom,  only,  the  publishers  could  look  to  carry  it  out  worthily  : — but 
the  cordial  reception  which  the  suggestion  at  once  received  from  them 
and  from  all  others  consulted,  speedily  removed  all  doubt  upon  this 
subject. 

From  every  department  of  the  Government,  from  the  officers  of  the 
army,  and  from  a  great  number  of  custodians  of  records  and  special 
information  everywhere,  both  authors  and  publishers  have  received 
every  aid  that  could  be  asked  in  this  undertaking ;  and  it  announcing 
the  issue  of  the  work  the  publishers  take  this  occasion  to  convey  the 
thanks  which  the  authors  have  had  individual  opportunities  to  express 
elsewhere. 


The  volumes  of  the  series  will  be  duodecimos  of  about  250 
pages  each,  illustrated  by  maps  and  plans  prepared  under 
the  direction  of  the  authors.  They  will  appear,  as  far  as 
possible,  in  the  chronological  order  of  the  Campaigns  of 
which  they  treat ;  and  by  their  preliminary  and  concluding 
chapters  will  be  so  far  connected  that  the  completed  work 
will  practically  cover  the  entire  field  of  the  war.  The  price 
of  each  volume  will  be  $1.00. 


The  following  volumes  are  now  ready,  or  far  advanced  in 
preparation,  and  will  appear  at  short  intervals  : 

I.— THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION.  By  John  G. 
NiCOLAY,  Esq.,  Private  Secretary  to  President  Lincoln;  late 
Consul-General  to  France,  etc. 

A  preliminary  vokime,  describing  the  opening  of  the  war,  and  covering  the 
period  from  the  election  of  Lincoln  to  the  end  of  the  first  Battle  of  Bull  Run. 


II.  — FROM  FORT  HENRY  TO  CORINTH.    By  the  Hon. 

M.  F.  Force,  Justice  of  the  Superior  Court,  Cincinnati ;  late 
Brigadier- General  and  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen'l,  U.S.V.,  commanding 
First  Division,  17th  Corps:  in  1862,  Lieut.  Colonel  of  the 
20th  Ohio,  commanding  the  regiment  at  Shiloh  ;  Treasurer  of 
the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 

The  narrative  of  events  in  the  West  from  the  Summer  of  1861  to  May,  1862  ; 
covering  the  capture  of  Fts.  Henry  and  Donelson,  the  Battle  of  Shiloh,  etc.,  etc. 

III.  — THE  PENINSULA.    By  Alexander  S.  Webb,  LL.D., 

President  of  the  College  of  the  City  of  New  York ;  Assistant 
Chief  of  Artillery,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  1S61-62;  Inspector 
General  Fifth  Army  Corps;  General  Commanding  2d  Div., 
2d  Corps  ;  Major-General  Assigned,  and  Chief  of  Staff,  Army 
of  the  Potomac. 

The  history  of  McClellan's  Peninsula  Campaign,  from  his  appointment  to  the 
end  of  the  Seven  Days'  Fight. 

IV.  — THE  ARMY   UNDER   POPE.    By  John  C.  Ropes, 

Esq.,  of  the  Military  Society  of  Massachusetts,  the  Massa- 
chusetts Historical  Society,  etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  Pope  to  command  the  Army  of  Virginia,  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  McClellan  to  the  general  command  in  September,  1862. 

v.— THE  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG.  By 

Francis  Winthrop  Palfrey,  late  Colonel  20th  Mass.  In- 
fantry, and  Bvt.  Brigadier  GenU  U.S.V. ;  Lieut.  Col.  of  the 
20th  Massachusetts  at  the  battle  of  the  Antietam  ;  Member  of 
Military  Society  of  Massachusetts,  of  the  Massachusetts  His- 
torical Society,  etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  McClellan  to  the  general  command,  Sept.  1862,  to  the 
end  of  the  Battle  of  Fredericksburg. 

VI.— CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG.  By 

Abner  Doubleday,  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen'l,  U.S.A.;  and  late  Major 
Gen'l,  U.S. v.;  commanding  the  First  Corps  at  Gettysburg, 
etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  Hooker,  through  the  campaigns  of  Chancellorsville  and 
Gettysburg,  to  the  retreat  of  Lee  after  the  latter  battle. 


VII.— THE  ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND.    By  Henry 

M.  Cist,  Brevet  Brig  Genl  U  S.V.;  A.A.G.  on  the  staff  of 

Major  Gen'l  Rosecrans,  and  afterward  on  that  of  Major  GenU 

Thomas,  Corresponding  Secretary  of  the  Society  of  the  Army 

of  the  Cumberland. 

From  the  formation  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  the  end  of  the  battles  at 
Chattanooga,  November,  1863. 

IX.  — THE    CAMPAIGN    OF   ATLANTA.      By  the  lion. 

Jacob  D.  Cox,  Ex-Governor  of  Ohio  ;  late  Secretary  of  the 
Interior  of  the  United  States;  Major  General  U.  S.V. ,  com- 
manding Twenty- thnd  Corps  during  the  campaigns  of  Atlanta 
and  the  Carolinas,  etc.,  etc. 

From  Sherman's  first  advance  into  Georgia  in  May,  1864,  to' the  beginning  of 
the  ^Slarch  to  the  Sea. 

X.  — THE    MARCH    TO   THE   SEA— FRANKLIN  AND 

NASHVILLE.    By  the  Hon.  Jacob  D.  Cox. 

From  the  beeinning  of  the  ?^Iarch  to  the  Sea  to  the  Surrender  of  Johnston — 
including  also  the  operations  of  Thomas  in  Tennessee. 

XI.  — THE   CAMPAIGNS   OF   GRANT  IN  VIRGINIA. 

By  Andrew  A.  Humphreys,  Brigadier  General  and  Bvt. 
Major-General,  U.S.A.;  late  Chief  of  Engineers;  Chief  of 
Staff,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  i863-'64;  commanding  Second 
Corps,  i864-'65,  etc.,  etc. 

Ccvering  the  Virginia  Campaigns  of  1S64  and  '65,  to  Lee's  surrender. 


VIII.— THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

and  one  other  volume,  completing  the  series,  are  in  course  of 
preparation,  and  their  contents  and  authors  will  be  announced 
in  a  short  time. 


The  above  hooks  for  sale  by  all  booksellers,  or  luill  be  sent^  post-paid^  upon 
receipt  of  price  by 

CHARLES  SCRIBXER'S  SONS, 

743  AND  745  Broadway,  New  York. 


